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The World War

1914 to 1918

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The Military Operations on Land

Fifth Volume

Published by E. S. Mittler & Son

Berlin in the Year 1929

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The Autumn Campaign 1914

In the West up to the Trench Warfare<br>

In the East up to the Retreat

With eighteen maps<br>

and fourteen sketches

Published by E. S. Mittler & Son<br>  
Berlin in the year 1929

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Introduction to the Fifth and Sixth Volume.

The present fifth volume and the soon-to-be-published sixth contain the depiction of the autumn campaigns of 1914 on both theaters of war. After the simultaneous setbacks at the Marne and in Galicia around mid-September, the close interactions between West and East become so pronounced that the previous method of describing the events on both theaters of war for specific periods in separate volumes had to be abandoned to clearly reveal the major connections of the multi-front war, especially the crisis-induced tensions of the overall situation. In the future, each volume will therefore depict the events of an operational period on all theaters of war simultaneously and coherently. In this process, the activities of the Supreme Army Command, insofar as they concern the overall war leadership, will be presented separately from their leadership on the individual theaters of war, so that the diversity and versatility of the tasks assigned to them become clearly apparent.

To avoid making the entire work too extensive, the depiction of events on the battlefronts is significantly shorter than before. While the great significance of the war of movement in the West up to the Battle of the Marne and in the East up to the liberation of East Prussia warranted a more detailed depiction of the battles along the entire front, these are now only described in more detail in those parts of the battlefront where their outcome was significant and influential on the operational decisions of the supreme command. The fundamental change that occurred in the West through the be-

Page: VIII keyno: 004

Introduction to the Fifth and Sixth Volume.

The transition from movement to trench warfare required a somewhat more detailed appreciation of the battles at the front than in the East.

The description of the events with the opponents provides only an operational overview without details of the battles.

The historical commission has tasked General of Infantry a. D. Dr. phil. v. Kuhl in Berlin-Steglitz and the Secret Councillor Dr. Brandenburg, professor of history at the University of Leipzig, with reviewing the fifth and sixth volumes. The Reich Archive extends its special thanks to both reporters.

keyno: 005

Table of Contents.  
The Autumn Campaign 1914.  
In the West until the Position Warfare.  
In the East until the Retreat.

I. Fundamental Decisions for the Overall Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. Operations in France and Belgium from Mid-September to Early November 1914. . . . 16

A. The German Counter-Attack between Somme and Moselle . . . . . 16

1. General v. Falkenhayn's Decision for the Command of

Operations in the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2. The Battles from September 15 to 18. . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

a) The Right Wing (1st, 7th and 2nd Army) . . . . . . 26

b) The Center of the Army (3rd, 4th, 5th Army including Army Detachment

Strang). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

3. The Supreme Army Command in Preparation for the Decision 56

4. The Events from September 19 to 22 . . . . . . . . . . 69

a) The Right Wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

b) The Center of the Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

5. General v. Falkenhayn's Front Journey . . . . . . . . . 77

6. The Offensive from September 23 to 27 . . . . . . . . . . 84

a) The Intervention of the 6th Army and its Battles from September 23 to

25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

b) The Events at the Army Center (1st, 7th, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Army)

from September 22 to 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

c) The Storming of the Côtes Lorraines and the Capture of Fort

Camp des Romains by Army Detachment Strang . . . . 95

d) Supreme Army Command's Push for General Attack . . 102

e) The Great Attack on September 26 and 27 . . . . . . . . 108

7. The Left Wing (Army Detachments Falkenhausen and Gaede)

from September 15 to Early October . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

8. Enemy Activities from September 14 to 27 . . . . . 123

a) French and British Command during the Period from September 14 to

20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

b) Defensive Measures against the German Advance at St. Mihiel.

Intervention of the French 2nd Army on the Left Wing. . . . . 134

c) French and British Command during the Period from September 25 to

27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

d) Condition of French Troops at the End of September . . . . . 141

9. Observations on the Battles from September 15 to 27 . . . . 143

Page: X keyno: 006

Table of Contents.

B. The Struggle for the Flank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

I. The Battle of Arras and the Breakthrough

Attempt at Noye. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

1. New Resolutions of the Supreme Army Command . . . . . . . . 146

2. The German Army Center from September 28 to October 10 . . . 153

a) The 5th Army including Army Detachment Strantz . . . . . 153

b) The Battles in the Argonne from September 28 to

October 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

c) Events on the Remaining Front of the German Army

Center from September 28 to October 10 . . . . . . . . . 159

3. The Battles on the Right Army Wing during the Period from

September 28 to October 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

a) The 6th Army from September 28 to October 1 . . . . . . 162

b) The Breakthrough Attempts at Noye from September 30 to

October 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

4. The Supreme Army Command and the Envelopment Attempt via Arras 173

5. The Development of the Battle of Arras from October 2 to

October 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

6. The Crisis of the Battle on October 5 . . . . . . . . . . . 187

7. The Continuation and End of the Breakthrough Attempts at Noye

from October 2 to 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

8. The End of the Battle of Arras from October 6 to 10 . . . . 198

9. The Operations of the 4th Cavalry Corps on the German Right

Army Wing from October 4 to 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

10. The Cessation of Fighting on the Right Wing of the 6th Army,

October 11 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

11. The Supreme Army Command at the Conclusion of the Battle of Arras 218

12. The Capture of Antwerp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

13. Enemy Activities during the Battle of Arras from

September 28 to October 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

a) French and British Leadership from September 28 to

October 3. Formation of Army Detachment de Maud'huy . . . 245

b) Events North of the Oise from September 30 to October 4 . 249

c) French and British Leadership on October 4 and 5.

Formation of Army Group Noye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

d) The Crisis in the Battles for Arras . . . . . . . . . . 257

e) Allied Leadership and Events from October 7 to 10 . . . . 261

14. Observations on the Battles for Arras . . . . . . . . . . . 270

II. The First Battle in Flanders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

1. The Deployment of the New Reserve Corps . . . . . . . . . . 272

2. The Decision to Deploy the New Reserve Corps and the

Development of the Operation Plan until October 18 . . . . . 275

Page: XI keyno: 007

Table of Contents.

Page

3. The Preparations for the Flanders Offensive by the 6th Army from

October 14 to 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

4. The Deployment and Advance of the 4th Army until October 19 295

5. The Battles of the 4th and 6th Army from October 20 to 23 . . 304

6. The Battles of the 4th and 6th Army from October 24 to 29 . . 318

a) The 4th Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318

b) The Marwitz Cavalry Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324

c) The 6th Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

7. The Supreme Army Command and the Formation of Army Group

Fabeck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

8. The Battles of the 4th and 6th Army from October 30 to

November 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

9. The Supreme Army Command at the Conclusion of the First Battle in

Flanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

10. The Army Front from the Somme to the Swiss Border from

October 10 to November 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350

11. Enemy Activities during the Flanders Offensive from

October 11 to November 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357

a) British Intervention on the Left Wing. Belgians Taking Position

behind the Yser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357

b) Events from October 17 to 20. Formation of the French

Army Division "Belgium". Beginning of the Battle in Flanders 369

c) Continuation of the Battle in Flanders. Events from October 21 to

23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375

d) Allied Leadership from October 24 to

November 3. Continuation of the Battles in Flanders . . . . 380

12. Reflections on the First Battle of Flanders . . . . . . . . 399

III. The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914 . . . 402

A. Operations to Relieve the Austro-Hungarian

Army in Southern Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402

1. The Advance toward the Middle Vistula until October 5 . . . 402

a) The Deployment of the German 9th Army . . . . . . . . . 402

b) Agreements with the Allies. — Position toward the Supreme

Army Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411

c) Beginning of Movements and Battle at Opatow, September 30 to

October 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418

d) Russian Measures and Results of the German Advance . . . 429

2. The Shift Northward until October 13 . . . . . . . . . . 435

a) The Battles before Iwangorod and Warsaw until October 10 . 435

b) Discovery of Russian Attack Plans and Battles from

October 11 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445

c) Russian Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457

Page: XII keyno: 008

Table of Contents.

3. The Intervention of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army . . . . . . 462

a) Negotiations and Events from October 13 to 19 . . . . . . 462

b) The Attack of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army at Iwangorod 471

4. The Retreat from Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485

a) The Battles on the Western Wing of the 9th Army and the

Initiation of the Retreat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485

b) The Russian Operations and Assessment of the October Campaign 491

B. The Operations in East Prussia until the Retreat to the Lötzen-

Angerapp Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501

1. The Battles under General v. Schubert . . . . . . . . . . . 501

a) Situation, Mission and Intentions of the new 8th Army . . . . . 501

b) The Battles from late September to October 3, 1914 . . . . 508

The Bombardment of Ossowjetz . . . . . . . . . . . . . 508

The Advance against the Njemen . . . . . . . . . . . . 509

The Battles at Augustow—Suwalki from September 29 to

October 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513

c) An Operation against the Russian Coast . . . . . . . . 520

d) The Enemy's Intentions and Assessment of Previous

German Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521

2. The Battles under General v. François . . . . . . . . . . . 526

a) The Change in High Command and the Battles of the Southern Wing

until October 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526

b) The Arrival of the XXV Reserve Corps and the Continuation of

Battles on the Southern Wing until October 29 . . . . . . 530

c) The Battles of the Northern Wing from October 2 to 28 . . . . 536

d) The Decision to Retreat to the Lötzen-Angerapp Position 538

e) The Russian Operations in October and Assessment of

German Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 542

C. Reflections on the Overall Operations in the East . . . . . 549

IV. A Crisis of the Two-Front War . . . . . . . . 553

V. Retrospective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565

Appendices.

Appendix 1: War Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589

Appendix 2: Troop Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 606

Appendix 3: Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620

Index of Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 623

Index of Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631

Page: XIII keyno: 009

Table of Contents.

Maps and Sketches.

Places that could not be entered on the maps 1:1000000 for technical reasons are included on the corresponding maps 1:300000 or 1:200000.

The maps are located in the map pocket at the end of the volume.

A. West.

Map 1 (1:1000000). The German Western Army on September 15, 1914.

Map 2 (1:300000). The German right wing on September 17 and 18, 1914.

Map 3 (1:300000). The German sea center from September 17 to 25, 1914.

Map 4 (1:1000000). The German Western Army on September 23, 1914.

Map 5 (1:300000). The German 6th Army on September 26 and 27, 1914.

Map 6 (1:1000000). The German Western Army on October 1, 1914.

Map 7 (1:300000). The German 6th Army and Army Group Foch on October 4 and 5, 1914.

Map 8 (1:1000000). The German Western Army on October 10, 1914.

Map 9 (1:1000000). The front of the allied armies on the evening of September 14, October 1, and 20, 1914.

Map 10 (1:1000000). The German Western Army on October 20, 1914.

Map 11 (1:200000). The German 4th Army on October 21 and 29, 1914.

Map 12 (1:200000). The battle at the Yser and in the Ypres salient on October 30, 1914.

Map 13 (1:300000). Situation at the 6th Army including Group Fabeck on October 30, 1914.

Sketch 1. Battles in the Argonne from September 28 to October 13, 1914.

Sketch 2. Situation before Antwerp from September 24 to October 8, 1914.

Sketch 3. Movements of the Beseler siege corps from September 26 to the capture of Antwerp on October 10, 1914.

Sketch 4. Advance of the reinforced III Reserve Corps from October 12 to October 18, 1914.

B. East.

Map 14. Overall front against Russia. Situation on the morning of October 1, 1914, and advance of the allies in Poland and East Prussia until October 5, 1914.

Map 15. Situation before Ivangorod and Warsaw. October 9 to 12, 1914.

Page: XIV keyno: 010

Table of Contents.

Map 16. Battle of Ivangorod. 21st to 22nd October 1914.

Map 17. Entire front against Russia. Situation on the evening of 26th October 1914.

Map 18. Advance against the Njemen and battles at Augustowo—Suwalki. 27th September and 2nd October 1914.

Sketch 5. Entire front against Russia. Situation on 14th September 1914.

Sketch 6. Perception of the enemy by the Austro-Hungarian military leadership on the morning of 18th September 1914.

Sketch 7. Battle at Opatow. 4th October 1914.

Sketch 8. Reproduction of a Russian sketch, captured by the German Infantry Regiment 129 on the battlefield of Grojec on 10th October 1914.

Sketch 9. Battles at Kosienice. Situation on the morning of 13th October 1914.

Sketch 10. Conclusion of the battle before Ivangorod. 26th October 1914, 4 PM.

Sketch 11. Situation in East Prussia on 19th September 1914.

Sketch 12. Situation in East Prussia on 4th October 1914.

Sketch 13. Battles at Lyck—Suwalki. 5th to 29th October 1914.

Sketch 14. Battles at Wirballen. 6th to 12th October 1914.

keyno: 011

The Autumn Campaign 1914

In the West until the Trench Warfare

In the East until the Retreat

Page: 1 keyno: 012

I. Fundamental Decisions for the Overall War Conduct.

On the evening of September 14, Lieutenant General v. Falkenhayn, in addition to his previous position as Minister of War, took over the duties of the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army. Although Colonel General v. Moltke remained, albeit only in form, at the request of the Supreme War Lord initially in his previous position at the Great Headquarters¹), the responsibility for the future conduct of operations was transferred solely to the newly appointed Quartermaster General v. Falkenhayn. The new assignment did not come as a surprise to him, as already on August 10, before the departure of the Great Headquarters to the field, the Chief of the Military Cabinet, General of Infantry Baron v. Lyncker, had asked him whether he would be willing to take over the leadership of the Field Army in the event of the possible failure of Colonel General v. Moltke²). During the following fateful weeks, General v. Falkenhayn was only informed about the situation of the German armies and the enemy's news as far as his duties as Minister of War required³), so he was completely unprepared for the new task. Only in the very last days, from September 12 onwards, does he seem to have been involved in the briefings of the Chief of the General Staff with the Supreme War Lord and to have gained more detailed knowledge of the operations. He had been critical of the previous German war conduct; the relentless forward thrusts, especially the advance past Paris behind an enemy who, in his conviction, was by no means crushed or retreating in flight, he considered a mistake. He expressed this view also in a discussion with Colonel General v. Moltke on the evening of September 14.

Indeed, it was a difficult operational situation that he inherited from his predecessor. With the simultaneous setbacks in the West and East, at the Marne and in Galicia⁴), the success of the original war plan for the two-front war, which in the West aimed at a

¹) The World War 1914—18 Volume IV, p. 484. — ²) Volume IV, p. 540. — ³) H. v. Zwehl: "Erich v. Falkenhayn", p. 66. — ⁴) Volume IV, p. 481.

Page: 2 keyno: 013

Fundamental Decisions for Overall War Conduct.

rapid and final campaign decision and in the East built on a successful defense against the Russian assault was initially seriously questioned. The idea of temporarily foregoing the campaign decision on the western front by transitioning to a defensive posture in a suitable defensive position and instead seeking the decision in the East was rejected outright by the new head of operations, although he did not fail to recognize that the tension of the situation in the East was significantly heightened not only by the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian army in Galicia and the unsatisfactory course of previous operations on the Serbian theater of war, but above all by Japan's declaration of war on Germany on August 23, which allowed Russia to bring even the last man from Siberia against the Central Powers. An immediate regrouping of stronger forces from the West to the East, according to General v. Falkenhayn, would lead to "intolerable conditions" in the West as long as the situation here was not completely stabilized. This goal seemed to him only secured after the defeat of the Anglo-French forces. He therefore believed that the current campaign plan to bring about the final decision in the West required only an early resumption of the offensive. It also seemed to him "possible, if the current German front holds, to bring the northern French coast and thus control over the English Channel into German hands." Nevertheless, he was already clear that a final decision in the West was not to be expected for weeks. The question of whether the Eastern Front could hold out alone against the ever-increasing Russian masses and provide the necessary rear protection for the Western army was serious. The Austro-Hungarian army was, in terms of combat strength, severely weakened, in full retreat-

1) Erich v. Falkenhayn, General of Infantry retired: "The Supreme Army Command 1914 to 1916 in its most important decisions" page 13. In the critical evaluation of this source, it should be noted that the transcript was made only in 1919 from memory, without any personal notes made during the operations and only partially using official source material.  
2) Volume I, p. 36. — 3) Falkenhayn, op. cit. p. 13.  
4) Falkenhayn, op. cit. pp. 11 and 12; it states: "This possibility could only be less relinquished, as the Chief of General Staff adhered to the original intention to bring about the decision in the West, and the Western Front, which had so far been the least to be restricted in terms of the balance of forces, as long as the front in the West was not completely stabilized ..."

Page: 3 keyno: 014

Center of Gravity of Warfare Remains in the West.

retreat behind the San. His army command — still unaware of the turn of events in the West — considered the time had come to transfer strong German forces from the French to the Russian front. However, this was not to be considered for the time being. The West had to help itself first despite everything. The new victory in East Prussia at the Masurian Lakes seemed to offer the possibility to provide additional forces to the allied army beyond the Landwehr Corps already deployed there. Thus, Colonel General v. Moltke had already promised two German army corps on September 13th in response to urgent calls for help, which could be temporarily spared in East Prussia. When Colonel General v. Hindenburg reported on the evening of September 14th that the 8th Army in East Prussia had succeeded in decisively defeating the enemy, they could manage there with even fewer forces than previously assumed and thus provide more help to their allies. The allied army command pressed ever more urgently; the supreme commander Archduke Friedrich wanted to strike again only when strong Imperial German forces could join the fight directly shoulder to shoulder with the Austro-Hungarian forces. Based on a very serious report from the authorized German general at Austro-Hungarian headquarters, Lieutenant General Baron v. Freytag-Loringhoven, General v. Falkenhayn ordered immediate support for the allies on September 15th through a new 9th Army consisting of four army corps and one cavalry division¹). The director of German operations calculated that these forces would be sufficient to give the allied army not only stability but also impetus to resume the offensive. He hoped that the Eastern Front would now be able to withstand the Russian onslaught through its own strength until the enemy in the West was defeated.

Here, since the Battle of the Marne, they were still dependent on French leadership; General v. Falkenhayn saw wresting back the initiative from them as his primary task. The original view, mainly represented by Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch, that through the deployment of the newly formed 7th Army marching from Belgium on the right wing of the army, they would soon succeed in resuming the offensive (which had only been temporarily suspended for the purpose of joining the 1st and 2nd Armies) and thereby bringing about the decision in the West that had only been postponed for a few days²), had all too soon proved deceptive. The greatest

¹) P. 408ff. — ²) Volume IV, p. 530.

Page: 4 keyno: 015

Fundamental Decisions for Overall War Conduct.

Part of the 7th Army had just been used to close this gap; to defend against the increasingly evident French encirclement efforts directed at the right wing of the 1st Army, only weaker forces were initially available.

It was only in the early hours of September 15th, when the Chief of the Operations Department, Colonel Tappen, returned to the Great Headquarters from the right wing of the army, that reassuring news about the situation there was brought. A unified army front was reestablished, and a balance of forces seemed foreseeable. It was certainly expected that the danger still existing for the right wing of the 1st Army would soon be averted by withdrawing individual army corps from the shortened army front and deploying them to the right wing.

To what extent the war mood, particularly the offensive spirit and combat strength of the troops, had suffered from the setback at the Marne, General v. Falkenhayn himself could not initially form a secure judgment. Based on impressions gathered by Colonel Tappen during his front visit, he leaned towards a favorable view of the offensive strength of his own troops, while it seemed to be lacking in the enemy.

By deploying the significant forces of the 6th Army, some of which were already in transit, on the right wing, General v. Falkenhayn intended to initiate a new decisive offensive. If this brought about the hoped-for change in the war situation in favor of the German forces, then the setback at the Marne had only delayed the decision on this battlefield by a few weeks, at most months.

Although initially a significant extension of the war duration due to the setback at the Marne did not seem likely, the question arose in these days whether the available personnel and material resources would suffice for all further tasks, especially since the difficult defensive task of the Eastern Army against the ever-increasing Russian superiority could not be solved with ample supply of manpower replacements and ammunition. Even after a full success in the West, the great campaign in the East was still ahead, for which new reserves, new replacements, and new vast supplies of ammunition had to be secured.

1) Volume IV, p. 472 and 506. — 2) Volume IV, p. 480. — 3) Volume IV, p. 473. — 4) Volume IV, p. 458 and 518.

Page: 5 keyno: 016

The New Reserve Corps.

The patriotic uprising carried by high moral momentum and the determined, unanimous will of the entire people to defend the threatened homeland with body and life resulted in a massive rush of war volunteers to the flags in the first weeks of August. By August 11, well over a million young Germans, men, and even old men, regardless of social class, had voluntarily rushed to the flags. Since no preparations had been made in peacetime for the clothing and equipping of additional units, only a relatively small number could be enlisted. "To make this enormous, still available national strength usable for national defense," General v. Falkenhayn, as Minister of War, had already ordered the formation of five Prussian reserve corps on August 16. Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg each formed a reserve division. The Prussian reserve corps received the numbers XXII to XXVI, the reserve corps formed from the Saxon-Wuerttemberg divisions received the number XXVII, and the Bavarian reserve division received the number 6. The military organization of the corps included 26 battalions, 2 squadrons, 18 field batteries with 4 guns each. By October 10, 1914, the new units were to be ready for mobile use. General v. Falkenhayn did not deny that "the implementation of the measure could only be accomplished with the exertion of all forces," but was convinced "that the zeal and dedication of all leaders, as well as the proven patriotism and enthusiasm of our people, would make the work succeed for the benefit of the fatherland." Generaloberst v. Moltke had gladly welcomed the creation of the new reserve army, which was solely due to the personal initiative of General v. Falkenhayn. When he took over the leadership of operations in mid-September, he expected to be able to rely on the new army reserve after about a month. However, the fulfillment of this hope was to be questioned just a few days later by a letter from the Deputy Minister of War, Lieutenant General v. Wandel; it stated: "Your Excellency, I urgently ask you to definitely oppose the desire for an early use of the reserve corps. Every day granted to them for training and consolidation is of utmost importance.

1) For more details, see "Military Armament and War Economy" Volume I; to be published shortly.  
2) Order of the Prussian Ministry of War from August 16, 1914 M. I. 3531/14 A. 1 on the formation of new army corps.  
3) See Appendix 1.

Page: 6 keyno: 017

Fundamental Decisions for Overall War Leadership.

of significant importance." Despite this warning, General v. Falkenhayn adhered to his decision, considering the overall situation, to deploy the young corps to the front by mid-October at the latest.

Closely related to the question of army reserves was the issue of replacements for the fighting army. The operational strengths of the armies in the West and East had decreased by 40 to 50 percent in some areas due to the weeks of ongoing battles and marches. It was urgently necessary to fill these gaps as quickly as possible. Although about 150,000 replacement troops had been sent from the homeland to the armies, they had not yet reached the armies by mid-September due to the sustained destruction of the railways in the occupied territories, but their arrival was expected imminently. Beyond these troop movements already sent to the front, the domestic replacement formations for the upcoming operations in the West and East still had significant stocks of trained troops, although mostly of older age groups, according to reports from the highest army commands. The recruitment depots currently had a stock of around 280,000 men.

While there was no shortage of troop replacements to be feared for the time being, the replenishment of officers, especially active officers, caused difficulties. Death had taken a terrible toll among their ranks.

Far more concerning than the replacement situation was the question of ammunition supply for the armies, which must have appeared to the Minister of War and the current head of operations, especially since he was aware that the existing mobilization stocks of artillery ammunition had largely been used up. For him as Minister of War, this serious difficulty was no surprise. In that conversation on the evening of September 14th1) with Generaloberst v. Moltke about the results of the operations so far, he emphasized that the shortage of artillery ammunition was particularly serious.

The anticipated wartime demand for ammunition for field and foot artillery was last determined in detailed consultations between the Ministry of War and the General Staff in 19122). However, the demands of the Great General Staff had to accept various reductions. But even the rates set at that time for the individual types of combat had not yet been reached at the outbreak of war.

1) p. 1. — 2) For more details: "War Armament and War Economy" Volume I.

Page: 7 keyno: 018

Supply and Ammunition Situation.

...since the procurements, considering the high costs, had been spread over a larger number of years.

The existing mobilization stock of field and foot artillery ammunition was largely made available to the armies at the beginning of the war, loaded in ammunition trains. The rest of the stocks located at home were available to the Supreme Army Command as an additional ammunition reserve for call-off. The allocation of these and other quantities still available in fortresses, depots, etc., to the front was carried out by the Chief of Field Ammunition Services, Lieutenant General Siegen, to whom the army high commands had to direct their requests.

The unexpectedly strong and rapid consumption of ammunition in the first weeks of the war far exceeded peacetime calculations. After the border battles and the Battle of the Marne, the available stocks were almost exhausted. At that time, the domestic industry was not yet able to replace the ammunition consumption with the necessary speed and in sufficient quantity. The efforts initiated in the last two pre-war years, mainly again at the instigation of the General Staff, to increase the efficiency of the munitions industry began to take effect only gradually after the start of the war. To prevent a shortage of ammunition, the War Ministry made comprehensive preparations for increased ammunition production immediately after the outbreak of war. Apart from the management of war-critical raw materials initiated by the then head of the General Electric Company, Walter Rathenau, in the first days of August, several measures already prepared in peacetime were accelerated by the War Ministry; above all, the efficiency of state munitions factories was increased and private industry was involved in ammunition deliveries to a greater extent. Nevertheless, new deliveries could not be expected before mid-October, and even then only for field artillery. But this was only made possible by the fact that in 1913 a field artillery auxiliary shell — the gray cast iron grenade — which was easy and quick to manufacture, had been designed. For the heavy artillery, it was believed that the ample equipment of the fortresses provided a sufficient reserve on which the field army could fall back in an emergency. The early deployment of the heavy artillery from the fortresses to reinforce the field armies also dashed this hope.

Thus, by mid-September, the Supreme Army Command was already facing a disastrous shortage of artillery ammunition, which initially

Page: 8 keyno: 019

Fundamental Decisions for Overall War Conduct.

could not be resolved. The seriousness of the ammunition situation prompted General v. Falkenhayn, just a few days after taking over the army leadership, to issue the following grave directive to the army high commands: "Utmost frugality with artillery ammunition is required. Restrict artillery combat to long distances. Preserve stocks for decisive actions."

In contrast to the unfavorable state of artillery ammunition, the provision of ammunition for small arms, whose mass production posed no particular difficulties, was readily assured. In the previous heavy battles, on average, no more than a third of the ammunition stock planned for an army or reserve corps had been expended.

As challenging as the issue of remedying the artillery ammunition shortage was the railway situation behind the western army in occupied Belgium and northern France due to the persistent destruction of the local railway facilities, primarily the circular railways. But aside from this, given the poor operational conditions of the railways in use in Belgium and northern France, especially with the lack of reliable telegraph and telephone connections, it was very doubtful whether the operational capabilities required for the rapid redeployment of entire army units would be achieved.

To master the critical situation and all the resulting difficulties, it required not only extraordinary energy but also a willingness to take responsibility without hesitation and foresightful initiative on the part of the new leader of German operations.

Upon assuming his new office, Lieutenant General v. Falkenhayn was 52 years old, thus, apart from the princely commanders-in-chief, younger than all commanding generals and army leaders. He did not belong to the circle of those general staff officers who had received particularly deep operational training under Field Marshal Count v. Schlieffen. Although he had found employment in both the Great General Staff and the Troop General Staff for a number of years due to excellent performance at the War Academy, it was precisely in the decade from 1896 to 1906, which was crucial for operational

1) Volume IV, p. 464 and "The German Field Railway System" Volume I, pp. 57ff., 84 and 202.

Page: 9 keyno: 020

Characteristics of General v. Falkenhayn.

Since the training of the General Staff had been so significant, he had been in military service in China and Kiautschou. Thus, he could no more be considered a representative of the strictly schooled strategically trained higher General Staff officers than his predecessor, Generaloberst v. Moltke. General v. Falkenhayn probably felt this lack himself and referred to himself as an "autodidact." However, his long stay abroad had broadened his horizons thanks to his undoubted statesmanlike talent in various directions, especially in political terms, and he had been able to show greater worldliness here. To what extent he possessed qualities that compensated for this lack despite missing operational training, particularly inner values such as strength, drive, and firmness of will, and above all daring, which shied away from delicate deployment, enabling him to take on the most responsible and difficult position, could only be shown by his actions. Undoubtedly, in his youthful freshness, his great physical and mental agility, and the assured dexterity of his nature, he was among the prominent figures of the German army at the outbreak of war.

General v. Falkenhayn was a passionate and ambitious nature, not without inner fire, yet always controlled and reserved outwardly, not susceptible to external influence, free from a craving for people, tireless in work performance, with fabulous nerves, of great personal simplicity and lack of needs. If the judgment of the new head of operations was often very reserved, this was perhaps due to his reticence, which could create an impression of opacity, and his entire manner of presenting himself outwardly. His last plans and intentions often remained hidden even from his closest surroundings. Compared to the older army and corps leaders, he naturally lacked authority at first, which in such a position at his young age could only be the result of great military successes. Thus, with a warm heart and passionate spirit, General v. Falkenhayn probably sought such successes, which were neither hindered by the sign of dignity due to his sober and cautiously weighing manner. He was only too easily inclined to be content with smaller, but seemingly certain successes.

The freshness and sense of responsibility with which General v. Falkenhayn, despite the difficult situation on both theaters of war, his new

1) S. v. Hoeßl: "Erich v. Falkenhayn", p. 7.

Page: 10 keyno: 021

Fundamental Decisions for Overall War Leadership.

Taking office did not leave his staff unimpressed. What the next few days demanded of him was extraordinary: despite the initial uncertainty in mastering leadership tasks, he had to push through to new, creative operational decisions and, in contrast to the previous loose reins of the Supreme Army Command, assert a clear and strong leadership will.

A few days of intense work sufficed for him to gain the necessary overview of the military situation and establish the required leadership with the other departments of the Great Headquarters. His experiences in assessing responsible personalities and knowledge, which he already possessed as Minister of War, were of significant benefit. His integration into the new position was greatly facilitated by the fact that from the beginning he found not only a strong support in the Military Cabinet but also had the full confidence of his supreme warlord. The Kaiser was not unimpressed by the personality of his new Chief of General Staff, especially by the courage with which he stepped into the breach at a critical moment. His special relationship of trust with the new head of operations could, however, in time give him a public superiority over the other advisors to the crown, especially since the unification of the two most significant military offices in the hands of General v. Falkenhayn conferred an overwhelming power.

General v. Falkenhayn believed he could not do without active support of land warfare by the navy, especially through submarines. Although the guidelines given for naval warfare did not initially anticipate the use of the high seas fleet¹) and a balance of the situation was not to be hoped for, he nevertheless urged as early as September 15th with the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, Admiral v. Pohl, for the immediate use of submarines to disrupt English troop transports to the mainland. The activity of these boats would have been greatly facilitated if the German leadership had already laid hands on the ports and bases of the Belgian and northern French coast during the first weeks of the war while advancing through Belgium and northern France. As long as there was hope of decisively defeating the Franco-English forces, such considerations had no place, and the coastal land would then have fallen into German hands by itself. Thus, this decision-

¹) Volume I, p. 20.

Page: 11 keyno: 022

Collaboration with the Admiralty Staff.

In battles, even the last rifle was rightly employed, regardless of any desirable secondary objectives. Only now, as the operations had taken such a completely different turn, did it prove disadvantageous that the coast had not also been occupied immediately.

The large transports of the British expeditionary corps in August were carried out almost without German counteraction. The current demand for the use of submarines by the German General Staff led to the dispatch of "U 9" under Lieutenant Commander Weddigen into the Channel, resulting on September 22 in the destruction of the three English armored cruisers "Aboukir," "Hogue," and "Cressy." Despite this brilliant achievement, which revealed to the army command for the first time what a sharp weapon the German warfare possessed in the submarines, an effective disruption of British transports remained naturally very dependent on chance due to the small number of German submarines.

The fleet was also to participate in supporting land operations in the East. On September 19, General v. Falkenhayn suggested to the Chief of the Admiralty Staff the execution of a fleet demonstration with strong high seas forces in the Baltic Sea; it was to simulate a large-scale landing by an infantry brigade on the Russian coast and thereby prevent enemy forces from being transported to Galicia. The Chief of the Admiralty Staff readily agreed to this undertaking.

General v. Falkenhayn also immediately established contact with the political leadership of the Reich. Like his predecessor, he saw a significant duty of the Chief of the General Staff in providing accurate and unbiased orientation to the leading statesman about the situation at the battlefronts; only through understanding cooperation between the Reich and army leadership did it seem possible to him to successfully implement a steady war policy corresponding to Germany's actual situation. Already on September 15, he had a first brief discussion about the war situation with the Chancellor v. Bethmann Hollweg, who was also present at the Great Headquarters, and the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, v. Jagow. General v. Falkenhayn and the political leadership of the Reich left no doubt about his serious view of the general war situation; although there was "no reason to despair of a satisfactory end to the war," the course of the war would, however, be influenced by the events

1) See more on p. 520f.

Page: 12 keyno: 023

Fundamental Decisions for Overall War Conduct.

at the Marne and in Galicia completely uncertain“). Regarding the details of General v. Falkenhayn's communications, State Secretary v. Jagow telegraphed on the same day to a German foreign representation; he first mentioned the victories in the East, against more than double superiority, and then continued: “...In the West, the French have launched a counterattack along the entire front, especially against the right wing of the German armies. The battle is ongoing! It is unlikely that the French could gain any advantages in the front. Even on the right wing, a temporary success of the French would not achieve more than that this wing would be withdrawn to the already advancing, very significant reinforcements. The general situation of the combatants is such that a final decision cannot be expected in the coming weeks.”

In a meeting apparently held a few days later with the Chancellor, General v. Falkenhayn outlined the significance of the course of previous operations on the western theater of war. The result of this discussion was reflected in a letter from the Chancellor dated September 19 to the Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Office, Zimmermann, who remained in Berlin. It initially provided an explanation for the withdrawal of the German front; then it continued: “The resulting enemy superiority required the withdrawal of our right army wing, necessitating the withdrawal of the entire army ... All enemy offensives against the new front have been repelled ... The overall situation, as long as no decision has been made, is naturally serious, but by no means to be judged pessimistically. The actual significance of our initial successes was probably overestimated ... In the first phase of the war, it was possible, while repelling the enemy offensive but without destroying the enemy armies, to relocate the entire theater of war into enemy territory. Now, in the second phase, we have likewise repelled the enemy offensive so far, but it continues, and it will take time before we can proceed to the offensive again on a larger scale ...”

In accordance with the seriousness of the situation, the leading statesman intensified his efforts to strengthen his own fighting power by gaining new allies, but otherwise to maintain the neutrality of the previously neutral states.

1) Falkenhayn, a. a. D. S. 20.

Page: 13 keyno: 024

Influence of the Military Situation on the Policy of the Reich Leadership.

Since the outbreak of war, efforts had been made to persuade Romania to fulfill its existing alliance obligations and, if possible, to unite with Bulgaria and Greece into a solid Balkan bloc, to which Turkey was to join as a fourth ally, to fight against Russia and Serbia. Such a policy seemed facilitated by the alliance proposals already made by Bulgaria and the Porte on July 24 and 28, 1914, in Berlin, although the existing antagonisms between the two states from the last Balkan War at least made an understanding difficult. However, Turkey had concluded a formal alliance treaty with Germany on August 2, 1914. The prospects offered here for gaining new allies in the fight against the eastern opponents were suddenly thwarted by England's obviously hostile stance against the Central Powers and by Italy's declaration of neutrality. The attitude of England and Greece, with its long, sea-threatened coastlines, towards unconditional neutrality, and Italy's behavior tipped the scales in Bucharest to remain neutral for the time being. Both also influenced Turkey's stance; instead of immediately entering the war on the side of the Central Powers according to the alliance treaty concluded on August 2, the Ottoman Empire declared its provisional armed neutrality on August 3. Bulgaria had also delayed the already begun alliance negotiations despite pressure from the German government. It was evident that both Romania and Bulgaria, as well as Turkey, were determined to await the first war decisions before taking final steps; for Turkey, compelling military reasons spoke in favor, especially the currently insufficient war readiness. Subsequently, the Central Powers, exploiting the initially favorable developing military situation, did not relent in their efforts to persuade Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria to join them. Despite initial disagreements between the involved political and military authorities over the question of deploying the potential new reinforcements and despite some fluctuations, by early September it had been possible to establish agreement that, if the policy of gaining new allies were to succeed, Turkey and Romania would have to deploy their main forces against Russia, while Bulgaria should turn against Serbia to relieve Austria-Hungary from the fight against its main opponent, Russia. Further tasks came

1) Volume I, p. 36.

Page: 14 keyno: 025

Fundamental Decisions for the Overall Conduct of War.

for the Porte, operations against England in Egypt and a demonstration in the Caucasus against Russia were considered, whose significance for the overall war situation had been repeatedly emphasized by the German Supreme Army Command. The rather unfortunate course of the German operations in France and the Austro-Hungarian ones in Galicia, as well as the situation in Serbia around mid-September, had to have a significant influence on the further decisions of Turkey and the Balkan states and seriously jeopardize the negotiations that seemed so promising. Just a few days after the retreat of the Austro-Hungarian armies, the German ambassador in Constantinople, Baron von Wangenheim, had to report to Berlin: "Meanwhile, details about the Austrian defeat in Galicia have become known. Added to this is the tremendous impact of the French offensive, while one was already counting on the fall of Paris ... Enver is becoming more isolated with his war plan daily, even among the officers. There is doubt whether Germany will win. (Jzzet Pasha1) said to Liman2): "We stand firm with you, but you cannot demand a suicide sacrifice from us ... If you win somewhere, so that we can believe in your ultimate success, then Bulgaria and we will move." Similarly serious were the reports from Bucharest, where, due to the retreat of the right German army wing before Paris, one was already considering the possibility of a final German defeat. On September 15, it was reported that Russia had offered Romania the southern part of Transylvania, and the next day the Romanian border was closed for the previously permitted material and ammunition transports from Germany to Turkey.

The serious voices of the responsible diplomatic foreign representatives showed impressively how much the success of efforts to gain new allies depended above all on the further development of the military situation.

From the beginning, General von Falkenhayn intended to inform the German public about the true events in the Battle of the Marne and during the subsequent retreat in an unreserved manner. Only towards the end of September did the military situation at the front, in his view, allow the execution of this intention. On September 28, he sent to the Foreign Office in Berlin for dissemination through Turkey.

1) Until January 1914, predecessor of Enver Bey as War Minister.  
2) Marshal Liman von Sanders was the head of the German military mission in Turkey.

Page: 15 keyno: 026

The German public opinion remains unaware of the significance of the retreat at the Marne.

Wolff's Telegraph Office provided a detailed report, in which, after outlining the military operations on all battlefields, it candidly admitted the retreat from the Marne and the unfavorable situation on the western front. Due to the Foreign Office's concerns, which emphasized that the telegram would have "unpredictable consequences" abroad, the Chancellor prevented the publication of the General Staff's report. As a result, the German public remained unaware of the great significance, particularly the far-reaching operational impacts of the Battle of the Marne, for a long time.

keyno: 027

III. The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

A. The Operations to Relieve the Austro-Hungarian Army in Southern Poland.

I. The Advance against the Middle Vistula until October 5th.

a) The Formation of the German 9th Army.

See Sketch 5 and Map 14.

With the retreat of the German army from the Marne, the decision against France was postponed indefinitely, and support for the East from forces in the West was initially not to be expected. The Austro-Hungarian army was still struggling for decision at Lemberg at this time, while the German 8th Army in East Prussia, after the destruction of the Narew Army at Tannenberg, had turned against the Russian Njemen Army. Generaloberst v. Hindenburg hoped to strike them so decisively through the initiated encirclement that he could then turn south against the Narew to bring the allies the support promised to them in peacetime and repeatedly requested since the beginning of operations. On the night of September 10th, the Russian Njemen Army began to retreat; General v. Rennenkampf avoided the decision in East Prussia before he could be decisively defeated. Generaloberst v. Hindenburg had to reckon with the possibility that the numerically far superior enemy would not remain decisively weakened in combat strength behind the German army in East Prussia. Then the Narew operation was not feasible.

The Austro-Hungarian military leadership, the "Army High Command"3), had already4) requested direct support from German troops, pointing out, among other things, that strong Russian forces were gathering in Poland west of the Vistula and thus not only threatening the Austro-Hungarian army flank,

1) Continuation from the presentation in Volume II. — 2) See p. 2f.  
3) Since the term "Army High Command" had a different meaning in the German army (= High Command of a single army), it has been replaced by "Military Leadership" in this presentation. — 4) Volume II, p. 261f.

Page: 403 keyno: 028

Operation from Silesia or over the Narew?

but also threatened the Prussian provinces of Silesia and Posen. This danger was not considered very high by the German 8th Army's high command at the time. However, if the Narew operation was no longer possible and the support of the allied army — as seemed to be the case — could no longer be postponed, then it had to be carried out from Silesia and Posen. Thus, Major General Ludendorff, as Chief of Staff of the 8th Army, inquired with the supreme army command on the evening of September 10th — still unaware of the changed situation in the West — whether further reinforcements could be expected for an army to be formed in Silesia. From East Prussia, which had to be held for military and economic reasons, two army corps could be released. On September 11th, the 8th Army, advancing from the western direction, halted the main reserve of the fortress Posen as the first part; it was to be transported back to the eastern border of the province of Posen and pushed into Poland.

Meanwhile, the decision at the Galician front had fallen in favor of the allies; thus, German assistance there became even more urgent. On September 11th, the entire Austro-Hungarian army had begun its retreat; the commander-in-chief, Archduke Friedrich, intended to initially repel the enemy at the San¹). Behind this naturally strong section, he could hope, relying on the large fortress of Przemysl and the makeshift bridgeheads of Jaroslaw and Sieniawa, to at least temporarily hold back the Russian superiority and reorganize his own troops. However, the allied army command no longer expected a timely effect from a German operation over the Narew under the changed circumstances. It now saw the only possible help in the direct support through the transport of German troops to Galicia and presented this view to the German supreme army command. The authorized German general at the Austro-Hungarian headquarters, Lieutenant General Freiherr v. Freytag-Loringhoven, who had previously supported the allies' request for the deployment of active German troops to Galicia, joined this view in a telegram to the supreme army command on September 12th.

However, the German 8th Army had meanwhile changed its view on how to assist the allies; for the success over the Russian Njemen army turned out to be much greater than assumed on September 10th. There was not much to fear from this enemy army for the foreseeable future, and in the last few days

¹) Army order from September 11, 1914, Conrad IV, p. 702.

Page: 404 keyno: 029

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

against the Russians advancing towards East Prussia's southern border had shown such little fighting strength that the success of an attack by the entire German 8th Army over the Narew seemed beyond doubt. From the fortifications there, after the successes achieved in the West against much stronger installations, no significant resistance was expected. Only against Osowiec, which lay off the main thrust over the Narew, was the heaviest artillery required; it was requested from the Supreme Army Command on September 12. Against the other positions, heavy field howitzers and the mortars (21 cm) available in Königsberg sufficed. So now seemed the time for the operation over the Narew to Siedlce, so often requested by the allies, to be more rapid and effective than an advance from Silesia and Posen. The prerequisite, however, was that the Austro-Hungarian army held at the San long enough for the aid from the Narew to become effective behind the Russians. That this prerequisite would be fulfilled was not entirely certain at the German 8th Army's High Command; they had to consult the allied army command. To initiate the new operation, the Guard Reserve Corps was ready as the first larger unit on September 13. Meanwhile, the turn of events in the West had become known. Generaloberst v. Hindenburg therefore, before ordering further actions, inquired at 11 a.m. that day with the Supreme Army Command about how many forces the East could continue to count on, adding: "for defense in Prussia, three army corps are required."

This inquiry coincided with a decision by the Supreme Army Command, which, based on Austro-Hungarian urging and its own assessment of the situation, had already decided to support the allies' front directly to prevent further retreat. They were to be provided with the two army corps of the 8th Army, which had been reported available for an army to be formed in Silesia on September 10 under different circumstances in East Prussia. However, on September 13 at 1 p.m., the 8th Army had been ordered: "Immediately free up and prepare two army corps for transport to Krakow. Response on when readiness is possible." At the same time, the request for the heaviest artillery against Osowiec was rejected.

At the 8th Army's High Command, this decision could not be reconciled with the aforementioned own inquiry, and thus they could not form a clear picture of the Supreme Army Command's intentions: Should the two corps go to Krakow alone or be made available to the Austro-Hungarian army command?

Page: 405 keyno: 030

Operation from Silesia or over the Narew?

be done? However, there were concerns. If German forces were sent for the immediate support of the allies, they were desired to be strong enough not only to support the Austro-Hungarian army but also to give it the impetus for a new offensive. Only through attack was it possible to continue to resist the Russian superiority in the vast fields of the East. In East Prussia, where the success against Rennenkampf was expanding to ever greater extent, it was eventually possible to manage with even fewer forces than had been considered necessary for this theater of war just a few days earlier. Then four army corps and a cavalry division could be freed up to support the allies. However, if these units were to be moved to Galicia in full strength, a lot of time would have to pass under the unfavorable Austrian railway conditions before they became effective, more time in any case than with an operation over the Narew. Whether the allied army would be able to hold the San line until then was questionable. Under such circumstances, Generaloberst v. Hindenburg saw it as his duty to also present this view to the German army command, and on the same evening, on September 13 at 9:20, he telegraphed to Lemberg: "Offensive against Narew in decisive direction possible in about ten days. Austria, however, requested direct support due to Romania by relocating the army to Krakow and Upper Silesia. Available are four army corps and a cavalry division. Rail transport takes about 20 days. Long marches to the Austrian left wing. Help arrives there too late. Request decision. Army must retain independence there in any case."

The Austro-Hungarian Chief of General Staff, General of Infantry Baron Conrad v. Hötzendorf, had assigned his wing adjutant, Captain in the General Staff Fleischmann v. Theiszruf, to the command of the German 8th Army and was therefore constantly informed about the views and intentions of Generaloberst v. Hindenburg. Thus, General v. Conrad had already emphasized in a telegram to the German Supreme Army Command on September 13 at 12:20 noon: "For further success, especially for direct coverage of Posen and Prussian Silesia, the dispatch of the strongest possible forces via Krakow to the earliest connection to our left wing is urgent. German readiness in Silesia would be far too far back ..." At about the same time, however, General v. Conrad had informed the Austro-Hungarian representatives at the German Supreme Army Command as well as at the command in

Page: 406 keyno: 031

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

Ordered East Prussia to immediately request support from four corps and a cavalry division'), which — as he had heard — would be available in East Prussia. Captain v. Fleischmann had urged his chief of staff in the evening of the day'), the German 8th Army's high command still intended the Narew operation. He therefore suggested reinforcing the demand for the deployment of German forces in Galicia by immediately sending a telegraphic request to the German Emperor and pointing out the "utmost possibility of holding" the San line, as only this seemed to ensure an orderly deployment of the German reinforcements. When this telegraph from Captain v. Fleischmann arrived during the night of September 13 to 14 at the allied army command, which had meanwhile been relocated to Neu-Sandez, the Austro-Hungarian army, with the sole exception of the left wing army, was still east of the San. Whether Archduke Friedrich ever intended to seriously resist in this river section is questionable. His chief of staff, General v. Conrad, reported that the continuation of the retreat depended on the enemy's behavior and the arrival of the requested German reinforcements. As a "recovery line," where he initially wanted to give the troops a rest and reorganize and replenish their severely depleted units and formations, he had initially considered the Dunajec (more than 100 km west of the San), "in the extreme case the heights of Krakow." "However, if the enemy's sluggish actions allowed for an earlier establishment, this was welcome"'). The decision to continue the retreat far to the west had become difficult for General v. Conrad. He had expressed to his surroundings at the time that one must separate heart and mind; the heart spoke against retreating, but the mind for it"). Given the visibly advancing enemy, it seemed impossible to attempt defense at the San any longer; as the left wing army was stripped of all Austro-Hungarian troops, encirclement and encroachment threatened from there). Under such conditions, the state of the army

1) War Archive Vienna, Study of Lieutenant Colonel v. Toly. — 2) Ibid. Conrad IV, C. 705 and 711. Differing information, as contained in some of the first orders and official communications (e.g., also from September 13 to Field Marshal Lieutenant Ritter v. Marterer from the Military Chancellery of Emperor Franz Josef, Conrad IV, C. 737), probably only served to not make the state of affairs generally known. 3) A. O. D. C. 752. 5) War Archive Vienna, Study of Lieutenant Colonel v. Toly. The account given by General v. Conrad in conversation with General Ludendorff on September 18

Page: 407 keyno: 032

The Abandonment of the Narew Operation.

Already upon reaching the San, the decision matured to abandon any defense of this river line. On the morning of September 14, the Archduke wired the German Emperor: "The Austro-Hungarian army will only strike the 8th Army in view of the advancing German forces when union with these forces is secured. Operation over Narew is now by no means effective. Only union in West Galicia is considered. I therefore request that transport via Krakow be arranged as soon as possible."

Presumably somewhat simultaneously with this message, a report from General v. Freytag had also arrived at the Great Headquarters in Luxembourg. Although written as early as September 10, before the start of the Austro-Hungarian retreat, it already gave a rather unconfident depiction of the state of the allied army. This "is not capable of maintaining very high performances on its own for the long term. Therefore, I allowed myself yesterday" — it continued — "to once again designate the immediate support of the Imperial and Royal Army in Galicia by active German troops, which would provide it with strong backing and fresh courage, as desirable..."

With the wiring of the Archduke, it was decided that the Narew operation was no longer in question for the German army in East Prussia. However, the shift to Krakow desired by General v. Conrad would have led the army behind the retreating Austro-Hungarian front and thus into an unfavorable situation in every respect. Thus, the German Supreme Army Command decided on September 14 at 12 noon in an instruction to the 8th Army Command: "Operation over the Narew is not considered promising in the current situation of the Austrians. Immediate support of the Austrians is politically necessary. Operations from Upper Silesia are possible. The transfer of troops from the West is not intended. The number of forces to be used in Silesia will be determined later. The independence of the army remains even in joint operations with the Austrians."

In view of the situation with the allies, the German 8th Army found itself, albeit internally reluctant, with this decision—

(Conrad IV, p. 796), "that we, if no German assistance could be expected, would have had to await the enemy behind the San, protected by Przemyśl" — is thus already to be denied, but probably reveals a coloring deemed necessary at the time to maintain prestige with the ally.

1) Nothing certain could be determined.

Page: 408 keyno: 033

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

The decision of the Supreme Army Command was pending. However, it was considered necessary to discuss again with them the strength and task of the forces designated to support the allies. If these — as apparently planned — marched immediately following the allied army, their advance could at most temporarily halt the enemy's encircling movement, but not lead to a more far-reaching success. For this, one had to advance more detached from the Austro-Hungarian left flank. General Ludendorff presented this line of thought to Generaloberst v. Moltke by telephone on the evening of September 14 and proposed sending the bulk of the 8th Army under its current commander to Upper Silesia and Posen, to initiate a completely new operation from here, detached from the Austro-Hungarian army. Generaloberst v. Moltke promised to examine the proposal; however, the further handling of the matter fell to his successor, Generalleutnant v. Falkenhayn, who had just that evening taken over the representation of the seriously ill current Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

On the evening of September 15, General v. Falkenhayn informed the High Command of the 8th Army: "His Majesty orders: A 9th Army will be formed for joint use with the Austrian army under General v. Schubert. Generalmajor Ludendorff will join the staff of the High Command of the 9th Army as Chief of the General Staff..." For the 9th Army, as it was further stated, according to the closer determination of the High Command 8, initially two army corps, including the Guard Reserve Corps, and a cavalry division were to join. They were to be transported by rail to the Silesian-Polish border, each army corps to Tarnowitz-Beuthen and Lublinitz-Koslerberg, the cavalry division to Kempen in Posen. In addition to these units joining the 9th Army, two more army corps were to be prepared for transport by rail in East Prussia. The 9th Army was, as stated in a simultaneous directive by General v. Schubert, to be advanced "in agreement with the Austrian commander-in-chief as much as possible against the flank and rear of the nearest reachable Russian forces."

These orders were supplemented and changed in the following days. From a recent inquiry by Captain v. Fleischmann about the prospects of resistance at the San, General v. Conrad learned.

1) See S.1. — 2) S. 501, Note 2.

Page: 409 keyno: 034

Reorganization of the Eastern Army.

that the German reinforcements should not be brought forward via Krakow, but should be unloaded at the Silesian-Polish border, and that from there an independent operation should be conducted, for which even the participation of Austro-Hungarian forces north of the Vistula was hoped for. This did not at all correspond to the plans of the Austro-Hungarian military leadership. Archduke Friedrich urged the German Emperor again on September 15 and requested unloading at Krakow-Tarnow and the subordination of the German army under Austro-Hungarian command. The intervention of this army was required as soon as possible north of Tarnow, "if joint action is to be ensured." The operational idea underlying this demand of the allied commander was not quite clear to the German military leadership. General v. Freytag also urgently pointed out in two communications that, based on previous experiences, a separate use of all German troop bodies, as a special left wing group, was absolutely better than a mixing with Austro-Hungarian units, as might correspond to the wishes of the allies.

On September 17, the German Supreme Army Command finally ordered the two army corps prepared in East Prussia to be transferred to the 9th Army; it determined — in accordance with the urgent demands of the allies — that the last arriving corps should now be unloaded at Krakow. The operation proposed by the command of the 2nd Army, to be conducted separately from the Austro-Hungarian army, was thus made impossible. At the same time, however, the German Emperor appointed Generaloberst v. Hindenburg as the commander of the 9th Army in place of General v. Schubert and thus also resolved the question of Austro-Hungarian command, as the Generaloberst ranked higher in service than the supreme commander of the allied army. "I entrust you," the order continued, "with the overall command of all operations in the East. The 9th Army, which General v. Schubert takes over, remains under your command. I reserve directives for cooperation with the Austrian army and operations in Prussia."

General Ludendorff, still unaware of these latest decisions, had already left Insterburg for Breslau early on September 16 to prepare the assembly of the new army. On September 18, the Generaloberst himself followed him there with the majority of the staff of the previous command. General Staff-

Page: 410 keyno: 035

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

v. Hindenburg and his Chief of Staff felt satisfaction that they were called back to joint activity by the new orders of the Kaiser. Both men were so closely connected by their previous successful cooperation, begun under the most difficult conditions, that they found the initially ordered separation hard to bear.

The German Eastern Army was organized for further operations into:

The 9th Army\*) under Colonel General v. Hindenburg, who was also the Commander-in-Chief of all forces in the East; Chief of Staff Major General Ludendorff. This army included:

Guard Reserve Corps

XI Army Corps

XVII Army Corps

XX Army Corps

Landwehr Corps

Main Reserve Posen

Higher Cavalry Commander No. 3 with 8th Cavalry Division

Deputy General Commands of the II, V, VI Army Corps with the fortresses and troops of their area, the latter excluding those designated for the newly forming Reserve Corps²), as well as replacement troops not designated for mobile use.

The 8th Army³) under General of Artillery v. Schubert, Chief of Staff Major General Grünert. This army included:

I Army Corps

I Reserve Corps

3rd Reserve Division

35th Reserve Division (Main Reserve Thorn)

Landwehr Division Goltz

6th and 70th Landwehr Brigade

Main Reserves Königsberg and Graudenz

1st Cavalry Division

\*) War organization see Appendix 1. — ²) p. 5. — ³) War organization see Appendix 1.

Page: 411 keyno: 036

Reorganization of the Eastern Army.

Deputy General Commands of the I., XVII., XX. Army Corps with the fortresses and troops of their area to the same extent as with the 9th Army.

The tasks of the Eastern Army were finally defined in an order from the Supreme Army Command on September 17, stating that the 9th Army should independently, in agreement with the Austrian Army Command, advance against the flank and rear of the nearest reachable Russian army group following the Austrians. — The 8th Army was to protect East and West Prussia against renewed Russian incursions. The main reserves of Posen, Thorn, and Graudenz were to "take over border security against their fortresses, ready for later offensive action." When Generaloberst v. Hindenburg left East Prussia, he had nothing to add to the orders he had previously given there as commander of the 8th Army. The next task of this army was to advance against the important Russian deployment route Grodno—Warsaw.

In the meantime, General Ludendorff had made the necessary arrangements with the Austro-Hungarian Army Command regarding the operations of the 9th Army.

b) The Agreements with the Allies. — Position towards the Supreme Army Command.

See Map 14 and Sketch 6.

Wild rumors about the fate of the German Landwehr Corps, which was retreating through Galicia as part of the Austro-Hungarian Army, had reached Silesia but were not confirmed. The commanding general, General of Infantry v. Woyrsch, reported that despite heavy losses, there was no respect for the Russians, who were "moderate in attack, tolerable in defense."

On September 18, Generalmajor Ludendorff traveled from Breslau to Neu-Sandez to the Austro-Hungarian headquarters; he was in high spirits. On the Austro-Hungarian front, the Russians were no longer pressing, and the latest reports made the condition of the individual armies appear favorable, much better than the harsh reality. The mood at the allied army command had accordingly brightened. Thus, General

Page: 412 keyno: 037

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

Ludendorff in Neu-Sandez, as he reported to the Supreme Army Command, maintained a "thoroughly confident outlook" despite heavy losses. However, the impression he gained of the allied army's combat readiness was not favorable, and yet it did not even show the full extent of this army's weakness.

The Austro-Hungarian Army (2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 1st Army, the latter including the German Landwehr Corps) had reached the western San River bank with 48¹) infantry divisions (including 8½ Landsturm divisions²) and 11 cavalry divisions. Its front was thus compressed to a width of about 150 km from south of Przemysl to the Vistula above Sandomir. Further east, small Landsturm forces (equivalent to German Landwehr) held the Carpathian passes. North of the Vistula, there were only weak border and railway protection units, but no combat-ready formations, not even cavalry. The enemy initially did not press forward. However, General v. Conrad expected that the Russians would soon resume their offensive toward Krakow. Meanwhile, due to his armies' reduced combat strength, he wanted to disengage from the enemy to resume fighting only where "direct battle support" through Imperial German reinforcements was secured. This meant leaving the large fortress of Przemysl in front of the lines. The 2nd Army was to withdraw southward into the Carpathians, while the three armies of the left wing had to retreat behind the Biala and the Dunajec to the naturally strong position Grybów—Tarnow, which was only about 50 km wide. This very tight concentration of three entire armies for a retreat movement astonished the German general. General v. Conrad justified it with the extraordinarily large gaps in the troops: the "combat strength" of the army in Galicia totaled only 400,000 men³).

Regarding the Russians, it was known that they were following slowly. They cautiously approached the outer works of the Przemysl fortress and the San bridgeheads of Jaroslaw and Sieniawa, but further downstream, where no resistance was attempted, they had already crossed the river on September 15 after the withdrawal of the Austrians and Hungarians. General v. Conrad assumed that to the right (southeast) of the Vistula, a total of five Russian armies had reached the general line Kalusz—San mouth, beginning from the southeastern wing with the 7th, 8th, 3rd, 5th, and 4th Armies, while the 9th Army was positioned in the second line behind them in the area southeast

¹) Every 2 individual brigades are counted as 1 division.  
²) The Austro-Hungarian Landsturm corresponded to German Landwehr.  
³) Conrad IV, p. 805.

Page: 413 keyno: 038

Discussion in Neu-Sandez, 18 September.

from Iwangorod gathered. All in all, he counted on 57 to 58 Russian

infantry divisions, six of which were tied up by Przemysl, so that in

total 51 to 52 divisions would continue the advance). The

Russians could thereby invade Hungary via the Carpathian passes

or turn towards Krakow and Silesia. The former seemed

to General Ludendorff not unlikely for the further shaping of the military

overall situation in the East, but it was the less likely. On the left bank of the Vistula, General v. Conrad

assumed about one Russian corps northwest of the San estuary as well as three to

four cavalry divisions border detachments in western Poland;

large rail transports from Warsaw to the south, in the direction

of Kielzy, were to take place. An immediate threat to the Austro-

Hungarian northern flank no longer existed in view of the approach of the German

9th Army.

If the enemy continued to follow the allied army, it had to come to a

battle at the Dunajec. Then the German 9th Army could bring about the decision on

the northern flank through encirclement. If the enemy halted his advance beforehand or turned towards

Hungary, then General v. Conrad wanted to proceed with the Hindenburg army

to attack. In any case, a strong

northern flank was necessary to deliver a decisive blow.

General Ludendorff therefore suggested the extension of the Austro-Hungarian

army from Tarnow northwards to the Vistula and the reinforcement of this northern flank

by parts of the 2nd Army from the Carpathians.

He also urgently needed to send Austro-Hungarian cavalry to the left

bank of the Vistula to conceal the German deployment there.

The discussion finally resulted in agreement on the overall

assessment of the situation as well as the next intentions; the following

agreement was reached: 1. If the Russians press, the Austro-

Hungarian armies with the northern flank along the Vistula will retreat towards

Krakow. Austro-Hungarian cavalry will be advanced from the south to

Kielzy. — 2. The German 9th Army gathers north of

Krakow. — 3. Both armies immediately take the offensive after the

assembly of the 9th Army.

While General Ludendorff was negotiating in Neu-Sandez,

Colonel General v. Hindenburg had arrived in Breslau. After clarity about

the cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian army was achieved,

Page: 414 keyno: 039

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

The task was to coordinate the overall war strategy of the two German Eastern armies. The 9th Army had just begun unloading the Guard Reserve Corps west of Kattowitz, the XX Army Corps was moving towards Tschenstochau, and the remaining parts of the army were to follow. On September 19, the main reserve Posen received orders to advance from Kalisch to Sieradz, while the Polish border guards were to be pushed forward towards the Warthe. The next day, the 35th Reserve Division (main reserve Thorn) of the 8th Army, which was still south of Mlawa, was designated for transport to Thorn to advance from there behind the Vistula-Narew via Wlozlawek towards Warsaw. However, it seemed necessary to continue exerting "as strong a pressure as possible towards Warsaw" from East Prussia. Therefore, the 8th Army was to prepare to "lead strong parts — perhaps one to two divisions — into the area of Mlawa to become offensive from there." Whether it would be possible to protect East Prussia from new Russian incursions in the long term with such a weakening of the 8th Army for the benefit of the operation in Poland was uncertain. Therefore, defensive installations were to be prepared here more sustainably.

Simultaneously with this local leadership measure, the Supreme Army Command was also concerned with easing the situation on the Eastern Front. At the suggestion of Lieutenant General v. Falkenhayn, a larger naval operation against the Russian Baltic coast was prepared to bind forces at this — as was known — particularly sensitive point for the Russians, which would then be absent from the land battlefront¹).

On September 21, the German 9th Army's high command was relocated to Beuthen in the deployment area of the advancing troops. It became increasingly clear that the Russians had ceased the immediate pursuit of the Austro-Hungarian army at the San; only hesitantly had parts advanced further. Thus, the only reason that — quite contrary to the intentions of the German leadership in the East — had triggered the decision to move the 9th Army with the right wing near Krakow was eliminated. However, even now, there was still the possibility to initiate the operation from a more northern direction. Thus, Generaloberst v. Hindenburg wired on September 21 to the Austro-Hungarian high command: "It is of decisive importance for the continuation of operations that strong Austrian army

¹) p. 11, 505 and 520f.

Page: 415 keyno: 040

The Deployment of the 9th Army.

is pushed north of the Vistula to join the German army in their offensive. Right wing of the German army approximately over Kielzy. — South of the Vistula, offensive of the other Austrian armies with a staggered right wing." However, General v. Conrad did not yet believe he could agree to such a plan. The Austro-Hungarian army had just reached the Wisłoka, and the retreat was to continue two more days' marches to the Biała and the lower Dunajec. Only west of the Dunajec estuary did the Austro-Hungarian Chief of General Staff initially want to push a cavalry division, with infantry as a reserve, onto the northern Vistula bank. Otherwise, the armies were to bring in reinforcements and await the arrival of the German 9th Army. From the upcoming joint operation, General v. Conrad hoped — as he had already written to Colonel General v. Moltke on September 20 — for the "campaign decision in the East." He had therefore simultaneously requested the deployment of further German forces, even if only second or third line, for the offensive into Poland.

In contrast, Colonel General v. Hindenburg insisted on September 22 that "the decision must be made now and executed, to bring a strong Austro-Hungarian army onto the northern Vistula bank during the retreat." He sent the Quartermaster General of the army, Colonel v. Sauerzweig, to Neu-Sandez and also explained to the Austro-Hungarian Captain v. Fleischmann that the German 9th Army must already advance so far north that a major success over the Russians through encirclement is ensured. "If Austria does not push strong forces over the Vistula, only weaker parts can be used for the encirclement.

1) Count Conrad later wrote about this (Conrad IV, p. 832): "For Colonel General v. Hindenburg, it was obvious to use the strongest possible forces on the left Vistula bank, especially since this provided the cover for Prussian Silesia. However, I had to reckon with the possibility that the Russians would only advance a group from the left Vistula bank, but would lead the main thrust south of the Vistula, which, if successful, would be of serious significance. Moreover, an independent offensive to the right of the Vistula was a threat to the Russians for us. I therefore had to wait for the gradual clarification before I could decide whether the Austro-Hungarian forces should be moved to the northern bank."  
2) Conrad, IV, p. 818. That in the meantime General v. Falkenhayn had fully taken over the duties of the German Chief of General Staff had become known from the directive he issued to the 9th Army.

Page: 416 keyno: 041

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

to take effect ...” Captain v. Fleischmann personally went to Neu-Sandez to represent this view and added that on the German side, the possibility had also been discussed of undertaking an independent operation with the 9th Army against Iwangorod—Warsaw, if Austro-Hungarian forces were not sent to the left bank of the Vistula. In response, General v. Conrad agreed on September 23 to send five, provisionally even six, Austro-Hungarian divisions of the 1st Army to the northern bank of the Vistula. However, he refused to deploy the entire 1st Army north of the Vistula, as the main Russian forces were still south of the river, where the terrain and their own lack of artillery necessitated numerous narrow divisional sectors. On the left bank of the Vistula, where General v. Conrad now assumed strong Russian forces, probably the Russian 9th Army, were assembling¹), the Austro-Hungarian divisions were to be ready behind the Dunajec estuary—Pintschow line by September 30 to participate in the advance to encircle the Russian northern flank. “This,” as stated in the response, “under the strict condition that the German 9th Army conducts this operation in direct cooperation with Austrian forces, with the aim of the entire operation being to achieve success by encircling the main Russian forces advancing against Austrian armies. In line with the advance north of the Vistula, the Austrian armies will also advance on the southern Vistula bank against these Russian forces.”

The advance of the German 9th Army was regulated according to these intentions so that the right wing reached the area of Pintschow by September 30. For this, the corps had to be moved from their unloading points in a northeasterly direction, with the XI Army Corps from Krakow initially even moved in an almost northerly direction. In this way, all other possibilities of the situation were also taken into account, as was still possible with the once fixed railway deployment. At the same time, the need arose for the wide-ranging offensive to immediately protect the open northern flank of the advance through deeper echeloning. Generaloberst v. Hindenburg therefore decided to assign the 35th Reserve Division (main reserve from Thorn), which according to the order of the Supreme Army Command of September 17 was to take over border security in the forefield of its fortress, to the 8th Army

¹) Austro-Hungarian Army Order of September 23, 1914. — Conrad IV, p. 840.

Page: 417 keyno: 042

9th Army and Supreme Army Command.

to continue entirely, to draw them directly to the northern flank of the 9th Army. However, the idea of an advance by parts of the 8th Army from Mlawa to Warsaw had to be temporarily abandoned. This army initially used its limited forces entirely for defense on the East Prussian eastern border. Through them, it was hoped that if they were led on Russian soil and offensively, they would bind equally strong, perhaps even stronger Russian forces than by an advance of weaker parts from Mlawa to Warsaw.

When the German Supreme Army Command learned of the new agreements made with General v. Conrad, it wished to adapt the railway march of the 9th Army, ordered under different conditions and already completed, to the new situation as far as possible. Perhaps at least the XI Army Corps, destined for Krakow, whose transport was to begin on September 23 at Insterburg, could still be redirected and unloaded further north. In this sense, General v. Falkenhayn wired on September 24 to the Army High Command 9; he added: "It is assumed that appropriate agreements with Austrians have already been made for this situation with the enemy." This intention of the Supreme Army Command probably also corresponded to the original wishes of the High Command 9, with which it had not agreed. Now the change of the Supreme Army Command came too late, because the transports had been accelerated at the instigation of Generaloberst v. Hindenburg, so that the unloading of the XI Army Corps at Krakow was already in full swing. Thus, the telegram from the Supreme Army Command only caused discontent at the High Command 9. It replied: "Unloading in Krakow is against our intention, only on the explicit order of the Great Headquarters. Unloading can no longer be changed now, as it is in progress. The army will be moved north after unloading to gain the base that has always been recognized as correct here."

On the same September 24, however, a telegram signed "Supreme Army Command" also requested clarification about the deployment of the 35th Reserve Division (main reserve Thorn) to the 9th Army. This decision, not yet reported by the High Command 9, had become known to the Supreme Army Command through official channels via the field railway authorities. Their intervention here caused dismay among the victors of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, who were accustomed to complete independence. That Generaloberst v. Moltke had been sidelined was not known; for the incoming wires were still

Page: 418 keyno: 043

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

had been signed "Moltke". Colonel General v. Hindenburg responded thus: "Colonel General v. Moltke: Supreme Army Command holds me accountable for drawing the main reserve of Thorn to the left wing of the 9th Army and not leaving it at Thorn." The reasons for the withdrawal followed. The telegram concluded: "I intend to maintain my issued order and request Your Excellency to grant me the necessary independence in directing the new campaign, just as in my previous operations." — An approving and clarifying response from General v. Falkenhayn followed, but could not completely eliminate the tension that had now developed between the two high command authorities. This tension also transferred to the relationship between the 9th Army High Command and General v. Freytag, who had particularly strongly advocated for the use of German troops in direct connection with the allied armies.<header>c) Beginning of Movements and Battle at Opatow, September 30 to October 5.</header>See Map 14 and Sketch 7.

September 30. On September 30, the Austro-Hungarian army stood with the 2nd Army under General v. Böhm-Ermolli in the Carpathians, with the 3rd under General v. Boroević, the 4th under General Archduke Josef Ferdinand, and the 1st under General Dankl adjoining them at the Biala and the Dunajec. The cavalry, which had suffered particularly heavily and needed rest, was positioned with its main force — seven divisions — initially behind the center, partly also behind the right wing of the army front. The left wing of the 1st Army (5½ infantry and 2 cavalry divisions) had been pushed to the northern bank of the Vistula and had reached the Nida section south of Pintschow. The fortress of Przemysl, whose garrison included three infantry divisions (including four Landsturm brigades), lay 90 km in front of the army's front. At the Carpathian passes and north of the Vistula, here only when approaching the Nida section, there had been insignificant encounters with the enemy; otherwise, the troops, as far as they had not moved to the northern bank of the Vistula, had about a week's rest and time to organize and replenish their units. This was disrupted by the simultaneous need for comprehensive medical preventive measures against dysentery and cholera; the 2nd Army alone had more than 2000 cholera patients, of whom more than half died. To create combat-ready units again, a Landsturm division and the march brigades and regiments that at

Page: 419 keyno: 044

The Austro-Hungarian Army.

At the beginning of the war, independent troop units had to be disbanded. Due to the small number of trained personnel, it was not possible to bring the infantry units back to full strength through this measure; in the cavalry, they had to settle for a squadron strength of 100 riders. The artillery losses were replaced except for 14 cannons still missing from the 2nd Army, and the ammunition was replenished. Thus, by October 1st, the Austro-Hungarian field army on the Russian front had reached a strength of 477,000 infantry, 27,000 cavalry, and 1,578 guns, but still remained almost a quarter behind the level at the beginning of the war. In total, 42 infantry divisions (including 1 division and 9 separate brigades of Landsturm) and 11 cavalry divisions were ready to advance1).

General v. Conrad had not requested to reinforce this army by withdrawing from the Serbian front; he would hardly have succeeded in Vienna with this. Although a stalemate had occurred in operations against Serbia, about 16 Austro-Hungarian divisions (including 3 brigades of Landsturm) now faced an enemy of hardly equal strength2).

The deployment of German forces in close contact with the Austro-Hungarian northern flank had restored confidence and aggressiveness in the allied command as well as in the troops. The commander-in-chief, Archduke Friedrich, expressed his confident mood in the army order of September 30th with the words: "Hardened in the fire of battles and filled with confidence, you will achieve the final victory and drive the enemy beyond the borders of our homeland. Your bravery and indomitable perseverance guarantee success3)." Such hope gave the Austro-Hungarian commander the strength to lead his troops back to the attack despite the previous severe shocks. The decision to do so must be highly credited to him.

In the German 9th Army, the prospects of the upcoming campaign were not estimated as highly as in the allied army. Even now, the goal of the campaign in the East could initially only be to gain time. Inside Germany, those in the deployment-

1) Additionally, 3½ infantry divisions were stationed in the fortresses of Przemyśl and Krakow, and a special detachment as security in Transylvania. In the 2nd Army, two independent brigades = one division were still set with the imperial German forces.  
2) See G. 550 and Volume II, G. 258. — 3) Conrad, IV, G. 905.

Page: 420 keyno: 045

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

deployment of new corps in their readiness for use); but beyond that, it was important to keep the Russian masses in check so that there would be as much freedom as possible for the deployment of these corps. From these perspectives, the German Supreme Army Command and Generaloberst v. Hindenburg assessed the upcoming operations against the Russians. Nevertheless, they hoped to succeed in delivering an effective blow to the armies standing directly in front of the Austro-Hungarian front. Only by a stroke of luck could more be achieved with the available own forces and the Austro-Hungarian forces weakened by losses.

On September 30, the German 9th Army, with its mass — in the front line XI Army Corps, Guard Reserve Corps, and XX Army Corps, behind the XI Army Corps in the second line the Landwehr Corps — had reached the area of Chmielnik—Kielzy and northwest of these places, slightly ahead of the Austro-Hungarian northern wing. To protect the northern flank, the XVII Army Corps had fallen back to west of Konsk, the "Drum Corps" had reached Petrikau and westward. This corps — initially consisting only of the main reserve Posen, known as "Division Bredow," and the 8th Cavalry Division — had been reinforced by the 21st Landwehr Brigade (main reserve Breslau) by the advancing 35th Reserve Division. These forces were to form the northern wing of the advance. The area between them and the border protection of the Thorn fortress was covered by the Landsturm of the Deputy General Commands of the V and II Army Corps from Sieradz to the Vistula. The forces prepared for the advance of the 9th Army totaled: 12 1/2 infantry divisions (including 4 1/2 Landwehr divisions) and 1 cavalry division with a strength of 133,000 infantrymen, 8,000 cavalrymen, and 837 guns.

The advance led through an area whose population only endured Russian rule under compulsion. A proclamation from the Russian side, promising greater freedoms as a reward for loyal cooperation in the common Slavic cause, had faded without effect. But the hope of the Central Powers to incite a rebellion against Russian rule had not yet been fulfilled. Even the Austrian troops used in Russian Poland had found no sympathy for their "liberation skills." Those with them

Page: 421 keyno: 046

The Polish Theater of War.

The formed "Polish Legion" exerted no attraction and continued to consist almost exclusively of Poles who were Austrian citizens and thus evaded their actual military service. The political reliability of this legion was as questionable as its combat value; its request for recognition was not rejected by the command of the German 9th Army for political reasons. It seemed, however, unlikely that the legion, in accordance with its incentives, would be useful in the intelligence service during a successful advance by undertaking actions against the Russians' rear connections, perhaps even helping to promote an uprising in the largest cities, especially in Warsaw itself. Resistance from the population was hardly to be expected during the advance; the August incidents in Kalisch and Tschenstochau remained isolated cases for which a sufficient explanation was still lacking.

A vast and, by German standards, road-poor area had to be traversed; for the Polish land west of the Vistula had been deliberately neglected by the Russians in terms of road and railway construction with regard to national defense. Not a single continuous road with a solid substructure led to the 90 km wide river stretch from the San estuary to Iwangorod. Thus, one was almost exclusively dependent on the roads common in Russia, which were very wide but not paved. They had turned into bottomless mud due to the rain, which continued into early October, on the tough clay soil of the advance area. Motor vehicle traffic was therefore limited to a few roads, mostly running crosswise or obliquely to the front. As a substitute for the heavy German field vehicles, the combined army command had already early on requested the provision of local Galician carts with native drivers and horses. More than 3000 such "Panje" vehicles, drawn by small, undemanding horses, were needed to maintain supplies. It could also rely on the strategic railway Radom-Kielzy-Radom-Iwangorod, which, however, first had to be converted to the German gauge and made passable by removing the found destructions. Above all, clearing the tunnel from Miechow, destroyed by the Russians and then more thoroughly by the Austrians during their retreat, required much work. Nevertheless, it was possible to overcome all difficulties so that traffic could be resumed beyond the tunnel as early as the first week of October.

1) Volume II, p. 253, note 1. — 2) Volume II, p. 49. — 3) See "The German Field Railway System", Volume I, p. 155 ff.

Page: 422 keyno: 047

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

could. The wish expressed by the allied side to take over the rear area

in southern Poland behind the German front could not be fulfilled, as it was

incompatible with German interests.

The transmission of orders and messages proved to be much more difficult

compared to the conditions in East Prussia. Only a few wire lines

were available, almost everything had to be newly created. In view of the

Russian cavalry roaming everywhere and the already described condition

of the roads, motor vehicles and dispatch riders were also hindered

and often had to take large detours. Radio stations, with which the

army had meanwhile been more richly equipped (almost every

general command had a station), often offered the only possibility

to quickly bring messages and orders to their destination.

North of the Vistula, the advance was to begin on October 1,

south of the river, the bulk of the Austro-Hungarian army was to follow on October 3;

its right wing army — the 2nd — was to advance from the Carpathians against the left

flank of the Russians south of Przemysl. The forward movement thus initially aimed

at a double encirclement of the Russian forces assumed to be on the left San and

Vistula banks from Przemysl to south of Ivangorod. The plan was based on the

agreements made with the Austro-Hungarian army command on September 18 and 23.

Meanwhile, the picture of the situation with the enemy began to clear up.

The measures of the Russians were unusually well informed. Although they

only sent encrypted radio messages since the Battle of Tannenberg, it was

thanks to the archaeologist, Professor Deubner, and interpreters of the Difftront as well

as the Austro-Hungarian general staff, through tireless efforts, that the keys to the

Russian encryptions were discovered. Thus, Russian radio messages, as far as they

could be intercepted, were no longer a secret for the German and Austro-Hungarian

command. Only when the Russians changed the keys, there was a short pause

until the new key was also determined. In addition, in Poland, in the wide areas

free of troops and the population little inclined towards the Russians,

the intelligence service proved to be more fruitful than on other fronts. Such favorable

circumstances compensated for the relatively small number of German and Austro-Hungarian

cavalry and air forces available on the left of the Vistula compared to the extent of the area

and the strength of the enemy.

Page: 423 keyno: 048

9th Army — News from the Enemy.

in many respects. Nevertheless, the aviation units of the German 9th Army, thanks to the tireless work of Major Thomsen¹, were reinforced by new formations at the urging of the Army High Command. Thus, the defense against the Schütte-Lanz airship "Liegnitz" on the Western Front was of little consequence; however, the weather conditions of the Polish autumn limited the use of air forces.

The German deployment north of the upper Vistula could not remain hidden from the Russians, as it was not reinforced by any Austro-Hungarian troops. Already on September 25, the enemy, as learned from their radio messages, had numerous reports about the "advance of the Germans from Silesia to the east." They then learned from a captured German rider about the arrival of the Guard Reserve Corps from East Prussia. The German 9th Army's High Command suspected that perhaps this was why the Russian advance had not crossed the Vistula. About four Russian corps were held at Przemysl, and another had been marching back east from the Vistula since September 25. On September 28, an intelligence report indicated that Russian supplies had been stalled for about a week due to poor roads. At the same time, it became clear that large shifts to the north were taking place, with the Russian 9th Army forming a new front on the Vistula west of Krasnik with at least three corps (Guard Corps, XIV, and XVIII Corps), initially appearing to be for defense. However, there was no doubt, given the overall situation of the Entente, that the ultimate goal of these enemy movements had to be a new major offensive; the only question was the timing of its start and the extent of its expansion to the north. On the other hand, it was certain that at least eight Russian corps had fallen out before the Austro-Hungarian army to the right of the Vistula. It also emerged that on the left bank of the Vistula in southern Poland, as the German 9th Army's High Command had previously suspected, the Russian cavalry had initially been pushed back by two divisions of the border axis; only on September 25 did an infantry brigade appear to have crossed to the northern bank of the Vistula just below its mouth. There, a cavalry corps of 5½ divisions under General Nowikow was united. As was known from his radio messages, this general — originally for overtaking pursuit

¹) Longtime head of the technical section of the deployment department of the Great General Staff and as such — in contrast to the War Ministry — an advocate of the airplane instead of airships.

Page: 424 keyno: 049

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

considered —, as soon as he recognized the advance of the Germans from Silesia, he abandoned the ordered crossing to the southern Vistula bank and limited himself to defense and concealment north of the river. Since the end of September, he retreated under rearguard actions with a southern group of three cavalry divisions (5th, 8th, and 14th) and an infantry brigade along the Vistula, with a northern group of 2½ cavalry divisions (4th and 5th Don Cossack Division and Turkestan Cossack Brigade) in the direction of Radom. Further north, the Caucasian Cavalry Division was identified in the area west of Lodz.

Since the Russians were south of the upper Vistula crossing, the attack task of the Austro-Hungarian army was facilitated, provided the enemy did not evade the blow intended for him. In this case, however, the German forces advancing north of the Vistula also had to reckon with the possibility that the turn to the south would not occur initially, that the battle would rather ignite at the Vistula below the San estuary. For this, a total of 5½ Austro-Hungarian and 12½ German divisions were available, parts of which had been withdrawn for flank protection against Warsaw. This German perception of the situation coincided with the intention of General v. Conrad. He wanted, as he later wrote, to proceed with concentrated striking power of around 330,000 rifles in the center, initially — as stated in his army order of October 1 — "to attack the enemy advanced in the area west, southwest, and south of Przemysl." His further intention was, "to push over the San at and below Przemysl, while the German 9th and the northern wing of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army would engage comprehensively or covering." For his 4th and, if possible, also the 3rd Army, he envisioned the "later advance northward" as a goal.

The attitude of Romania had to be of utmost importance for the upcoming operations. Just now, when the Russian advance had come to a halt and the armies of the Central Powers jointly launched new attacks, the leaders in the East seemed to see the moment to win over the renegade ally. It was precisely because of Romania that the Austro-Hungarian army command had demanded immediate German support in Galicia, and so Generaloberst v. Hindenburg had also wired the Supreme Army Command on September 28 that influence on Romania was urgent

Page: 425 keyno: 050

Advance of the 9th Army.

On October 1, the Allies in southern Poland began their advance with a force of a total of 18 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions. The reports from the enemy seemed to bring further clarification of their intentions. By the afternoon, it was learned from intercepted radio messages that the Russian Guard Rifle Brigade had crossed the Vistula at Sandomir to advance towards Opatow. Further forces were on the march to Sandomir; among them, the 2nd Rifle Brigade as the vanguard of the XIV Corps was to cross the river on October 2, while the Russian Guard Corps marched north on the eastern Vistula bank over the San.

From these movements, perhaps also from other reports that can no longer be verified today, the German 9th Army's high command gained the impression that the new Russian offensive was now beginning. This seemed to fulfill the hopes that had been entertained. In the army order of October 1, the troops were informed that the Russian 9th Army intended "to cross the Vistula between the mouth of the San and Ivangorod and to become offensive against the Austro-German armies north of the Vistula." The order further stated its own intention to "attack the enemy army during the Vistula crossing. Quick action is required and of decisive importance." The advance, which had previously been directed roughly parallel to the upper Vistula towards the northeast, was now turned more southwards. For the Austro-Hungarian forces advancing on the left Vistula bank and the southern flank of the German 9th Army, it became necessary to move the marching columns closer together. On the northern flank of this army, the Frommel Corps was to continue advancing along the Pilitza, and further rear detachments were to be prepared to secure the unprotected flank.

On October 2, the reconnaissance of the German high command seemed to be confirmed: General Nowitnow had ordered his two cavalry groups to bring up reinforcements and, if possible, to hold them "to give the riflemen time to strengthen their position at Opatow and to facilitate the crossing of the vanguard to the left Vistula bank." It was learned that the Russian 5th Army was also moving

Page: 426 keyno: 051

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

North, towards Sandomir, gathering, while the 9th was still assembling further north.

The next target for the German 9th Army was thus the Russian forces at Opatow; they expected further reinforcements and anticipated the first clash on October 4th. The Landwehr Corps, the XI Army Corps, and the Guard Reserve Corps, which had meanwhile moved to the front line, were deployed in conjunction with Austria and Hungary in the general direction of Opatow, and the XX Army Corps was also to be ready, with a division against Radom, where stronger resistance was also expected, initially adopting a waiting stance.

On October 3rd, the Landwehr Corps, marching in a column, reached the area 20 km southwest of Opatow; to the right, the northern wing of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army connected at about the same level up to the Wisłoka estuary. To the left, ahead of the Landwehr Corps, was the XI Army Corps, with both divisions side by side, having already approached Opatow from the west to about 8 km; it faced fortified Russian positions nearby. The Guard Reserve Corps, also with both divisions side by side, had already reached the area north of Opatow, left wing towards Ostrowiez, and further north the XX Army Corps with the 37th Infantry Division beyond Ilża, while the other division of this corps was staggered more to the rear around the XVII Army Corps. The reports received that day — as far as we know — could have evoked a different perception of the enemy. At Sandomir, only the 80th Reserve Division and one to two rifle brigades (Guard and 2nd) had been identified on the left Vistula bank. Flyers had reported a bridge at Sandomir and another north of the San estuary at Annopol, observing Russian columns marching north at the height of this bridge on the eastern Vistula bank. The enemy, perhaps not yet as far as previously assumed, was pushing its right wing further north, with an expected crossing at Josefow and below. Meanwhile, a radio message from the Russian Guard Corps indicated — as far as deciphering was successful — "The crossing at Annopol is to be undertaken. This point is to be secured for the corps crossing."

Generaloberst v. Hindenburg expected to encounter enemy forces of at least two Russian corps at Opatow on October 4th, but also parts of the 38th Infantry Division of the XIX Corps, and additionally three divisions from the Cavalry Corps Nowotwo.

Page: 427 keyno: 052

9th Army — Battle at Opatow.

and approximately one assigned Infantry Brigade and finally a Guards Cavalry Brigade. The next objective of the German leadership therefore remained unchanged: destruction of these enemy forces positioned at Opatow and to the south with their backs to the river. However, it was already apparent that this would only be a partial task, after which the army would likely need to be deployed in a more northerly direction.

The army order for October 4th positioned the Landwehr Corps to pass south of Opatow, the XI Army Corps through Opatow, and the Guards Reserve Corps to the north of it in the direction of the Vistula, to destroy the enemy standing west of the river. It further stated: "On the other hand, the fighting army units must not crowd together, but their advance northward must be ensured..." When it was then learned that the enemy was "in a strongly entrenched position at Opatow," the XI Army Corps and the Guards Reserve Corps were instructed that they "must first destroy the enemy at Opatow in close cooperation"; only then should the Guards Reserve Corps advance in the direction specified in the army order.

On the morning of October 4th, the XI Army Corps alone first encountered the fortified Russian position west of Opatow. To destroy the enemy through encirclement from both sides, General v. Plüskow wanted to wait for the approach of the Landwehr Corps, which was still somewhat behind on his right, and also called up the Guards Reserve Corps for immediate support. However, the relatively weak enemy¹) did not wait for the effect of the German encirclement but began to withdraw around noon. Only through sharp wheeling of parts of the Guards Reserve Corps to the south did they manage to cut off stronger elements of the enemy. In the process — as was hardly avoidable given the course of the battle — the three German corps in the enveloping attack finally crowded together in the narrowest space and partially intermingled. It is eloquent testimony to the agility of the troops that they nevertheless managed to begin the pursuit without delay on October 5th; it led the foremost elements of the XI Army Corps on this day to the Vistula section Zawichost—Josefow, while the Landwehr Corps and the Guards-

¹) Guards Rifle Brigade with independent Guards Cavalry Brigade and 2nd Rifle Brigade. The Russian 5th Cavalry Division, which was originally directly adjacent to the north, had previously withdrawn; in its place, the independent Guards Cavalry Brigade, which had previously been facing the Austrians and Hungarians, had been drawn to the northern wing. Cf. also p. 432ff.

Page: 428 keyno: 053

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

Reserve corps had already been halted and prepared for redeployment to the north. North of the Kamjenna section, the XX Army Corps with its 37th Infantry Division approached the river. The enemy had partly retreated southeast over Sandomir to the right bank of the Vistula, partly over a bridge in the area of Annopol, which he then destroyed. According to Simow reports, numerous Russians were said to have drowned during the crossing here. As spoils from Opatow, about 5000 prisoners and 16 guns were counted; in total, the Russians had lost more than 7000 men¹).

In the north, the German XVII Army Corps had meanwhile occupied Radom on October 5. Here too, the enemy — two battalions of the 75th Reserve Division (main reserve Iwangorod) and two Cossack divisions — had retreated east without engaging in serious combat. Behind the German northern flank stood the Frommel Corps northwest of Radom up to the Piliza; its 8th Cavalry Division had come north of this river into the area of Rawa and east. The Caucasian cavalry division apparently standing alone opposite here had retreated towards the Vistula.

Through the advance of the German right wing over Opatow to Sawichost, the northern wing of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army, which had originally been set for Annopol, was pushed south. It had fought back the Russian 80th Reserve Division to Sandomir. This place itself and its bridges, however, remained in enemy hands on October 5.

South of the Vistula, the Austro-Hungarian army had only begun its advance on October 4. Here, Russian advance troops initially retreated without a fight behind the lower Wisloka and the upper San. It was clear that the enemy was moving further forces north behind San and Vistula. General v. Conrad therefore wished that the northern wing of the 1st Army would not be pushed further south²). On the other hand, he had reports that the enemy was making all preparations for a violent attack on Przemysl. He therefore did not want to give up hope that the Austro-Hungarian main forces would still

¹) Koroltkow, Warsaw-Iwangorod, p. 66. — In this official Russian account, it is reported about the events during the retreat of the Russian rifle brigades: "Since the guarding of some accidentally captured prisoners was difficult, it was ordered to shoot them."  
²) Conrad V, p. 41/42.

Page: 429 keyno: 054

The 9th Army Reaches the Vistula.

d) Measures of the Russians and Result of the German Advance.

See Map 14, Sketches 5 and 7.

The August and September battles had not brought the Russians closer to their great goal of advancing deep into Germany. However, in accordance with the London agreement of September 4, they were determined to continue the war with all emphasis. The Tsar himself said on September 23: "I will continue the war to the utmost. To wear down Germany, I will exhaust my resources; I will retreat to the Volga if necessary."

Due to the severe defeats in East Prussia and the great losses in Galicia, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, as the Supreme Commander, initially believed he had to wait for reinforcements and replacement troops before resuming the attack. France was also put off until later (in view of its own impending ammunition shortage — again in mid-September) and requested the earliest possible relocation of military operations to the left bank of the Vistula and a march into Germany. Conversely, the Russian military leadership now demanded from the French that they prevent the transfer of further German forces to the East.

All Russian decisions were paralyzed by the fact that East Prussia remained in German hands. The Germans were seen as the more dangerous and mobile opponent and could now, supported by a particularly efficient railway network for eastern conditions, intercept and paralyze any Russian army offensive on the left bank of the Vistula as well as one into Austria-Hungary from the flank and rear. Thus, the Russian successes on the southwestern front were by no means able to compensate for the failure in East Prussia.

1) War Archive Vienna, Study of Lieutenant Colonel v. Holy. See also the entry at Conrad V. C. 48, 50, 52 and Appendix 5.  
2) In London, England, France, and Russia had committed not to make a separate peace. More details on this in the forthcoming Vol. VI.  
3) Paleologue, I, C. 135f. — 4) Gbl. C. 125 and 129.  
5) First in early August Volume II, C. 36 and 65.  
6) Danilow, p. 289 ff. — 7) Gblnda, p. 281 f.

Page: 430 keyno: 055

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

In Galicia, the armies of the "Southwest Front" (9th, 4th, 5th, 3rd, and 8th Armies with a total of 49½ infantry-1) and 21 cavalry divisions) were unable to significantly enhance the results of their victories through pursuit. These armies suffered on the one hand from the unfavorable grouping of their forces, which had concentrated in the attack against the San, and on the other hand from supply difficulties and heavy losses in men and equipment, which also thinned their ranks. The result of three weeks of fighting was that "the victors could hardly be distinguished from the vanquished"2). In total, the Southwest Front was missing 225,000 men from the target strength of 900,000. Roads turned to mud by rain and sudden flooding on the Vistula and San rivers hampered the forward movement. Thus, the pursuit, although it still brought some spoils — the Russians report since September 14, 1500 prisoners and 100 outdated guns from the San bridgeheads4) —, essentially came to a halt around mid-September at the San. Only in its lower part was this river crossed, and that without a fight by the Russian 9th Army. To the left of the Vistula, apart from border guard detachments, there was initially only the cavalry corps Nowikow with 3½ divisions, which only on September 17 received a brigade of the 75th Reserve Division3) as a reserve. The commander-in-chief of the Southwest Front, General Ivanov, intended to proceed further against Krakow after the completion of the fortress Przemysl. For this, two cavalry divisions were to reinforce the cavalry corps Nowikow and during the operations, 9 to 10 corps were to cross to the left bank of the Vistula. However, since the encirclement of Przemysl would take until September 30 and since the replenishment of the troops, where the new replacements often arrived without weapons, could only be completed by mid-October, considerable time had to pass before the start of the advance. Meanwhile, the Grand Duke issued a proclamation to the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, urging them to shake off the yoke of the Habsburgs and realize their national claims5). The Russian Foreign Minister also sought to influence Romania,

1) Without 1½ divisions in Iwangorod and Brest-Litovsk, which are included in Volume II, p. 373. — Korolklow, Overview, p. 5/6, assumes only 47½ infantry divisions. How his calculation came about is not known.  
2) Korolklow, March-Iwangorod, p. 5. — 3) Korolklow, Overview, p. 5/6. — 4) Korolklow, Overview, p. 14 and 17.  
5) On the German side, a brigade of the 38th Infantry Division was mistakenly assumed (cf. p. 426). — 6) Paleologue, I, p. 131.

Page: 431 keyno: 056

Measures of the Russians until September 19.

so that it occupies Transylvania and together with Russian troops the Bukovina).

At the "Northwest Front" there were a total of 32½ infantry and 10½ cavalry divisions available). By September 17 at the latest, General Ruzki, the new commander-in-chief, had learned that the German pursuit against the Njemen had been halted; earlier German forces had been observed retreating there. At Mlawa, however, an enemy reinforcement was reported. Since then, General Ruzki was certain that the Germans would now continue their attack from East Prussia southward. Here, alongside the Russian 2nd Army, which had not yet recovered from the blow at Tannenberg, there was only the also depleted and not yet fully assembled 1st Army. Thus, the commander-in-chief of the Northwest Front decided, to prevent the danger of a new defeat, to retreat with the left wing to Bjelst (40 km south of Bjelostok), abandoning the Narew line. West of this, only the "Warsaw Detachment" (3 reserve and 1¾ cavalry divisions) was to hold the area around this city and the fortress of Nowogeorgiewsk. "Under strong enemy pressure," however, General Ruzki also wanted to abandon Warsaw and then strengthen the garrison of Nowogeorgiewsk with one of the two divisions there to two divisions, and with the other to retreat to Inwangorod. The Russian supreme command agreed with these intentions; the Grand Duke himself was with his general staff on September 19 in Bjelostok with General Ruzki. The movement was already underway when finally the commander-in-chief of the Southwest Front raised serious concerns about such an exposure of his flank. General Iwanow was concerned that his planned advance on Krakow would pose a threat to his rear. This may have been influenced by reports of the appearance of German infantry on the Warthe near Kolo and Sjerads and the arrival of "37 troop trains daily" in Tschenstochau). Therefore, General demanded

1) Russia in World War, p. 178ff.  
2) Of the 34½ infantry divisions listed in Volume II, p. 370, 6½ (XIII and XV Corps and 1½ 2./5. Landw. Div.) had been destroyed or dissolved. In return, the Northwest Front was reinforced by 4½ infantry divisions (II Caucasian Corps, 64th and 11th Siberian Rifle Division, 2nd Turkestan Brigade) and the 4th independent cavalry brigade. — Korolffow, in World War, p. 3/4; he does not say how these numbers are calculated.  
3) La Grande Guerre, pp. 238, 273 and 293f.  
4) Korolffow, World War, p. 13, and Warsaw-Inwangorod, p. 10f.

Page: 432 keyno: 057

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

Iwanow, that the army group of the Northwest Front not only remained standing, but that it supported the attack of the Southwest Front on Krakow by simultaneously advancing on Warsaw and Breslau.

Now the Russian Supreme Military Command saw itself compelled to intervene. The 2nd Army had already retreated with its main forces to the line Lomsha–Malkin, the II Siberian Corps, which had been annulled to the army, began unloading in Kleßtschel, and on the lower Narew, only one infantry regiment remained in the bridgeheads of Ostrolenka, Roshán, and Pultusk. On September 22, the Grand Duke traveled with his advisors to a meeting with the commanders-in-chief of both army groups in Cholm, the headquarters of the Southwest Front. He looked with concern at the situation on the border against East Prussia. Against General Iwanow's intention to now advance strong forces on the left bank of the Vistula, he had reservations due to the high water, as there were no solid bridges above Warsaw. However, he complied with the wishes of the Southwest Front insofar as he ordered the retreat of the Northwest Front to be halted in view of the likelihood of a German operation "against the middle Vistula" and envisaged strengthening its left wing near Warsaw with two other Siberian corps. At the same time, the Southwest Front was to move an army of three corps and a cavalry division to Iwangorod. Thus, everything was initially set for defense on the Vistula.

General Iwanow designated three corps (Grenadier Corps, XVI, and III Caucasian) already pushed into the second line by the San high water to Iwangorod and initiated their shift on the eastern bank of the Vistula by foot march and rail northward, while the Ural Cossack Division took the same from the south west of the river. Among the tasks of this new 4th Army was the cover of Sandomir and the support of the Southwest Front against the north (Lomsha–Ziechomow) mentioned first. Meanwhile, reconnaissance by the evening of September 24 revealed the appearance of considerable German forces in the line Sieradz–Noworadomsk–Miechow. General Iwanow now reckoned with the possibility of a German attack from this direction against the middle Vistula, where they – as he thought – had already been on September 29.

1) Danilow, p. 281/82. – 2) Ibid, p. 296.  
3) Korolíow, above, p. 22. In doing so, the VI, XII, and XIX army corps should be established. The latter two numbers are probably attributable to the 8th Cavalry Division, to which a brigade of both peace corps belonged.

Page: 433 keyno: 058

Russian Southwest Front until October 5.

could begin, while the Austro-Hungarian army from Tarnow-Jasło could launch its attack by October 1st at the latest. The Russian Supreme Army Command initially held a different view. That strong German forces were actually present at the Silesian-Polish border did not seem proven to the Grand Duke, and even less so that the appearance of these forces was connected to a weakening of the German armies in East Prussia. Even on September 25, he still primarily expected a German offensive from East Prussia towards the south. There, General Russki had meanwhile withdrawn his 2nd Army further east despite the directives issued in Cholm, but now wanted to proceed with an attack using the 1st and 10th Armies, the right wing of his army group, to halt the German offensive feared by the Grand Duke.

In this situation, General Ivanov emphasized his completely divergent view by reporting to the Supreme Army Command his intention to timely evade any potential enemy advance in order to regain operational freedom. For this purpose, he wanted to withdraw behind the river sections of Vistula, San, and Tanew, and in Galicia only hold Lemberg, to either defend or to break out in a general attack after regrouping forces. These extensive withdrawal intentions met with "the most unfavorable reception imaginable"¹) from the Grand Duke; in his view, they did not correspond to the situation, as he was now certain through observation of German railway movements that no stronger German forces had been transferred from the French to the Russian front. Above all, a withdrawal at the Southwest front was highly undesirable to him for political reasons. To prevent it, the Supreme Commander went to Cholm again on September 26. The immediate effects of the discussion there²) were that General Ivanov now pushed half of the 9th Army behind the new 4th Army northward on the eastern bank of the Vistula. The encirclement of Przemyśl remained in place, and the defense along the Vistula line was to be conducted actively. It could primarily rely on the small fortress of Ivangorod, which, although abandoned, had been restored to a defensive state and equipped with artillery since August 28. As support for General Novikov's cavalry, strengthened to 5½ divisions (5th, 8th, and 14th Cavalry Division, 4th, 5th Don Cossack Division, and Turkestan Cossack Brigade), the Supreme Commander therefore

¹) Danilov, p. 299.  
²) The decisions made here regarding the continuation of major operations will be discussed later. Cf. p. 457ff.  
† World War. Volume V. 28

Page: 434 keyno: 059

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

the 9th Army forces in the total strength of a corps (Guard and 2nd Rifle Brigade, 80th Reserve Division and independent Guard Cavalry Brigade) were advanced to the left bank of the Vistula, where west of Ivangorod also stood half of the 75th Reserve Division and the Ural Cossack Division. Thus, apart from the Caucasian Cavalry Division of the Northwest Front stationed at Lodz, by the end of September, a total of 2½ Russian infantry divisions and 7 cavalry divisions were on the left of the Vistula. They were to offer stubborn resistance to the enemy with the rifle brigades united at Opatow. It was not until October 3rd that they were ordered by the army group to retreat in view of the great enemy superiority. However, the local commander did not yet consider the situation so serious. But when he began the retreat around noon on October 4th, a costly partial defeat could no longer be avoided. All other troops stationed on the left of the Vistula could be withdrawn across the river without loss.

The danger that the Austro-Hungarian army feared from immediate Russian pursuit, especially from the Russians' overtaking advance on the left bank of the Vistula, had actually not existed since mid-September. The heavy losses suffered by the Russians in Galicia, the slowness of their movements, the high water of the Vistula and San, but above all the German victories in East Prussia, had decisively relieved the allied army. A German operation from East Prussia on Siedlce, as initially intended by the Hindenburg-Audendorff High Command, could not only have cleared the way in the second half of September but also had great consequences; it could have brought Warsaw and the middle Vistula probably into the hands of the Central Powers. The view of General v. Conrad that the effect of such an operation would have come too late can no longer be considered correct today.

The transfer of German troops from East Prussia to the Austro-Hungarian front came as a surprise to the Russians; what purpose was associated with it remained "initially a mystery," as General Danilow, the then Quartermaster General and Chief of the Operations Department in the Russian field army, writes1). The blow that the allied armies of the Central Powers planned for the first half of October west of the Vistula has

1) Danilow, p. 297.

Page: 435 keyno: 060

9th Army — Situation on October 5th.

the restraint of the Russians deprived them of ground. The success at Opatow, though welcome, was of little significance for the overall situation and remained the only outwardly prominent result of this campaign phase. Nevertheless, the Russian advance was initially halted, and thus time was gained for the German supreme command in the East without deploying new forces. The political impression made by the advance of German troops deep into Poland was also noteworthy.

2. The Shift Northward until October 13th.

a) The Battles before Ivangorod and Warsaw until October 10th.

See Maps 14 and 15.

The battle of Opatow had eliminated uncertainty. It was clear that the enemy could no longer be grasped west of the Vistula. The German 9th Army's high command considered how to proceed with the operations. Continuing the attack across the rain-swollen river was out of the question given the strong enemy. To engage them, the impact of the Austro-Hungarian armies advancing on the right bank towards the San had to be awaited. Meanwhile, the 9th Army's high command had already initiated a shift northward several days earlier, as a counter-move against the increasingly apparent parallel Russian movement. They aimed to outflank the enemy if possible. However, whether they would still be strong enough to attack if successful was questionable. Perhaps they had to be content if they managed to draw as many Russian forces as possible to the northern flank, thereby easing the impending attack of the Austro-Hungarian army. General v. Conrad hoped to force a decision by swinging his 2nd and 3rd Armies northward, with the German 9th Army serving only as flank cover or as a "pivot" according to his view).

Based on the early reports available by October 5th, the German 9th Army's high command assumed that the Russian 9th Army, with at least three corps (XIV, XVIII, and Guard Corps), was positioned behind the Vistula line Sandomir—Josefow; further north, however, up to and including Kasimierz, parts of the Russian 4th Army (XVI and Grenadier Corps) had been newly identified. It appeared that this army

1) Conrad V, G. 21, 22 and 41.

Page: 436 keyno: 061

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

still north of the 9th; it then had to reach Ivangorod. This, except for two works on the western front, outdated military site was indeed abandoned as a fortress before the war, but not yet dismantled. It could still offer the enemy a strong base and secure river crossing.

Generaloberst v. Hindenburg decided to block the Vistula south of Ivangorod with weaker forces, hoping that the advance of the Austrians and Hungarians would soon enable the crossing there. They had, including the garrison of Przemysl, at that time 45½ infantry divisions (including 1 division and 14 brigades of Landsturm), which, as was assumed at the time, still faced about 47 to 48 Russian divisions south of the San estuary. Generaloberst v. Hindenburg wanted to direct the main focus of the German operation against Ivangorod or further downstream.

On October 6, the corps of the German 9th Army were moved northwards from the general line San estuary—Radom, while from the southern adjoining group of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army, four infantry and one cavalry division moved in almost the opposite direction at Sandomir behind the retreating enemy to the southeast across the Vistula to meet with the main forces of their army.

The Austro-Hungarian military leadership was continuously informed about the events at the German 9th Army by Captain v. Fleischmann. Furthermore, the continuation of operations on October 6 was thoroughly discussed with Colonel Slameczka, sent by General v. Conrad. The colonel reported that the mass of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army intended to defeat the "enemy (Russian XIV Corps) pinned in the San-Vistula angle" and that the other Austro-Hungarian armies were also advancing. Based on new reports about the enemy, General v. Conrad, however, already considered the possibility of a timely Russian retreat behind the San later that day. In this case, the main forces of the 1st Army were to advance over the lower San towards Lublin, for which German cooperation in a comprehensive approach on both sides was requested; "an extensive movement downwards Ivangorod, as planned by the German Army Command 9 for three corps," was desired for this.

1) Conrad V, p. 53.

Page: 437 keyno: 062

9th Army — Shift to the North.

There was full agreement between the German and Austro-Hungarian leadership in their understanding and intentions. Initially, however, Generaloberst v. Hindenburg had to decide, albeit with a heavy heart, to grant his troops a day of rest, as they were extremely strained by an uninterrupted, four-day rapid advance, partly with combat. Only on October 8 could the new movements begin, whose first goal was to expel the Russian forces still west of the Vistula and to attack Ivangorod.

The necessary expansion of the German operation to the north also required stronger measures to protect the open left flank of the army. The Frommel Corps alone was no longer sufficient for the tasks to be solved there. New, apparently Siberian troops seemed to be gathering south of Warsaw; they had to be dispersed before they could become threatening. Moreover, Warsaw itself posed a constant source of danger. This city had also been abandoned as a fortress; the works, which enclosed it in a double row with a shorter circumference of over 50 km, were outdated and mostly closed, but according to reliable reports, they had recently been partially re-established for defense. The capital of Russian Poland, with its three solid Vistula bridges, was of even greater military importance, as only a few days' marches north of the city stood the Russian 2nd Army, and good railway connections favored the rapid deployment of additional forces from the interior of the empire as well as from all parts of the Russian front directly to Warsaw. Thus, the question arose of how to deal with this place in the continuation of operations. It was known that the northern Russian armies had resumed their attack against East Prussia since the beginning of October; their forces seemed initially tied there. From the situation at Warsaw itself, reconnaissance and agent reports by October 8 had shown that Gora-Kalwaria, Grojez, Skierniewice were temporarily only weakly occupied. Also, in the city of Warsaw itself, there were supposed to be no strong forces, but only many thousands of wounded and sick, allegedly 80,000 men1); the command of the Russian 2nd Army had been from Warsaw since October 6.

1) The map of the enemy situation on October 5" at Conrad V, Annex 2, shows more troops between Radom and Warsaw and in the city, including "parts of the I Corps". Whether the assessment changed by October 8 or whether it was a different evaluation of existing reports could not be determined.

Page: 438 keyno: 063

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

had been moved to the large fortress of Nowogeorgiewsk. Difficulties from the population were hardly expected in Warsaw; rather, it was believed that their assistance could be counted on. Thus, a coup against the large city seemed promising; something similar had succeeded against Liège at the outbreak of the war. If Warsaw was in hand, the northern flank of the army was secured, and a relief of the German 8th Army struggling against superior forces in East Prussia was expected, and finally, the capture of the old Polish capital with its 800,000 inhabitants and extensive administrative, commercial, and transport connections was also of political and economic significance.

General v. Mackensen received the order on the afternoon of October 8 to "seize Warsaw through a rapid advance." His XVII Army Corps and the Frommel Corps were made available to him; at least one infantry brigade of the XX Army Corps was to follow these forces. Whether the rest of this corps could be deployed in the same direction was not entirely certain given the unclear situation on the Vistula below Iwangorod. In total, at least 4½ infantry and 1 cavalry division could be counted on against Warsaw, while the 21st Landwehr Brigade and the Landsturm Brigade Hoffmann, advanced by the Border Guard of the Deputy V Army Corps, covered the northern flank of the operation at Sieniewicze and Lowitsch.

Thus, in the following days, almost half of the German 9th Army turned against Warsaw, about a quarter against the Vistula at Iwangorod, while the rest blocked the river south of this city to later join the expected advance of the allies.

The Austro-Hungarian armies had meanwhile continued to follow the retreating enemy everywhere. The brave garrison of Przemysl under Field Marshal Lieutenant v. Kusmanek had bloodily repelled three days of desperate attempts by the Russians to capture the fortress before the approaching relief. In the Austro-Hungarian army report, the losses of the attackers were estimated at 40,000 men. For October 10, General v. Conrad set the attack of his right wing (2nd and 3rd Army) against the enemy still standing before the fortress, the 4th and 1st Army were to take the San line below the fortress.

The operations of the German 9th Army led to battles before Iwangorod as well as before Warsaw.

Page: 439 keyno: 064

9th Army — Before Ivangorod, October 9.

Against Ivangorod, the Guard Reserve Corps under General of Artillery v. Gallwitz had been deployed, reinforced by the 3rd Landwehr Division of the Landwehr Corps behind the right, the reinforced 72nd Infantry Brigade of the XX Army Corps (including six batteries) on the left wing. Furthermore, seven heavy mortar batteries (30.5 cm) were promised by the Austro-Hungarian military command, but could only arrive in a few days. The Guard Reserve Corps was instructed on October 8 to "initially advance as close as possible to Nowo-Alexandria—Ivangorod." However, General v. Gallwitz stated in his order for October 9, "no serious attack is intended on this day, neither on Nowo-Alexandria nor on Ivangorod, but it is merely a matter of repelling the enemy's advance troops and reconnoitering the foreland." For this purpose, the two Guard Divisions and the 72nd Infantry Brigade were given a line as a target, which was about 8 km from Nowo-Alexandria and about 10 km from Ivangorod from the Vistula. Northern wing on the Radom—Ivangorod railway. Behind the southern wing, the 3rd Landwehr Division was to follow up.

Meanwhile, new reports reached the Army High Command: In Warsaw, significantly stronger forces seemed to be gathering than previously assumed; at least two fresh Siberian corps had to be reckoned with there. According to another report, the III Caucasian Corps, previously used in Galicia, was to be unloaded in Ivangorod and 20 km northwest of it, at Sobolew. In view of such strength and distribution of enemy forces in the Ivangorod—Warsaw section, Generaloberst v. Hindenburg decided to first concentrate all available forces against the stronger group of the enemy, i.e., against Warsaw, to force a decision there, while smaller forces were to block Ivangorod until the heavy batteries arrived and the attack could begin. According to a corresponding, apparently verbal instruction, a General Staff officer of the Army High Command arrived at the Guard Reserve Corps on October 9 at about 8:30 a.m.; there, the following was recorded about the instruction1): "Guard Reserve Corps should soon close sharply with all means against Nowo-Alexandria—Ivangorod and also against Kozienice, so that no Russian can come out here. Free up everything that can be freed, so that these troops from

1) Underlinings in the record are reproduced in italics. The instruction itself is not in the files.

Page: 440 keyno: 065

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

From October 10, large marches over the Warta could be undertaken1). These troops from the Guard Reserve Corps should take, if possible, the active Guard Division; then deploy at the Vistula from the Landwehr Corps. Aircraft and 10 cm cannons were to target the unloading stations of the III Caucasian Corps.

This directive no longer influenced the actions of the Guard Reserve Corps for October 9. Movements were already in full swing. The idea of now immediately moving closer to the Vistula was prohibited at Iwangorod due to the counteraction of the long-range Russian fortress guns; an extension of the relief over the railway north to the Vistula also seemed impractical, as there was a lack of forces for this section, which was still more than 6 km wide. The 3rd Guard Infantry Division was set for Nowo-Alexandria, which was to march back northwest the next day. This march was questioned if they were pushed further forward on October 9 and perhaps involved in serious fighting. However, the 3rd Landwehr Division was still so far away that its deployment was only considered on October 10. These considerations prompted General v. Gallwitz to leave the previous orders for October 9 unchanged. For October 10, he ordered the relief of the 3rd Guard Infantry Division by the 3rd Landwehr Division in the closing position west of Nowo-Alexandria and the preparation of the former for the march north. He refrained from shifting other forces down the Vistula, as his troops were already spread over a good 20 km; their northern wing was to remain at the Radom—Iwangorod railway.

On October 10 at 4:30 a.m., General v. Gallwitz received another "oral directive from Generaloberst v. Hindenburg," stating that the corps should "not expose itself to heavy losses, not attack, but close the Vistula crossing against offensives from Nowo-Alexandria, Iwangorod, Kotsienice. Concealment in this area. — Mass of the march north! Prepare all dispensable parts at the middle Vistula bend east of Kotsienice," where the high command expected transition attempts with an intercepted radio message. Also, the first Austro-Hungarian mortar batteries expected from October 10 onwards were to continue marching north; whether and when to expect such batteries against Iwangorod remained questionable. Following this directive, General v. Gallwitz believed he should no longer advance the blockade.

1) To be added: in the direction of Warsaw.

Page: 441 keyno: 066

Guard Reserve Corps near Iwangorod, October 10.

Meanwhile, fighting had already begun early on October 10 near Nowo-Alexandria. The enemy had advanced from Kazimjerz across the river to Janowice and simultaneously attacked the 3rd Guard Infantry Division on the road leading west north of Nowo-Alexandria. Parts of the 4th Landwehr Division of Lieutenant General v. Bœgener, which was adjacent to the south, turned against the Russians at Janowice, but failed to drive the enemy back here. The Russian attack was repelled early in the morning by the 3rd Guard Division. Since the division was to be withdrawn and a forward movement of the closing line was not intended, the division commander, Lieutenant General v. Bornin, left at the request of General v. Gallwitz, who was himself present on the battlefield, approved this decision; he deployed the incoming 3rd Landwehr Division to attack the southern flank of the Russians west of Nowo-Alexandria and determined that the 3rd Guard Division should only engage in combat with artillery and parts of its right wing as the situation required.

Upon receiving news of the enemy's attack near Nowo-Alexandria, the army command issued the order at 12:00 noon: "The main thing is to throw the enemy into the Vistula today and clear the western bank. For this, if necessary, the 3rd Guard Division can remain there and does not need to be relieved." Immediately afterward, the commander-in-chief inquired why the 3rd Guard Division was not attacking; everything else must now take a back seat. When this inquiry reached General v. Gallwitz, who was directing the battle separated from his staff, he decided to deploy the division without restriction. However, it was 2:30 in the afternoon before the division commander could issue the attack order; only 2½ hours remained until dark, but 8 km had to be covered in the attack to reach the Vistula. Meanwhile, the pressure from the 3rd Landwehr Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Baron v. König, against the Russian southern flank had already forced the enemy to retreat. In a costly battle that continued deep into the night, Landwehr men, as well as grenadiers and fusiliers of the 3rd Guard Division, supported on the northern flank by the 15th Reserve Brigade of the 1st Guard Reserve Division, drove the enemy back to the bridgehead of Nowo-Alexandria. He finally held only on the heights immediately west of the Vistula on the main road.

1) For Russian activities see p. 459.

Page: 442 keyno: 067

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

West of Ivangorod, the Russians held back. Here, the 1st Guard Reserve Division had extended with the northern wing up to the railway, while the 72nd Infantry Brigade of the XX Army Corps had been moved north to counter expected enemy crossing attempts at Krosniew. The radio message, through which the Army High Command had knowledge of them, had already been intercepted on the evening of October 9 and stated that the III Caucasian Corps had received orders that morning to transfer a regiment and a battery to Krosniew. Consequently, by 7:30 p.m., the telephone order had been issued to the Guard Reserve Corps to occupy the place immediately. However, this order did not reach the General Command until the morning of October 10 for unclear reasons. Thus, the departure of the 72nd Infantry Brigade could only be ordered on that day at 5:45 a.m., and its commander, Major General Schaar, finally set out with the foremost infantry at 8:45 a.m., more than 13 hours after the departure of the radio message ordering the movement from the Army High Command. At noon, the brigade engaged in battle at Samowoshe against an opponent who had already entrenched himself in a bridgehead-like position here¹). The battle remained undecided until the evening.

For the operation against Warsaw, the German Army High Command had recommended to General v. Mackensen on October 8 to deploy his troops — initially only the XVII Army Corps and the Frommel Corps with the 8th Cavalry Division — north of the Pilitza on October 9, so that on the 10th, with very strong marching performance in several columns, they could reach the line Piaseczno-Nadarzyn (about 13 km from the outer fortifications and 20 km from the center of the city of Warsaw) and begin the attack on the city itself on the 11th. If the operation did not succeed as expected, Warsaw should be sealed off on the south side, the railways leading from Skierniewice and Lowitsch should be sustainably destroyed, and as strong forces as possible should be prepared for crossing the Vistula at Gora-Kalwaria. But shortly after the departure of this order, a Russian radio message came into the hands of the Army High Command on October 8 at 9:00 p.m., which already

¹) According to Russian sources, a Caucasian infantry brigade. See also p. 455.

Page: 443 keyno: 068

General v. Mackensen before Warsaw, October 8 to 10.

mentioned) — changed. The II Siberian Corps was in Warsaw and was

to connect with the XXIII Corps of the 2nd Army, which was

half destroyed at Tannenberg, now presumed northwest of Warsaw. What

other reports came in could not be confirmed. However, a situation report

presented to the Guard Reserve Corps during the oral instruction on the

morning of October 9 showed the High Command's view at that time:

Almost 50 km southwest of Warsaw, at Grojec and Mszczonow,

the four battalions were in trenches, with heavy artillery also deployed at

Grojec; the situation between both places remained "unclear". Southwest

of Przasnysz stood the Russian I Corps; the II Siberian Corps,

beginning a new deployment, gathered south of Warsaw. Such strength

of the enemy at Warsaw forced the strengthening of the left army wing,

as Warsaw was the key to the Russian Vistula front.

Not only the two available brigades of the XX Army Corps

were to follow there, but also parts of the Guard Reserve Corps if possible.

To address the increasingly felt lack of cavalry on

the northern flank, the Army High Command turned on

October 10 to the allied army command, where eleven cavalry divisions

were still standing in and behind the front, without any prospect of

appropriate use. General v. Conrad willingly provided the 3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions

and placed them under Field Marshal Lieutenant Edlen v. Korda, the

commander of the 7th Cavalry Division, on October 11 to march on Radom.

It was agreed that the Habsburg Monarchy must have an interest in

seeing Austro-Hungarian troops involved in the potential capture of the

capital of Poland.

Meanwhile, the first clashes had occurred before Warsaw:

General of Cavalry v. Mackensen had advanced with the

XVII Army Corps and the Frommel Corps in a 15 km wide front to the

north and had on October 9 pushed his sharply advanced right wing, the

35th Infantry Division, between a newly reported enemy unit at the

Vistula near Gora-Kalwaria and the Russians in fortified positions at Grojec. The

1) p. 439. — 2) The combat readiness of most divisions was still greatly   
reduced after heavy losses in the initial campaign (communication   
from the war archives).   
3) Conrad V. p. 167 (Letter from Minister Count Berchtold to General   
v. Conrad), pp. 168 and 217 (Response from the General).

Page: 444 keyno: 069

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

The 13th Siberian Rifle Regiment<sup>1</sup> standing alone at Grojez was able to somewhat timely evade the comprehensive attack of the German 36th Infantry Division advancing behind the 35th on October 10, but then fell into the hands of the Landwehr Division Bredow advancing further west and lost about 2500 men and six guns as prisoners.

Meanwhile, General v. Mackensen had learned from the Army High Command that aircraft had identified a Russian bridgehead and troops on the eastern bank of the Vistula near Gora-Kalvaria; countermeasures were inevitable. In addition to the cavalry of the XVII Army Corps, the half of the 41st Infantry Division advancing from the south at the end of the XX Army Corps, reinforced by the 87th Infantry Brigade of the 35th Infantry Division, was to turn against Gora-Kalvaria. However, the latter division had meanwhile been attacked south of Piasieczno by Siberian riflemen<sup>2</sup>. It could no longer withdraw its 87th Brigade from the action, so that finally only half of the 41st Division (74th Infantry Brigade) under the division commander, Major General Sonntag, marched against the new Russian bridgehead. After about 50 km of daily marching, it reached the area 15 km southwest of Gora-Kalvaria on October 10, only around 11 p.m. The XVII Army Corps and the Frommel Corps were positioned this evening in a width of about 10 km south of Piasieczno, where the enemy had been pushed into defense but still held, halfway to Mschtschowno—Nadarzyn. Behind the XVII, half of the XX Army Corps (37th Infantry Division) had immediately followed over Grojez. On the western flank of the Mackensen group, the 8th Cavalry Division was set against the enemy marching from Skierniewice to Warsaw. The 21st Landwehr Brigade had reached the area of Rawa, the Landsturm Brigade Hoffmann Glowno (halfway Lodz—Lowitsch).

Important Russian documents were captured on the battlefield of Grojez on October 10. From them, it was immediately deduced that at least 4 Russian corps (I, II, XXIII, II Siberian) were to be expected in the Warsaw area, with at least 1½ on the western bank of the Vistula, others at the crossings of Gora-Kalvaria above, and at Jablonna below Warsaw. The most significant of the captured documents was an order revealing the overall intentions of the Russian leadership and the distribution of their forces at

Page: 445 keyno: 070

9th Army — Changed Situation on October 10.

b) Discovery of Russian Attack Intentions and Battles from October 11 to 13.

Including Map 15, Sketches 8 and 9.

The headquarters of the German 9th Army had been moved from Kielzy to Radom on October 9. The Russian attack operations across the Vistula, whose focus was increasingly extending northward, and the reports of newly arriving reinforcements of the enemy near Warsaw had raised increasing doubts about the success of further attacks. The focus of military operations shifted more and more to the left for the own army, into the area of Warsaw, while a corresponding relief occurred at the Austro-Hungarian front. An effective blockade of the 180 km long Vistula stretch from the San estuary to Warsaw had so far only been successful south of Iwangorod. West of this place, west of Nowo-Alexandria, at Iwangorod itself and at Kosienice, the enemy was still on the west bank of the river. At Kasimierz, it might have been just a diversion attempt, as a bridge had not yet been built there; at Nowo-Alexandria, however, where the Russian Grenadier Corps was stationed, flyers reported a bridge, and at Iwangorod, where the III Caucasian Corps and reserve divisions were stationed, two of them including the railway bridge; at Kosienice, no bridgehead had been established so far, but at Gora-Kalwaria. At Warsaw, two new Siberian corps had already been reported on October 9, east of the city the enemy had at least three divisions available by October 10 and was still reinforcing. Whether it would be possible under these circumstances to capture Warsaw seemed quite doubtful. There was no doubt that the enemy was carrying out a major reorganization of his forces; one had to be prepared for a general attack to begin soon. In this situation, the order captured at Grojec in the evening brought surprising clarity. Four Russian armies, the 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 9th, were gathering behind the Vistula from the San estuary to Nowogeorgiewsk to advance, and were largely already ready to do so. The focus of their

1) The document itself could no longer be found in the files, but only an associated sketch reproduced here as an attachment (Sketch 8) and some other less important captured pieces.

Page: 446 keyno: 071

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

The attack seemed to be on the northern flank, where the 2nd Army was preparing with at least five corps (I., II., XXIII., XXVII. Corps and II. Siberian Corps, perhaps also IV. Corps, as well as I. and IV. Siberian Corps), now advancing over the line Nowogeorgiewsk—Plitza-Münchung in a generally southwestern direction, northern flank towards Lodz, to attack. South of the 2nd Army, the 4th Army (Grenadier, XVI., XVII. Corps, III. Caucasian Corps, 75th and 81st Reserve Division) was to advance with the southern flank on Starhyslto (== Bzin), south of Iwangorod the 9th Army (Guard, XIV., XVIII. Corps, 60th, 82nd Reserve Division) and apparently also the 5th Army. With such a distribution of forces by the enemy, the hope dwindled that the German 9th Army could still succeed in attacking the Russian northern flank to achieve victory. However, it had now attracted such a strong enemy that the way seemed paved for the advance of the Austro-Hungarian army. Generaloberst v. Hindenburg had to be content if he managed to hold off the overwhelming enemy on the Vistula front long enough for the allies to achieve victory.

The Austro-Hungarian army now had only the Russian 3rd and 8th Army and the "Siege Army" formed from contributions of both, previously used against Przemysl, in front of its front on the right bank of the Vistula. The enemy had abandoned the encirclement of the fortress and retreated to the northeast and north. The Austro-Hungarian army command had set its 2nd Army on Lemberg in the south, the 3rd and 4th in a more northern direction. The 4th and 1st Army were to overcome the lower San in the attack. The execution of this enterprise had already been somewhat delayed and was now set for the night of October 11th. The Austro-Hungarian and also the adjoining German troops (XI. Army Corps) standing below the San mouth on the Vistula were initially to participate through feigned operations, but then also to cross over themselves and carry the attack on the eastern bank northwards. For this, the German XI. Army Corps and the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the 22nd Infantry Division, already on the march to Swoleń as army reserve, were subordinated to the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army from October 11th. The San was swollen high from rain, the swamp area east of its mouth at the time of the autumn rains as particularly

1) The following information is compiled from the reports and situation maps of the Army High Command.

Page: 447 keyno: 072

9th Army — Threatened by Overwhelming Attack.

It became increasingly difficult for the German High Command to determine whether the allied 1st Army could ultimately carry out the attack across the San, and even if the crossing succeeded, a relief of the German front on the Vistula was only to be expected gradually, as several Russian positions had already been identified on the eastern bank of the Vistula below the San estuary, including those facing south. However, if the 1st Army's operation stalled, one had to wait until the attack of the other Austro-Hungarian armies became noticeable. This could take a week or more.

The German 9th Army was now likely to rely on its own strength for an extended period against a numerically superior enemy. Everything depended on preventing a surge of Russian masses accumulated east of the Vistula from crossing the river, especially from Warsaw and Nowogeorgiewsk. The main threat lay on the northern flank. To free up troops for this, one had to manage with minimal forces further south. The enemy had to be pushed back across the river here, their bridgehead destroyed, and the crossing points blocked. At Ivangorod, Nowo-Alexandria, Kosienice, and Groz-Kalvaria, the attack against the Russians on the west bank was already underway. According to the captured Russian camp map, another bridgehead at the Pilitza estuary seemed to be in question, against which forces were also deployed. It was hoped that the attacking power of German troops would succeed in throwing the enemy into the river at all five points.

The situation at Ivangorod was more difficult. Of the expected Austro-Hungarian mortar batteries, the first had turned north, and others had not yet arrived¹). For the time being, one had to be content with defense behind the Russian bridgehead position, which lay in a river bend and was over 10 km wide, with Fort Dammowist providing strong support. Whether this defense could be maintained long enough with the available forces was questionable.

Against the enemy at Warsaw, immediate cooperation of the German 8th Army, which remained in East Prussia, might now have been considered, similar to how Generaloberst v. Hindenburg took over the

¹) p. 439 f. — They were ultimately not deployed at all due to the escalating situation (Conrad V, p. 127).

Page: 448 keyno: 073

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

“Overall command of all operations in the East”) had been considered. However, after having to initially abandon this plan at the end of September, he did not return to it later“). It turned out to be impossible to manage operations of another army far away in the East from southern Poland alongside the difficult operations of one's own army. In Warsaw, the only option left was to try to push the enemy back behind the outer fortress belt with the available forces. For a certain time, a defense seemed possible, but not its duration.

The uncertainty of the situation before Iwangorod as well as before Warsaw prompted preparations for a possible retreat. General Ludendorff and Lieutenant Colonel Hoffmann, his first assistant, were particularly convinced that thorough destruction of all transport facilities could significantly slow down the enemy's pursuit, perhaps even bring it to a complete standstill temporarily. Only in this way could one hope, if retreat became necessary, to regain distance from the enemy and operational freedom. To achieve such an effect, however, extensive work had to be done in the Polish area, which was poor in transport facilities. It was advantageous that preparations for their re-destruction had already been made simultaneously with the restoration of the railways and bridges. But even with these, one had to march early, accepting the unfavorable impression on the fighting troops and disadvantages for the supply. The demolition of the cross railway Lodz—Bzura had already been ordered to protect the flank when the advance against the Vistula was still ongoing. The main supply railway of the army, the double-track line via Kielzy—Radom to Iwangorod, had just become passable up to Bzura and was supposed to reach Radom by October 13. However, for the last 25 km before Iwangorod, destruction was now ordered, although the attack against the fortress had to be definitively abandoned, which made it more difficult. Further north, the railways from Siernewize and from Lowitsch to Warsaw, which were irrelevant for the army's operations anyway, were to be thoroughly destroyed, starting as publicly as possible. Corresponding instructions were already issued on the evening of October 10“), because from that point on, it was clear what had to come.

1) p. 414. — 2) See also p. 417 and 506f.  
3) For more details see “The German Field Railway System”, Volume I, p. 159ff.

Page: 449 keyno: 074

Guard Reserve Corps near Ivangorod, October 11.

On both sides of the Vistula near Ivangorod, the attack to drive the enemy from the western bank continued. The army command had ordered support for the 4th Landwehr Division by the Guard Reserve Corps, on whose right flank the 3rd Landwehr Division was fighting, for October 11. The measure was unnecessary when the advancing units of the 4th Landwehr Division found the western bank of the Vistula at Kazimierzsh already cleared of the enemy on the morning of October 11. The troops of the 3rd Landwehr and the 3rd Guard Division took the bridgehead of Nowo-Alexandria and captured prisoners. At both locations, the Russians had withdrawn their troops to the eastern bank as much as possible during the night, but at Nowo-Alexandria, the Grenadier Corps still lost more than 3000 prisoners and 17 guns. The bridges had been destroyed by the Russians, the one at Nowo-Alexandria apparently having been rendered unusable by a hit from German artillery beforehand. Thus, the threat south of Ivangorod was eliminated, and the active 3rd Guard Division, albeit after considerable effort and losses, was free for use elsewhere since the afternoon of October 11. Overall, the battles at Kazimierzsh and Nowo-Alexandria cost more than 2000 men.

At Ivangorod itself, the enemy remained calm, although two bridges and the fortifications on the western bank of the Vistula offered favorable crossing and deployment opportunities. Aerial reconnaissance had indicated that no large troop concentrations were present in the fortress area. However, the closure of its western front had not yet been completed in its northern parts. Here, the Vistula flows through a wide lowland, which had been partially turned into a swamp by rain. The river itself is accompanied on the left bank by a high embankment, which blocks the view of the water surface and the eastern bank and simultaneously offered a strong defensive position. From this embankment, one was still several kilometers away; at Kosienice, a stronger enemy held it occupied over a width of about 7 km. Major General Schaer had only been able to achieve minor successes with his 72nd Infantry Brigade by the evening of October 11. They faced the Russians head-on, even being partially outflanked by them. Reinforcement was urgently needed if the stubbornly resisting and probably increasingly reinforced enemy was to be driven away.

1) C. 441. — 2) For more details on the enemy, see C. 459f.  
3) Krow. C. 145. — regarding the effect of German artillery against the railway line, see C. 493.

Page: 450 keyno: 075

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

General v. Mackensen had wanted to continue the attack on Warsaw on October 11, despite the stronger enemy forces identified there, focusing on the right wing of the XVII Army Corps. At the same time, however, he had to decide to turn the 1½ divisions of the XX Army Corps, which had meanwhile been assigned to him, eastward against the Vistula, where a bridgehead at the Piliza estuary was expected according to renewed Russian orders. To prevent this, the commanding general of this corps, General v. Scholtz, had already received orders from the army high command. General v. Mackensen also instructed him to turn right with the enemy at Gora-Kalwaria, as this was of decisive importance for carrying out the attack on Warsaw. However, after the marching efforts of the last few days, the attack at Gora-Kalwaria did not get underway so soon. The half 41st Infantry Division (74th Infantry Brigade) detached here had already set out again after a short rest at 6 a.m. and only engaged the entrenched enemy on the western Vistula bank after a 15 km march at noon. Later, extending on both sides, the 37th Infantry Division (without the Infantry Regiment 147 of the 73rd Infantry Brigade sent against the Piliza estuary) joined the battle. But then the approaching darkness forced the postponement of the attack to the next day.

Meanwhile, the XVII Army Corps and the Frommel Corps encountered stubborn resistance in their advance on Warsaw on October 11. The enemy strengthened at Piasieczno. Thus, the attack of the 35th Infantry Division made little progress here, and the place itself remained in Russian hands. The 36th Infantry Division and the Bredow Division were also only able to push the Russians back into the woods northeast and north of Nadarzhyn. The 35th Reserve Division, whose advance had first loosened the enemy in front of the Bredow Division, fought its way to Brwinow (halfway between Nadarzhyn and Blonie) and gained the Warsaw—Skierniewice railway line. By the evening of October 11, they had come within about 10 km of the outer fort belt of Warsaw. The army high command had already indicated on October 11 that it was no longer a matter of capturing a city, but rather of pushing the enemy into the city and enclosing them there. Accordingly, General v. Mackensen had ordered to exploit tactical successes further.

1) According to Korolkow, Warsaw-Ivangorod, p. 101, the 5th Siberian Division fought here; it lost a total of about 5000 prisoners and 20 guns (cf. note p. 451).

Page: 451 keyno: 076

General v. Mackensen near Warsaw, October 11.

the rest, however, to set up a defense in the general line Piaseczno—Brwinow.

The left flank initially remained uncovered; Blonie and the railway Warsaw—Lowitsch

had not yet been reached. The 8th Cavalry Division, deployed in this direction,

had been fighting against the enemy identified at Skierniewice for two days;

however, it had not succeeded in diverting him to Warsaw1). The division,

with heavily fatigued horses, was still about 10 km east of Skierniewice on

October 11, in the same area it had reached on the 8th. Lieutenant General

Woyrsch had continued the march with the 21st Landwehr Brigade to Skierniewice;

the Landsturm Brigade Hoffmann had been subordinated to him and reached Lowitsch.

At the A r m y C o m m a n d, October 11 completed the picture of the

impending Russian attack and simultaneously brought the disappointment

that the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army had postponed the San crossing again

by two days, to October 13, as heavy artillery and bridge trains were not

yet in place due to road conditions. Whether and when to expect the crossing

became increasingly questionable. On the other hand, it became clear that

the Russians north of the San estuary had been greatly weakened. Thus,

the German High Command conceived the idea of now also moving allied

forces northward to strengthen the front against Warsaw. Generaloberst

v. Hindenburg had therefore, on October 11, two divisions from the Austro-Hungarian

1st Army in exchange for the German XI Army Corps subordinated to this army2).

However, General v. Conrad was not in agreement with the deployment of the

two divisions in the direction of Warsaw. He did not want to give his troops

so far out of hand and only wanted them used to free up German forces further

east on the Vistula. The associated loss of time had to be accepted, although

the situation in the north was becoming increasingly tense.

After October 11, at 9 p.m., the German Army Command had expected

that it would be easy to drive the enemy from the western Vistula bank

at S o l e c as well. The Guard Reserve Corps, which was to hand over the

section from Nowo-Alexandria to the Landwehr Corps, was intended for use

against Warsaw. Then an intercepted enemy

1) According to Koroltkow, Warsaw-Ivangorod, p. 99, the vanguard of the   
5th Siberian Division was opposed here; German reports about regiments and 253,   
which were reported here, do not seem to agree. — 2) C. 446.

Page: 452 keyno: 077

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

A radio message was received, indicating that at Rosjienice, where only parts of the III Caucasian Corps had been assumed so far, the Russian XVII Corps would now cross the Vistula on the night of October 12. The situation now appeared serious. It was crucial to deploy sufficient forces to Rosjienice before the enemy could reinforce too much there. At 10 o'clock, the Guard Reserve Corps received orders to march there immediately with as many strong units as possible; however, a field artillery regiment had to remain at the disposal of the artillery-weak Landwehr Corps. The 43rd Infantry Brigade of the 22nd Infantry Division of the XI Army Corps, stationed as army reserve at Swolen, was alerted and also marched north at the disposal of the Guard Reserve Corps. Since their troops were housed in numerous individual farms, it took considerable time before they could begin the march. Meanwhile, General v. Gallwitz had already set the 15th Reserve Infantry Brigade of the 1st Guard Reserve Division and, following it, the 3rd Guard Infantry Division in motion, which, exhausted from the battles of the last two days, had just come to rest. In pouring rain, on muddy roads, mostly with empty stomachs and after insufficient rest, the march proceeded slowly northward through the darkness.

The 72nd Infantry Brigade had received an immediate order from the Army High Command to "absolutely prevent" the Russian crossing of the Vistula; without knowledge of this order, their General v. Gallwitz later ordered them to "evade from the west." He hoped to then effectively flank the advancing enemy from the south. When the troops of General v. Gallwitz arrived on the morning of October 12, the brigade was still in its previous position, only the left flank had been slightly withdrawn by Major General Schaer to avoid being outflanked; his troops were very tired. The enemy, who had held back until now, was now attempting to attack. Major General Schaer sent a corresponding radio message to General v. Gallwitz at 9:40 a.m. and decided to deploy his foremost troops as quickly as possible. Essentially, only a frontal attack remained. The commanding general wanted to focus on the left flank, where he hoped to avoid the enemy encirclement. Initially, however, he deployed the first arriving 15th Reserve Infantry Brigade on the right flank to quickly bring the 72nd Brigade into combat. The advance of the Reserve Brigade took place under particularly unfavorable conditions, leading to heavy losses and ultimately ending in a setback, as the enemy meanwhile attacked

Page: 453 keyno: 078

Guard Reserve Corps near Kosienice, October 12.

also from the expanded bridgehead of Iwangorod along the Vistula

embankment. To the left of the 15th Reserve Brigade, General

v. Gallwitz had positioned the 3rd Guard Infantry Division, with the 43rd Infantry

Brigade as the outermost left wing, on Ispynka-Wolka and northwest.

However, since the Guard Division was marching in the column behind the 15th Reserve Brigade

and its artillery found it difficult to position in the softened lowland,

its attack started late. It encountered the simultaneous attack of the Russians¹)

and soon got stuck in the mire of the Vistula lowland in the face of enemy fire,

the onset of darkness, and continuous rain. By evening, Germans and Russians

were facing each other closely. A continuous Russian position extended

from Siejechow, connecting to the outer defenses of the fortress Iwangorod,

along the Vistula embankment and the western edge of the adjacent villages

up to the Vistula bend northeast of Kosienice. Here, aviators had

identified a bridge built over the Vistula from Pavlonwize. The enemy front

now had a width of more than 10 km. There was no longer any doubt that

quite strong Russian forces had crossed the river; barely detectable and hard-to-capture batteries

supported them from the east bank.

General v. Gallwitz rightly considered the situation serious. A midday

incoming, completely surprising aviator report that the enemy was again

crossing northwest of Nowo-Alexandria with strong forces may have reinforced

the unfavorable perception, and an early inquiry prompted by this report

from the army high command regarding earlier events at Iwangorod

may have had a disconcerting effect. The commanding general wanted to leave nothing

untried and decided, as had meanwhile also been suggested by the high command itself,

to carry out the attack now at night. If the own troops

did not advance, then at least the enemy should be kept in check

and deterred from further actions. Whether orders would be delivered in time

was questionable; the signal "Quickly forward" was supposed to

restart the attack movement around midnight. It

dissipated in the wind and rain of the pitch-dark night. The exhausted,

partly half-submerged, almost frozen from wetness and cold

troops found it impossible to continue the attack; they were literally

stuck in the mud. General v. Gallwitz then ordered the

defense.

¹) For information on the enemy, see page 461f.

Page: 454 keyno: 079

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

On October 13th at 6 a.m., an order from the High Command from the previous evening arrived at the Guard Reserve Corps: "Army High Command orders that the enemy be attacked at the earliest dawn on October 13th under all circumstances and thrown into the Vistula." At the same time, a report from Major General v. Hülsen (43rd Infantry Brigade) arrived, stating that his brigade had pushed the enemy back and was positioned with the left flank on the Vistula. He had the impression that the Russian resistance was now only to be considered minor. General v. Gallwitz was immediately determined to resume the attack, and at 7 a.m. he gave the order for the 3rd Guard Infantry Division and the 43rd Infantry Brigade. This brigade was to advance against the bridgehead and roll up the enemy along the Vistula embankment from the northwest. But soon after, Major General v. Hülsen himself appeared to retract his confident report based on new impressions. General v. Gallwitz was compelled to report to the Army High Command at 9 a.m.: "Yesterday afternoon, last night, and this morning I ordered the attack against enemy positions; it has in no case progressed beyond the initial stage. My subordinates explain that it is not the will of the leaders or the morale of the troops that oppose the execution, but merely the physical impossibility of conducting the attack in the marshy ground and over the swollen streams as necessary against the excellently arranged and well-occupied position of the enemy. The infantry cannot run, only creep; the artillery has already partly stalled, and it has no positions from which the enemy's heavy artillery standing across the Vistula can be effectively combated. I intended to roll up the enemy position from the narrow Vistula side. The general standing there, v. Hülsen, also declares this not feasible, because the troops in their current state, even if they were to become masters of the Vistula entrenchments on this side, would become a victim of the enemy line on the other side and the heavy artillery standing there. I am not lacking in troops, the number is sufficient, but even the position of the Andreykorps can no longer bring any change. I urgently request orders on whether I should order the attack at all costs, for which none of the generals is in a position to vouch for success, or whether I should remain in the position I have chosen or march off for other use, leaving covering troops. — The troops are on their fourth day of operations today and have received only makeshift or no supplies at all in these days."

Page: 455 keyno: 080

9th Army before Ivangorod.

Under these circumstances, Generaloberst v. Hindenburg had to refrain from pushing the enemy back across the Vistula at Kosienice. However, the Guard Reserve Corps was to ensure a complete and seamless closure. This resulted in a defensive front approximately 25 km long for this corps, currently reinforced by two infantry brigades (43rd and 72nd), from south of Ivangorod to north of Kosienice. The enemy was positioned in the fortified foreland of Ivangorod in numerous villages and opposite the Vistula dam. Reinforcements could continuously flow to him over two bridges in Ivangorod (one of which was a railway bridge) and one at Pawlowice.

At the army headquarters, the already mentioned air reconnaissance report from midday on October 12th¹), that the enemy was again crossing south of Ivangorod, near Nowo-Alexandria, had prudently aroused very serious concerns and triggered a series of measures that disrupted the course of operations. From the north, the XX Army Corps had been set in motion to provide assistance, and from the south, the 44th Infantry Brigade of the XI Army Corps was also quickly mobilized, although the corps was at that time under the Austrian-Hungarian 1st Army. In the area of the allied army command, the temporarily severe disturbance of leadership was expressed. Only in the afternoon did reports from the Landwehr Corps clarify that the pilot had mistaken the location — he had observed the crossing at Pawlowice. Captain v. Fleischmann, who had immediately requested the deployment of the Austrian-Hungarian 5th Infantry Division at his army command, reported as justification for this still in the evening²): "The situation was extremely critical. The Landwehr performed poorly³)."

The expected bridgehead at the mouth of the Pilica, against which the 147th Infantry Regiment had already been deployed, seemed to be absent. However, a pilot had already identified the beginnings of a bridge at Ryczywól on October 12th at midday; forced to make an emergency landing by Russian fire, he was only able to deliver his report to the army headquarters on October 13th. The Guard Reserve Corps then received the order at 2:30 p.m. to push back the enemy at Ryczywól with a detachment of all arms. General v. Gallwitz determined that the reinforced 72nd Infantry Brigade, which was thus again in

¹) G. 453. — ²) Conrad V, S. 123.  
³) This was an error caused by the false air reconnaissance report; the Landwehr had not been attacked at all and therefore had not performed poorly.

Page: 456 keyno: 081

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

was supposed to retreat to the area of their army corps. However, it was only ready to march on the morning of October 14 at Rosienitze after being relieved.

Meanwhile, the battles with the Mackensen Army Group continued on October 12 and 13.

The detachment sent by the XX Army Corps to the Pilitza estuary had determined that no crossing was taking place there. At Gora-Kalwaria, the enemy did not wait for the German attack to be carried out, but instead evacuated the western bank of the Vistula during the night of October 12 and broke the bridge. They left 400 prisoners behind. Thus, General v. Scholtz was able to immediately direct his 37th Infantry Division north to support the XVII Army Corps at Piaseczno. However, this movement was not executed, as the army corps — with the exception of the transferred 73rd Infantry Brigade, which was to join the XVII Army Corps — was recalled south by the army command due to a reported new Russian crossing at Nowo-Alexandria. When it was later revealed that there had been an error in aerial observation at Nowo-Alexandria and additionally General v. Gallwitz reported on the morning of October 13 that no success could be achieved at Rosienitze even with reinforcements, the XX Army Corps was initially assigned the protection of the Vistula line Ryczywol — Gora-Kalwaria.

In front of Warsaw, the 35th Infantry Division had taken Piaseczno on the morning of October 12; also on the rest of the front of the Mackensen Group, the troops of the XVII Army Corps and the Frommel Corps had advanced a few kilometers, then began to build positions. On their left flank, the 8th Cavalry Division also only reached about 10 km southwest of Blonie on this day. The marching-weary troops of the General Command v. Brodrück (21st Landwehr Brigade and Landsturm Brigade Hoffmann) were located at Chierniezewo and Lowitsch.

At the army command, doubts arose as to whether it would be possible to hold close to Warsaw without the XX Army Corps, which had turned south; there was particular concern about the extreme left flank. By October 12, at least 2½ enemy corps had been identified south of Warsaw, the I, as well as ½ I and II Siberian Corps. On October 13, Colonel v. Sauvezweig was sent to General v. Mackensen to inform himself on site. He took with him a draft order for retreating to the line Grojez

Page: 457 keyno: 082

General v. Mackensen before Warsaw.

Mischtschonow and ordered behind the Piliza. General v. Mackensen was already in the process of shifting more combat-effective troops to the left flank in response to the changed situation. Despite reports of enemy reinforcements arriving by rail before Warsaw, he viewed the situation confidently and was concerned that retreating would lower morale among his own ranks and increase enemy confidence in victory. He also considered the current position of his troops tactically more favorable than further back. He decided to hold his ground and extend his left flank by bringing in the troops of the General Command v. Brodrhem behind Utrata and Bzura up to the Vistula. There, on the orders of the High Command, the border guard troops of the Deputy General Command of the II Army Corps and the Thorn Fortress were to join the Landsturm Brigade Rintelen at Gombin and the Landsturm Brigade Westernhagen at Wlozlawek. Without being disturbed by the enemy, the shifts began on October 13.

c) Measures of the Russians¹).

See Map 14 and 15.

The Russian Supreme Command was initially prompted to conduct a delaying war due to the state of their armies in mid-September, but the Grand Duke never lost sight of resuming the general offensive. Since he had to reckon with a German advance from Silesia against the middle Vistula, his next goal was to decisively strike the forces expected here. If successful, the way to Germany was open; East Prussia and all major German eastern fortresses could be bypassed in the south. Thus, gradually, from the situation and the exchange of views with the army groups of the northwest and southwest fronts, the plan developed to weaken East Prussia and Galicia and concentrate all available forces behind the middle Vistula for a major strike against the German army in Poland. The already mentioned meeting on September 26 in Cholm²) led to the first directives of the Supreme Command in this direction. The main task of the southwest front was to prepare the attack from the middle Vistula against the upper Oder for an incursion into Germany. To cover the northern flank of this attack, the northwest front army group was already preparing to resume the offensive against the Masurian Lakes.

¹) Connection to p. 433f. — ²) p. 433. — Korolklow, Overview, p. 24 and 31, and Warsaw-Ivangorod, p. 17f.

Page: 458 keyno: 083

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

increase; their 2nd Army was to advance in conjunction with the armies of the Southwest Front from Warsaw, to form an "attack group of ten to twelve corps" on the left bank of the Vistula with the aim "Posen—Breslau").

On September 30, it was learned from the diary of a fallen German officer that of the six corps that had fought at the Masurian Lakes, only two remained in East Prussia, along with some individual divisions and Landwehr brigades. The Russian Supreme Command further estimated a German troop strength of at most four corps in East Prussia, opposed by ten Russian (10th Army), — furthermore, insignificant German forces at Mlawa and Thorn, opposed by more than two Russian corps from the 2nd Army and the Warsaw detachment —, and significant enemy forces gathered in the Lodz—Kielzy area, near Krakow and behind the Carpathians. The group at Lodz—Kielzy was described as "the most dangerous." To defeat them, the Russian 4th, 5th, and 9th Armies were to attack their front from the middle Vistula, with the 2nd Army, reinforced by two to three corps, striking them in the flank from Warsaw. All forces involved in the attack and the Vistula fortresses up to and including Nowogeorgiewsk were placed under the command of General Iwanow.

General Iwanow wanted to wait with the attack until all forces were assembled. He moved his 4th and 9th Armies northwards on the right bank of the Vistula, while assembling the 5th behind them at Lublin, to then advance them by rail into the area between the 2nd and 4th Armies, between Warsaw and Iwangorod. While permanent fortifications on the left bank of the Vistula and advanced defensive positions beyond it secured the advance for the 2nd Army at Warsaw and to a limited extent also for the 4th Army at Iwangorod, such bridgeheads were lacking on the rest of the front. On October 8, General Iwanow had the following, rather false picture of the enemy: 1) At

1) Letter from the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Januschkewitsch, to the Minister of War dated September 28, 1914 (Krahn Archive I, G. 251).  
2) Danilow, p. 299.  
3) Korolkov, Liberbild, p. 28, and Warsaw-Iwangorod, p. 36. — For consistency, only entire corps are counted in this section and further on, without considering individual independent divisions and brigades. The strength of the numerous troops in the Russian deployment is inferred from the appearances of German reserve, Landwehr, and replacement formations with corresponding regiment numbers.

Page: 459 keyno: 084

Russian Attack over the Vistula.

their troops from the XVII and XIX Reserve Corps and the establishment of an XI Reserve Corps, at Kalisch parts of the XVII Army Corps and at least eight Landwehr brigades, in the line Radom—Sandomir troops from the XIX, XX, XI Army Corps, from the Guard Reserve Corps, from the Landwehr Corps and from an Austrian Corps. While, according to significant Russian perception, the Austro-Hungarian forces at Sandomir and on the San were particularly active, further north the German corps seemed to hold back more. General Iwanow believed he had time to establish a broad front on the western bank of the Vistula opposite them; for this, he ordered the crossing of the river by the forces ready until then for October 10. He does not seem to have anticipated serious combat.

Following the advance troops of the 2nd Army south of Warsaw (II Siberian Corps at Siernewize, Mschtschonow, and Grojec), the XXIII1) and II2) Corps, both temporarily assigned to the 5th Army, were to cross the river at Gora-Kalwaria as its vanguard and reach the Grojec—Warta line by October 11. The 4th Army was to cross in the Kosienice—Iwangorod section and, if possible, gain the Jedlinsf—Gwolne—Ilfanka mouth line by October 12, thus taking the entire Vistula bend west of Iwangorod and Nowo-Alexandria as a bridgehead. For this, the III Caucasian Corps was to advance over Iwangorod, the Grenadier Corps over Nowo-Alexandria, and the XVI Corps over Kazimierz.

When on October 9 the Ural Cossack Division, scouting in front of the line, reported the German advance and German artillery took the Russian defensive lines west of Iwangorod under fire in the evening, a brigade of the Caucasian Corps was set to cross further north, over Pawlowice to Kosienice. On the night of October 10, three new Vistula bridges were to be built, but only the one at Nowo-Alexandria was completed by dawn, the one at Kazimierz only by 11 a.m., and the one at Kosienice apparently much later3). Thus, the Grenadier Corps advanced first to the west, and as the XVI Corps was still behind, its southern flank remained uncovered. The grenadiers therefore retreated in the afternoon before the attack of the German 3rd Landwehr and 3rd Guard Infantry Division to the bridge site. In-

1) Previously 2nd Army. — 2) Previously 1st Army.  
3) Korolftow, Warsaw-Iwangorod, p. 89ff., and Overview p. 48ff. — The information from these two sources differs significantly in many details; it has not always been possible to determine which of the two accounts is correct.

Page: 460 keyno: 085

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

In between, the XVI Corps had full success and pushed back parts of the German 4th Landwehr Division with 1 1/2 divisions. From Ivangorod, however, where a solid bridgehead with two bridges and about 3 1/2 divisions (1 1/2 from the III Caucasian Corps, 75th and 81st Reserve Divisions, Ural Cossack Division) could have been available, the attack against the German 1st Guard Reserve Infantry Brigade standing sideways on the other bank was not attempted at all. From the German XVI Corps, a brigade moved under the protection of the fortifications on the left bank of the Vistula along the river to the west, another began the crossing at Pawlowice; General commanded the rest of his troops there. By evening, troops of the 21st Infantry Division, at least of brigade strength, but essentially only infantry, could establish themselves in a bridgehead-like position on the left bank of the river and initially set up undisturbed.

The misfortune of the Grenadier Corps prompted the commander-in-chief of the 4th Army, General Ewert, to relinquish the success of the XVI Corps in the afternoon. He ordered both corps to retreat to the right bank of the Vistula and to dismantle the bridges. Thus, on the morning of October 11, the Russians had only a foothold on the left bank of the river at Kosienice, apart from the bridgehead of Ivangorod itself. However, General Ewert also ordered the retreat and dismantling of the bridge for these parts in the evening. But the commanding general of the Caucasian Corps, who had no enemy in front of him there, nevertheless left his troops on the west bank of the river. When they were attacked during the day, half of the 21st Infantry Division held out, albeit with heavy losses.

The sudden and completely unexpected German attack on Warsaw had brought further serious concerns. The commander-in-chief of the 2nd Army, General Scheidemann, had 2 1/2 corps (I, 1/2 I Siberian and II Siberian) available south of Warsaw on October 11, with more troops stationed in Warsaw (XXVII Corps) or arriving; above all, he counted on the cooperation of the XXIII and II Corps from Gora-Kalwaria. But by the evening of the day, the right wing of the army at Brwinow was in disarray under heavy losses, while support from Gora-Kalwaria failed to materialize, General Scheidemann did not want to engage in further combat against the supposed German superiority. "In terrible hours, the Siberian corps held back the Germans!"

Page: 461 keyno: 086

Failure of the Russian Attack.

At that time, an American war correspondent present in Warsaw wrote1) — "the losses were appalling. Entire regiments were completely destroyed or lost all officers." General Scheidemann led his troops back to the line of the former forts of the fortress on the night of October 12, so that after the severe shocks from the German heavy artillery, they had time to recover2). "The streets of Warsaw" — the American report continues — "were crammed with fleeing or wounded soldiers. Hungry, emaciated troops streamed into the city day and night — all deserters, many without weapons."

At Gora-Kalwaria, where two corps of the 5th Army were supposed to cross the river, initially only one brigade of the Russian XXIII Corps reached the western Vistula bank, as the construction of the bridge dragged on until noon on October 11. By the evening of the day, however, the entire corps had reached the west bank, and the beginning of the II Corps had just begun to cross — when a counter-order from the army group caused them to evacuate this bank again from midnight.

Although the 2nd Army at Warsaw, including the fortress garrison, could have assembled at least four corps by October 12, the Supreme Army Command and the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front were nevertheless seriously concerned about this important place and the execution of the intended attack from there against the German flank. General Ivanov had therefore recalled the II and XXIII Corps of the 5th Army at Gora-Kalwaria to the right Vistula bank, to now set them marching behind the river towards Warsaw. To relieve the 2nd Army, he ordered the 4th Army to continue attacking at Kosienice. On October 12, besides the entire III Caucasian Corps, the foremost brigade of the XVII Corps of the 5th Army, which had just arrived by rail, was deployed, while the 75th and 81st Reserve Divisions were still held back on the right Vistula bank and in Iwangorod. On October 13, the rest of the XVII Corps also entered the battle; at Kosienice and Iwangorod, there were a total of 6½ Russian divisions available against only three German ones. Nevertheless, the Russians barely managed to hold on. The German pressure was so strong that the commanding general of the Russian XVII.

1) Chicago Daily News from late autumn 1914. — 2) Korolkov, Warsaw-Iwangorod, p. 101f.

Page: 462 keyno: 087

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

corps had already ordered the retreat to the right bank of the Vistula by the evening of the day, when the army commander intervened and the movement halted again).

The concern about Warsaw had meanwhile been resolved, for on October 13, the Russians had been able to advance their positions far beyond the fort belt almost without a fight after reinforcements arrived, as the Germans had not followed. The German reconnaissance had missed the temporary complete withdrawal; the works of the fortress and the concern about long-range fire had contributed to this.

3. The Intervention of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army.

a) Negotiations and Events from October 13 to 19.

Including Maps 14, 15 and Sketch 9.

The question of how to continue the operations of the German 9th Army had become pressing since it was known that the Russians were preparing a major counterattack from Warsaw. The situation had become increasingly difficult by October 13: At Ivangorod and northwards, the enemy held the west bank of the Vistula in a front about 25 km wide. There was hardly any prospect of driving them back here for the time being. Two bridgeheads in the area of the fortress and one opposite Rotsizeine gave them the opportunity to quickly reinforce further. In Warsaw, the enemy's resistance and the number of their forces were growing rapidly; flyers reported troop movements on the eastern Vistula bank with foot march and rail in the direction of the city.

Meanwhile, the difficulties for the crossing of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army over the San were also increasing. In view of the unfavorable water and road conditions, it seemed necessary to limit the crossing to the right wing corps of the army. But the 1st Army, advancing further upstream, had not yet crossed the river. General v. Conrad hoped for the effectiveness of the 3rd Army, which was fighting further south. Regarding the distribution of forces, by October 11, the picture had emerged that — not counting the Austro-Hungarian Landsturm Brigades — 35 Austro-Hungarian divisions faced 26 Russian divisions on the right of the Vistula, while on the left of the river, against also 26 Russian divisions, there were only 16½ divisions of the

Page: 463 keyno: 088

Interpretation of General v. Conrad.

Allies1). On October 12, the 1st Army reported, "that a San crossing due to the high water level and the very strong position of the Russians would end in failure"2); under such circumstances, it was considered in Neu-Sandez to use another Austro-Hungarian corps on the left bank of the Vistula, so that only the X Corps of the 1st Army remained on the San. When on that day the already mentioned erroneous air report3) that the Russians were again in full transition at Nowo-Alexandria prompted the German High Command to request support, General v. Conrad immediately sent his northernmost, the 5th Infantry Division, northward and ordered the advance of three more divisions (V Corps of the 1st Army) to the left bank of the Vistula. However, he postponed the crossing of the 1st Army over the San until the intervention of the 3rd and 4th Armies; the latter was to begin the crossing 50 km above the mouth on October 13.

The Austro-Hungarian Chief of General Staff laid down his overall view in a letter he wrote on October 12 to General v. Bolf- franz, the head of the military chancellery of his emperor4): "Now a major Russian offensive from the Vistula in the stretch from the San mouth to Warsaw is likely to begin; hopefully, the Germans, reinforced by parts of our 1st Army, will hold out west of the Vistula long enough for our offensive east of the Vistula to show decisive success."

This view of General v. Conrad was entirely in line with that of the German High Command. The question of how to continue to solve the task on the middle Vistula pressed for a decision.

The hope for German reinforcements from the western theater of war had to be ruled out from the outset. The bulk of the newly formed reserve corps was just marching there to give the overall situation a decisive turn5). On the other hand, since October 11, the newly established XXV Reserve Corps wanted to advance to the 9th Army at Iwangorod, where command had been transferred to General v. Francois on October 4th6). On October 8, in view of the great Russian superiority, he had immediately inquired with Generaloberst v. Hindenburg and also with the Supreme Army Command whether he could count on reinforcements7).

Page: 464 keyno: 089

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

and General v. Falkenhayn, who no longer expected any major successes from the operation in Poland, had designated the only remaining available new reserve corps for East Prussia. Generaloberst v. Hindenburg had not been consulted on this measure, although the 8th Army was under his command; however, he had not raised any objections to the deployment of the XXV Reserve Corps in East Prussia, at that time still unaware of the Russian troop concentrations near Warsaw. He held the view that the extremely important East Prussian territory for the continuation of the war in the East must be held at all costs and considered a retreat to the at that time still incomplete lake line only permissible in the most extreme emergency. The defensive actions led offensively by General v. Francois seemed to tie down significant Russian forces and thus keep them away from the battles on the Vistula. Ultimately, however, the XXV Reserve Corps was the least combat-ready of all the new corps. Its commanding general, General of Infantry Freiherr v. Scheffer-Boyadel, reported on October 10 that the troops were still missing large parts of their equipment, weapons, and gear: "Despite urgent desire to engage the enemy, reserve corps cannot be deemed operational." Such a troop could hardly be used effectively in a mobile war deep in enemy territory.

In the days following October 10, it became apparent that the Russians were indeed moving forces from the East Prussian front to Warsaw, and the situation on the Vistula was becoming increasingly tense. Thus, Generaloberst v. Hindenburg worked on October 13 with the 8th Army: "It must be considered to move a division of the I Army Corps here upon the arrival of the XXV Reserve Corps from East Prussia." General v. François, whose subordinate relationship to the general staff was not entirely clear after all that had happened, responded evasively: "All forces are tied against approximately threefold superiority. Clearing possibly feasible if decision is brought about by engaging new corps." In further inquiries, he reported on October 15 of partial successes at Lop and Schwirnimb: "... Coming to support after weapons success, which is aimed for in the coming days." He only wanted to immediately send two mortar batteries requested by the 9th Army. Thus, the exchange of ideas about bringing forces from the 8th Army to Poland initially broke off again.

At the same time, the already weeks-long existing muni-

Page: 465 keyno: 090

Overall Situation in the East Mid-October.

to make the shortage of supplies felt in the East as well; the supply

flowed more sparsely. The already difficult situation of the German Eastern armies

was further exacerbated by this.

In the middle Vistula, almost everything depended on the intervention

of the advancing Austro-Hungarian forces

since mid-October. Regarding the question of how they should be used on the left bank of the Vistula,

differences of opinion arose between Generaloberst v. Hindenburg and

General v. Conrad: the Generaloberst held

the view that it was possible to keep the enemy in check on the Vistula

above Warsaw with the existing forces, as he was continuously moving

more forces from this section northwards (on October 15, the XVII Corps

was reported as the last). However, at Warsaw, where he was constantly

reinforcing, the situation of the German forces

under General v. Mackensen had to become untenable. Here, the parts of the Austro-Hungarian

1st Army already marching north, especially the I Corps with the 12th and 46th Infantry Divisions,

perhaps also the following 35th Infantry Division, as well as

the Landwehr Corps Rorda, could provide effective assistance if they, together with

these troops, which are currently stationed on the Vistula, were brought forward for an attack

northwards. The direction of the attack was intended to be along the river

towards Warsaw. Such an operation seemed to promise great results, but it was conditional on the

Austro-Hungarian troops involved being subordinated to Generaloberst v. Hindenburg.

The Austro-Hungarian military leadership also recognized the urgent

necessity to reinforce the troops in front of Warsaw, but

in their opinion, German forces should be brought in — if necessary from the West

or from the 8th Army from East Prussia — or an

advance of this army over the Narew should be undertaken. As long as

General v. Conrad was under the impression that there was an immediate danger at Nowo-Alexandria and

Iwangorod, he had readily made available to the German leadership whatever he could; however, he was not willing to

give up further detachments of his own troops. He

believed: The continuous heavy Russian attacks suggested a deployment

of the Austro-Hungarian forces to fill the gap that had arisen in the German

front, which would have meant a disintegration of the same.

1) See C. 6 ff. and 308f. — 2) War Archive Vienna, Study of the Oberstltz. v. Tolly.

Page: 466 keyno: 091

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

On October 15, 1914, it was stated that he envisioned the "intervention of the forces coming from the south not as a frontal, piecemeal confrontation, but as a unified thrust from the south against the flank of the enemy who had crossed the Vistula." This plan was finally clearly expressed in the communication directed to the German High Command the following day, on October 16: "According to the current view, the German army group in front of Warsaw must absolutely hold, while the German group opposite the Vistula line Kasimirsch-Iwangorod-Kozienice can withdraw to the west, thereby opening up the chance for the 1st Army's thrust from the south to the north for a flank attack. A decisive decision here depends solely on this thrust, so it is essential that it be conducted uniformly with all the forces of the 1st Army." The 1st Army was to advance into the Vistula—Radom line but should no longer be weakened by contributions for the defense on the Vistula itself; this task must remain in the hands of the German troops (Landwehr Corps) previously deployed for this purpose.

Coincidentally and completely independently of the Austro-Hungarian plan, which he did not know at all, the commanding general of the Guard Reserve Corps in front of Iwangorod expressed himself in a similar manner to the allied army command in a telephone conversation with General Ludendorff on the afternoon of the same October 16. Based on the situation of his own corps, General v. Gallwitz believed that the attack against the Russian bridgeheads was too difficult. He doubted that a "positive success" could be achieved through the previous "blockade tactics"; it cost time and resources; they must abandon it and consolidate everything for a major strike. The army's quartermaster general, Colonel v. Sauzebveig, held a similar view.

The supreme commander and General Ludendorff thought differently: They believed that the enemy at Iwangorod would probably only cautiously follow across the Vistula and would soon intervene again. Ludendorff also shared an unfavorable effect at this point on the immediately adjacent front of the allies. Since the Austro-Hungarian attack over the San had been delayed day by day, they doubted whether the allied troops, in the event that the Russians really came across the river in masses, had sufficient strength for a counterattack. Thus, they did not share the hopes that General v. Conrad had for the thrust against those "emerging" from Iwangorod.

1) War Archive Vienna, Study of Lieutenant v. Joly.

Page: 467 keyno: 092

The Plan of General v. Conrad.

Russians set. In the war diary of the High Command, it says about General Ludendorff's view on October 16: "Initially, it is quite doubtful whether the Russian will go into the hole left to him west of Ivangorod. If the enemy goes in, only a tactical success could be achieved. It would rather be necessary — by blocking the Vistula in the area of Ivangorod and southwards — to launch a unified and strong offensive over Warsaw with all available forces, including the Austrians. However, since the Austrian 1st Army is not subordinate to the German army leader, the German army command has no influence on the operation. — The Austrian rejection of the connection of troops towards Warsaw forced the army high command to consider a withdrawal of the Mackensen group..." In this sense, a "secret orientation" was issued to General v. Mackensen on October 16, in which it was further stated: It is naturally desirable that the "retrograde movement occurs as late as possible"; the Guard Reserve Corps holds very well at Ivangorod, so no breakthrough is expected there; at least another 48 hours must be held before Warsaw.

The disputes and agreements with the allies increased the difficulties of the situation to an increasing extent and took the workforce of the army high command to such an extent that General Ludendorff and Lieutenant Colonel Hoffmann sharply pointed out this deficiency in a telephone conversation with the Supreme Army Command on October 17. In Mézières, it was recorded "in essence": "The main difficulty in the east lies in the leadership of allied troops. This causes a loss of time, as Austrians are not subordinated. Ordering this from here is hopeless. The Austrian 1st Army would gladly submit to subordination. The main obstacle is Conrad. A direct imperial telegram is urgently needed to achieve the subordination of the Austrian 1st Army under the 9th Army. — Since the 9th Army is in the heaviest fighting against significant superiority, perhaps everything depends on the unity of leadership."

On the night of October 18, the German Emperor worked on Emperor Franz Josef and asked to "immediately subordinate the 1st Army to General Hindenburg for operations in Congress Poland." In Vienna, they did not want to make the decision without hearing General v. Conrad. He sharply opposed the subordination: "The concern that the Imperial and Royal 1st Army could be handed over merely for unilateral German interests, and the conviction that with the subordination under the German High Command 9 in operative

Page: 468 keyno: 093

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

In this regard, nothing would be gained, but with goodwill on both sides, mutual understanding would suffice, determined my view and the response to His Majesty1). General v. Conrad has pushed further reasons to the forefront against General v. Freytag. He reported: General v. Conrad told him that the subordination from the Emperor's side "was not approved, after a subordination of our 9th Army under Austrian command suggested by the Austrian side was rejected by us for reasons that he, Excellency Conrad, by the way, knew how to appreciate"2).

The response from Emperor Franz Josef was sent on October 19 and stated: "Following my order yesterday, to arrange for the support of your 9th Army as much as possible, Archduke Friedrich has instructed the 1st Army Command to advance in full agreement with the German 9th Army High Command against the enemy facing this army." Then followed details about the distribution and strength of the Austro-Hungarian forces in Russian Poland, and at the end it said: "Thus I believe that your valued wish has been fulfilled." The core point of the German Emperor's request, the subordination of the 1st Army under German command, was deliberately3) not addressed. Everything remained the same.

During the duration of these negotiations with the ally, the overall situation, without anything significant happening at the front, had become increasingly unfavorable: Although the Russians had gradually withdrawn ten corps from Galicia, the attack of the Austro-Hungarian army had barely advanced beyond the line where the Russians had halted their retreat. A lack of ammunition had significantly contributed to this. At Chyrow, the Russians even attacked again from October 14; the situation here was particularly difficult, as it had not yet been possible to restore the railway over the Carpathians. Thus, the right wing of the allied army was stuck in the mountains and in front of the Russian encirclement positions east of Przemyśl, its center at the San. The German 9th Army High Command gained the impression from the incoming reports that the allied army no longer had the strength to bring about a decisive turn on the Galician-Polish theater of war through its attack. However, in the extremely tense situation

1) Conrad V, p. 181f. and 220f. — 2) See p. 409.  
3) Letter from General v. Volfras dated October 18, 1914 (Conrad V, p. 220f.).

Page: 469 keyno: 094

Negotiations with the Allies.

To be sure, General Ludendorff on October 17 also obtained the personal opinion of a German General Staff officer assigned to General v. Freytag regarding the Austro-Hungarian attack intentions. The respondent, Captain Häfke, considered "gradual progress of the entire Austrian offensive likely," but the decision would "only be achieved after heavy and prolonged fighting; therefore, the timing is not foreseeable," as they were everywhere facing strongly entrenched Russian positions with too weak artillery of their own. The hope that the Austro-Hungarian offensive in Galicia could soon bring a victory and thus relief for the German 9th Army had to be abandoned. Slow pushing forward or merely holding was not sufficient given the overall situation.

Meanwhile, the situation at the German front had developed as follows:

At the Vistula below Ivangorod, Russian attacks that began on October 14 and were renewed daily had stalled in the swamp and mire of the lowlands and in the German defensive fire, just as the German attacks had previously. Only local skirmishes had taken place, in which the 3rd Guard Division occasionally captured 1000 prisoners on October 16. Otherwise, the combat activity was mainly limited to the artillery on both sides. Since October 18, however, their activity on the German side also had to be restricted due to a shortage of ammunition. The fact that the Russian bridge at Pawlowitze had become unusable for probably two days due to hits from the German 10 cm guns firing with aerial observation could not be exploited given the overall circumstances. The enemy had increasingly reinforced; they were reckoning with six Russian divisions (XVII Corps, III Caucasian Corps, 75th and 81st Reserve Division) on the left bank against only 2½ German divisions of General v. Gallwitz. Thus, one had to be satisfied if it was possible to prevent further advances by the enemy. The extremely unfavorable weather and ground conditions favored the defense but also posed almost superhuman demands on the mental and physical forces of the German defenders. Their losses had grown to about 4000 men, perhaps more, since the beginning of the fighting at this location. North of the Guard Reserve Corps, the reinforced 72nd Infantry Brigade of the XX Army Corps had been at Ryschtynow on October 14 at noon

Page: 470 keyno: 095

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

only encountered very weak enemy forces, which immediately withdrew across the Vistula.

Since then, the corps protected the Vistula front with one and a half, later with only one

infantry division¹), together with the Austro-Hungarian 3rd Cavalry Division, up to Gora-Kalwaria.

Near Warsaw, the troops of General v. Mackensen,

including since October 15 the entire 37th Infantry Division of the

XX Army Corps, held their only advanced positions under local

fighting. Only on the outer flanks did the enemy succeed

in gaining ground. Thus, on October 16, they pushed back a German company defending a

river section at Jefiorna, where they had strengthened themselves. The attempt to

repel the Russians here on October 18 through an attack by the reinforced 87th Infantry Brigade,

including the Austrian 1/2 3rd Cavalry Division, under

Major General v. Hahn, failed. The enemy seemed

by the evening of the day on this flank to have reached the road Gora-Kalwaria—Piaseczno²) and

to have built a bridge over the Vistula west of Karschin behind

this front.

Meanwhile, the Russians also extended their right flank west

of Warsaw, as was assumed, to outflank the German forces there.

They advanced against Blonie and pressed with strong cavalry

even further west against the Utrata crossings, before the 21st Landwehr Brigade,

the Landsturm Brigade Hoffmann, and the 8th Cavalry

Division, which had only slowly advanced, effectively attacked there.

Thus, a series of battles unfolded around the Utrata

section, into which the foremost parts of the active German

36th Infantry Division, advancing from the right flank, intervened east of Blonie on the afternoon of October 14.

At Blonie itself, on October 15, the 21st Landwehr Brigade was shaken by the attack of a far superior

enemy, but the active division under Lieutenant General v. Seinerneck

restored the situation. The town of Blonie was held, but

it was not possible to regain control of the Utrata crossings there;

nor were the German forces nearly sufficient to block the

Utrata and Bzura section west of Blonie to the Vistula, a total of over 40 km of front.

Thus, Russian cavalry

¹) The 73rd Infantry Brigade of the 37th Infantry Division remained with the XVII  
Army Corps (p. 456), the rest of this division was transferred there on October 15.  
²) According to Russian sources, they actually advanced beyond Jefiorna  
(Korolów, Overview, p. 58, and Warsaw-Ivangorod,  
p. 144).

Page: 471 keyno: 096

General v. Mackensen before Warsaw.

— according to German reports, two divisions — on October 17

take Sochaczew. Just on this day, however, the Austro-Hungarian 7th Cavalry Division arrived as reinforcement; it had covered the 180 km

march from the area of Opatow in six days.

Its commander, Field Marshal Lieutenant Edlen v. Rodt, was assigned the

German 8th Cavalry Division. The cavalry corps thus formed drove the enemy out of Sochaczew again on October 18,

but the Russian cavalry did not retreat north from there, but

had, as could be determined with certainty, moved southwest to

Lowitsch and thus remained deep in the flank of the German troops.

During these days of highest tension, General v. Mackensen

was significantly supported in his decisions and execution by his aviators.

They had been able to report on October 16, under favorable weather conditions, that the area west of the Blonje—

Nowogeorgiewsk line was free of the enemy. On October 17, General

v. Mackensen had to prepare the subordinate leaders confidentially for the impending retreat based on the secret directive

of the army high command from that day, because he knew

now five to six Russian corps were in front of the 45 km long front of his

forces, which were only 2½ corps strong. Although the pressure of the enemy

superiority, especially against both flanks, became increasingly stronger,

General v. Mackensen was determined to hold out until the afternoon of

October 19. Only in the night of October 20 was

the retreat initiated in agreement with the army high command after the return of the

wounded, the ammunition and all equipment, and after thorough destruction

of all railway facilities, wire lines, and bridges. General v. Mackensen "disappeared like a ghost and left

behind no gun, no rifle, no cartridge, and only a few unable to march" — as an American reporter wrote at the time. The

next target for the Mackensen group was assigned by the army high command to the

Grojec-Mischtschonow line. The movement there proceeded

without friction and without disturbance by the enemy.

b) The attack of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army at Iwangorod.

For this, see maps 14, 15 and sketch 10.

The advance of the Austro-Hungarian army

in Galicia had gradually come to a complete standstill.

1) Only with the inadequately equipped militia troops with medical units  
were wounded left behind. The Russians reported 500 prisoners.  
2) See p. 461 note 1.

Page: 472 keyno: 097

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

The 3rd Army was initially supposed to push back the enemy east and southeast of Przemysl together with the 2nd Army. Extremely unfavorable weather: snowfall in the Carpathians, rain, swollen watercourses, and bottomless roads hindered the advance. The artillery inferiority compared to the Russians was further exacerbated by difficulties in ammunition supply and replacement.

When the attempts of the 4th Army to cross the San upstream failed, General v. Conrad abandoned the attack over the San on October 17 and switched to defense there. At the same time, the prospect of decisive successes for the 3rd and 2nd Armies shifted from day to day. The 2nd Army defended its right flank only with difficulty against Russian counterattacks, while the 3rd was firmly positioned against the previous encirclement positions of the Russians in front of the eastern front of Przemysl. The hope of General v. Conrad that the attack of the Austro-Hungarian army in the south would halt the enemy's advance over the Vistula in the north was not fulfilled.

In view of the stalemate in their own attack and the simultaneous severe threat to the German left wing near Warsaw, the Austro-Hungarian Chief of General Staff had already had the impression since October 14 that a complete change in the overall situation was being prepared, which would also necessitate a new operational plan. "The direct support of the 9th Army came to the forefront." Three days later, he wrote to General v. Bolfras: "... Now we have no choice but to intervene to relieve the Germans, as their possible defeat would also be a severe disadvantage for us." For this task, he intended to deploy the 1st Army as cohesively and uniformly as possible, after having - according to his already mentioned plan - given the Russians at Iwangorod the Vistula crossing; the X Corps and three cavalry divisions were to follow the remaining parts of the army northwards. Moreover, General v. Conrad had hoped that the German troops on the Vistula above Iwangorod would also remain there so that the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army could carry out the attack without any diversion of forces under their flank protection. Such retention of German troops above Iwangorod had also been envisaged by Colonel General v. Hindenburg on October 16, as it was still about the deployment of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army against Warsaw. Under the now

1) Conrad V, p. 172. — 2) Gfenda, p. 105; see also the overview p. 550 of this volume. — 3) Gfenda, p. 121. — 4) Gfenda, p. 178. — 5) p. 466.

Page: 473 keyno: 098

Preparation for the Deployment of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army.

The completely changed conditions made it impossible for him to comply with Conrad's wishes. He could only secure the indispensable reinforcements against Warsaw if the German southern flank (1/2 XI Army Corps and Landwehr Corps) at the Vistula was relieved by allied forces.

General v. Conrad could not escape the compulsion of this situation, as the Russians also seemed to be shifting more and more forces from the area above Ivangorod northwards. He took over the Vistula security above Ivangorod, which now required minimal forces. Less combat-capable Landsturm units took over the protection here, so that for the attack at Ivangorod, the originally envisaged number of seven infantry divisions was ultimately available; the X Corps, still deployed at the San, could not arrive in time anyway. By October 19, the relief of the German troops was so far advanced that only Austro-Hungarian units stood south of Ivangorod. The German XI Army Corps, including its detached parts, and the Landwehr Corps were to march northwest to join the troops of General v. Mackensen1).

At the headquarters of the German 9th Army, the planned operation at Ivangorod was still considered unpromising2), but efforts were made to help as much as possible. The fiercely contested and blood-soaked ground of the western Vistula bank on both sides of Ivangorod from Kasimierz to Pilica had to be cleared to free the battlefield for the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army. On the morning of October 19, Generaloberst v. Hindenburg asked General v. Conrad what mission this army had and whether the start of their attack could be expected on October 21; it was intended to withdraw the Guard Reserve Corps on the night of that day, with the southern flank moving towards Radom. General v. Conrad replied that on October 21, the space for the advance of the 1st Army would still be too limited, as the southern flank of the German Guard Reserve Corps, as he heard, could only reach Politcze by that day. To capture strong enemy forces, it seemed advisable "to give more space westwards for the attack of the 1st Army; thereafter, coordination in action between the Army High Command 9 and the 1st Army Command will need to be established."

1) p. 485f. — 2) p. 466f.

Page: 474 keyno: 099

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

By the morning of October 20, it became clear that the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army intended to launch its attack on October 22 with the left wing over Jedlnia towards Kosienice. They wished for the Guard Reserve Corps to clear the front accordingly and prepare to participate in the attack at Glowatschow and southwards. When a corresponding order from the German Army High Command reached the Guard Reserve Corps at 9 a.m. on October 20, preparations for the retreat to Radom were already underway. The left of the corps front, particularly disadvantageously situated in the marshy terrain east of Kosienice, had been withdrawn to this location the previous night. The general march was to take place the following night and continue on October 21 in the direction of Radom—Jedlnia1). When the Army High Command, in accordance with the wishes of the allies, demanded that the corps be positioned with the main forces at Glowatschow, and otherwise south of this place by the evening of October 21 to attack on the 22nd, General v. Gallwitz decided to assemble the corps on the left bank of the Radomka in the line Jedlnia—Glowatschow. However, this required a retreat oblique to the previously northeast-facing front; the often marshy Radomka ground with few inadequate and unreliable bridges had to be crossed. General v. Gallwitz saw no possibility of executing this movement on the groundless forest paths, especially at night, given the likely pursuing enemy. Only the left wing, the 3rd Guard Infantry Division, could reach the left Radomka bank in time, while the right wing had to divert via Radom. Additionally, the corps was so exhausted after uninterrupted eleven-day battles under difficult weather and terrain conditions that it urgently needed a day of rest before it could attack again. The Army High Command could not ignore such considerations. It deemed a rapid advance of the Russians unlikely anyway and accordingly changed its directive that the Guard Reserve Corps should clear the front for the Austrians on October 21; on the 22nd, it should "concentrate in the area of Glowatschow and southwards to be ready on October 23 to participate in an Austrian offensive against the Russians, should they advance over the Vistula." Consequently, General v. Gallwitz organized the retreat movement so that by the evening of October 21, the 1st Guard Reserve Division should be accommodated at Radom, and the 3rd Guard Infantry Division northeast of it on the left

1) 40 to 50 km march.

Page: 475 keyno: 100

On the Eve of the Battle at Iwangorod.

Radomka Riverbank up to Glovatschow inclusive. Behind it, the 22nd Infantry Division of the XI Army Corps, which had already fought a brigade with the Guard Reserve Corps, was to reach the area west of Radom according to a command from the High Command, so that it could be on the move the next day if necessary.

On the evening of October 20, in pitch-black night, the German troops withdrew from their positions in front of Iwangorod and at Kozienice, which they had held for almost ten days in heavy and costly fighting. The light beams of the searchlights from Iwangorod and the disruptive fire of long-range Russian guns accompanied them.

The Austro-Hungarian 1st Army under General of the Cavalry Dankl was to be ready for attack on the evening of October 21 with the V and I Corps, a total of six infantry divisions1), in a line extending from the Altanka estuary, southwest past Swolen, to the railway 15 km east of Radom. Behind the center of this front, the 43rd Infantry Division was to stand as a reserve at Ilza. In connection with the right wing, Austrian Landsturm, 35th Brigade, and 106th Division secured at the Vistula. The additional forces, X Corps and three cavalry divisions, which were to advance from the San, were held back there at the last moment, as the Russians had managed to cross a river section previously considered impassable during the flood and establish themselves on the left bank.

But even without the intended reinforcement, which could only have come into effect later, General Dankl had a considerable force in his seven infantry divisions, which since September 9, for six weeks, had undertaken larger marches but had not had to endure any more serious battles. The losses were minimal.

On the morning of October 21, General Dankl informed the German High Command of his attack decision. At that time, he was still unaware that the Guard Reserve Corps would not be ready to attack until October 23. He continued to assume that the Russians would closely follow the retreating German corps and had ordered,

1) I Corps with 5th, 12th, 46th Infantry Division, V Corps with 14th, 33rd, 37th Infantry Division.  
2) The German High Command only learned of this on October 21. Coincidentally, they had crossed the San; the Russian XXI Corps on the night of 17/18, the XI, IX, and ½ X Corps on the night of 18/19 October.

Page: 476 keyno: 101

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

that the V and I Corps were to launch an attack on the morning of October 22nd, with the left wing of the I Corps advancing through Jedlnia at 8 a.m. and further along the main road towards Kosienice. The order for the attack further stated: "The Guard Reserve Corps, which is stationed at and south of Glowaczów, will be deployed as soon as a battlefront forms, to engage the western flank... (followed by information on reinforcements of the Austrian 43rd Infantry Division)... The battle is to be conducted according to the general war situation in such a way that the Russians are defeated by the end of October 22nd."

While General Dankl was thus determined to carry out the thrust against the Vistula with full force on October 22nd, the German 9th Army's high command still doubted that decisive battles would occur on that day. According to reports available by the evening of October 21st, the enemy was only following with advance troops at a great distance. At 6 p.m., Generaloberst von Hindenburg ordered: "The Guard Reserve Corps will be positioned tomorrow in echelon to the left, west of the Radomka, ready to support the Austrians (— presumably on October 23rd)." However, the task of the Guard Reserve Corps had become even more difficult, as other Russian forces were reported to be advancing against the rear of the designated deployment area, from Gorakalwaria along the Vistula and also from the north towards Warka against the Pilitza sector. There, the XX Army Corps, together with the Austrian-Hungarian 3rd Cavalry Division under its command, covered a wide area. This division was positioned opposite Warka on the southern Pilitza bank, with the XX Army Corps itself to the left of it on the main road Radom—Grojec and even further west. For all eventualities, Generaloberst von Hindenburg had also held the 22nd Infantry Division of the XI Army Corps, united at Radom, as a reserve group for October 22nd. The Austro-Hungarian army commander looked forward to the impending attack of his troops with confidence. General Dankl did not doubt a successful outcome and therefore informed the German high command on the evening of October 21st that he had received instructions from his army command to "participate in the operations of the 9th Army on their eastern flank" following a successful advance against Iwangorod. He was already asking for the "prevailing considerations for this operation" to align himself in time.

Page: 477 keyno: 102

The Attack of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army.

to be able to close. If the attack on Ivangorod had the hoped-for success for the allies, there might still be a prospect of cooperation by the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army against Warsaw.

On October 22, General Dankl had his 1st Army advance in a front about 35 km wide, with six divisions in the front line and one as a reserve behind the center. The right wing found almost no enemy in front of it, the center gained ground, initially fighting against weaker enemies, but on the left wing, the Austro-Hungarian 12th Infantry Division encountered resistance at Jedlnia early in the morning, which it could not immediately break. The enemy here was estimated to be a brigade. It had entrenched itself at the western edge of the large forest area, which extends 12 km deep from Jedlnia to the northeast towards Kosienice.

The first report on the situation at Jedlnia was received by the German Guard Reserve Corps at 11:30 a.m. from the Austrian General of Cavalry Baron von Kirchbach on Lauterbach, the commanding general of the I Corps. The report concluded with the sentence: "Intervention of the Guard Reserve Corps with a division from the direction of Glownaczow against Stanislawice is desired, so that the enemy brigade can be completely cut off." However, at this time, the Guard Reserve Corps was not yet in a position to intervene in the allies' battle with stronger forces. The 3rd Guard Infantry Division had been located at Glownaczow and southwest during the night of October 22. The 1st Guard Reserve Division had orders to move into a bivouac area to the left of the Radomka during the course of the day, extending from Glownaczow to 20 km southwest of this place; the 3rd Guard Division was to close ranks accordingly. When the Austro-Hungarian attack order became known, General von Gallwitz instructed these divisions to ensure that "orders of the General Command regarding their alert and readiness are always reachable." Finally, on the morning of October 22, when reports were available indicating that the enemy had spread out on the right bank of the Radomka up to about 20 km from the Vistula to the west, at 9:45, he ordered the 5th Guard Brigade to be ready at Glownaczow, so that it could support the allies' attack in the direction of Kosienice on special orders, while the 6th Guard Brigade was to take over the protection of the army corps against the north. However, General von Gallwitz did not expect serious fighting on this day. The instruction therefore concluded: "The order for today is

Page: 478 keyno: 103

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

The accommodation area of the 3rd Guard Infantry Division is expected to be occupied for the night ...” No new order was issued to the 1st Guard Reserve Division; this division, particularly exhausted, only began to march in groups to their new accommodation area in the later morning hours.

Initially, only the intervention of a single German infantry brigade was possible when at 11:00 a.m. the mentioned request from General v. Kirchbach was received. The decision to immediately send this brigade from Glownaczhno southeast to strike over the Radomka to Stanislawice, to cut off the Russians at Jedlnia, was already shaken by other reports. The enemy had reached Ryczywol at the mouth of the Radomka with some battalions coming from the north. Furthermore, a report received at 11:15 a.m. from the army high command stated that the Austro-Hungarian 3rd Cavalry Division reported a bridge over the Vistula between the mouths of the Radomka and Pilitza and Russian occupation at Warka on the Pilitza. The high command itself was at this time just about to move from Radom to the new army headquarters at Konsk. Serious concern for the 3rd Guard Division from the east and north was now to be expected. Nevertheless, General v. Gallwitz ordered the attack of the 5th Guard Brigade over Błuska to Stanislawice at 12:00 noon. Immediately thereafter, however, the XX Army Corps reported that the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry Division was no longer opposite Warka as before, but was moving back to a location about 16 km southwest of there. Since it was also reported that the localities on the right bank of the Radomka south of Błuska were already occupied by the enemy, the attack order was withdrawn. General v. Gallwitz hoped, however, to carry out the attack after bringing in the 1st Guard Reserve Division the following day, and wished that the Austro-Hungarian cavalry would again take over the blockade at Warka, where the enemy had not yet set foot on the southern bank of the Pilitza.

South of the Guard Reserve Corps, the battle of the Austro-Hungarian troops continued. By the evening of October 22, the 12th Infantry Division had broken the Russian resistance at Jedlnia; they reported 1200 prisoners. In its entirety, the army of General Dankl had advanced to the line of Vistula Heights west of the Nowo-Alexandria-Boguzin area, 8 km west of Kosienice, intending to continue the attack the following day. So far, the only opponents were the troops of the XVII Army Corps, which had been fighting at Zwangorod and Kosienice for more than a week.

Page: 479 keyno: 104

The Battle of Ivangorod.

III. Caucasian Corps as well as the 75th and 81st Reserve Divisions were identified. The Russians had been weak in front of the right flank. Further south, enemy crossing attempts at Josefow had to be repelled, with further attempts of this kind recognized in the afternoon at Kasimierz. In front of the left flank, the enemy held unknown strength in the forest area south and west of Konskiez up to the Radomka. Three bridges at Ivangorod and Pawlowice and now a fourth at Tarnow were available to them for bringing up new forces.

At the German Guard Reserve Corps, the enemy had not advanced from the Vistula or the Pilica during the afternoon. The Austro-Hungarian 3rd Cavalry Division, exhausted by marches and security duties, objected to taking over the security at Warka again. When General v. Gallwitz received this report and learned that a Guard Battalion advanced to Bluska had been pushed back over the Radomka by a Russian brigade, he became increasingly doubtful whether the attack to the south would still be possible. As a result of a telephone conversation with the Army High Command, the task of the corps was recorded at 7:45 p.m. with the following keyword: "Primarily our duty to cover the flank of the Austrians. However, it must not come to the point that the Guard Reserve Corps becomes so entangled in the battle at Ivangorod and Konskiez that it loses its connection to XX." This meant a significant restriction of the original attack mission. Around the same time, General v. Gallwitz also learned from the XX Army Corps that the allied 3rd Cavalry Division had orders to "advance on Warka again tomorrow"; the enemy was said to be weak there; the right flank of the corps, 41st Infantry Division, at Zielosblhegi, would remain. Regardless, General v. Kirchbach was informed that his left flank, 12th Infantry Division, had orders to advance on Lutschinowo (5 km north-northwest of Konskiez) on October 23. In view of the difficult situation of the Guard Reserve Corps, he added — with significant restriction of previous wishes: "Success possible tomorrow if the Guard Reserve Corps opens to the south and defends to the north — or vice versa..." General v. Gallwitz now ordered the assembly of his corps for the morning of October 23 at Glowatschow. He reserved the decision on whether to proceed towards Konskiez, Ryschkowol, or Warka until the situation was clarified by aerial reconnaissance the following morning.

1) Not marked on the map.

Page: 480 keyno: 105

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

On October 23, the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army resumed the attack at dawn along the entire front. General Dankl had reinforced his left wing, believing the right at the Vistula to be sufficiently secured. However, during the night, the Russians had brought up new forces and now launched their own attack. Heavy fighting began in the center and on the left wing as early as 6:00 a.m.

By the time the situation in front of the Guard Reserve Corps was clarified enough for General v. Gallwitz to give the attack order, it was 9:00 a.m. Airmen had identified two battalions marching up the southern Radomka bank from Rzschtykow, while more infantry was still north of the river at Rzschtykow. The enemy at Warta seemed to have turned all parts to the northern Pilitza bank towards the west; however, the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry Division was initially still 15 km southwest of Warta at Stromiez. In this situation, the 3rd Guard Division was ordered to "support the parts of the Austrian 12th Division fighting at Ursynow and Stanislawow<sup>1</sup> by advancing over Glownatchow to Bzhuja and over Rogoshef to Adamow<sup>2</sup>. The 1st Guard Reserve Division, still located north, was to push north from Glownatchow to take over the cover against the north. Until then, the left wing of the 3rd Guard Division remained bound by covering tasks against Rzschtykow of the Radomka. The attack of this division initially only got underway with the 6th Guard Brigade on the right wing, and only in the afternoon did the left advance. Attacking in a southeasterly direction, the 3rd Guard Division under Lieutenant General Litzmann, their newly appointed commander, drove Russian infantry and artillery from their positions at the forest edges 3 km east of Bzhuja by evening. To their right, the newly established Austrian 43rd Infantry Division had advanced to the same level. However, with these successes, nothing decisive was achieved, but the situation behind the Guard Reserve Corps had become threatening. Although the Austro-Hungarian 3rd Cavalry Division under Field Marshal Lieutenant Ritter v. Brudermann had meanwhile advanced eastwards again and driven back strong Russian cavalry south of Warta, by noon General v. Gallwitz knew from air reports-

1) Both places not marked on the map; they are about 6 km south of the Radomka bridge from Bzhuja.  
2) Both places not on the map; Rogoshef is 3 km northwest of Glownatchow on the left Radomka bank, Adamow opposite Rogoshef on the right.

Page: 481 keyno: 106

The Battle of Ivangorod.

that besides this opponent, an entire Russian corps at Tarnow was in full transition across the Vistula. His own corps stood with the front facing east, north, and northwest around Zbusha and Glowatschow.

The Austro-Hungarian 1st Army had made no significant progress on October 23. The Russian resistance had solidified; the situation of their own right wing had even become quite serious. Here, the enemy, apparently parts of the 70th Reserve Division, had been able to gain a foothold on the left bank of the Vistula from Nowo-Alexandria, and had also begun bridging at Kasimierz. The V Corps under Field Marshal Puhallo v. Brlog had essentially only the Hungarian 37th Infantry Division to deploy against this enemy; the X Corps, which was now marching north, was still far off. It was not possible to push the enemy back across the Vistula by evening. Nevertheless, General Dankl wanted to continue the attack on the entire front the next day. He no longer counted on significant support from the German Guard Reserve Corps given the situation in its rear.

October 24 brought setbacks on both wings of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army. In front of Nowo-Alexandria, the situation temporarily deteriorated so threateningly that General Dankl considered retreat; however, based on the confident reports of his two commanding generals, he postponed the final decision to the next morning. On October 25, the Russian attacks became less frequent and weaker; the enemy was also exhausted from the battles of the last three days. The Austro-Hungarian army was able to hold its positions on this day. General Dankl also wanted to continue the fight on the 26th, after the Hungarian 11th Cavalry Division had meanwhile arrived as reinforcement behind his right wing and the arrival of the foremost division of the X Corps was expected for October 27. On the 29th, the other two divisions of this corps were to follow, with two more cavalry divisions marching behind the center of the front. A suggestion from the German Army High Command for further reinforcement of the allied army before Ivangorod had already been rejected by General v. Conrad on October 24 with the reasoning, "as a decision in the heavy fortress-like battle south of Przemysl is not yet foreseeable."

The German Guard Reserve Corps was meanwhile increasingly threatened by the enemy advancing from Rhyshcywol and Warta.

Page: 482 keyno: 107

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

...so that finally only the 5th Guard Brigade under Major General v. Below stood to support the allied I Corps on the right bank of the Radomka. On October 24, it had advanced several kilometers further east in the forest, but no decision had been made here. Meanwhile, at least one infantry and one cavalry division seemed to be advancing from Rychtynpol, Tarnow, and Warta against the left flank and rear of the corps. General v. Gallwitz led 1 1/2 divisions to attack them on October 25. He encountered both divisions of the Russian Grenadier Corps, against which his corps had already fought at Novo-Alexandria. Further north, a mixed brigade of the 41st Infantry Division of the German XX Army Corps under Major General v. Böhmann and the Austro-Hungarian 3rd Cavalry Division mainly fought against Russian cavalry. The 6th Guard Infantry Brigade under Major General v. Friedeburg and the 1st Guard Reserve Division under Major General Albrecht managed to push back the Russian grenadiers, partly in heavy fighting, several kilometers and take 1600 prisoners from them. However, their own losses were considerable; they amounted to more than 600 men in the 1st Guard Reserve Division alone. A full decision had not yet been reached despite the initial success. General v. Gallwitz wanted to continue the attack on October 26 to throw the enemy against the Radomka from the west. Generaloberst v. Hindenburg agreed, despite serious doubts about whether the Austro-Hungarian army could continue to hold before Iwangorod, and despite the threatening growth of the Russian wing west of Warsaw, which would soon force the relocation of the Guard Reserve Corps to the west.

October 26 brought the turning point: Before the Guard Reserve Corps, the enemy had retreated north of the Radomka during the night to a position further back. On the other hand, General Dankl had to decide to yield to the constantly growing Russian pressure. He wanted to begin the retreat the following day. But the events were stronger: The Russians had meanwhile also gained a foothold south of the Ilshanka near Solez on the left bank of the Vistula.

1) Koroltkow, Warsaw-Iwangorod, p. 216, states the total loss of the corps at 5000 men and notes that the German attack was so fierce that the Grenadier Corps "began to retreat and could only be held with difficulty."

Page: 483 keyno: 108

End of the Battle at Iwangorod.

Already by noon, the right wing of the Austro-Hungarian V Corps began to retreat south of Iwangorod, and in the early afternoon hours, the I Corps also received a blow, which caused the right wing of the Austrian 43rd Infantry Division to retreat southwest of Kolonie. This division, leaning on the German Guard Reserve Corps with its other wing, retreated, and the remaining parts of the I Corps joined it. Thus, the order issued by General Dankl on October 26 at 1 p.m. to initiate the retreat actually only represented the approval of the movements already underway. They were to be conducted by the evening of that day to the general line Gwoleń—Jedlnia, and on the 27th to Kaszjano—Radom.

Simultaneously with the issuance to their own troops, the retreat order was also supposed to be communicated to the German Guard Reserve Corps, which was still known to be in attack¹). In the attempt to transmit this message via the German XX Army Corps, to which the most reliable telephone connection was available, its chief of staff intervened. Colonel Hell had just received a report of favorable progress in the battle with General v. Böhmann and did not see the overall situation as immediately threatening. He therefore suggested not to disturb the Guard Reserve Corps in its promising attack and to inform them of the order later. This was followed by the allied side²). Meanwhile, however, the German High Command received the following report around 4 p.m. from the leader of the German telephone station in Radom to Lieutenant Hoffmann: "I have just overheard an Austrian army order that has passed through here and which I assume will interest you. The 1st Austrian Army is to begin the retreat immediately; however, this is not to be told to the German Guard Reserve Corps before 6 p.m.³)." This message gave the German High Command, which did not recognize the connections, the erroneous impression that the communication of the retreat order was being delayed by the Austro-Hungarian side for selfish reasons. Even immediate orders from General Dankl to cover the flank of the German Corps endangered by the retreat and subsequent clarification could not dispel the first impression. It had a more lasting effect on the High Command, as complaints from the Landwehr Corps about

¹) War Archive Vienna, Study of Lieutenant v. Joly.  
²) See Conrad V, pp. 265—285, where this incident is clearly demonstrated.  
³) Hoffmann, War, p. 61.

Page: 484 keyno: 109

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

Unfavorable experiences with the proximity of Austro-Hungarian troops from Tarnawka were still fresh in memory.

For the Guard Reserve Corps, the delay in communicating the retreat order had no consequences; the Russians did not press anywhere. General v. Gallwitz had halted the advance against the front of the new Russian positions north of the Radomka in consideration of the overall situation already in the morning. Only the parts of the XX Army Corps, along with the allied 3rd Cavalry Division, supported by parts of the 1st Guard Reserve Division, were fully engaged in combat. A decision had not yet been made here. Without being disturbed in any way, the German troops withdrew from the enemy on the evening of October 26.

On the night of October 26 to 27, the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army stood from the Iljanka estuary over Swolen to Jedlina, with the German Guard Reserve Corps deployed forward on the left at Glowaczow and northwest of this place. The enemy held back. On the morning of October 27, the withdrawal was to be continued.

The operation, begun with doubts on the German side and confidence on the Austro-Hungarian side, had to be broken off after five days of partially heavy fighting with a booty of almost 15,000 prisoners — at least 3,000 of them by the German Guard Reserve Corps. The Austro-Hungarian 1st Army had lost 40,000 to 50,000 men, the Guard Reserve Corps 1,000 men.

The expectation of the Austro-Hungarian military leadership that the enemy masses would "surge" over the river as soon as the crossing points were cleared had been fulfilled. This early pursuit resulted from the fact that the Russians had already ordered the attack for October 20. However, their strength grew so rapidly since they could cross the Vistula unhindered that the soon-to-be-gained superiority took impotence but the situation festively. Further delay in Warsaw soon made it impossible to remain in Hungary, a beautiful victory at this point or on the Austro-Hungarian right wing in Galicia would have turned the overall situation. Instead, the allied army was now also in defense in Galicia.

1) Zam II, G. 334. — 2) Conrad V, G. 399. General Knov, who participated in the battles with the Russian Guard Corps attacked over Ungarnod, notes on October 26 that the Russian XXV and XIV Corps had captured 5,000 prisoners in four days (Knov, G. 158). — 3) For more details on the Russian operations, see G. 494.

Page: 485 keyno: 110

End of the Battle at Ivangorod.

4. The Retreat from Poland.

a) The Battles on the Western Flank of the 9th Army and the Initiation of the Retreat.

See Maps 15 and 17.

As long as the allied Austro-Hungarian 1st Army held its ground at Ivangorod, Generaloberst v. Hindenburg had not yet given up hope that the attack against the Russians north of the Pilitza might still be carried out. Since the withdrawal of Mackensen's group from Warsaw on the night of October 20, the bulk of his army had been positioned in the nearly 90 km wide front Bielobrzegi-Rawa-area 15 km south of Lowitsch, to initially intercept the expected Russian assault. On the right flank, the reunited XX Army Corps stood in an extended front behind the broad and often marshy lowlands of the Pilitza, between Nowe-Miasto and Rawa, the Landwehr Corps joined, followed by Mackensen's group, in the middle of which — flanked by the two divisions of the XVII Army Corps — was the Frommel Corps. Further left, the nearly 50 km wide area up to the Vistula was covered only by two cavalry divisions and Landsturm. The XI Army Corps was still near Radom and westward.

Already on October 20, the Russians had begun to follow General v. Mackensen's troops in a broad front. How the German High Command assessed the situation in the following days is shown by an entry in the war diary from October 23: "According to the reports of the corps and the numerous intercepted Russian radio messages, it can be assumed with some certainty that the Russians are army-like weak south of Warsaw, but very strong at the Rawa and Pilitza. Either they fear an encirclement of their right flank from Thorn — or, more likely given their strength, they intend an offensive encircling the German left flank while simultaneously holding the allied forces in front of Ivangorod. — Despite today's success in front of Ivangorod, the situation of the German army

1) See p. 472 and the overview on p. 550. — 2) p. 471.

Page: 486 keyno: 111

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

due to the conditions on the left flank and the increasing numerical superiority, the situation did not improve. Furthermore, the Army High Command believed it could hardly count on Austrian cooperation for the upcoming decision. "Whether the planned thrust over the lower Pilitza towards Warsaw" was still possible had therefore become increasingly questionable. The XI Army Corps, intended for cooperation, had to be set in motion towards the threatened extreme left flank, and General v. Mackensen had received orders to prepare the further withdrawal of this flank.

On October 24, when the enemy had not reached the positions of the Mackensen group, it withdrew, with its outer flank to Kolaszyn, south of Lontschitz. Further north, the cavalry corps and landsturm, repelling the Russians, retreated westward. Only near the city of Rawa, where the enemy's pressure had already been most felt the day before, did an incident occur: parts of the 21st Landwehr Brigade were inserted into the front of the 35th Infantry Division. Due to discrepancies in command transmission, the Landwehr infantry withdrew, while batteries of the active division remained; eleven guns fell into the hands of the sharply pressing Russian I Corps.

The enemy appeared in places as early as October 25 before the new positions of General v. Mackensen. Against them and the Landwehr Corps adjoining on the right, he undertook fierce but unsystematic attacks. In the process, parts of the Russian 22nd Infantry Division from I Corps, near Gluchow, west of Rawa, managed to penetrate deep into the position in the morning fog on the border between the German 35th Infantry Division and the 21st Landwehr Brigade; a counterattack led by the commander of the 87th Infantry Brigade, Major General v. Hahn, with limited reserves, cut off the intruding Russians; their remnants were captured. At the same time, however, Russian forces from the counter-move north of Lodz also threatened the western flank of the Mackensen group. Here, in the meantime, the German XI Army Corps under General v. Plüskow was advancing. Its forward, 38th Infantry Division under Lieutenant General Wagner attacked at Strykow and defeated the enemy; the 22nd Infantry Division was even further back.

At the Army High Command, reports about the growth of the Russian right wing had meanwhile become more and more consolidated. This seemed to be marching straight westward,   
1) p. 465 and 467. — 2) p. 476.

Page: 487 keyno: 112

9th Army, Operations Southwest of Warsaw

was established by October 25 between Rawka and the Vistula with at least ten infantry divisions: I., IV., XXIII., II. Corps, 50th Infantry Division, and 79th Reserve Division. Thus, the large numerical superiority of the enemy on this flank was already clearly established; furthermore, additional forces were on the march there: the VI Corps, which had previously stood north of Nowogeorgiewsk, and the II Siberian Corps. Finally, it was stated in one of the particularly numerous intercepted Russian radio messages these days, which was addressed as "very urgent" to the II Corps: "from October 25 to 26, parts of the new Renown Army, the staff at the 6th Siberian Division, V Siberian Corps, will advance to the lower Vistula"¹). Even if this radio message — which was considered possible by the army command at the time — was a "bluff," the situation on the German western flank had become so serious that it was untenable without a quick success of the Austro-Hungarian army. The hope for such a turn was barely existent. On the other hand, a retreat to the west, which would have denied the enemy the next path into the heart of the German homeland, was no longer possible. One could only evade in a westerly direction, moving further away from the direction towards Berlin, which then remained on the left flank, with each step. As the first preparation for such a retreat, the order had already been given to the Deputy General Command of the VI Army Corps in Breslau on October 20 to repair the roads leading south from the Kielzy—Noworadomsk line. When it became doubtful on October 25 whether the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army could continue to hold its ground, instructions followed to the same General Command and to the Stage Inspection in Noworadomsk for the immediate construction of a position by pioneers and civilians along the Noworadomsk—Wieslun line.

The German 9th Army had held out to the limit of what was possible. For them, the decision came with the retreat of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army from Jangrodor on October 26. The German army, without the prospect of an imminent turn, could no longer be held responsible for exposing itself to the dangers of encirclement. What was to happen next was initially unclear. The prepared extensive railway and road destructions²) were intended to halt the enemy's advance; the command expected that he

¹) Wording of the transmission as in the files. — ²) See p. 425, 442, and 448.

Page: 488 keyno: 113

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

at least 100, possibly 120 km for at least a few days to come to a halt“). The desire to launch a new strike during this pause inspired the army leadership, as they still felt victorious and superior to the enemy, provided the numerical ratio was not too unfavorable.

How seriously the situation was taken is shown by the following report, which was sent to the Supreme Army Command at 1 p.m. on October 26, just as it had been learned that the allied 1st Army intended to retreat the following day“): “Austrians retreat from Ivangorod on October 27. German offensive over Pilitza therefore excluded. 9th Army will have to retreat. — 8th Army instructed to send all available units to Thorn. All formations still in the country requested to move to Posen. In front of the 9th Army, 14 Russian corps, of which 4 to 5 outflank our left wing. Advance of these against the German border cannot be prevented by the army. — Nothing to expect from the Austrian army. Own Landwehr partially retreats.” When it became clear on the afternoon of October 26 that the allied 1st Army had already yielded to Russian pressure that day, the situation appeared even more threatening. The Supreme Army Command was further informed at 7:30 p.m.: “Own army repelled all Russian attacks today. Austrian army at Ivangorod broken through and thrown back by Russians. 9th Army must therefore begin retreat on the right wing. Where the Austrian army can be brought to a halt is still unclear“). Through telephone, it was inquired at the Supreme Army Command whether and when reinforcements for the East could be expected. It was especially important to replenish the garrisons of the eastern fortresses, after they had given up their most capable units, the main reserves, and the heavy artillery for use in the open field“), where they could not be spared in the future.

At this time, the German offensive in Flanders) was still in full swing. General v. Falkenhayn replied: “Currently, no operational formations available in the country. Army command at liberty-

1) Hofmann, War, p. 63. — 2) p. 482f.  
3) The judgments contained in these reports about Austro-Hungarian troops merely reflect the impression that the German Army Command had at the time, based on the requirements set for their own troops.  
4) 35th Reserve Division from Thorn, Landwehr Division Bredow from Pojen, 21st Landwehr Brigade from Breslau. — 5) p. 321f. and 329f.

Page: 489 keyno: 114

9th Army — The Retreat Order.

orders, replacement formations of local corps to be thrown into the eastern fortifications. The importance of providing the eastern fortifications with garrisons will be clear to Army Command 9. From here, the 5th Cavalry Division departs in about three days by rail transport towards Posen. Maintaining close relations with Austria is of utmost political importance. Otherwise, instructions for local measures cannot be given from here, as they are in the best hands." The following day, General v. Falkenhayn made "around 40,000 trained men without officers and with few non-commissioned officers" available for the east; they were designated by the Army Command for the replenishment of the departing troops and the fortress garrisons.

On October 27 at 9 a.m., Generaloberst v. Hindenburg ordered the retreat. He had to begin with the most threatened right wing of the army, while the left had to hold near Lodz. Here, General v. Plüskow, the commanding general of the XI Army Corps, pushed his third 22nd Infantry Division westward after the success at Strykow and thus also held the area north of Lodz until October 28. Meanwhile, the right wing of the army gradually joined the retreat of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army and the Guard Reserve Corps. On the night of October 28, the Landwehr Corps and the Mackensen Group also withdrew, followed a day later by the XI Army Corps as the last unit. The enemy did not press.

The German retreat, in conjunction with the allied 1st Army, initially led the Guard Reserve Corps, the XX Army Corps, and the Landwehr Corps into the Kielzy—Noworadomsk line, while the Mackensen Group, now comprising the XVII Army Corps, Frommel Corps, XI Army Corps, and Korda Cavalry Corps, was to retreat to the prepared position Noworadomsk—Wielun. On the left flank, border protection was advanced northward by the Deputy General Command of the V and II Army Corps against the upper Warthe; it consisted almost entirely of Landsturm with very weak artillery and was to obscure and retreat to the border in the over 160 km gap between Wielun and the outer section of the Thorn fortress near Wloclawek on the Vistula. The eastern fortifications prepared for the reception of the oppo-

1) The Guard Reserve Corps achieved 5000, the XI Army Corps 3000, the XVII and XX Army Corps each 6000, the fortresses Breslau, Posen, Thorn, and Graudenz each 5000 men.

Page: 490 keyno: 115

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

ners ready. The assignment of replacement troops and the return of part of their horse-drawn artillery located with the field army increased their defensive strength as much as possible. The Vistula above Thorn was to be blocked by mines.

The 8th Army in East Prussia had not yet been informed of the full seriousness of the situation in Poland. For their small forces, there was initially no immediate danger; with the railway, parts also over the spit and by waterway, they could be withdrawn at the last moment if necessary. The longer General v. Francois held out, the more he relieved the front of the 9th Army. No response had been received to the request sent to him by Generaloberst v. Hindenburg by October 26 to send all available forces to Thorn. On October 28, General v. Francois reported to the Supreme Army Command in response to a direct inquiry from there that he was in an advancing attack against a superior entrenched enemy. A decision was expected in about eight days. After a military success, transport of parts to Thorn for the 9th Army. The extent of the contributions to the 9th Army depends on the scope of the success. The rest remains on Russian soil to protect East Prussia. In view of the overall situation, these intentions aroused strong concerns in General v. Falkenhayn. When he informed Generaloberst v. Hindenburg, who had not yet been informed by the 8th Army, of them, he had a telegram sent to General v. Francois on the evening of October 28: "The situation will soon require the deployment of strong forces of the 8th Army to protect West Prussia. Request a detailed report on the situation with the 8th Army." General v. Francois replied on October 29 that it was still unclear when the decision would be made; after military success, the transport of one to two army corps to Thorn was planned. If the attack must be abandoned prematurely due to West Prussia, a gradual retreat and then release of East Prussian territory will likely be necessary. Please keep the 8th Army continuously informed of local intentions and positions." In this response, the Army Command 9 saw another evasion and asked the Supreme Army Command to intervene. Then General v. Francois reported on October 30 that he could not continue the attack due to a lack of ammunition. Only then did the question of retreat behind the lakes and the transfer of troops to Thorn come into flow on the East Prussian front.

Meanwhile, the German 9th Army

1) Cf. p. 540.

Page: 491 keyno: 116

continued. A proposal by General v. Mackensen, which aimed primarily at quickly resuming action with regard to his own troops and also corresponded to the views of General v. Gallwitz, had been rejected by Colonel General v. Hindenburg. Only by distancing themselves far from the enemy could they regain operational freedom. Thus, the army approached the borders of Silesia in the last days of October. Following them, the 1st Army of the Austro-Hungarian forces was slowly retreating, while on the right at the Vistula, the allied front still stood. Their prospects had even slightly improved since October 27; the Carpathian railway was restored up to Chyrow. Supplies to the 2nd Army stationed there flowed abundantly. However, General v. Böhm-Ermolli was able to resume the attack on October 28. He achieved local successes, but they could no longer change the overall situation decisively.

b) The Russian Operations and Assessment of the October Campaign.

For this, see maps 14 to 17.

After the setbacks of October 10 and 11¹), General Ivanov suggested a new personal discussion with the Grand Duke in Cholm²); it took place on October 12. On this occasion, General Ivanov pointed out how much the reinforcement of the Northwestern Front to Warsaw was delayed. These complaints, the previous development of the situation, and a certain understandable mistrust of General Ivanov's leadership³) after the failures on the Vistula line, but especially the concern for Warsaw, which was believed to be seriously threatened at this time, prompted the Supreme Commander to take the lead of the major offensive himself. The Grand Duke was of the opinion that the fate of the entire first war period had to be decided on the Vistula, which is why achieving success here required the utmost effort. Under these circumstances, it was no longer acceptable to continue in the role of an observer⁴). On October 13, the Supreme Army Command ordered that General Ruzski, who now commanded the Narew Group (= former Warsaw Division), the 2nd Army, the Cavalry Corps Nowikov, and also the 5th Army, should lead the main attack from Warsaw against the German left flank,

¹) See page 462. — ²) Korolilow, Overview, p. 52; Danilow, p. 315 ff.  
³) Ibid., p. 317. — ⁴) Ibid.

Page: 492 keyno: 117

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

while General Iwanow was to attack the front with the 4th and 9th Armies south of the Pilitza. The date for the general offensive was set for October 18.

Meanwhile, the previously described local battles near Warsaw and Ivangorod continued.

South of Warsaw(1), the Russian 2nd Army, still in assembly, initially did not realize that General v. Mackensen's troops had switched to defense since the evening of October 11. On October 14, a map with the positions of the German forces between Sochaczew and Ivangorod was captured from a downed Russian aircraft. Nevertheless, the intervention of the 36th Infantry Division on the same day at Blonie and the advance of the 21st Landwehr Brigade and the Landsturm Brigade Hofmann gave General Scheidemann the impression of a major German encirclement attack against his own western flank, as intelligence repeatedly reported the deployment of two new German corps at Thorn. Thus, the Russian attacks on this front section initially served only defense, while further north the VI and I Turkestan Corps, previously belonging to the 10th Army, covered the flank and rear against East Prussia(2). General Scheidemann moved the XXIII Corps, the 50th Infantry, the 13th Siberian Rifle Division, and the Cavalry Corps Nowikow (5th, 8th, 14th Cavalry Division), which arrived in the Warsaw fortress area on October 14, as reinforcements behind his right wing. On October 16, the previous right wing corps, II Siberian, had to be supported by the 1st Rifle Brigade of the XXIII Corps in the face of German counterattacks, and the adjoining IV Corps to the east could only hold its positions with difficulty, although now south and west of Warsaw 12 1/2 Russian infantry and 5 cavalry divisions faced only 5 1/2 German infantry and 1 cavalry division(3). General Scheidemann ordered stubborn defense. Even on October 18, the Russian right wing remained on the offensive and "could hardly hold on." The Cavalry Corps Nowikow and cavalry of the 2nd Army fell on German infantry at the lower Bzura; to support them, the 79th Reserve Division, main reserve of Nowogeorgiewsk, was set in motion, while a brigade of the XXIII Corps remained as a garrison in the fortress. Below Ivangorod(4), here on the western

1) G. 450f., 456f. and 470. — 2) See G. 545. — 3) Korolów, Warsaw-Ivangorod, G. 127. — 4) G. 469 ff.

Page: 493 keyno: 118

Attack Plan and Preparations of the Russians

The bridgehead gained on the Vistula bank was further expanded under constant fighting. New troops moved across the river. Opposite Kosienice, the XVII Corps had established itself, further south the III Caucasian, with them were the 61st and the 1½ 75th Reserve Division. Apart from the artillery of the fortress Ivangorod (34 heavy guns), about 350 Russian guns faced about 170 German ones. Nevertheless, all further Russian attack attempts were stifled by the superior German artillery fire. General Gwert had to remind to economize on ammunition. On October 17, the situation escalated into a serious crisis due to the swelling of the Vistula; the bridge at Pawlowice threatened to break.

The general attack of the 2nd, 5th, and 9th Army was set for October 18; however, this day could not be adhered to. The assembly of the troops took more time than had been anticipated. The fact that the railway traffic Lublin—Ivangorod—Warsaw was disrupted, perhaps even completely interrupted, by German artillery fire for several days at Nowo-Alexandria seems to have increased the difficulties. However, shifts to the north placed extraordinary efforts and deprivations on the 5th, 4th, and 9th Army. The 5th Army, which was largely transported by rail and then from the area south of Warsaw, is said to have been without bread for six days. It was necessary to decide to postpone the general attack; meanwhile, at least the left wing of the 2nd Army was to advance further to open the crossing over the Vistula for the 5th Army. Thus, on October 18, the I Corps and the I Siberian Corps, further reinforced by the 13th Siberian Rifle Division, advanced along the river to attack southwards. Behind their front, the XIX Corps, the northernmost of the 5th Army, began to cross to the left bank at Karstchen. The Russian attack, which met "stubborn resistance" from the German 87th Infantry Brigade, found "stubborn resistance" and advanced only a few kilometers that day. On October 19, it was not continued further, as the crossing of the 5th Army was further delayed; their bridges

1) Danilow, p. 314. — Knor reports on October 12 that the railway was hit six times by German artillery fire on the evening of the 11th, but was restored on the afternoon of the 12th (p. 144), further on October 16, the line was "still closed to traffic due to German fire" (p. 149).  
2) Knor, p. 142. — 3) p. 470.

Page: 494 keyno: 119

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

had arrived late from the San and could not advance on impassable

roads; by the evening of the day, only infantry and twelve guns from the XIX Corps

could be transferred.

However, the movement of Austro-Hungarian forces

northward to the area of Ivangorod caused concerns for the Russian Supreme

Army Command. The possibility of enemy reinforcements arriving was also considered again; the transport of newly formed reserve corps in Germany may have triggered this.

A new major attack by the enemy seemed imminent. The Grand

Duke decided not to wait any longer; he set the Russian

general attack for October 20. Although

not everything could be ready for this at that time, the advance

began as ordered.

The evasion of the Mackensen Group on the night of the 20th and

the Guard Reserve Corps on the night of the 21st of October was a complete surprise for the Russians. They followed cautiously; their 2nd and 5th Armies

advanced only slowly on destroyed roads; on October 22,

General Russki gave them a day of rest, while the 4th Army at

Ivangorod encountered the counterattack of General Dankl. Still unaware

of the significance of the battles that developed from this,

the Grand Duke issued a pursuit order on this day, setting the

attacking armies (2nd, 5th, 4th, and 9th) the line Kutno—Tomaszów (on the

Pilica)—Sandomierz as the target.

Held up by roadblocks and battles against German rearguards,

the troops advancing from the direction of Warsaw under

General Russki reached the German

positions on October 24, which extended from south of Łowicz, over Rawka and

Nowe Miasto to Bielohbregi. With 18½ infantry and

6½ cavalry divisions¹), the Russians began their attack here against

8 German infantry divisions, half of which were Landwehr, and 2 cavalry

divisions²). German advance troops were pushed back, but in the

main position, the Russians did not advance anywhere on this day.

When the attack was to be continued on October 25, the

¹) ¾ XXVII Corps and 79th Reserve Division of the Narew Group; — II.,   
XXIII., II. Siberian, IV., I Corps of the 2nd Army; — I. Siberian, XIX Corps,   
50th and 13th Turkish Division of the 5th Army.   
²) ½ XI Army Corps, Landwehr Corps, Mackensen Group, ½ XI Army Corps   
and Cavalry Corps Korda.

Page: 495 keyno: 120

The Great Russian Attack.

The Germans vacated their positions before the 2nd Army. Further east, the advance at the Pilitza came to a halt. With the 2nd Army, General Scheidemann pursued vigorously and appeared in places by the evening of the day before the new positions of the Madenius group and the Landwehr Corps, which moved from Koluszki south past the Rawka to the Pilitza. When the Russians launched an attack against these positions on October 26, they were repelled with significant losses. Meanwhile, the events at Iwangorod had begun to affect the situation south of Warsaw.

At Iwangorod, the 4th Army, following the Grand Duke's order for a general attack, resumed the offensive on the morning of October 20 at Kozienice and south with the XVII and III Caucasian Corps with a total strength of 5½ divisions¹) and soon realized that the Germans had partially vacated their previous positions; the German artillery fire seemed weaker; by evening, they could approach within a few hundred yards of their positions. Thus, the commander of the Southwestern Front already gained the impression on the evening of October 20 that the Germans were withdrawing. He was eager to expedite the river crossing of his troops. 5 Russian divisions followed the withdrawing allies from Kozienice and Iwangorod as early as October 21, albeit without pressing. In the evening, the XVII Corps reached the Walbrand line east of Pyscha-Jedlnia, south of which the III Caucasian Corps was still behind; a larger gap had arisen between the two corps. Only the lead gained by the night march of the German Guard Reserve Corps separated friend and foe. On October 22, the Russian advance was to be continued with all forces; the Ural Cossack Division and behind it the XVI Corps were to follow over the bridge at Pawlowice, the Grenadier Corps and the Transbaikal Cossack Brigade were to cross the river further north at Tarnow. The counterattack of the Dankl Army brought the Russian advance to a halt and led to serious setbacks, although the Russians were in the majority at Jedlnia. When the German Guard Reserve Corps then pushed forward from Radom over Glownoßachow just against the night of the two army groups between the 5th and 4th Army, the Russian Supreme Command became concerned, as the left wing of the 5th Army, V Corps, positioned at Gora-Kalwaria, was still behind due to the delayed crossing of the Vistula.

¹) See p. 477.

Page: 496 keyno: 121

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

By order of October 25, the Grand Duke halted the promising westward advance of the comprehensive army wing, the 2nd and 5th Armies. "One naturally had to assume that the enemy had only given up the offensive and begun the retreat to undertake new maneuvers through regrouping. It would therefore have been sufficient if each of the two army groups continued the pursuit on their own, especially since a gap had already formed between them due to the lagging of the V and the Grenadier Corps." Initially, they wanted to "await the outcome against Austria" and strike the enemy at Radom, with the left wing of the 5th Army pushing into their rear over the Piliza, while the Grenadier Corps, the right wing of the 4th Army, attacked over the Vistula between Piliza and Radomta. This attempt failed due to the resistance of the German XX Army Corps and the counterattack of the Guard Reserve Corps. Meanwhile, the Russian XVI Corps and the Guard Corps had followed over the Vistula at Pawlowice and Iwangorod, and at Nowo-Alexandria, the XXV Corps began the crossing, followed by the XIV. By October 26, Russian forces on the left bank of the Vistula south of the Piliza had grown to 17 1/2 divisions, gaining an overwhelming superiority against 2 1/2 German and 7 artillery-weak Austro-Hungarian divisions. The Dankl Army had to retreat.

On the same October 26, the attack of the right army wing (2nd Army) was repelled before the German positions east of Lodz. It was initially not resumed. Thus, a standstill occurred on the decisive wing intended for encirclement at the moment when the enemy retreated before Iwangorod; the wing was to be reinforced first. The news received with suspicion by the German High Command about the "new Rennenkampf Army" was accurate. Since October 26, a formation northwest of Warsaw actually...

1) Korolkov, Overview, p. 68. — 2) In Korolkov, Warsaw-Iwangorod, p. 183, these reasons are cited, albeit in a somewhat different context. —  
3) Danilow, p. 327.  
4) Starting from the right wing: Grenadier Corps with 3/4 7th Infantry Division, Transbaikal Cossack Brigade and Ural Cossack Division, XVI Corps, XVII Corps with 61st Reserve Division (the 81st Reserve Division was still on the right bank), III Caucasian Corps with 75th Reserve Division, Guard Corps, Guard Riflemen and independent Guard Cavalry Brigade, XXV Corps, XIV Corps with 2nd Rifle Brigade, 1st Don Cossack and 13th Cavalry Division.  
5) p. 487.

Page: 497 keyno: 122

The Russian Pursuit Stalls.

a new 1st Army, while on the East Prussian Eastern Front the 10th Army remained alone with correspondingly altered strength.

Near Swangorod, the Russians only recognized the retreat of the Allies initiated on October 26 on the following day. For the pursuit, the Supreme Army Command repeated the goal already given on October 22: Kutno—Tomaschow—Sandomir. The 2nd Army had already reached this line; thus, the order initially only realigned the lagging front in the middle. Only the numerous reports arriving on October 27 and 28 at the Northwestern Front about German withdrawal movements even before the right flank prompted General Russki to set this flank in motion again on the 29th. The Russian front barely extended beyond the line Kutno—Lodz—Tomaschow—Sandomir by October 31. The engagement with the enemy was lost, "even the cavalry failed to catch up with them"¹).

The Russian Supreme Army Command faced new decisions. In the direction of the lower Vistula, there was apparently a large gap in the enemy's overall front, but they did not dare to boldly push into it. Destructions hampered the forward movement, the supply lines could not keep up, but above all, the flanks of their own army front in East Prussia and Galicia did not seem too far back. Thus, the opportunity for a major strategic breakthrough remained unused. General Ivanov urged a swing against Galicia, where the enemy, it seemed, held; while the Southwestern Front cleared the table here, the Northwestern Front could conquer East Prussia by repeating the procedure attempted in August. But then doubts arose: the troops of General v. Hindenburg, just driven from the middle Vistula, regained full freedom of movement and could use the German railway network. This concern led to the armies of the center (2nd, 5th, 4th, and 9th) being set in motion again on October 31; but even this time, they were only assigned targets about 20 km forward. On November 2, the pursuit movement came to an end. While the attack continued in East Prussia and Galicia, in Russian Poland, railways and roads had to be restored before they could advance again.

The October campaign in the Vistula bend did not bring a major decision and probably could not bring one. On the side of the Central Powers, the frictions that are hardly avoidable in an alliance war

¹) Korolów, Overview, p. 73—75.

Page: 498 keyno: 123

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

made leadership difficult. The campaign was therefore already ailing at the first assembly: the mass of the Austro-Hungarian army had concentrated in the narrow space between the Carpathians and the upper Vistula, but the German 9th Army had to march in immediate proximity against the will of its leaders. Political reasons had decisively influenced this. As the campaign progressed, the great numerical superiority of the Russian army on one hand, and the reduced striking power of the Austro-Hungarian army on the other, were decisive. The San and Vistula, swollen by rain, offered the Russians secure protection for any regrouping of their forces, and the fortified bridgeheads of Ivangorod and Warsaw facilitated their renewed attacks. In the area immediately east of the middle Vistula, the Russians had a relatively well-developed railway and road network, while the "Vistula Borderland" on the other side of the river had been deliberately neglected in every respect to create difficulties for an invading enemy. Thus, all the advantages of the theater of war in Poland fell to the Russians, and all the disadvantages to the troops of the Central Powers.

When Major General Ludendorff discussed the joint operational plan with General v. Conrad on September 13, both hoped that an opportunity would arise for a strike against the right flank of the Russians. However, based on the experiences of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, the Russians, as far as German troops were facing them, had become even more cautious than they had already been. They withdrew in time from the strike intended for them west of the San and Vistula; thus, the German attack at Opatow was a futile effort. Cautious evasion and numerical superiority enabled the Russians, despite the slowness of their movements, to build a new overwhelming attack front with a strong right wing behind the Vistula River. However, the Grand Duke from Galicia had drawn relatively strong forces, so that the roles of the German 9th Army and the Austro-Hungarian army were exchanged. This was unfavorable. General v. Freytag reported on October 19: "The offensive initiated by the Imperial and Royal Army together with our 9th Army had to take into account the tireless resistance in the front association, that it led the Vistula for our 9th Army and parts of the Austrian 1st Army, while the main forces of the Imperial and Royal Army located on the right bank of the Vistula, through pressure on the Russian forces opposite, gave the enemy a

Page: 499 keyno: 124

Assessment of the Campaign against the Vistula.

making the prolonged defense of the Vistula line impossible. Thus,

the allied army with the lesser striking force was given the main role...

How slight this striking force was, the German 9th Army's command

could not foresee at the beginning of the operations. It was still full of hope.

When the Central Powers' offensive then stalled around mid-October

along the entire front from the Carpathians to Warsaw, while the Russians

were strengthening at this city and to the west of it, the German army

command planned the attack over the lower Piliza along the Vistula towards

Warsaw. This was an extraordinarily bold breakthrough operation, whose

success could still save the overall situation in Poland by the end of October.

However, it would have required a strike that penetrated quickly and deeply

into the enemy front south of Warsaw. Whether the forces of the Imperial

German troops would have sufficed for such a strike in the last third of

October, given everything that had happened, is hard to determine. Since

General v. Conrad declined participation in the attack north of the Piliza,

it did not occur. From then on, it essentially involved only a holding action.

This task was exemplary solved by the German 9th Army. It was already

the third new opponent that Colonel General v. Hindenburg faced repeatedly

with the same, numerically inferior, own troops. When finally the Russian

masses — a full five weeks after the major initial offensive in Galicia had

concluded — launched a new decisive attack, the steadfast German attacker

evaded the impending encirclement at the last moment and brought the

advance of the overwhelming Russian front to a halt through systematic

destruction of roads and railways. (The Russians therefore did not regard

the German retreat as the result of a defeat\*). The intended decisive

destruction was once again successful for them, as was the small German

army’s ability to effectively strike the overwhelming opponent. And yet

this army could be proud of what it had achieved against a numerically

superior enemy once again\*).

The fame of the field, which had surrounded the German leaders since

their victories in East Prussia, had facilitated the task of the German army

in Poland. This was evident in the almost anxious behavior of the Russian

command during the Vistula crossing and later during the pursuit. Always

\*) Danilow, p. 321. — 2) See the overview on p. 550.

Page: 500 keyno: 125

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

again, entire corps that had already crossed the river were withdrawn, and the pursuit was repeatedly halted to align the front. Regarding the battles before Warsaw, the Russian historical account judged: "Overall, the numerical superiority was on the side of the Russians; by the end of the battle, it was more than double, but due to the extraordinary activity of the Germans, this numerical advantage only led to a balance in combat success."

It is difficult today to form a satisfactory picture of the difficulties and dangers of the situation of the 9th Army at that time. Let us hear what the First General Staff Officer of the High Command wrote home on October 12, in the midst of the war action: "The Russians have thrown themselves at us with four armies, i.e., they wanted to. We preempted them with colossal audacity, of which history will speak, repelled their vanguards, and now do not let them cross the Vistula... It was probably the hardest time I went through; day and night the excitement and constant agitation and panics... Ludendorff and I felt each other... And then on October 18, full of pride over the achievement: 'It was the most beautiful operation of our campaign.' — And on the 29th, on the retreat: 'We are not afraid of the Russians, even if they come now in triple numbers.'"

The German 9th Army had multiplied its forces through mobility. Despite the worst connections and greatest expansion, it remained firmly in the hands of the leadership. This achievement is matched by the troops, who fought, bled, and endured in an area that, on the Russian side, was designated for evacuation in the event of war, was fundamentally neglected in all respects, and therefore offered neither accommodation nor roads. Unheard-of efforts and deprivations were endured at that time, especially by the troops deployed before Ivangorod in the deep mud of the Vistula lowlands, while the bloody losses remained almost everywhere within tolerable limits. Overall, the army had lost around 15,000 men in combat in the previous campaigns, of which a substantial third at Ivangorod, somewhat less against Warsaw; however, the total loss was very high due to the extraordinary efforts. The opponent, however, had lost about 20,000 prisoners and 50 guns to the German troops alone, in addition to his bloody losses.

1) Rordorf, Warsaw-Ivangorod, p. 146f. — 2) Hoffmann, Records I, p. 57 ff. — 3) Cf. p. 489, note on allocated replacements.

Page: 5 keyno: 126

B. The Operations in East Prussia until the Retreat to the Lötzen-Angerapp Position.

I. The Battles under General v. Schubert.

a) Situation, Task, and Intentions of the new 8th Army.

See Sketches 5 and 11.

By the order of the Supreme Army Command on September 17, the composition and command relationships of the German 8th Army remaining in East Prussia were newly regulated1). This army was tasked with the difficult job of holding the successes achieved at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes against the continuously strengthening enemy, with almost half-reduced forces, a total of 9 1/2 infantry divisions — including only the I Army Corps, the I Reserve Corps, and the 3rd Reserve Division in active and reserve troops — and a cavalry division. Generaloberst v. Hindenburg intended to solve this task as aggressively as possible. Besides the intention to take the small but important and strong Bobr Fortress Ossowiec, he was also considering advancing against the large fortress Grodno. On September 17, the last army order before his appointment as commander of the 9th Army, the Generaloberst ordered further actions on Ppasnüsch, preparation for the inspection of Ossowiec, securing the Augustów Forest, and interruption of the Bjelostok-Grodno railway.

The new commander, General of Artillery v. Schubert2), arrived at the army headquarters in Insterburg on September 19. Major General Grünert, the chief quartermaster of the former 8th Army, joined him as chief of staff. The new command found the following situation:

According to an instruction from the Supreme Army Command on September 16, "all means were to be set in motion to sustainably destroy the Russian railways located in the area of the 8th Army" and furthermore "to initiate comprehensive railway destructions in Russia through agents." The order from

1) See p. 410f. and War Organization (Appendix 1). — 2) Until 1911 Inspector of Field Artillery, then retired, since the beginning of the war commanding general of the XIV Reserve Corps (7th Army) in the Northern Vosges.

Page: 502 keyno: 127

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

On September 17, the task of the new 8th Army was explicitly stated again as the "securing of East and West Prussia against renewed Russian invasion." The main reserves from Thorn and Graudenz were to "take over border security against their fortresses, ready for later offensive action."

The army's forces were executing the last instructions of Generaloberst von Hindenburg as follows¹):

On both sides of the Vistula, the fortress of Thorn had advanced parts of its garrison onto Russian soil.

The 35th Reserve Division (main reserve Thorn), the main reserve Graudenz, and the 70th Landwehr Brigade were positioned south of Zychowno and near Przasnysz.

The Landwehr Division Goltz had crossed the border from Lyck in the advance against Ossowiec. It was known that in recent years, efforts had been made to rebuild its outdated facilities; the artillery equipment was unknown. The fortress had only a single, 6 km wide front, directed towards the northwest, almost impregnable due to the swampy and completely exposed Bobr lowlands. In the memorandum of the General Staff prepared in peacetime, it was stated: "An attack over the Bobr is only possible in severe frost or prolonged drought. Otherwise, the fortress can only be taken if a crossing over the Njemen—Bobr—Narew line is successful elsewhere." Lieutenant General Freiherr von der Goltz was to demand the surrender of the fortress and prepare the bombardment. Several days had to pass before the opening of fire.

The 3rd Reserve Division with the 1st Cavalry Brigade was stationed around Augustów and had orders to advance detachments to the southern edge of the Augustów Forest. The hope of gaining the southern bank of the Bobr and thus the way into the rear of Ossowiec seemed not to be fulfilled according to the latest reports from the division. The Russians were positioned in the forest terrain directly opposite; this, however, was, as Lieutenant General von Morgen reported, "completely swampy" and outside the roads "impassable for all weapons." The general recommended bypassing the forest via Sejny.

The I Army Corps had reached the area of Kalwarya and west of it in the march from Mariampol to the south, the 1st Cavalry Division (without 1st Brigade) Suwalki.

The I Reserve Corps with the Landwehr Division

¹) See Volume II, pp. 303—305.

Page: 503 keyno: 128

Situation in East Prussia, September 19.

Königsberg (main reserve of the fortress) covered both sides of the Kowno railway on Russian soil, protecting the northern flank of the army. The 9th Landwehr Brigade occupied Tilsit; north of it, the Landsturm of the Königsberg fortress secured the Russian border. Behind the front, the 6th Landwehr Brigade was engaged in transporting prisoners and loot at Insterburg. It was to reach Goldap by September 22.

As a supplement to the permanent fortifications of East Prussia, the construction of a position for about one army corps at the southern border near Mlawa was ordered, and a similar position was to be created at the eastern border near Wirballen. Above all, work was being done with emphasis on the expanded facilities of Lötzen.

There was nothing to fear from the sea; there, the German fleet had the upper hand.

From the enemy, as far as was known on the German side, the 2nd Army, heavily defeated at Tannenberg, with at least 6½ infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, not counting the corps XIII and XV, which were partly destroyed, partly captured, as well as the reserve divisions that arrived after the battle, had retreated against the Narew.

The Russian 10th Army, about 6 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division, was assumed to be at the upper Bobr, namely the XXII and the III Siberian Corps after unfortunate battles at Ossowjez and before Augustow, the newly arrived II Caucasian Corps behind them at Dombrowo, the 1st Cavalry Division at Sopozkinje. Between the 10th Army and the southern wing of the 1st Army at Olita, there seemed to be a wide gap.

The 1st Army, just defeated at the Masurian Lakes, about 8½ infantry, 8 reserve, and 4½ cavalry divisions, was distinguished behind the Niemen. At Olita, the XX Corps was identified, north of it the IV and at Kowno the III Corps, southwest of Olita the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions; at Olita, as was known, the II Corps had also retreated, which had suffered particularly heavily. The 68th Reserve Division was to be added in the area of Tauraggen—Schauten. Presumably, the army also included the 5th Rifle Brigade, seven reserve divisions involved in the last battles (53rd, 54th, 56th, 57th, 72nd, 73rd, and 76th), and the two Guard Cavalry Divisions.

Against 10 German infantry divisions (of which half were Landwehr divisions and 1 cavalry division with the Vistula fleet, about thirty Russian infantry divisions, of which at least 29 infantry divisions (of which only about a third were reserve) and

Page: 504 keyno: 129

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

8½ cavalry divisions are counted. Nevertheless, the new commander of the German 8th Army agreed with the view presented to him by his chief of staff, an expert on the situation. It suggested that the enemy, after his heavy defeats, would not be capable of new undertakings soon; he had never carried out a systematic, powerful infantry attack, even when he was still unweakened, and his defensive resilience was still considered low.

General v. Schubert saw it as his task to conceal the withdrawal of his own forces and to keep the enemy believing that he still had the 8th Army in its previous strength before him. This also had to benefit the operations of the new 9th Army in southern Poland. He wanted to continue expanding the victories in East Prussia, as long as it was still possible, in the spirit of his predecessor. Such achievements could only be reached through bold and swift action; consideration for the troops' need for rest to boost their combat strength, almost as urgently needed as the Russians, had to be set aside; the already initiated operations should be vigorously continued.

These intentions were reflected in the army order of September 20. The basic idea was: attack on the right flank and in the center, defense in the north. The idea was to bring about the fall of the fortress Ossowiec by advancing the 3rd Reserve Division from Augustów over the upper Bobr. To open the difficult path through the swampy terrain of the Augustów Forest, the I Army Corps was to bypass these woods eastward from Suwalki via Seiny—Sopockinie. The possibility of capturing the fortress Grodno by surprise attack was not ruled out by the army command. The 1st Cavalry Division was tasked with interrupting the railways leading from Grodno and Kowno to Vilna.

In the following days, the high command faced new decisions. On the evening of September 21, the order from Generaloberst v. Hindenburg arrived, which designated the 35th Reserve Division from Mlawa to advance over Neidenburg and operate on the left bank of the Vistula1). According to this order, the 8th Army was also to exert as strong a pressure as possible in the direction of Warsaw and, following the advance against the Warsaw—Grodno railway, an advance of two to three divisions from the area of Mlawa to the south was to be undertaken.

1) See p. 414.

Page: 505 keyno: 130

East Prussia — Intentions of General v. Schubert.

to be prepared; the associated weakening of the East Prussian eastern front was to be compensated by the ongoing expansion of fortified positions. In the event of a "still possible renewed incursion" by the Russians, the railways from Mława to Warsaw and from Lyck to Ostrowo were to be thoroughly destroyed. On the other hand, the Supreme Army Command had suggested a naval operation against the Russian coast, which could also ease the situation in East Prussia).

General v. Schubert decided to conduct border protection at Soldau-Neidenburg initially purely defensively, but he wanted to continue trying to gain the Bobr section. On September 22, the army headquarters was moved behind the right wing to Lyck.

In the meantime, greater difficulties had arisen in the advance against the upper Bobr than General v. Schubert had initially assumed.

Before Dislowiez, the Landwehr Division Goltz had pushed the enemy back so far by September 21 that the artillery deployment could begin. Two batteries of mortars (21 cm), eleven batteries of heavy field howitzers (15 cm), and two batteries of 10 cm cannons, a total of about 60 guns, were available; they mostly rolled in by rail from Königsberg.

East of Dislowiez, however, the 3rd Reserve Division, intended for the advance through the Augustower Forest, could no longer move forward, and the hope that the impact of the I Army Corps would open the way for them dwindled more and more. The idea of reaching the rear of Dislowiez via the upper Bobr had to be abandoned. Against this fortress, it could only be a feint operation from then on. The Landwehr Division Goltz was assigned the 1st Cavalry Brigade to protect its right flank threatened from Lomsha, for which there was no longer any use in the Augustower Forest.

The I Army Corps had received orders from the Army High Command on September 20, while marching from Kalwaria to Augustow, to turn southeast, over Seiny to Sopoziniec, to bypass the Augustower Forest. However, in this order, General v. François felt that the importance of the Grodno fortress was not sufficiently appreciated. He was of the opinion that a feint attack against the fortress was pointless, but a decisive attack with the available means was "almost impossible," as aerial reconnaissance, apart from the permanent works

1) See p. 414 and 520f.

Page: 506 keyno: 131

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

had established extensive field installations. The commanding general

therefore did not want to march on Seiny, but more to the west, on Suwalki,

to be used from there "depending on the situation against the enemy advancing

again over the Njemen." This intention was only reported to the army

high command on September 21, when the 1st Infantry Division was already

marching towards Suwalki. General v. Schubert reluctantly gave his consent.

He abandoned the idea of using the I Army Corps to gain the southern

Bobr bank and approach the Warsaw-Grodno railway, but insisted on

an "advance with a strong vanguard to Sopockinie." The I Army Corps

could then be deployed against the Grodno-Wilna railway. Insofar as

Russian security was already north of the Njemen, it was assumed by the

army high command that there were only troops in this direction that had

just been heavily defeated at the Masurian Lakes; an advance over the

Njemen seemed feasible.

With this plan, General v. Schubert arrived on September 22

at Suwalki at the headquarters of the I Army Corps. The corps had

reached Suwalki on September 21, partly in a very strenuous march on

poor roads, with the 1st Infantry Division, with advance troops of the

2nd Infantry Division reaching Seiny; the troops urgently needed rest.

General v. François raised serious concerns about the intentions of the

commander-in-chief; he believed that it was more appropriate for the

condition of the troops to let the enemy run into a position to be expanded

in the Suwalki-Wilkowischki line, which the Russians would hardly be

able to muster the necessary strength for. After thorough discussion,

however, the commander-in-chief stuck to his decision. The I Army

Corps, to which the 1st Cavalry Division was subordinated, was to reach

Druskieniki on the Njemen on September 24 and "thoroughly destroy"

the Grodno-Wilna railway east of the river. A division was to cross over

and the headquarters was to show its flag on the right bank of the Njemen.

The right flank seemed secured from Augustow by the 3rd Reserve Division,

the left had to remain open. General v. Schubert consciously accepted

this disadvantage. He countered, as he reported to Generaloberst v.

Hindenburg on September 24, the "hope that the enemy might be tempted

by this undertaking to launch a premature offensive from Olita, even from

Kowno, and that the opportunity might arise to break through with his

right wing in the area south of Ralow." At Wirballen, the I Reserve Corps

was to be ready to engage in the battle. If the thrust over the Njemen did

not bring the hoped-for opportunity for a profitable...

Page: 507 keyno: 132

8th Army — Decision to Advance over the Njemen.

the blow, General v. Schubert wanted to withdraw the I Army Corps again and wait for the Russian advance in the Suwalki–Wilkowischki line.

These plans assumed that the already barely sufficient forces of the army would not be further weakened. The later requested transfer of one to two divisions to Warsaw by Generaloberst v. Hindenburg would completely change the situation. General v. Schubert therefore expressed in the mentioned report of September 24 to the Generaloberst the hope "that for the next eight days the necessity of this deployment would not arise, but only after successes against the enemy advancing from the Njemen had been achieved."

In the response from Generaloberst v. Hindenburg received on September 26, it stated: "With the current enemy measures, it is primarily about protecting the province of East Prussia against an attack from the Grodno–Kowno line for the 8th Army. A weakening of the army by deployment to Warsaw does not seem feasible to me at this time either. Therefore, Your Excellency, I have to solve your task with all the forces available to you. A use of parts of the 8th Army towards Warsaw can only occur after further clarification of the situation in front of the 8th Army's front." The Generaloberst again pointed out "terrain reinforcements to the greatest possible extent" at Würzballen and thorough railway destructions on enemy and also on own territory, if the 8th Army had to retreat. "In the planned destruction of the railways" — it was added for clarification — "I see a very essential means to decisively influence a new superior Russian offensive."

General v. Schubert could thus dispose of his troops unhindered for the time being. He also brought the last field troop, the 70th Landwehr Brigade, from Prasnysz to the army near Grajewo and took over the immediate protection of the border against the Russian 2nd Army from Thorn to south of Lyck with fortress troops and Landsturm.

The small but battle-tested and victory-conscious German 8th Army guaranteed that everything humanly possible would be done against the numerically far superior enemy. However, how long it would succeed in keeping him in check was difficult to foresee. The own ranks were — especially among officers — thinned; the enormous efforts of three battles had exhausted the forces

Page: 508 keyno: 133

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

the people and probably even more so the horses were worn out. It added to the fact that the German territory with its good roads and accommodations had now been left behind, and the fight had to be continued on Russian soil, with sparse and poor roads, impoverished villages, large swamp and forest areas. However, the enemy's forces had to grow from day to day. His armies, defeated in East Prussia, could organize themselves behind fortified river sections, replenish troops and equipment without being hindered; fresh troops from the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Siberia began to arrive. Thus, the success of further operations on the German side depended above all on the skill and determination of the leadership.

h) The Battles from the End of September to October 3, 1914. The Bombardment of Ossowiec¹). Herewith Sketch 11 and Map 18.

On September 23, the Landwehr Division Goltz repelled Russian cavalry advancing on Schtschutschin, then the 1st Cavalry Brigade took over the security of the right flank. On September 24, the airship "Z IV" determined that the fortress Ossowiec was currently completely surrounded by water and swamp. Troops and horses of the Landwehr had to help bring the siege batteries and their ammunition into position. On September 26, Lieutenant General Freiherr v. der Goltz opened fire against the fortress, and on September 27, it was continued from more advanced positions. An advance by the Russians deep into the left flank of the division, against the road Grajewo–Augustow, was repelled on the same day, but it showed the entire danger of the undertaking; it was all the greater as the heavy batteries on the rain-soaked roads could only be withdrawn again with great effort of auxiliary forces and time. By September 29, the 70th Landwehr Brigade arrived as reinforcement. However, the overall situation had changed significantly. In view of the battles that had meanwhile flared up at Augustow²), the bombardment of Ossowiec was to be abandoned.

When it was determined on September 28 that the enemy was also approaching again from the east and therefore a sudden advance of stronger enemy forces against the right flank of the Goltz Division was to be expected, General v. Schubert ordered the withdrawal of the siege artillery to begin. Already the following morning, on September 29,

¹) Cf. p. 502 and p. 505. — ²) p. 513ff.

Page: 509 keyno: 134

The Landwehr before Ossowjez.

tember, several Russian columns advanced from the Narew towards Schtschuschin; the 1st Cavalry Brigade stationed at Stawischki had to retreat. General v. der Goltz was tasked with covering the right flank of the army southwest of Grajewo.

On September 30th at noon, the enemy attacked the Landwehr at Grajewo. As reports of the continued march of Russian columns from Schtschuschin northwards were received, General v. der Goltz intended to retreat to Lyk. However, the commander-in-chief did not agree; he ordered a counterattack to repel the Russians and sent his First General Staff Officer, Major Englein, to Grajewo. The counterattack could not be carried out. Since the enemy from Schtschuschin must have already had a lead towards Lyk, General v. der Goltz, in agreement with Major Englein, decided to retreat eastwards over the Lyk River to Raigrod; they might then be able to engage in the battle at Augustow the next day. As the divisional staff was about to leave Grajewo as the last part at nightfall, to follow their troops over the only provisionally restored bridges of the Lyk River, they were caught in a heavy fire attack in the town. The staff narrowly escaped; motor vehicles, a gun, and other vehicles were lost in the rather disorganized retreat.

On the night of October 1st, the Landwehr rested at Raigrod and to the west; the 1st Cavalry Brigade had retreated over the Lyk River at Prostken to the northeast. The road Grajewo—Lyk, and thus the way into the rear of the army, was open to the enemy.

The Advance against the Njemen.

See Map 18.

According to the orders given by the army high command, the I Army Corps was to reach the Njemen at Druskeniki on September 24th; this was almost 50 kilometers of march from Seiny, where the foremost parts of the 2nd Infantry Division were located, over partly the worst roads through difficult terrain. Then the corps was to force the crossing and interrupt the railway another 18 kilometers away; at the same time, a strong detachment of all arms was to advance against Sopockinie to distract the enemy. The I Army Corps still had serious concerns about such an extensive undertaking. In view of the extraordinary efforts made previously, General v. François requested that

Page: 510 keyno: 135

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

The Army High Command on the evening of September 22 again considered "whether it is advisable to continue advancing with the army corps in an easterly direction and thereby give the enemy the possibility of a flanking maneuver from the direction of Dombrowo and Olita," thus from the south and north simultaneously. He considered it more prudent to lure the Russians out and then attack them. Despite these renewed objections, General v. Schubert maintained his order. General v. Francois, however, decided to allow his corps to rest initially on September 23.

By the evening of September 23, General v. Francois had received reports that made the fulfillment of his mission appear quite difficult. On the right flank of the ordered advance, Russian security forces were stationed at the Augustów Canal, and behind them, on the Augustów–Grodno road, a gathering of strong troops, estimated to be a corps, was reported, along with strong cavalry north of Sopozinije. Already west of the Njemen, the raiding detachments of the 1st Cavalry Division had been repelled with losses, and halfway between Seiny and the river, mixed enemy detachments were expected to be stationed on the main roads. At Druskeniki itself, a tethered balloon indicated a stronger enemy presence. North of there, the enemy was positioned in Mereč, northeast of Serje and Simno. At Olita, an enemy corps and two cavalry divisions were expected. In light of this situation, General v. Francois again suggested to the commander-in-chief to refrain from advancing over the Njemen, thus deep into the enemy's formation, and to only initiate partial advances on Druskeniki and Sopozinije. General v. Schubert, however, adhered to his orders on this day as well; he assessed the strength, combat power, and fighting spirit of the enemy as less significant than General v. Francois. He pointed out that the railway interruption was of utmost importance; "sufficient forces" should be deployed for this purpose, and if no ford was available, a bridge should be constructed. He considered it necessary to designate the bulk of the forward division for the crossing. As a reserve, the 3rd Reserve Division would be moved from Augustów to Seiny. If the enemy were provoked into a counterattack by the thrust of the I Army Corps, it would be desirable.

On September 24, the I Army Corps began its advance from Seiny and secured Druskeniki up to about 20 km; it was the day when the corps, according to the first order it had received, should have already reached this location. On the left flank, the 1st Cavalry Division (without the 1st Brigade) had been securing the area near Serje for two days;

Page: 511 keyno: 136

The Advance of the I Army Corps against the Njemen.

To guard against surprises from the forest area in the south, a regiment of the 2nd Division was advanced against Sopozkinje. The 3rd Reserve Division (without a regiment that remained in Augustów) reached the area south of Seiny and pushed parts forward to Kopziowo.

On September 25, the 2nd Infantry Division found that the enemy was in a reinforced position on the eastern bank of the Njemen at Druskeniki. General v. Francois set the attack for the next day and moved the rear, 1st Infantry Division to the left next to the 2nd Division at Serje. The 1st Cavalry Division advanced south from there to be ready for the advance against the railway. A reconnaissance of the division against Mereczh led to fighting; the enemy seemed to have established a wide bridgehead on the western bank of the Njemen bend, from which he could advance at any time.

When General v. Francois finally wanted to give the order to attack Druskeniki on September 26 at noon after final preparations, an air report reached him stating that the main road on the eastern bank of the Njemen from Olita via Mereczh almost to Druskeniki was covered by a column of all arms marching southwards and estimated to be an army corps. General v. Francois decided to forgo crossing the Njemen. From the south, the enemy pressed against the canal crossings at Augustów and the lake narrows south of Seiny. The army command still did not consider the situation of the I Army Corps at the Njemen to be critical. The operation against the railway was to be abandoned, but the corps was to feign crossing intentions at the Njemen on September 27 to hinder the enemy from any planned evacuations. To protect the flanks, the 6th Landwehr Brigade, which had meanwhile arrived in Suwalki, was deployed to Augustów, and the 1st Reserve Division of the I Reserve Corps from Kalvaria to Simno. At the I Army Corps, General v. Francois ordered feigned attacks for the 2nd Infantry Division against Sopozkinje and Druskeniki, for the 1st Cavalry Division against the bridgehead west of Mereczh. The 1st Infantry Division was to support the cavalry from Serje and probe with weak elements against the enemy positions on the road to Olita.

These orders led to minor skirmishes on September 27 at Druskeniki, west of Mereczh, and southwest of Olita, where the enemy retreated from the 1st Reserve Division. Meanwhile, there was no cause for concern on the Njemen front itself. However, the enemy pressed sharply against Augustów, where he established a firm foothold south of the town on the western bank of the canal and advanced against the road Augustów—Grajevo.

Page: 512 keyno: 137

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

rose. To keep the important crossings of Augustow in hand, the 3rd Reserve Division was to move from Seiny on the straight road through the forest back there. Meanwhile, the enemy had destroyed the bridges on this road. Late in the evening, the order had to be changed; the division was to reach Augustow on September 28 via the detour through Suwalki, a march of 60 instead of 42 km. However, with the release of Seiny, the I Army Corps lost the flank protection against the large forest area, where it suspected three Russian corps. Thus, General v. Schubert had to decide on the evening of September 27 to withdraw the I Army Corps; he hoped that the enemy would follow and that there would be an opportunity to attack his right flank.

When the army order: "I Army Corps is gradually to retreat to the line Seiny—northern end of Galadus Lake" arrived at General v. François on the evening of September 27, he had already ordered the continuation of operations against Sopockinie, Druskieniki, and Meretisch for the 28th. He initially adhered to this order and only moved parts of his corps back to Seiny for the defensive 3rd Reserve Division.

In the early morning of September 28, the German troops deployed for the defense of Augustow — a regiment of the 3rd Reserve Division and the 6th Landwehr Brigade — evacuated the place before the Russians advancing from the south and east and retreated northwards. General v. Schubert sent the 36th Reserve Division of the I Reserve Corps to reinforce the southern wing towards Suwalki. He ordered the I Army Corps to return "as soon as possible" to the line ordered the day before. General v. François ordered the withdrawal for the 2nd Infantry Division in two columns via Kopciowo and northwards to Seiny, for the 1st Infantry Division even further north from Sereje to the west. The 1st Cavalry Division was to conceal the movement. The retreat was difficult on partially poor and muddy roads. From the large forest in the south, the enemy made advances over the southern retreat road of the corps leading through Kopciowo, losses occurred. They had to turn north onto pathless field roads, which led over inadequate, often collapsing bridges under the vehicles between swamp and lakes to the west. In pouring rain, the corps only reached behind the Galadus Lake on September 29. The 1st Cavalry Division held in front of the left wing of the corps.

The operation against the Njemen thus reached its conclusion. It owed its origin to the justified feeling of moral

Page: 513 keyno: 138

8th Army — The Retreat from the Njemen.

superiority over the enemy and a frequent overestimation of the importance of individual railway interruptions at the beginning of the war. It demanded maximum mobility from the troops. However, their strength was no longer the same as at the beginning of the war, even if they willingly gave their all. Added to this were ammunition shortages and rainy weather! The commanding general and his staff officers saw the advance over the Njemen as a "cavalry raid," in whose successful outcome they had no confidence from the outset. Only two days later, as anticipated by the high command, did the foremost parts of the corps reach the Njemen at Druskeniki; thus, the advantage of surprise was called into question. The resistance of the Russians had meanwhile stiffened, and the undertaking had become more difficult and dangerous. The pressure of the Russians against Augustów finally brought the I Army Corps into a rather difficult situation.

The losses at the Njemen and during the retreat were not light and gave cause for concern; the threat to the flanks had put nerves to a severe test. The fighting strength and spirit of the troops were not encouraged by the retreat on muddy roads in rainy weather²).

The Battles at Augustów—Suwalki from September 29 to October 3.

See Sketch 11 and Map 18.

The advance of the I Army Corps did not bring the hoped-for opportunity for a blow against the enemy. Since it remained calm in the north and the 36th Reserve Division was already marching south towards Suwalki, General v. Schubert wanted to take advantage of the opportunity now presented to attack the enemy, who seemed to be advancing far at Augustów.

On September 29, the 36th Reserve Division, marching southwest over Suwalki, reached the beginning of Ratschki. In Suwalki, Lieutenant General v. Morgen was with half of the 3rd Reserve Division, a regiment held together with the 6th Landwehr Brigade halfway between Suwalki and Augustów at Olschanka, the last regiment was with the I Army Corps. During the day, signs increased that the enemy, for his part, wanted to continue attacking north from Augustów: according to intercepted radio messages, they were supposed to

1) Reliable information on the extent of the losses has not yet been determined. — 2) Regarding the enemy, see p. 522 ff.

Page: 514 keyno: 139

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

about 1½ Russian corps to advance on Suwalki, infantry with cavalry was already in the woods just south of the Seiny—Suwalki road in the flank of the exhausted troops of the I Army Corps. General v. Schubert therefore wanted to withdraw the troops standing with the front to the east at Seiny—Simno to the Suwalki—Kalvaria road on September 30. General v. Morgen, however, was to attack the enemy at Augustów with the two reserve divisions (3rd and 36th) united at Suwalki.

For September 30, General v. Morgen positioned the 36th Reserve Division (without a regiment¹) west of the Rospuda section from Ratschki to Augustów, the 3rd Reserve Division (without the regiment with the I Army Corps) was to follow behind. This allowed them to face west again and take the enemy's flank from an effective direction; the 6th Landwehr Brigade now had to defend its position at Olchanta on the Suwalki—Augustów road alone. The 36th Reserve Division under Major General Kruse encountered the enemy 8 km northwest of Augustów; General v. Morgen turned the beginning of the 3rd Reserve Division southwest to extend the 36th to the right. Russian artillery then opened fire on the end of the marching column at Ratschki; the enemy was also advancing, east of the Rospuda towards Suwalki. Quickly deciding, General v. Morgen turned the 3rd Reserve Division east to attack the enemy at Ratschki; the 36th Reserve Division was to form a defensive front against Augustów. A fierce battle erupted around the Rospuda section on both sides of Ratschki, but it remained undecided until the evening of September 30; the enemy west of Augustów remained calm. On October 1, the battle at Ratschki continued. It was possible to repel Russian encirclement attempts north of the place and cross the Rospuda here. But even on this second day of fighting, it was not possible to drive the enemy, supported by concealed artillery, from his naturally strong positions.

Meanwhile, the I Army Corps from Suwalki had also joined the battle. Its retreat on September 30 had been extremely difficult again. When General v. Francois arrived in Suwalki, he received a report from the 6th Landwehr Brigade that they were holding at Olchanta "against strong superiority," but had already exhausted all reserves. He had therefore initially...

¹) A regiment had remained with the I Reserve Corps.

Page: 515 keyno: 140

8th Army — The Battle at Ratschki.

the regiment of the 3rd Reserve Division, the Landwehr, was sent to assist. At the same time, there was concern for the 2nd Infantry Division, which, with exhausted troops and horses, was moving westward on the only available road through swamps and lakes, constantly threatened by the enemy in the south, who occasionally harassed their march with artillery fire. Although General v. François was determined to repel this enemy by attack if necessary, it was noted — as stated in the corps' war diary — "after passing through the narrowness of Tartak, there was a feeling of overall relief." The enemy did not press from the east. The I Army Corps halted at Suwalki and northeast of it. According to the instructions of the army high command, it was to remain there the following day, as it urgently needed rest after the previous exertions. "Great, extraordinary marching achievements for Russian road conditions" — as further noted in the war diary — "combined with short night rest and poor accommodation placed higher demands on the troops than during the pursuit days of Tannenberg and Goldap. The unfavorable weather made the initially passable roads almost unusable. Special efforts must be demanded from the 2nd Division, which was set for the Niemen crossing." The most affected was the 1st Cavalry Division; it reported on September 30: "Three rain bivouacs without oats, land exhausted. Due to the lack of supplies and oats for days and deep roads, artillery is now inoperative. Only step on road possible."

In such a state of the troops, a report came in on the night of October 1 at 2:30 that the 6th Landwehr Brigade was retreating north from Olschanka "in dissolution." General v. François alerted the 2nd Infantry Division and set it from Suwalki southward for a counterattack. Between the roads leading to Ratschki and Augustow, fighting occurred south of Olschanka; no decision was reached by evening. Half of the 1st Infantry Division was moved to Suwalki, the other half of this division had to bend its northern flank to the southern tip of Lake Selment¹) as enemy infantry was reported advancing from the east. The 1st Cavalry Division secured the left flank at the road junction halfway between Lake Suwalki and Kalvaria.

General v. Schubert, who had already decided on September 29 to move his headquarters — more behind the center of the army, from

¹) Not to be confused with the lake of the same name east of Lyck.

Page: 516 keyno: 141

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

Lyc to Goldap, had postponed this change due to the events on the southern wing until October 1st. Meanwhile, the overall situation of the army had become increasingly difficult. The enemy had not only attacked at Gumbinnen but also at Grajewo, where the withdrawal of the Landwehr Division Goltz to Raigrod had opened the way to the rear of the army; furthermore, he was now also moving against the northern wing of the army. A far superior enemy was advancing in a continuous front. However, the own army was stretched over a width of 80 km with its limited forces and had no reserves. If it were to be torn apart in skirmishes on Russian soil, any serious setback could be disastrous. Such considerations led General v. Schubert already on the night of October 1st to the conviction that it was necessary to gradually withdraw the army to the Lötzen—Angerapp position. The events of October 1st dispelled even the last doubts: Serious reports arrived from the Landwehr Division Goltz (including the 70th Landwehr Brigade); it had not marched east from Raigrod to Augustowo early on October 1st, but had evaded northwards over the Reich border to Kallinowen before an enemy reported from the south and reported that it was "completely exhausted, both combat and movement incapable" and lacked supplies and ammunition. Furthermore, the news of the retreat of the 6th Landwehr Brigade was received. The situation with General v. Morgen was still unclear. The I Army Corps, exhausted by previous efforts, hoped to move with parts to the south and was also tied down by a superior enemy, who now seemed to follow in a broad front from the east. In addition, General Otto v. Below, the commanding general of the I Reserve Corps, reported in the evening that he was beginning the retreat from Kalvaria to Mariampol to Wirballen due to the threat of encirclement. The demand of the High Command to instead deploy the 1st Reserve Division to support the I Army Corps from Kalvaria to the south and only withdraw the Königsberg Landwehr Division to Wirballen, he could no longer comply with. The center of the German army fighting at Ratschki—Gumbinnen was deprived of its flank protection both in the south and in the north. With eight to nine corps, the enemy seemed to be advancing to encircle this center. However, among the own forces, four Landwehr Brigades, which the army commander had previously counted on, were apparently in a condition that excluded any use in the open field for the foreseeable future. In this situation, General v. Schubert decided not to wait any longer with the retreat to the Angerapp position.

Page: 517 keyno: 142

8th Army. — Battle at Ratschki.

the Landwehr troops could find a use corresponding to their capabilities,

the active and reserve troops were united as a strike group on the northern

flank. On the evening of October 1st, General v. Schubert reported to the

Supreme Army Command: "Enemy advance today on the front Pilwiszki—

Mariampol—Ludwinowo—Seiny—Augustowo—Grajewo—Schtschutschin

established. North of the forest of Augustow, 1st Army with four corps,

including the new XVIII Corps(1) and some reserve divisions, and southwest

of the forest of Augustow, 10th Army with about four to five corps. Today

a favorable battle for us between Augustow and Suwalki, which will also

continue tomorrow. Persistence, gradual retreat from encirclement to

extended Bobr and Angerapp positions. There, a decisive battle is likely.

Landwehr due to continuous fighting and poor weather as well as heavy

ground only very conditionally usable." The army order for October 2nd

regulated the preparations for the retreat. Landwehr, trains, and baggage

were sent westwards to Lötzen, the Below Corps had to hold the positions

at Wirballen, while the Morgen Corps and the I Army Corps were to bring

the battle at Ratschki "to a conclusion," as there might still be a success

to achieve here. However, they could not linger there much longer; the

order stated: "The whole situation forces us to end with the enemy as

quickly as possible. If necessary, the I Army Corps must withdraw from

a superior encirclement of the enemy from the north and east to Filipowo.

... Morgen Corps, not reachable from here(2), must act according to

circumstances."

At the M o r g e n C o r p s, October 2nd began with a fierce attack

by the Russians against the left wing of the 3rd Reserve Division north

of Ratschki. At the same time, the right wing of this division managed

to gain the Rospuda crossings south of Ratschki. By evening, the enemy

was pushed back over the entire division front beyond the Schebertal

section. General v. Morgen had the impression that the Russian resistance

was broken. "I will ruthlessly exploit my success," he reported to the

commander-in-chief in the evening. "I hope thereby to bring the army

into such a favorable position that it does not need to undertake further

retreat and cross the border again. I hope that the other parts of Your

Excellency's army will also rise against the superior enemy.

(1) There was an error here.  
(2) Telephone connection did not exist. Otherwise, it could only have been a  
very short-term unreachability.

Page: 518 keyno: 143

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

“...To completely destroy this enemy, I am counting on the intervention of the 2nd Infantry Division...” Instead, on October 3rd, he received a message from an officer sent to the I Army Corps at 4:30 in the morning that this corps had already begun the retreat from Suwalki to the west “by order of the Army High Command.” Thus, General v. Morgen also had to abandon further combat. After burying the dead, he began the retreat; his troops had lost 46 officers and 1571 men in dead, wounded, and missing.

At the I Army Corps, General v. François had ordered the continuation of the attack on Augustowo for October 2nd, but it had not been executed. The eastern wing of the 2nd Infantry Division had been pushed back north by a strong enemy during the day; only in a position 5 km south of Suwalki was the division commander, Lieutenant General v. Falk, able to reorganize the defense on this wing. The right wing, however, held its ground; the advancing attack of the 3rd Reserve Division had driven three Russian batteries (18 guns) and more than 2000 men as booty into its arms.

Meanwhile, General v. François had already been informed by a telegram from the Army High Command at 9 a.m. that he should not “exploit his success south of Suwalki; the Supreme Commander places more value on the fact that the Army Corps can be withdrawn from the battle in good condition to be capable of new tasks”1). Given the overall situation of his corps and the setback on the left wing of the 2nd Infantry Division, but still unaware of the successes on their right wing and with the Morgen Corps, General v. François had therefore already ordered the march westward at 3:30 p.m. Around 5 p.m., the 1st Infantry Division moved out, followed by the 2nd during the night; the enemy did not press.

The departure of the I Army Corps was not reported to the Army High Command, although there was telephone communication. Thus, General v. Falk only learned of it in the afternoon. He was called to the telephone by the Supreme Army Command on October 1st. General v. Falkenhayn wanted to know whether he could carry out a comprehensive operation against one of the Russian flanks. General

1) Note at the I Army Corps. — Colonel General v. Schubert doubted in a letter to the Reichsarchiv from spring 1928 that this telegram had been given with his approval; in any case, he never feared that the I Army Corps could advance too far south.

Page: 519 keyno: 144

8th Army — Thoughts on Retreat.

v. Schubert had replied that his situation was not particularly favorable at the moment, he was himself encircled; but they should just let him be; he would "extricate himself and later carry out the requested operation." When the enemy did not press strongly at any point of the encirclement front on October 2, the retreat no longer seemed urgent to him. He halted the march of the Landwehr and intended, as he reported to the Supreme Army Command in the evening along with the victory at Ratschki, to "rest tomorrow at the border on Russian territory." The battle at Ratschki was to be brought to a full conclusion. In the army order for October 3, it was stated: "The Morgen Corps will advance at dawn in an easterly direction, throwing the opposing enemy back into the forest area together with the 2nd Infantry Division." Initially, the I Army Corps was to gather in the direction of Ratschki, ready to repel an enemy advance from the south; the 2nd Infantry Division was to follow the 1st Infantry Division withdrawing to the west. Only when this army order reached the I Army Corps in Filipowo around midnight did the army leader learn that the corps was already in full retreat.

On October 3, a more reliable assessment of the situation was established. It turned out that the III Siberian Corps had been defeated at Ratschki; 3500 uninjured prisoners and 24 guns had been reported as booty. At Grajewo, the enemy still held back, and General v. Schubert went to General v. Francois in Filipowo. On the way there, the high defensive capability of the border lakes was particularly evident; in such terrain sections, even the Landwehr could repel the enemy. When the commander-in-chief then learned in Filipowo that the enemy from Suwalki had barely followed, he decided to carry out the defense intended at the Angerap already at the national border. "No further step back!" was his verbal instruction to the army corps.

Since the enemy in the south could not be grasped, General v. Schubert now decided on a strike in the north. This corresponded to a simultaneous proposal by General v. Below, who recommended a comprehensive attack against the Russian northern group advancing on Wirballen. General v. Schubert wanted to concentrate all available forces against them, while the southern flank remained in defense in the meantime. This was under the command of Lieutenant General v. Morgen on the morning of October 4, with his 3rd Reserve Division, the Landwehr Division, and the 6th and 70th Landwehr Brigades in the naturally strong defensive section up to

Page: 520 keyno: 145

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

Filipowo was to be taken over. In the attack against the enemy northern group,

besides the I Reserve Corps (including the 36th Reserve Division),

the entire active I Army Corps was to participate as much as possible, as well as the Landwehr

Division Königsberg and the 9th Landwehr Brigade, which had been stationed at Tilsit,

all in all about 5½ divisions of infantry.

These plans changed on October 4. As the

enemy advanced against Batajarschewo and Filipowo, General

v. Francois wanted to postpone the march north of the 1st Infantry Division

ordered by the High Command to first "clear up" these

enemies. General v. Schubert could not entirely dismiss this necessity; he ordered that the I Army Corps should

repel the enemy but not pursue them beyond their current positions. However, the Commander-in-Chief held firm to the decision for a later attack on the northern

flank. In the army order from 2 p.m., it said: "The Army High Command wants to seek the decision at Wirballen;" for this, the 1st Infantry Division, as ordered yesterday for today,

immediately moves out. General v. Francois takes over with the 2nd Infantry

Division, 6th Landwehr Brigade, and Landwehr Division Goltz the protection

against Swalki from south of the Rominter Heath up to and including

Batajarschewo." The I Army Corps was also to keep in mind the detachment

of the 2nd Infantry Division and its readiness behind the left

flank to also march north.

This army order was the last to bear the signature of General

v. Schubert. Shortly thereafter, a telegram from the Supreme Army

Command arrived, calling him for "personal consultation" to the Great Headquarters.

He did not return to his post from there1). His

successor, General v. Francois, immediately abandoned the idea of the attack on the

northern flank.

c) An Operation Against the Russian Coast2).

For this, see Map 14.

For the landing operation of the fleet, the Supreme Army

Command, in agreement with the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, designated the small

port of Windau on the coast of Courland as the target. The Baltic

forces were moved from the North Sea through the IV and V Squadrons of the

1) See p. 526f.  
2) See p. 414 and 505. — Further details on the naval execution of the operation can be found in: The War at Sea 1914—1918, published by the Naval Archive;   
The War in the Baltic Sea, Vol. I, p. 135 ff.

Page: 521 keyno: 146

Parts of the Fleet before Windau

high seas fleet reinforced; Grand Admiral Prince Heinrich of Prussia had taken command of the entire formation. The originally intended involvement of a reinforced infantry brigade of six battalions, two squadrons, and three batteries had to be abandoned, as preparing the necessary transport ships would have taken too long. The planned landing of a mixed troop formation had to be canceled; the operation was now to be limited to "a demonstration with the available naval forces..." and "excluding even small landing operations." For this purpose, a replacement battalion of 750 men still in training was embarked on the battleships of the V Squadron in Danzig.

On September 24, parts of the fleet appeared before Windau and began preparatory measures for a landing; the operation was to continue the following day. However, when reports came in during the night, consistently reporting the entry of English naval forces into the Kattegat, the Grand Admiral felt compelled to return swiftly to the western Baltic Sea to confront the new enemy. Even when the mentioned reports soon proved false, the once-abandoned operation was not resumed due to the landing difficulties recognized at Windau. Whether this brief feint operation had any effect remains unclear. In a Russian account¹), it is stated: "What prompted the German ships to come so close to the coast remained unclear, as they withdrew after a short time without undertaking anything." Had the initially planned landing of an entire brigade been carried out, the result might have been different, and thus a relief of the battlefront might have been possible. But even so, the concern over a German landing, which had burdened the Russian command since the beginning of the war, continuously tied up forces on the Baltic coast that were missing elsewhere.

d) The Intentions of the Enemy²) and Evaluation of the Previous German Operations.

For this, see Sketch 11 and Map 18.

After the defeats at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, the armies of the Russian Northwestern Front needed rest to replace their extraordinarily heavy losses and the diminished victory-

Page: 522 keyno: 147

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

to revive the confidence of the troops. Regarding the impression that

Grand Duke Nicholas as Supreme Commander on September 19th

received during a visit to the headquarters of the Northwestern Front in Bje-

lostok, his Chief of Staff wrote to the Minister of War the following day1): "The situation is not particularly good, as the 1st Army is not combat-ready.

There are divisions with a strength of 3500 men!! with 18 guns!!

Despite all efforts, the whereabouts of the IV and XXVI Corps

are still unclear." The 2nd Army had been severely weakened since Tannenberg,

the freshest was the 10th Army. The new Commander-in-Chief of the North-

western Front, General Ruzki, therefore initially wanted to remain on the defensive

and to withdraw his left wing, even giving up the fortified

Narjen Line, back to the area of Bjelostok. Only the

intervention of the Supreme Army Command prevented the implementation of this intention.

In anticipation of a German attack from East Prussia to the

south, the Grand Duke ordered on September 25th that the

right wing of the Northwestern Front, 1st and 10th Army, should attack again, and

advance to the border on October 3rd and push the enemy back behind the line

of the Masurian Lakes.

When General Ruzki received this order, his armies were

distributed with 36 infantry divisions and 11 cavalry divisions over more than

500 km of front from Riga to Nowogeorgiewsk as follows:

The 1st Army under General v. Rennenkampf stood with 11½ cavalry

divisions of General Radko, the III, IV, II, XX Corps and

the XXVI (Reserve) Corps, the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Division on

the Njemen from Kowno to south of Merech. The army had, including

the forces held ready for coastal defense at Riga and Schaulen and the

garrison of Kowno, a total of 14½ infantry divisions and

4 cavalry divisions.

The 10th Army under General Flug stood with the XXII, II Caucasian,

III Siberian and I Turkestan Corps from Druskeniki to

west of Bjelostok. It counted, including the garrisons of Grodno

and Olitawe, 10 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry divisions.

Their troops had suffered the least so far, two of their corps had

not fought at all.

The 2nd Army under General Scheidemann stood with advance guards

on the Narjen, with the main body of the VI, XXIII, and I Corps south of

Lomsha to the Bug; behind it, the II Siberian Corps arrived at Kleschtscheli.

This army comprised 8 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry

divisions.

1) Correspondence Januschkewitsch-Suchomlinow in Krasny Archive I, p. 245.

Page: 523 keyno: 148

Operations of the Russian Northwestern Front.

The Warsaw division, including the XXVII (Reserve) Corps, covered Warsaw and Nowogeorgiewsk with 3 1/2 infantry and 1 3/4 cavalry divisions, primarily on the western Vistula bank.

When the Russian Supreme Command learned of the shift of strong German forces to Upper Silesia, it pointed out as early as September 27 the imminent assembly of strong forces of the Northwestern Front near Warsaw to flank the expected German attack in southern Poland. General Ruzski did not yet consider the time ripe for such a regrouping of his forces, as he still had six to seven German corps in front of him. However, he decided to reject the German advance against Druskieniki and Olwyoz, and to begin the attack of his 1st and 10th Armies immediately, without regard to the still incomplete preparations, rather than on October 3. On September 28, these two armies, a total of 16 infantry divisions and 3 1/2 cavalry divisions with a combat strength of 145,000 men and 750 guns, began their advance on a 250 km wide front. The 1st Army advanced over the Njemen, the right wing over Kowno, the left over Druskieniki. The 10th Army moved through the forest of Augustow; from it, the II Caucasian and the XXII Corps, along with the 1st Cavalry Division, turned against Kopciowo—Seiny, the III Siberian Corps, reinforced by a brigade, a cavalry brigade, and half of the I Turkestan Corps against Augustow, the other half of this corps against the Germans at Olwyoz. The next day, parts of the 2nd Army, VI Corps, and 4th Cavalry Division also moved forward from Lomsha, while this army otherwise had to cover the left flank. This maneuver threatened the three Landwehr brigades of General v. der Goltz near Grajewo with encirclement. Whether the combat strength of the Landwehr would have sufficed to master the difficult situation in a bold counterattack, at least temporarily, seems doubtful despite the numerous heavy artillery available to the German commander here.

The advance of the Russian 10th Army against the flank of the German I Army Corps, which was still at Druskieniki at the time, posed a very serious threat to Krahny; it was only mitigated by the fact that the Russians did not dare to give the right wing of their army a more n o r t h e a s t e r l y direction from the outset. By the evening of September 28, more than an entire Russian corps was already near Augustow,

Page: 524 keyno: 149

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

while the German I Army Corps, pressed from the south and east by three

additional Russian corps, only reached the area north of Kopziowo.

On September 29, General Rußki gave his 1st and 10th Armies

the further objective of advancing step by step to reach the line

Stallupönen—Suwalki—Grajevo and westward by October 5. During this

advance, there were battles south of Suwalki and northwest of Augustow, as already

described¹). The German Morgen Corps initially faced about 1½ infantry divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division

at Ratschki.

The commander-in-chief of the Russian 10th Army, General Flug, considered

the situation so promising that he decided, against the explicit

wishes of General Rußki, to let the III Caucasian and the

XXII Corps from the east, and a division of the III Siberian Corps from

the south, attack Suwalki as early as October 2. Thus,

2 infantry and 1½ cavalry divisions eventually fought against

the German Morgen Corps. At the same time, 1½ corps from the south and one corps from the east attacked the German

I Army Corps, while further north, two cavalry divisions and,

following them, the XXVI Reserve Corps as the left wing of the 1st Army

were present. General v. Francois escaped the dangers of this situation by

withdrawing on the afternoon of October 2.

In assessing the battles of Augustow—Suwalki, it should be noted

that the Russian corps deployed here, with the sole exception

of the XXVI, were not significantly affected by the major defeats in East Prussia,

some even arriving only after these and thus were completely fresh.

They faced experienced and battle-hardened German troops,

which, however, were partially significantly weakened by losses in previous battles and extraordinary

efforts. This was particularly true for the troops of the I Army Corps, which had been engaged in

continuous movement combat for more than six weeks and now had to be

constantly redeployed from the retreat from the Njemen.

Additionally, coordination in action between the I Army

Corps and the Morgen Corps was not achieved. The enemy standing

between them, large distances, and local difficulties

of the combat area played a role; also, the army high command itself was affected by the simultaneous advances on the flanks of its

Page: 525 keyno: 150

Assessment of the Operations of General v. Schubert.

The front, more than 150 km wide, was too demanding to fully focus on the management at Ratschki—Suwalki. However, the enemy, upon recognizing the threat looming behind them, managed to relieve pressure at a decisive point in time. Nevertheless, the victory of Lieutenant General v. Morgen succeeded in significantly damaging parts of the enemy, who had previously felt little of the sharpness of German weapons, through bloody losses and captured spoils.

On the Russian side, the spoils of the battles of Suwalki—Augustow are reported as 1000 prisoners and two guns along with a motor vehicle. However, a much larger result was intended. Regarding the actions of the 10th Army, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army wrote to the Minister of War: "Mr. Flug has a screw loose; he has created an ideal situation. Again, we miss an Ulm. Russki is in despair. Tomorrow we will go there to settle accounts. A veritable doom hangs over the northwest front." Whether such an assessment of the independent actions of the 10th Army was justified seems doubtful to us in light of today's knowledge of the situation.

"To be modest, to be content with the indeed very beautiful success, and then to disengage from the enemy" — this was how General v. Schubert understood the task of the German 8th Army, and given all the circumstances, one can hardly fault him for this.

At the moment when he ordered the retreat of his army, consisting of only 8½ infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division, into a defensive position at the Reich border, a total of 20 to 22 Russian infantry divisions and 6½ cavalry divisions were advancing against them.

The German army leadership had fully succeeded in concealing the weakness of the German troops until September 27. At that time, the enemy still reckoned with 6 to 7 corps, while including garrison and fortress troops, at most 4½ corps stood before them. However, in the long run, the own weakness could not be concealed even through offensive operations. For their execution, General v. Schubert had gathered everything that was achievable, even at the ruthless exposure of other front sections. Such retreats

1) Korolkov, Overview, p. 35. — 2) Letter from General Januschkewitsch dated October 2, 1914, Krahny Archive I, C. 253.

Page: 526 keyno: 151

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

had temporarily unsettled the enemy. "The stubbornness of the Fritzen¹) at Suwalki astonishes us. Apparently, there are only a few, but their tenacity and impudence are incredible" — so wrote the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army to the Minister of War²). However, the German 8th Army's offensive operations could not significantly influence the Russian measures; the Russian superiority was too strong, and they were aware of it. The exhausted German forces could only hold their extended positions as long as the enemy did not attack seriously and with full force.

2. The Battles under General v. François.

a) The Change in Command and the Battles of the Southern Wing until October 8.

Including Sketches 12 and 13.

The German Supreme Army Command received the report from General v. Schubert about the victory at Ratschki and the intention to "rest" on Russian territory at the border on October 3, at 4:30 in the morning. Then followed a victory report from General v. François³). He saw the victory primarily as an achievement of his corps, whose 2nd Division had captured significant booty. From the discussion with the Commander-in-Chief, he had the impression that despite the victory, the latter was determined to withdraw the army further. However, he saw this as a misfortune. From the beginning of the war, he believed that the East Prussian border had to be held, and he was convinced that this goal could still be achieved despite enemy superiority. Thus, immediately after the discussion with General v. Schubert, he decided to take the unusual step of reporting directly to the Supreme War Lord³): "The I Army Corps, in conjunction with the 3rd and 36th Reserve Divisions, defeated the enemy in a two-day battle at Suwalki. At the I Army Corps

¹) This referred to the Germans. — ²) Krasny Archive I, p. 233.  
³) General v. François argues in a letter to the Reichsarchiv that this step was justified for commanding generals in the Prussian Army, because: "The position of the commanding general was an immediate position, which included direct reporting to the Supreme War Lord in wartime. This immediate right was developed in the supreme interest of national defense and was abolished with the World War by a Supreme Cabinet Order." However, it should be noted: The "immediate position" of the commanding generals, at least as far as it

Page: 527 keyno: 152

8th Army — Change in Command.

up to now made 3000 prisoners, captured 18 guns, including a

heavy battery. For reasons that are incomprehensible to me, the Army

High Command has forbidden the exploitation of the success and ordered a retreat to

Angerapp. The operations of the last ten days suggest

that the commander-in-chief is poorly advised, which I feel obliged to report to Your

Majesty." To what extent this representation was accurate could not be verified at the

Great Headquarters. General

v. François appeared as the victor of Ratschki, whose success the High

Command failed to exploit. The following inquiry was therefore sent to

General v. Schubert: "Immediate short wire report on how it is intended to

continue the operation in general by exploiting the beautiful success of Ratschki."

The response from General v. Schubert, which arrived at the Supreme Army Command

on October 4 at 4 a.m., read: "Success of

Ratschki, 3500 prisoners, 20 guns without barrels, 4 heavy

cannons, could not be exploited by further pursuit, as strong

enemy forces are deployed against the northern army wing —

concentration of 3½ divisions of the 8th Army in prepared position at Wür-

ballen; southern army wing today withdrawn to line Oletzko (8) — Bakałarschewo —

Pischczol. If successful battles occur at Würballen in the next few days,

the army will refrain from retreating to the line Lötzen —

Insterburg." This explanation could not dispel the impression

of the report from General v. François. At 10 a.m.,

an order from the Supreme War Lord was issued, summoning General

v. Schubert for consultation to Charleville and further decreed:

"General v. François will take command of the 8th Army during the absence of General

v. Schubert." This order was supplemented

by the immediate instruction from Lieutenant General v. Fallen-

hayn to General von François: "His Majesty has entrusted you with the

command of the 8th Army on the condition that you

Questions concerning the conduct of the war were effectively nullified by the war organization and

staffing ordered by the Emperor as Supreme War Lord simultaneously with the mobilization.

The commanding generals have since been subordinate to the

Army High Commands and no longer, as in peacetime in Prussia, directly to the Emperor as

King of Prussia. With the introduction of a prescribed

intermediate authority, the "Immediate Appointment" was also abolished, as

reasonable justifications for it had become obsolete.

1) See p. 517 f.  
2) That this inquiry was prompted by the report from General v. François is   
probable, but cannot be confirmed by records.  
3) Marggrabowa.

Page: 528 keyno: 153

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

will do everything to add new successes to their previous ones through extensive operations against the Russians. No restrictions will be imposed on you ...” The Chief of Staff of the Army remained Major General Grünert.

General v. Francois received the Emperor's order on October 4th around 5 in the afternoon in Filipowo. He was determined to now initially strike with the southern wing of the army, but had the 1st Infantry Division, which, according to the last instruction of General v. Schubert, had already initiated the march north, halt again. Then he went to the army headquarters in Goldap. At this time, the situation was as follows:

At the East Prussian southern border, from the Vistula to Johannisburg inclusive, were detachments of the fortresses Thorn and Graudenz as well as the Deputy General Command of the XX Army Corps. The enemy, presumably in front of the 6th and 15th Cavalry Divisions, held back cautiously.

East of the lakes, Lyck was occupied by a detachment of the Lötzen fortress. Southeast of Marggrabowa, General v. Morgen stood with the 3rd and 36th Reserve Divisions; the latter was already partially in transport to Wirballen. Behind them lay the Landwehr Division (33rd, 34th, and 70th Landwehr Brigade). In a wide arc east and north around Filipowo stood the I Army Corps with security in almost 30 km extension from Bakalarzewo to Pötschersl south of the Rominten Heath; behind it, the 6th Landwehr Brigade was advancing. To the north, up to the Wischtyter Lake, the 1st Cavalry Division joined, whose 1st Brigade¹) was moving back to the division. The enemy, assumed to be the VI Corps and 4th Cavalry Division, was supposed to have crossed the border from Schtschutschin and Grajewo, from Suwalki he was advancing in a broad front towards the west. In general, three to four corps were expected here; on and north of the road leading from Filipowo to the east, they were already attacking, about 10 km ahead of the 1st Cavalry Division.

North of the Rominten Heath, General Otto v. Below stood with his 1st Reserve Division and the Königsberg Landwehr Division in a 19 km long defensive position at Wirballen; as reinforcement, the 36th Reserve Division came from the south, the 9th Landwehr Brigade from the north. The enemy, estimated here at four corps, cautiously advanced against the German positions.

¹) See p. 509.

Page: 34 keyno: 154

East Prussia — Intentions of General v. François.

General v. François issued the first army order signed by him on October 4 at 8:45 p.m.: "I. Army Corps will push back the enemy standing before it to Sumalki tomorrow with Hellswerden. 3rd Reserve Division accompanies the attack via Ratschki. 1st Cavalry Division remains Sittlthemen. I. Reserve Corps holds its positions." The 33rd Landwehr Brigade was assigned to General v. Morgen, the I. Army Corps the Landwehr Division (now 34th and 70th Brigade) and the 6th Landwehr Brigade.

On the southern flank of the army, a series of bitter battles ensued in the following days. Lieutenant General v. Morgen encountered his previous opponent, the III. Siberian Corps, and reached the woods west of Ratschki on October 5. The I. Army Corps, now under the command of Lieutenant General v. Falt, initially allowed the enemy, the II. Caucasian Corps, to advance and then repelled them in a counterattack. The Russians suffered heavy bloody losses. On the German side, however, these successes strengthened the hope that it might be possible to push the enemy further east over Gswalti on October 6. Then General v. François wanted to swing north from there on October 7 against the enemy, who in the meantime attacked the Below Corps<sup>1</sup>. However, on October 6, the German southern flank had little room left; their own ammunition was difficult. The Russian attacks against the Below Corps continued, but in the south, strong Russian cavalry, at least three divisions, were reported on the right flank of General v. Morgen; from Grajewo, the enemy advanced further. Thus, General v. François could not carry out his attack intentions either, but had to decide on defense; he wanted to conduct them as long as possible at the border itself. "Only if pressed"<sup>2</sup> — as stated in the army order of the evening of October 6 —, should they retreat to the Lützen—Angerapp position: General v. Morgen to Angerburg, I. Army Corps to Darkehmen—Nemmersdorf, I. Reserve Corps to Gumbinnen—Mallwischken.

However, this retreat was not necessary for the time being, because the enemy in the east had — as soon became apparent — no more offensive power; he only pressed against the Below Corps, which successfully defended itself. However, the situation became threatening on the southern flank, where Lydt at

<sup>1</sup> The battles of the Below Corps are discussed in detail on p. 536 ff.  
<sup>2</sup> Double underlined in the original text.

Page: 530 keyno: 155

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

On October 7, the I. Turkestan Corps and simultaneously Bialla were lost to Russian cavalry. The positions of General v. Morgen were threatened from the rear. However, the German southern flank was withdrawn to Marggrabowa on October 8. (As far as was known), five Russian corps were now fighting: I. Turkestan, III. Siberian, XXII., II. Caucasian Corps, and XXVI. (Reserve) Corps against the troops of General v. Morgen and the I. Army Corps. The I. Reserve Corps faced at least two more Russian corps, XX. and III. Corps. The Russian II. and IV. Corps were also assumed to be in front of the East Prussian eastern front, although their exact location was not known. General v. François saw no danger despite this overwhelming enemy superiority, as long as the Russians limited themselves to local attacks; however, in the long run, the extended border position could hardly be held with the available weak forces. Therefore, on October 8, he addressed the Supreme Army Command and Generaloberst v. Hindenburg with the inquiry whether "reinforcements, especially artillery, could be expected soon." Meanwhile, he had about seven replacement battalions, three light and two heavy batteries freed in Graudenz and Königsberg and mainly assigned to the southern flank under General v. Morgen.

b) The Arrival of the XXV. Reserve Corps and the Continuation of the Fighting on the Southern Flank until October 29.

See Sketch 13.

On October 9, the Supreme Army Command made the newly formed XXV. Reserve Corps available to the 8th Army; the corps would reach Deutsch-Eylau by rail from October 12; further reinforcements were not to be expected for the foreseeable future. It was added that the 8th Army should spread the belief by arranging unloading points and through agents that six new army corps were destined for East Prussia. Such deception maneuvers could also temporarily ease the situation in East Prussia. Generaloberst v. Hindenburg, whose 9th Army had reached the Vistula near and above Iwangorod at that time, announced that he would attack towards Warsaw on October 10, much further north than the 8th Army had previously known. This brought the possibility of interaction between the operations of the 9th and 8th Armies into the realm of possibility, especially since on the northern flank

1) Actual strength of the Russians see p. 543. — 2) Cf. this with p. 275 and 463.

Page: 531 keyno: 156

Reinforcement of the 8th Army.

the 8th Army seemed to be in no immediate danger; the troops of General v. Below had just recaptured the border towns of Schirwindt and Wladislawow on October 9 and taken numerous prisoners. General v. François decided to deploy the new corps on the southern flank.

The following days showed that the enemy might have withdrawn forces from the East Prussian front. The Russian II Corps was no longer expected on October 12; whether the IV was still there was questionable; at Lyk and Marggrabowa, there were signs of retreating movements. In the north, all Russian attacks were repelled, with 3,500 prisoners and about 30 guns reported as booty. General v. François was determined to attack the Russian southern flank. "With the arrival of reinforcements" — he announced his further intentions on October 13 — the army will move from defense to attack. XXV Reserve Corps will take possession of Lyk with the first unloaded troops..." Under their protection, the unloadings should be advanced, and the corps should be pushed forward to the border so that it can attack Augustow immediately upon the arrival of the sixth parts. The corps Morgen was to prepare for this, simultaneously attacking Suwalki from the west with the reinforced I Army Corps. Corps Below was to remain in defense for the time being.

The XXV Reserve Corps under General of Infantry Freiherr v. Scheffer-Boyadel was composed similarly to the new corps intended for the west. It consisted mainly of young war volunteers, who were full of good will but often not yet physically mature and only hastily trained. The number of officers and non-commissioned officers was very low, and those with war experience were almost entirely lacking. The corps had two divisions, each with 3 battalions, 1 squadron, 10 batteries (including 1 heavy). It had to lag behind the corps intended for the west in terms of equipment, but was only provisionally equipped when the transport to the front began; machine guns, field artillery, and machine gun tent equipment were not yet complete.

The first unloadings of the XXV Reserve Corps were covered by troops from the fortress of Lötzen, who managed to take possession of Lyk on October 13. Unloaded parts of the 49th Reserve Division advanced

Page: 532 keyno: 157

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

immediately followed. However, Russian counterattacks on the night of October 14 and on that day itself led to fierce fighting and temporary panic in the streets of the city, until the enemy was finally defeated by the approaching bulk of the division. Calm was restored. On the morning of October 17, the reserve corps was ready to march, with the 49th Reserve Division at Lyck, with the 50th behind on the Lötzen road.

Meanwhile, aircraft had reported the march of enemy columns from Ratschki southwards, towards Grajewo. Here, besides the I. Turkestan Corps, the 11th Siberian Rifle Division and the 4th Independent Cavalry Brigade were identified, while the enemy seemed to have weakened at the front from Marggrabowa. General v. François anticipated deployments at Grajewo. Therefore, despite the still unfavorable ammunition situation, he adhered to the attack plan. The XXV Reserve Corps was to advance on October 17 from Lyck to Grajewo, while the Morgen Corps (3rd Reserve Division and Ziemen Division, newly formed from the 33rd Landwehr Brigade and fortress troops from Graudenz) was to advance spatially far apart from Marggrabowa to Ratschki.

On October 18, the XXV Reserve Corps reached Grajewo after overcoming weak resistance. A last departing train there could still be taken under artillery fire; the enemy had retreated to Ossowiec. — The situation was different for the Morgen Corps: its attack encountered sustained resistance from the III. Siberian Corps in the difficult terrain southeast of Marggrabowa, which in turn repeatedly counterattacked. Strong enemy forces were also reported further south near Kallinowen.

For the continuation of the attack, General v. François had already ordered the XXV Reserve Corps on the morning of October 18: "After capturing Grajewo, the task of the Scheffer Corps is to advance against the left flank of the enemy facing the Morgen Corps. The Russian left flank is to be grasped in the general direction of Augustowo. Grajewo is to be held fortified." The condition of the young troops of the reserve corps, whose effectiveness was already greatly diminished by extraordinary marching losses, did not allow them to immediately take on the new task; a rest was necessary.

1) The I. Turkestan Corps consisted of two Turkestan brigades and the 11th Siberian Division; the high command, however, was not aware of this at the time.

Page: 533 keyno: 158

The Battles of the XXV Reserve Corps.

day should be set. General v. Morgen was to continue the attack only when cooperation with the XXV Reserve Corps was ensured.

Meanwhile, on the afternoon of October 18, flyers observed a Russian mixed brigade advancing from Lomsha, and a division near Raigrod; on the 19th, the Russian 4th Cavalry Division was repelled near Grajewo. In the distance of the Reserve Corps, the enemy stood at the narrow pass south of Gr. Selmentsee. General v. Francois ordered this pass to be taken on October 20 and to secure the road leading north of the lake from Lyk to the east.

General v. Scheffer then moved his 50th Reserve Division on October 20 from Grajewo to Raigrod, with the 49th to the left. The 50th Division under Lieutenant General v. Petzel encountered troops of the Russian XXII Corps west of Raigrod, whose resistance they could not break. The 49th Reserve Division under General of Infantry v. Briesen found the pass south of Gr. Selment-See free from the enemy on the night of October 21 and reached Pissanitzen. General v. Scheffer wanted to strike the enemy at Raigrod from the rear from here. However, the 49th Reserve Division remained on October 21 in front of a fortified position of the III Siberian Corps, with the southern flank of the Morgen Corps further north. General v. Scheffer had the 50th Reserve Division follow the 49th, so that the corps was united east of Pissanitzen in the early morning of October 22; only a weak detachment remained west of Raigrod, the Lötzen troops at Grajewo.

General v. Francois wanted the XXV Reserve Corps to continue the attack on October 22 and advance over the border to the main road Raigrod–Augustow. General v. Scheffer requested to postpone the advance by one day. "The troops are" – he reported on the night of October 22 – "so exhausted by the continuous battles with heavy losses, the hardships due to poor roads, weather conditions, and poor equipment that they are not fit for use." The enemy, however, disturbed the granted rest; he attacked on October 22. The troops at Grajewo around

1) The supply strength of the corps had already been reduced by 4000 men by October 20, just one week after its arrival, including a very large number of march and illness losses. The losses continued to rise in the following days.

Page: 534 keyno: 159

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

Weak German detachments left behind at Raigrod retreated to Lyk. The 49th Reserve Division initially repelled the enemy but had to bend its northern flank the following day due to new attacks by the Siberians, to connect with the Morgen Corps, which, despite all efforts, had only advanced a few kilometers northward. Further north, there was calm in front of the positions of the I Army Corps. At Wirballen, there was no danger at the time, and in the south, the enemy had only cautiously followed to Lyk.

According to estimates by the pilots, about two Russian corps were in the area of Augustów-Suwalki and eastward on October 23. North of that, only weak enemy forces were detected in front of the 1st Cavalry Division. Reports of the approach of twenty trains at Augustów reinforced the army leader's belief that the enemy was withdrawing troops. Therefore, he decided, despite the continued shortage of ammunition, visibly reduced offensive power, especially of the XXV Reserve Corps, and the limited success of previous battles, to resume the attack in the direction of Augustów-Suwalki. Even the pilot report that strong enemy cavalry was advancing from the southwest and northeast on Grajewo did not shake this decision.

To secure the right flank, General v. Scheffer had to reinforce the garrison at Lyk; additionally, the 41st Cavalry Brigade was transported there from the 1st Cavalry Division. As further parts of the XXV Reserve Corps had to block the narrow area southeast of the Gr. Selment Lake — now facing south — only a few battalions and batteries from the 50th Reserve Division remained available behind the 49th Reserve Division at Pissanitzen.

The attack was to begin on October 24 and be led with a shock group formed from the left wing of the XXV Reserve Corps and the right of the Morgen Corps (fortress troops from Graudenz) towards Ratschki. This main thrust was to be supported by the right wing of the I Army Corps, advancing from Filipowo east of the lakes also towards Ratschki. The attack was under an unfavorable star. The shock group consisted of troops of the lowest combat value. Their attack fell apart in time, as newly deployed parts of the 50th Reserve Division arrived partially delayed. This resulted in the surprising loss of the attack direction into strong enemy artillery fire. The own artillery support failed, and the attack stalled. But even the I Army Corps got stuck, although its

Page: 535 keyno: 160

8th Army — The Attack Stalls.

The commanding general, Lieutenant General Kosch, had moved his 1st Infantry Division behind the 2nd to the right flank to reinforce the thrust and let them attack unexpectedly through the Landwehr stationed there. In the first rush, several Russian positions east of Bakałarzewo were taken; however, to continue the attack, it would have required new aggressive artillery preparation. However, the ammunition was lacking. The brave troops of the 1st Army Corps had left 3,470 men dead and wounded. — The enemy had almost everywhere engaged the best troops in battle. On November 5th, he felt convinced that he was even attacking the XXV Reserve Corps, albeit without success.

According to the orders of General v. François, attempts were made in the following days to continue the German attack; however, progress was hardly achieved. On the other hand, the pressure from the enemy from the south became increasingly noticeable. He constantly tied up considerable forces at Łoć and fiercely threatened the city and the road Łoć—Piątnica. East of the XXV Reserve Corps, under enemy fire from the south, General v. François was forced on October 8th to assign this corps, whose offensive power was already exhausted, "the protection of the right army flank" as its main task; thus, it was excluded from the attack to the east. The army leader therefore brought the 36th Reserve Division I Reserve Corps from the northern flank of the army to the 1st Army Corps and wanted to continue the attack with this corps and the corps the next morning. However, in the following days, progress was also slow here, moving from trench to trench. Thus, the attack brought some territorial gains in places, as well as several thousand prisoners; breaking the Russian resistance, however, did not succeed. On the other hand, the combat strength of the heavily exhausted own troops decreased more and more, and the overall situation changed.

Gradually, it had become apparent that the Russian VI and the I Turkestan Corps had been moved from the Grajewo area to the lower Narew, where a new Russian army was set up to break through the exposed East Prussian southern border. The request of the Braudenz government for the return of its troops could therefore not be refused. At the same time, the situation in the middle of the army front also intensified.

1) For more details, see p. 538.

Page: 536 keyno: 161

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

c) The Battles of the Northern Wing from October 2 to 28.

See Sketch 14.

During the offensive operations of the southern wing, General Otto v. Below had repelled the enemy north of the Rominten Heath. Since the morning of October 2, his troops, initially only the I Reserve Corps (without the 36th Reserve Division) and, to the north of this, the Königsberg Landwehr Division, were positioned on Russian soil in a line about 20 km wide east of Wirballen. General v. Below had refrained from further extending the position to the south or north, as his forces were insufficient. Cavalry covered the 15 km wide area between Lake Wischtyter and the southern wing of the corps, about 8 km north of the left wing was the border town of Wladislawow, weakly occupied. The 36th Reserve Division was advancing from the south, from the north the 9th Landwehr Brigade, previously used at Tilsit, was to advance. From intercepted radio messages, it was known that the Russian XX and III Corps, the 5th Rifle Brigade, and the 56th Reserve Division were in front of the front.

On October 4, the enemy cautiously approached the German positions. General v. Below proposed a large-scale counterattack using reinforcements. The commander-in-chief, then still General v. Schubert, had the same intention. However, as already described, it was not carried out due to the change in command. General v. Below had to rely on his own forces. The enemy, however, pushed forward.

On October 5, Wladislawowo and Schirwindt were systematically handed over to the Russians. In front of the fortified position of Wirballen, the enemy generally held back, but in the south, they advanced east of Pillupönen deep into the flank. Against this threatening encirclement, the arrival of the just-arriving 36th Reserve Division could be scheduled for October 6. Meanwhile, the situation also became more serious in the center and especially on the northern wing. Against the left wing of the 1st Reserve Division and against the Königsberg Division, the Russians came in repeated attacks to close distances, but were repelled, partly with heavy losses. In the north, the retreating 9th Landwehr Brigade was able to recapture the German border town of Schirwindt only after fighting.

On October 7, Schirwindt had to face a new Russian attack

Page: 537 keyno: 162

The Battles of the Below Corps.

had to be abandoned again; the 9th Landwehr Brigade retreated to Willuhnen, followed by the enemy. Meanwhile, however, the encirclement threat on the southern flank was averted; General v. Below was able to move the bulk of the 36th Reserve Division as a reserve behind the northern flank and launched a counterattack here on the afternoon of October 8th, together with parts of the Königsberg Division. They succeeded in pushing the Russians back towards Wladislawow—Schirwindt. Against these places, General v. Below ordered parts of the 36th Reserve Division and the Königsberg Division, as well as the 9th Landwehr Brigade, to launch a comprehensive attack from the south and west on October 9th. The enemy was thrown back, and the pursuit extended over Wladislawow about 4 km eastwards. More than a thousand prisoners from the Russian 56th Reserve Division and the 5th Rifle Brigade were captured. General v. Below did not intend to hold the newly taken line permanently; he withdrew the 36th Reserve Division as a reserve group to the south; the 9th Landwehr Brigade retreated again to the west to Willuhnen on the evening of October 10th in the face of renewed superior enemy advances.

When the enemy advanced again over Schirwindt on October 11th, General v. Below immediately set his troops to counterattack, this time with the aim of encircling the enemy. West of the border, Lieutenant General Clausius advanced well with the 9th Landwehr Brigade; the 70th Reserve Brigade under Major General Bett also threw back the enemy southeast of Schirwindt. However, the decisive blow, which parts of the 69th Reserve Brigade were to deliver from the south east of the border into the enemy's rear, encountered stubborn resistance at the Scheimena section, which could only be broken the next day. Meanwhile, the northern flank at Schirwindt successfully repelled Russian counterattacks. The enemy had received a heavy blow, although the planned encirclement had not succeeded. The spoils of the previous battles counted 3500 prisoners and about 30 guns.

The offensive power of the Russians was broken on this part of the battlefront; calm ensued. However, due to pathless roads and wet, cold weather, the last days of fighting had also been extremely strenuous for the German troops. Further exploitation of the victory had to be abandoned. General v. Below considered the area around Schirwindt — as he reports¹) — still "as our maneuver field, where we do not transition to positional warfare, but remain in movement-

¹) Letter to the Reich Archive from 1927.

Page: 538 keyno: 163

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

wanted to remain in the war, because in it we felt superior." On October 13, the troops, except for a weak garrison, were withdrawn from Schirwindt, and soon after, the reserve troops were moved to the now especially threatened right wing of the front. When General v. François moved the 36th Reserve Division south on October 26, only 2½ divisions, more than half of which were Landwehr, remained north of the Rominten Heath, facing the enemy. But the Russians also seemed weakened on this front and to have shifted their forces southward1).

d) The Decision to Retreat to the Lötzen—Angerapp Position.

See Sketch 13 and Map 17.

On October 28, the expected breakthrough attempts by the Russians seemed to begin at Lake Wischtyter. Several divisions were known to be in front of the line there. Their thrust hit the weak center of the German 8th Army, where the 1st Cavalry Division stood alone between Lake Hantfisch and Lake Wischtyter. It retreated to Szittkehmen. The I Army Corps2) had to sharply bend back the 6th Landwehr Brigade as the northern flank north of Ptscherschof. The Russian attack also seemed to slip onto the Below Corps, but the line did not unfold. General v. François decided to abandon the now recognized as hopeless offensive undertakings at the Morgen Corps and the I Army Corps. He intended to restore the situation south of Lake Wischtyter by a thrust at Ptscherschof to the north. For this, the I Army Corps was to withdraw as strong parts as possible from the front on October 29. However, Lieutenant General Kosch did not consider this feasible, as the enemy was also attacking his front. They were facing the enemy at close range, while the pressure against the 1st Cavalry Division seemed to be easing. Thus, General v. François finally agreed on October 30 that Lieutenant General Kosch should order the resumption of the attack to the east, "to not call into question the successes of the last days of fighting and the entire prestige against the enemy." However, the attack did not advance. The 36th Reserve Division even had difficulty maintaining its position. The left wing had to be extended to maintain connection with the 1st Cavalry Division, which was pushed back to the distance of the Rominten Heath on that day. To assist there, General v. François now decided to move south of Bakałarschewo.

1) See p. 542 ff. — 2) E. 535.

Page: 539 keyno: 164

8th Army — Serious Situation Towards the End of October.

to withdraw the designated Landwehr Division. It was to march north behind the front of the I Army Corps to attack Sittkehmen via Pischerosl on October 31.

The focal point of the battle on October 31 was also with the 1st Cavalry Division. The Landwehr Division, under its new commander, General of Infantry v. Jacobi, only reached Pischerosl and Filipow that day, while the commander of the Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General Brecht, remained reliant on his weak own forces. On orders from the Army High Command, he withdrew north, leaving minimal security in the eastern part of the heath. The Russians pressed forward. Between Lake Hantscha and Rominten, their advance was halted by the German defense, but they gained control of the southeastern tip of the heath. Further north, Lieutenant General Brecht pushed back the Russian cavalry advancing from Wischtjnez to the west; meanwhile, the 9th Landwehr Brigade had arrived north of Lake Wischtjnez, where calm prevailed on the front of Corps Below.

The Army High Command, based on Russian radio messages, assumed that south of Lake Wischtjnez, the Russian 29th Infantry Division was set to attack Pischerosl. On November 1, General v. Jacobi launched a counterattack from the south against them. His Landwehr Division was reinforced by the 70th Reserve Brigade of the 36th Reserve Division and the cavalry of the I Army Corps. The expected Russian advance did not materialize; without major combat, the locations on the southern edge of the heath were essentially reached. On November 2, the attack was to be continued with the involvement of reinforcements. However, the enemy attacked the southeastern corner of the heath itself the night before, overthrowing the Landwehr stationed there and capturing two guns. Repelling this opponent became the next task of Group Jacobi. Whether they would achieve anything significant beyond that was questionable, and the overall situation of the army demanded new decisions.

Throughout October, 10½ German divisions, including only 2 active and 1 cavalry division, held their ground against at least 20 Russian divisions and 8 cavalry divisions at the border. The German attacks had brought local territorial gains in places, but the overall situation had shifted decisively in favor of the defenders of East Prussia, especially over the last few weeks. Above all, the situation on the East Prussian southern front had changed due to the Russian troops

Page: 540 keyno: 165

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

shifts had become threatening; the rear connections of the

army required stronger protection there soon.

In the German troops, strained to the utmost, the lack of artillery ammunition and, closely linked to it, a weakening of the striking power became increasingly noticeable. Still unaware of the disastrous "overall ammunition situation," General v. François had wired directly to the Ministry of War in mid-October: "Absolutely need 6 ammunition trains of cannons, 12 ammunition trains of heavy field howitzers, and 23,000 unit shells 05 immediately. Operations otherwise in question. Recommend putting individuals who delay ammunition supply before a court-martial." The Supreme Army Command, to which this request was forwarded, could not comply. Also, the message sent on October 19 to Generaloberst v. Hindenburg: "Further offensive only possible with the delivery of artillery ammunition in significant quantities; have not prevented the transport of enemy forces to Warsaw," remained ineffective.

The events with the German 9th Army in Poland were also noticeable. Since October 13, it had been about the 8th Army, after the hoped-for military success by General v. François, transferring forces to the 9th Army. When this army then initiated the retreat from the middle Vistula on October 26, the danger in the approximately 200 km deep, unprotected southern flank of the 9th Army became more serious. The more the pressure on the East Prussian eastern border eased, the stronger forces the enemy could unite against the southern border, where a new army was to be assembled for a decisive battle. General v. François initially saw no reason to abandon his attack plans. Even on October 28, he wanted to transfer parts of his army to Thorn to the 9th Army only "after military success"; however, he made the extent of these transfers dependent on the size of the success achieved up to that point. On October 29, he pointed out that premature termination of the attack would gradually lead to retreat and thus the abandonment of East Prussian territory. On the evening of October 30, however, he had to report, given the development of the situation on his own front and the absence of the requested ammunition: "Our attacks cannot be continued initially due to a lack of ammunition." On the evening of October 31, the order came from Generaloberst v. Hindenburg to "prepare" the transport of three divisions. General v. François, however, now had the counterattack at Pscheorlin in-

Page: 541 keyno: 166

8th Army — The Decision to Retreat.

guided, whose success he initially wanted to await. He reported, therefore,

on November 1, that before the completion of this attack, the transport

was impossible, and he requested ample ammunition supply again.

Meanwhile, General v. François had begun to initiate the withdrawal

of parts of his army. However, he hoped not to have to give up these

forces immediately, but thought to use them at least initially for carrying out

his own attack plans. With the remaining troops, he wanted to transition

to a kind of border defense position, leaning on lakes and waterways, to

a "stiff defense." On the night of November 1, the XXV Reserve Corps

was first withdrawn from its far-advanced position. On November 2, the

commander-in-chief traveled to Marggrabowa to discuss further measures

with Generals v. Scheffer, Kosch, and v. Morgen. According to records in

the war diary of the I Army Corps command, he stated that the attack

had to be broken off because the XXV Reserve Corps had "failed," the

Morgen Corps could no longer advance, and the I Army Corps lacked

ammunition and infantry replacements. The left wing of this corps was

now threatened with encirclement from the Rominten Heath; 23 battalions

of reserves and militia had not managed to take them in two days of

fighting. The resistance strength of the I Army Corps' screening unit at

Lake Hantscha was reported to last only until tonight. They had to

transition to a tighter defensive position, as it was not possible to continue

the attack, and stronger forces for East Prussia had to be withdrawn. The

future position should lie along the general line Lyk—Marggrabowa—Stallupönen.

On the afternoon of November 2, the newly appointed commander-in-chief

received the following telegram: "Immediate report when the transport of

the three divisions begins." General v. François learned that no forces

would remain for offensive use, not even temporarily. This decisively

changed the situation.

The German 8th Army still stood, despite all Russian superiority, in a

fairly closed front from Lyk to Wirballen. Also, at Lake Wischtyter, it

was possible by the end of November 2 to restore the situation to such an

extent.

1) The corps had lost about 11,500 men in about 14 days — ⅓ of its   
strength, including 4,500 men due to illness; the remaining 7,000 men   
included 2,500 wounded. — 2) See p. 558.

Page: 542 keyno: 167

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

indicating that there was apparently no longer any danger. But without reserves and thus without the prospect of finally repelling the enemy here, the 100 km long army front in the open field could not be held. General v. François had to decide to retreat to the Lötzen-Angerapp position, where he could manage for a longer time even with limited forces. The retreat was associated with the abandonment of East Prussian territory, which was particularly difficult for the current commanding general of the Königsberg Army Corps, whose troops had fought and suffered in three major battles and numerous smaller skirmishes for the defense of their immediate homeland since the beginning of the war. But General v. François also saw no other possibility. On the evening of November 2, he reported to the Commander-in-Chief East: "Attack today in the Rominter Heide area successfully continued. In recent days, around 3000 prisoners taken, four machine guns captured — transport of the three divisions begins on the evening of November 6. ... Due to transport, it is impossible to protect the East Prussian border. Gradual retreat initially required behind Angerapp. Artillery ammunition constantly scarce."

On the evening of November 2, the retreat movement began on the southern flank of the army, undisturbed by the enemy.

e) The Russian Operations in October¹) and Evaluation of the German Operations.

For this, see Map 17, Sketches 12, 13, and 14.

On October 1, the Russian Supreme Command ordered the crossing of the 2nd Army and the Warsaw Division, henceforth called the "Narew Group," from the Northwest Front to the Southwest Front; these army units were to participate in the large encirclement operation on the Vistula²). For the same task, the II Siberian Corps of the 10th Army was already moving towards Warsaw. Two more corps were to follow this corps; General Ruzski, after some hesitation, designated the II and IV Corps, which had previously stood behind the 1st Army in the second line. Finally, he was also to move the VI Corps, which, assigned to the 10th Army, was located at Grajewo at the most promising point of the attack front, from there to Lomsha and westward, to close the gap between the 10th and 2nd Army.

General Ruzski thus ordered further operations against East-

¹) Continuation on p. 525. — ²) Cf. p. 458.

Page: 543 keyno: 168

Russian Operations against East Prussia.

Prussia — excluding the VI Corps — had only 21 infantry divisions and 8 cavalry divisions of the 1st and 10th Armies. He believed that the most effective way to fulfill the task of covering the rear and right flank of the Vistula operation with these forces was to continue the attack once begun. He accepted that this had to be conducted essentially frontally, as on the flank of the German front south of Lyck, apart from cavalry, only the 11th Siberian Division of the I Turkestan Corps was available.

The attempt at Suwalki, whose evacuation was only recognized early on October 3, to decisively encircle larger parts of the German army, led to four corps of the 1st and 10th Armies crowding into a narrow space. General Russki wanted to resume the advance from the line Wladislawow—Suwalki—Augustowo on October 7, due to reasons presumably related to losses and frictions. Assuming that the Germans would continue their retreat to the line of the Masurian Lakes, he thought to reach the line Insterburg—Arys—Johannisburg and south by October 11, to then attack the entire position comprehensively from north and south simultaneously. However, this did not happen.

As the Germans held at the border, heavy new battles erupted here from October 5. North of the Rominter Heide, the 1st Army under General v. Rennenkampf was set for attack, except for the XXVI (Reserve) Corps, which was withdrawn south to support the 10th Army. Initially, the 5th Rifle Brigade, 1 1/2 Guard Cavalry Divisions, and following them, the 56th Reserve Division, advanced against the northern flank of General v. Below, the III Corps against its center, the XX Corps and the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions against the southern flank. However, as early as October 8, the Russian XX Corps followed the XXVI south, and the III Corps remained in the prepared German positions, the pressure against the southern flank and the center of the Below Corps soon subsided. In contrast, since October 10, the 53rd Reserve Division from Kowno intervened in the north for support. Here the battle surged back and forth. The Russian 68th Reserve Division, positioned north of the Niemen, along with the 1st Independent Cavalry Brigade, however, have

1) See note 1 on p. 532. The two Turkestan brigades of the corps were deployed further north. — 2) See p. 536.

Page: 544 keyno: 169

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

did not venture across the border at all, although only Landsturm faced them on the German side.

The 10th Army under General Flug attempted to advance frontally from the east and also extensively from the south against Filipowo—Lyk. In doing so, the XXVI, II Caucasian, XXII Corps and half of the III Siberian Corps charged against the positions of the German I Army Corps and the Morgen Corps, the other half of the III Siberian Corps and the mass of the I Turkestan Corps along with stronger cavalry turned against the almost completely unprotected German southern flank. Nevertheless, the Russians only reached Lyk on October 7, their 4th Cavalry Division reached Bialla. In the meantime, however, their frontal attacks, as they were not conducted uniformly, despite almost double superiority, collapsed under heavy losses; the commander-in-chief of the army had been replaced by General Sievers on October 6. However, even he did not succeed in advancing further in the frontal attack. By October 10, losses in some regiments had risen to 75% of officers and 50% of men. The railway could hardly manage the evacuation of the masses of wounded, although their own supply had been suspended for four days. The horses had long been barely getting any oats; the corps complained they could not harness half of their artillery.

On October 10, General Russki decided to halt the offensive, although on that very day the I Turkestan Corps had come from Lyk to Marggrabowa, the 4th Cavalry Division to Urtsch. They were deep in the enemy's flank here and only needed to march further north to get behind the German front, between it and the lake positions. Such an advance could have been carried out with the involvement of the VI Corps with five infantry divisions and would have encountered hardly any significant resistance at that time, as the German XXV Reserve Corps had not yet arrived. The restraint of the Russian leadership saved the German 8th Army from disaster in those days.

The mentioned difficulties of the attack can only partially explain its cessation. The decisive factor was probably given by the Supreme Army Command, which did not want to leave strong forces on the East Prussian front, while the concern for Warsaw and the thought of the new major offensive over the middle Vistula fully occupied them. The German-spread reports about rolling towards East Prussia

Page: 545 keyno: 170

The Russian Operations against East Prussia.

Significant reinforcements¹) may have contributed. It was decided to concentrate all forces at Warsaw.

On October 11, General Rußki ordered: The right wing of the 1st Army should still capture the area of Wirballen, otherwise, this army should dig in, while the 10th Army should even retreat on the night of October 12 and leave only a rearguard in the previous position. The 1st Army was also unable to solve the limited task assigned to it. At Wirballen, General v. Below held the battlefield. The mobile German defense had proven itself. The Russian 10th Army had meanwhile retreated with its main force to the line 10 km north of Suwalki—Ratschki—Piszänitzen, with the I Turkestan Corps retreating to Grajewo—Schtschutschin. Only the II Caucasian Corps had to be left entirely in its previous position west of Suwalki, as it had — as stated in the official Russian account²) — suffered too heavy losses to be able to detach a rearguard of sufficient strength.

On October 13, the Supreme Command instructed the Commander-in-Chief of the Northwest Front to lead the main attack across the middle Vistula against the German 9th Army³). This removed General Rußki from the task of solving the issue against East Prussia. He immediately took the I Turkestan and the VI Corps from the 10th Army to reinforce the Narew Group. The resulting large gap was gradually filled by shifts within the 10th and 1st Armies. The advance of the German XXV Reserve Corps against Grajewo therefore encountered only relatively weak resistance.

When the general Russian attack on the Vistula began on October 20, the offensive in East Prussia was also to be resumed. General Rußki instructed the now reinforced 10th Army from the 1st Army to continue the attack in the previous direction. The objections of General Sievers, who advocated a reversal at the Masurian Lakes Front in the south, were dismissed. Under pressure from the Supreme Command and General Rußki, the attack had to begin on October 22 by advancing against the German XXV Reserve Corps at Grajewo. The III Siberian Corps, which had meanwhile been shifted to this flank and reinforced to 3½ divisions, pushed back the German covering troops, a reinforced brigade of the 50th Reserve Division, without difficulty. On both sides of the Gr. Selz-

¹) Cf. p. 530. — ²) Korolow, Überbild, p. 39. — ³) Cf. p. 491.

Page: 546 keyno: 171

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

ment-Sea, however, the attack came to a halt before the main German forces and, despite all urging from higher authorities, could not initially be resumed.

On October 25, Grand Duke Nicholas placed all troops of the 1st and 10th Armies under General Siewers, while the High Command ordered Rennenkampf to form a new 1st Army in the Warsaw area. This left, against the German 8th Army without the garrison of the Njemen fortresses (presumably three reserve divisions), a total of 17 infantry divisions and 8 cavalry divisions. The Russian formations, however, were partly of low strength; for example, the 53rd Reserve Division is said to have had only 7000 (instead of 16000) rifles. General Siewers correctly estimated his opponent at seven divisions plus some Landwehr and Landsturm brigades. The Supreme Army Command demanded the continuation of the offensive by October 27 at the latest. However, General Siewers felt capable of this only after a comprehensive regrouping of his forces, despite double numerical superiority. On October 28, he ordered that the attack should proceed: north of Lake Wischtwyter the III Corps and the three-division strong cavalry corps Gutro, south of it the XX and the II Caucasian Corps, with the latter being directed from Suwalki in a generally westerly direction; further south, the XXII and XXVI (Reserve) Corps were to hold their positions; the III Siberian Corps was to seize "the area of the Gr. Selment Lake." The following day, the Supreme Army Command assigned the army the task of breaking the Russian resistance and clearing the way to the lower Vistula; General Rußki was instructed to act on the 10th Army in this sense.

On the morning of October 29, the attack was to begin. However, on this morning north of Lake Wischtwyter, the III Corps, as it is represented by the Russians, was itself attacked¹); it held its positions. The XX Corps, which encountered the gap in the German formation, slowly advanced south of the lake while fighting; the II Caucasian Corps, however, which had had to defend itself against German attacks during the night, due to exhaustion²), did not dare to take the offensive, and the III Siberian Corps also did not advance against Pißanten.

October 30 brought only slight progress with the XX Corps, and even here only minor advances; at the same time, it became increasingly apparent that the turning

¹) In fact, no attack was made there by the German side.  
²) Korolkow, Overview, p. 105.

Page: 547 keyno: 172

Assessment of the German Operations in East Prussia.

Shortage of ammunition. General Sievers anticipated the arrival of further German reinforcements and wanted to halt the attack to await replacements and ammunition. There seemed to be hope for success on the northern flank. The 1st Independent Cavalry Brigade had reached the national border north of Wladislawow, and the Gurko Cavalry Corps was in the area north of Lake Wischtyter; there was hope to encircle the German northern group stationed at Wirballen. General Sievers ordered the continuation of the attack for the III and XX Corps. The extreme northern flank advanced slightly on October 31 at Wladislawow, but the attack of the III Corps against the positions of the German Corps Below hardly developed at all. Gurko's cavalry retreated before the German 1st Cavalry Division. The XX Corps slowly advanced in the southeastern part of the Rominten Heath. On November 1, General Sievers continued the attack. However, he did not make significant progress on that day or the following day. The official Russian account of this section of the campaign in East Prussia concludes with the statement: "The struggle of the Germans against the Russians, who were almost always in double numerical superiority, shows all the characteristics of German tactics. The Russian operations, since General Sievers took command, were conducted slowly but consistently, step by step towards the goal." This approach was recognized by the commander-in-chief of the Northwestern Front.

The German 8th Army succeeded in keeping the Russians off East Prussian soil until the end of October. Considerable enemy superiority was tied up at East Prussia's eastern border; their losses from futile assaults were severe. However, neither General v. François nor General v. Schubert managed to achieve a decisive victory. All attempts to dictate terms to the enemy and keep the operation mobile soon led back to a stalemate. General v. François attacked the Russian center. Perhaps a rigid defense along the numerous lake lines in the south and an attack with concentrated force against the relatively weak Russian northern flank would have brought better success and also spared the German troops more. Such an attack had already been prepared by General v. Schubert before he was recalled, and Generals Otto v. Below and v. Morgen had proposed it several times. On the

Page: 548 keyno: 173

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

However, the numerical superiority of the enemy was too great; it

prevented the greater efficiency of the German troops from having the effect

that the higher command hoped for. The old divisions, proven in great battles,

were finally so depleted in continuous fighting and exhausting

marches in unfavorable weather that the battalions sometimes numbered only 300 men and barely half a dozen

officers. For this, reserve units, quickly assembled replacement formations, and young troops had to be led into heavy battles

where, due to unfavorable composition, inadequate equipment, and armament, they quickly lost combat

value despite their best intentions. Since for weeks there had been a business overload

with the enemy along the entire front, there had been neither relief from the front line nor

rest.

In tenacious defense of the homeland, active, reserve,

and landwehr units, replacement troops, landsturm, and newly formed formations,

mostly consisting of young volunteers, gave their best. That the overwhelming enemy

could only occupy insignificant German border areas by early November remains their merit

and that of the strong-willed and tirelessly active army leadership of General

v. Schubert to General v. Francois. The delay the enemy suffered

at the border provided the time to expand the Lötzen-Angerapp position

into a strong bulwark, so that the defense there could be carried out with

minimal forces in the future.

Reliable information on the German business losses could not be determined,

but an approximate calculation suggests 15,000 to

20,000 men. Opposed to this were — in addition to the heavy bloody losses

of the Russians — about 20,000 prisoners and about 50 guns as booty.

Page: 36 keyno: 174

C. Considerations on the Overall Operations in the East.

Including Maps 14 and 17.

In mid-September, three Russian armies, heavily defeated in East Prussia, were in retreat, while five Russian armies followed as victors the retreating Austro-Hungarian army in Galicia. At that time, a German offensive from East Prussia over the Narew could probably have achieved great things¹). The urgent calls for help from the allied army command led to the abandonment of this operation. The offensive then begun in southern Poland was hampered from the outset by the fact that it could not — as desired by Generaloberst v. Hindenburg — be conducted far removed from the Austro-Hungarian flank towards Ivangorod and Warsaw. Warsaw, with its railways and Vistula bridges, soon proved to be the key to the entire Russian Vistula front. The danger threatening the northern flank of the German 9th Army could, as the situation developed further, only be countered by a swift and decisive victory, which the Austro-Hungarian army, relieved by the German advance, then had to achieve alone. The circumstances had developed such that the decision depended on the success of the materially weaker part of the joint front.

The following comparison of the strength ratios in the East on October 1 and October 26 by divisions²) shows how the Russian masses concentrated along the middle Vistula during the month of October:

¹) See p. 434.  
²) Among the Central Powers, all active reserve and Landwehr (Austro-Hungarian "Landsturm") units are included, but not the German Landsturm; among the Russians, only active and reserve units are counted. Independent brigades are counted as half divisions. The Russian infantry divisions averaged 16 battalions and 48 guns, the German and Austro-Hungarian divisions only exceptionally more than 12 battalions, with the German divisions averaging 72 guns, the Austro-Hungarian divisions averaging 42, and the German reserve and Landwehr divisions at most 36.

Page: 550 keyno: 175

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

<table>

<tr>

<th>German<sup>6)</sup></th>

<th>Austrians and Hungarians<sup>6)</sup></th>

<th>Central Powers<sup>6)</sup> together</th>

<th>Russians<sup>6)</sup></th>

</tr>

<tr>

<td>Infantry</td>

<td>Cavalry</td>

<td>Infantry</td>

<td>Cavalry</td>

<td>Infantry</td>

<td>Cavalry</td>

<td>Infantry</td>

<td>Cavalry</td>

</tr>

<tr>

<td colspan="8">1st October 1914.</td>

</tr>

<tr>

<td>Galicia<sup>1)</sup></td>

<td>Poland<sup>1)</sup></td>

<td>East Prussian Front</td>

<td>12<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>1</td>

<td>41</td>

<td>5<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>9</td>

<td>2</td>

<td>41</td>

<td>9</td>

<td>39</td>

<td>14</td>

<td>21<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>9<sup>3/4</sup></td>

</tr>

<tr>

<td>Total</td>

<td>21<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>2</td>

<td>46<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>11</td>

<td>68</td>

<td>13</td>

<td>87<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>31<sup>3/4</sup></td>

</tr>

<tr>

<td colspan="8">26th October 1914.</td>

</tr>

<tr>

<td>Galicia<sup>1)</sup></td>

<td>Poland<sup>1)</sup></td>

<td>East Prussian Front</td>

<td>12<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>1</td>

<td>41<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>11<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>6</td>

<td>24</td>

<td>6</td>

<td>41<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>12</td>

<td>47<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>11<sup>1/2</sup></td>

</tr>

<tr>

<td>Total</td>

<td>23<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>2</td>

<td>53<sup>3/4</sup></td>

<td>11</td>

<td>76<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>13</td>

<td>93<sup>1/2</sup> to 94<sup>1/2</sup></td>

<td>32<sup>1/2</sup></td>

</tr>

</table>

At the same time, about 16<sup>2)</sup> Austro-Hungarian divisions were still stationed on the Balkan Front, which had even been reinforced by a third of their previous strength since the end of August, against barely equally strong Serbian-Montenegrin forces. For political reasons, the attack here was maintained, but it hardly advanced. General v. Conrad considered a reinforcement of the main army in Galicia at the expense of the Balkan forces desirable, but he did not promote it, presumably because he did not feel strong enough against the head of politics, who was supported by the head of the military chancellery of Emperor Franz Josef. Despite repeated Austro-Hungarian requests for German reinforcements against Russia, the German Supreme Army Command has not intervened in the distribution of the allied forces on the Serbian and Russian fronts since the beginning of operations; only an inquiry about the actual distribution of forces was sent to General v. Freytag on October 21.

The distribution of the German Eastern forces on the Polish and East Prussian theaters of war also gives cause for thought. Certainly, a sharper consolidation of these forces would have been possible and more advantageous for the conduct of operations, even if it is hardly provable

<sup>1)</sup> The boundary is taken as the course of the San and the upper Vistula. — <sup>2)</sup> Including fortress garrisons and stage troops. — <sup>3)</sup> The Austro-Hungarian army was reinforced by the formation of Landsturm units and brigades. — <sup>4)</sup> Of these, about 17 against 1<sup>1/2</sup> Austro-Hungarian divisions with 30 against 12<sup>1/2</sup> rifle divisions. — <sup>5)</sup> The Austro-Hungarian 74th Reserve Division is not in this position. — <sup>6)</sup> The 12th Siberian Rifle Division is not counted, as it arrived later. — <sup>6)</sup> Note 2 on p. 549.

Page: 551 keyno: 176

Reflections on the Overall Operation.

It was intended to achieve a significantly more favorable overall result in the East.

The restraint of the Supreme Army Command towards Austria-Hungary and their distribution of the German Eastern forces on the Polish and East Prussian theaters of war are explained by General v. Falkenhayn's view that the East could only be a holding action for the time being. However, the protection of one's own borders was important for political as well as economic reasons. Furthermore, East Prussia had to be held under all circumstances for purely military reasons, as it presented far superior Russian forces and above all formed an indispensable gateway for future operations. Therefore, when General v. Francois asked for reinforcements on October 8, citing the great enemy superiority, the newly formed XXV Reserve Corps was immediately assigned to him. The justification for such a deployment to hold East Prussia is retrospectively shown by the judgment of the Russian General Danilov. According to him, all Russian intentions to carry the attack "deep into Germany" failed mainly because East Prussia, with its well-developed railways for eastern conditions, remained firmly in German hands, threatening any Russian advance to the west in flank and rear. Even when the Russians followed the German 9th Army through Poland, they had to divide their forces. More than a fifth of their army was far off at the East Prussian eastern border, so that the northern wing of the advancing main force was increasingly threatened by German concentrations from East Prussia with every step forward. By the end of October, a gap of more than 200 km wide had opened between it and the left wing of the 10th Army from Plozk to Grajewo, in which only two corps and cavalry stood.

Since the beginning of October, German and Austro-Hungarian armies have been working shoulder to shoulder on a joint task; it was different from the beginning of the war, when each part had to fulfill its own task spatially far apart from the other. It was clear that a unified command for the German Eastern Front of the Allies would have been necessary. The final reasons why it still did not come about, however, lay — as in the West with the French and English — not purely on military grounds and therefore should not be further discussed in this context.

The fact that no higher command was created for the two German armies was a deficiency, which was remedied by placing the 8th Army in East Prussia under the command of the 9th Army

Page: 552 keyno: 177

The Campaign in the East until the End of October 1914.

could not be balanced in southern Poland. Since the Supreme Army Command had reserved the right to issue instructions to the 8th Army, its command communicated directly with it. This hindered the influence of the Army High Command 9, which was already overburdened by its own operations and negotiations with the ally and was spatially far separated from the 8th Army. It was completely questioned since the command in East Prussia passed to General v. François on October 4, and he was expressly given full freedom for his operations. The subordination relationship under Generaloberst v. Hindenburg was thus virtually abolished until the Supreme Army Command pointed out during an Austro-Hungarian inquiry on October 20 and then again during the retreat from Poland that it still existed.

Despite such difficulties, great achievements have been made. Not least, the reputation that German leadership and troops had gained with the enemy since the great victories in East Prussia contributed to this. Only this can explain the caution bordering on anxiety that the Russians observed despite their superiority during the initiation and execution of their great offensive; they gave the Central Powers time for countermeasures that would otherwise have been hardly feasible. However, German leadership and troops accomplished what had to be accomplished at that time. General v. Conrad, who was not entirely in agreement with the operations, wrote under the fresh impression of the unexpectedly rapid advance against the Vistula: "One must concede to the Germans: they are much tougher in their demands on the troops and ruthlessly extract the utmost from them. This spirit of ruthlessness was already common among them in peacetime, unlike us." However, the German troops were able and capable of meeting such high demands; this was primarily where their superiority lay.

No widely visible success crowned the German October operations in the East; but the rapid advance of the 9th Army revived the Austro-Hungarian army and, together with the battles of the 8th Army in East Prussia, secured the freedom of action in the West for the German Supreme Army Command until November. More was hardly possible in view of the Russian superiority.

1) From a letter to General v. Bolfras dated October 12, 1914 (Conrad V. S. 110).

Page: 275 keyno: 178

IV. A Crisis of the Two-Front War.

At the turn of October/November 1914, a serious crisis had arisen in the conduct of the two-front war. The development of events on the various battlefields forced the leader of the German operations to once again decide with compelling urgency on which battlefield the focus of military actions should be placed.

In the West, these had taken a by no means satisfactory course since mid-September. If General v. Falkenhayn initially hoped to bring about a change in the situation on the western battlefield within a few weeks by deploying the 6th Army, which was being transported from the left wing, he was disappointed by the outcome of these operations. On the northern wing, the leadership's efforts on both sides to bring about a decision by encircling the enemy's outer flank had only led to a balance of forces in the first week of October. The hoped-for change in the situation could not be achieved in the first three weeks of Falkenhayn's leadership; above all, it was not possible to deprive the enemy of operational freedom of action.

This failure prompted General v. Falkenhayn to make the serious decision to deploy the last reserve of the Supreme Army Command, the newly formed volunteer corps, except for the XXV Reserve Corps assigned to the 8th Army for the protection of East Prussia, in the West, in order to strive for a change in the situation through one last major effort. This decision was facilitated by the fact that operations in the East had so far proceeded as desired. By deploying the newly formed 9th Army in South Poland, it was possible to divert the main Russian forces from the heavily pressured Austro-Hungarian army. The situation in the East thus seemed temporarily secured and did not appear to require immediate support through reinforcements from the West.

The situation in the Balkans was also not threatening at this time. Although, as already mentioned, the unfortunate course of operations at the Marne, near Lemberg, and in Serbia had exerted an unfavorable influence on the stance of the Balkan states; particularly Romania's position had become increasingly uncertain since those days.

Page: 554 keyno: 179

A Crisis of the Two-Front War.

By mid-September, Russia, as had become known in Berlin, had directed an alliance offer to Bucharest, which dangerously strengthened the already existing inclination here to side with the enemies of the Central Powers. Only the threat from Turkey and Bulgaria of armed action against Romania, should it enter the war against Austria-Hungary, had prompted the leading statesmen in Bucharest to exercise restraint. With King Carol I, a loyal friend of the Central Powers had passed away on October 10; that his successor, King Ferdinand, declared for the continuation of his predecessor's policy was initially reassuring.

While negotiations with Bulgaria over its entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers had come to a complete standstill since early October, efforts in Constantinople seemed more successful. Since the day of the neutrality declaration on August 3, a stubborn struggle had been taking place here for many weeks between the "Neutrality Party" under Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha and the "War Party" under War Minister Enver Pasha. The presence of the German military mission under Marshal Liman von Sanders, as well as the arrival of the German Mediterranean Division in the Dardanelles on August 10, namely the large cruiser "Goeben" and the small cruiser "Breslau" under Vice Admiral Souchon, had a significant influence on the development of events in Turkey. After selling the German ships to the Turkish government, Souchon had the Ottoman insignia affixed to both cruisers and was appointed commander of the floating Turkish naval forces. From early October, the War Party began to assert itself more and more in Constantinople. A visible success of the German or Austro-Hungarian arms could now give the impetus for Turkey to strike, which Bulgaria might then join. This prospect had strengthened General von Falkenhayn in the decision to finally force the long-delayed decision in the West through a new massive effort, in order to then carry out the large transport movement to the eastern theater of war.

However, the hope of bringing about a rapid turnaround in the situation through the deployment of the newly formed 4th Army in the West was not fulfilled. Yet, despite the great exhaustion of the opponents, General von Falkenhayn did not lose faith that he would achieve a major, decisive success with the new operation planned in Flanders.

Page: 555 keyno: 180

Gen. v. Conrad Suggests Shifting the Focus of Warfare to the East.

By the end of October, the situation in the East had significantly worsened due to the necessary withdrawal of German and Austro-Hungarian forces from southern Poland. The full seriousness of the situation was revealed in the report from Generaloberst v. Hindenburg to the Supreme Army Command on October 26th in the afternoon regarding the impending withdrawal of the 9th Army1). The valuable provinces of Silesia and Posen, as well as parts of East Prussia, were threatened by Russian invasion. The Upper Silesian industrial area was as indispensable for the war effort as the vast agricultural lands of these eastern provinces, on whose yield the nutrition of the entire population largely depended. Whether the resistance of the Danube Monarchy would be sufficient to withstand the Russian incursion into Bohemia and Moravia, into the territory of the already unreliable Czechs, was uncertain. The seriousness of this situation also influenced the political stance of the Balkan states. The prospects for Bulgaria's participation in the war began to fade, and the threat of Romania joining the Allies became less imminent, especially as Queen Maria increasingly used her influence passionately for this cause. Despite the unfavorable general situation, General v. Falkenhayn believed he had to stick to his original goal, to achieve a decisive success in the West before regrouping stronger forces to the eastern theater of war.

On October 27th, a telegram from General v. Conrad arrived: "Only the grave consequences of the current moment compel me to share my view of the situation with Your Excellency. I believe that a decisive success in the West will still require long battles, but here in the East, where the enemy is energetically deploying his superiority of 30 divisions, a rapid breakthrough and thus decisive for the fate of Germany and Austria-Hungary." General v. Conrad's suggestion was not convenient for General v. Falkenhayn at this moment. In the hope of winning over the Austro-Hungarian Chief of General Staff through a verbal discussion for his view, he proposed a meeting on the same day together with a representative of the Army High Command.

1) p. 488.

Page: 556 keyno: 181

A Crisis of the Two-Front War.

mandates 8 and 9 for October 30 in Berlin. Given the tense situation on the Austro-Hungarian front, General v. Conrad believed himself to be personally indispensable and offered, if the discussion could not take place at his headquarters in Neu-Sandez, to send his wing adjutant, Major Rundmann, to Berlin with written instructions, the essential content of which he had already telegraphed to General v. Falkenhayn in Mezières on October 28. He first thoroughly explained his view that "now the decision must undoubtedly be sought in Poland west of the Vistula." Then it continued: "... I consider that in the next six weeks the main decision lay in the West, i.e., on the French theater of war, but now it is located on the eastern theater of war, i.e., in Russian Poland, because the threat from there is much more dangerous for Germany than that from the West. But if a decisive settlement is made with Russia, then the decision in the West can be pursued with increasing calm. — However, if this decision in the East is to be of decisive value, it must first be immediate and second with strong forces; therefore, at least 30 German divisions must be deployed to the left of the 9th Army. If this happens, then the k. and k. armies would indeed try to hold back the Russian Bornirsch as much as possible, but if forced to retreat, they must accomplish this to the Danube line Vienna—Budapest."

General v. Falkenhayn responded to this wire with a renewed request for General v. Conrad's personal appearance in Berlin: "Despite the conviction of the urgent necessity of direct verbal discussion, the trip to Neu-Sandez is unfortunately too time-consuming for me. I am in Berlin War Ministry from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. on October 30. If Your Excellency can still make the trip possible, which would be highly desirable for coordination in operations, please send your wing adjutant. I must, of course, point out the very conditional value of the discussion through adjutants." General v. Conrad, however, insisted on his decision to be represented by his wing adjutant.

Before the joint meeting on October 30, according to a communication from General Ludendorff, a confidential discussion took place between him and General v. Falkenhayn at the War Ministry in Berlin, in which the latter described the situation on the western theater of war in Flanders as "very promising." The impending deployment of the army group was, as he firmly hoped, to bring about the "imminent decision" on

Page: 557 keyno: 182

General v. Falkenhayn Insists on the Western Decision.

to bring about a western theater of war"). Until then, the eastern front must hold on its own strength. In the immediately following joint discussion, in which, besides General v. Falkenhayn and Major General Ludendorff, Colonel Tappen and Major Rundmann also participated"), the situation in Poland was first discussed. Here, Major Rundmann expressed, based on his written instructions, that according to General v. Conrad's view, a quick success in the West was no longer to be expected; therefore, it was now a matter of seeking the decision in the East. The Austro-Hungarian Chief of General Staff considered German reinforcements of about 30 divisions necessary. General v. Falkenhayn described the transfer of such strong forces from the West to the East as impossible, as then "any success in the West would be excluded. Transport, deployment, etc., would take so long that in the end the front in the West would collapse before one could still fight in the East. That would be no relief. The German decision must proceed in the West; in the East, it must be held out as long as possible." To Major Rundmann's question of how long this could last, General v. Falkenhayn replied that he could not answer that now, perhaps six weeks. The leadership of the operations planned on the eastern theater of war was then discussed in more detail, with Major General Ludendorff stating that the plans were not yet fully developed. The question of whether "the Russian advance had indeed stalled" and the German 9th Army "had regained its freedom of movement" was not yet fully clarified. The certainty of this, however, would be the prerequisite for a new German offensive. In the further course of the conversation, General v. Falkenhayn insisted on his view that "the decision must continue to be sought in the West." Major General Ludendorff believed, as he reported"), the decision of

1) How firmly General v. Falkenhayn believed in a great success in the newly initiated offensive in Flanders is also evident from a statement he made on the same day to the Chief of the Ottoman General Staff, General Bronsart v. Schellendorff, who had arrived from Constantinople to give a lecture in Berlin, regarding his views on the difficulties of ammunition supply in Turkey: "In 14 days, Turkey will have as much ammunition as it wants." He expected Romania to join the Central Powers in the spring with all certainty. This remark indicated an imminent great success in the West, as otherwise, at this time, one could hardly expect Romania to switch sides.  
2) The representative of Army High Command 8 could not arrive in time.  
3) Letter from General Ludendorff to the Reichsarchiv dated February 6, 1927.

Page: 558 keyno: 183

A Crisis of the Two-Front War.

General v. Falkenhayn "could not contradict" because he had just recently, in a private conversation, presented "the success in the West at Ypres as within reach and assured." "Since the Supreme Army Command sought the decision in the West," it is stated in General Ludendorff's communication, "I declined to do everything to hold the Eastern Front." He pointed out to General v. Falkenhayn that according to the war situation "fights must develop along the entire eastern border of the Kingdom of Prussia, which are closely interconnected; a unified and strict leadership is therefore a necessity"1).

As a result of this discussion, the Kaiser appointed Generaloberst v. Hindenburg on November 1, relieving him from his position as leader of the 9th Army, to "Commander-in-Chief of all forces in the East of the Reich." Major General Ludendorff remained his Chief of Staff. The 8th and 9th Armies and the Deputy General Commands of the I., II., V., VI., XVII., and XX. Army Corps, along with their fortresses, were subordinated to him.

When General v. Conrad learned of Falkenhayn's decision regarding the further conduct of the two-front war, he believed he could not be reassured. On October 31, he telegraphed again to the German Supreme Army Command: "Telegram received from Berlin that deployment of strong forces in the East was rejected. Can only emphasize again, referring to the local telegram of October 28, that in the event of such deployment, success would be achievable and thus the overall situation would be considered favorable both militarily and politically..."

A final attempt by Emperor Franz Josef to win the German Emperor for the Eastern decision also failed. Following a suggestion from General v. Conrad, Emperor Franz Josef sent a telegram to Emperor Wilhelm, which concluded with the words: "In the highest interest of our common cause, I must urgently ask you, dear friend, for those appropriate measures that make us strong enough together to defeat the Russians and thoroughly prevent any further advance by them." In the German Emperor's response on November 1, it was stated: "... As much as I must agree with you that only the deployment of very ample forces to the East can make our allied armies strong enough to decisively defeat the Russians, I am nevertheless not

Page: 559 keyno: 184

Attempt by Emperor Franz Josef to win the Emperor over to the offensive decision.

to my deep regret, to allow that postponement, apart from stronger cavalry, to take place now. Unless I succeed in defeating our enemies on the western front so that their offensive power is crippled, withdrawing strong German forces from the western front would not only result in a certain failure in the west but also likely no success in the east, as the arrival of these German reinforcements in the east can only occur very late for purely technical reasons, and the Russians would initially evade the counterattack. We would not come any closer to our ultimate goal. Only by delaying action on the eastern front until the necessary decision in the west, even if only partially, is achieved, can our common goal be reached...“ In conclusion, Emperor Wilhelm suggested placing all Austrian-Hungarian forces gathered and yet to be deployed on the left bank of the Vistula under the command of Generaloberst von Hindenburg in operational matters. However, Emperor Franz Josef refused such subordination.

General von Falkenhayn was by no means unclear about having put everything on one card with his decision to continue the offensive in the west. He watched the outcome of the battles in Flanders, which had resumed with the deployment of Army Group Fabeck on October 30, with understandable tension. But even the first days of fighting made it clear, despite some local progress, that a greater success could no longer be achieved here, since the Belgians had managed to flood large areas along the Yser Canal up to Dixmude by opening the sluices at Nieuport, making any further successful operations by the 4th Army fighting here impossible. In Emperor Wilhelm's response to Emperor Franz Josef on November 1, doubt about the decisive success of the campaign in Flanders had already been expressed; now they were apparently only counting on a "partial" success. But even this last weak hope was finally destroyed by the unfavorable news about the course of the battles of Group Fabeck. It became increasingly clear that the long-desired breakthrough of the enemy front was no longer to be hoped for. This was a severe and bitter disappointment for General von Falkenhayn, which shook his confidence in his military fortune.

Page: 560 keyno: 185

A Crisis of the Two-Front War.

a severe test was posed. Perhaps the thought weighed on the leader of the German operations that his reputation as a commander might be impaired by the great successes of the leaders in the East; his operational decisions were not influenced by this. He did not conceal from himself that if the struggle for decision in the West ended without result, the successful conduct of the two-front war was indeed called into question. What was to happen if the weak forces in the East could no longer withstand the Russian superiority and the Eastern Army was forced to retreat to the Danube, Silesia, Posen, and West Prussia? This danger was all the more serious as the condition of the allied army had repeatedly been judged very unfavorably by both Generaloberst v. Hindenburg and Generalleutnant v. Freytag. These were pressing concerns that filled the soul of the German leader. The tension between the demands of the two theaters of war had reached its peak. Under their influence and with the absence of successes in the West despite utmost efforts, General v. Falkenhayn's self-confidence was severely shaken in those days¹), although his severe mental strain remained generally hidden from his surroundings; for "never, even in the most severe crises, did he lose his composure," as reported by his later associate, General Freiherr v. Freytag²).

On November 3, General v. Falkenhayn was finally appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army while retaining his position as Minister of War. Besides the concern about the course of operations, he was at this time also burdened by the almost more serious concern about the ammunition situation. How much the lack of ammunition had called into question the success of all operations in the West and partly also in the East had often painfully come to his awareness.

The mobilization reserves accumulated in peacetime had been depleted, although all munitions suitable for field use from fortresses, depots, surplus stocks, etc., had been drawn upon for their replenishment. In the battles in Flanders, these last reserves were consumed. Thus, the ammunition supply was now almost exclusively dependent on new production.

¹) Communications from the then Chief of the Central Department in the General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel S. Fabel, to the Reich Archive on March 26, 1927.  
²) Freiherr v. Freytag-Loringhoven, "People and Things as I Saw Them in My Life," p. 281.

Page: 561 keyno: 186

Serious State of Artillery Ammunition Supply.

The domestic industry was relied upon1). Thanks to the measures initiated by the military administration, such as the expansion of state and private enterprises, the involvement of a larger number of private factories in ammunition production, simplifications in shell design, approval of all permissible facilitations in shell acceptance, retention of furloughed skilled workers in munitions factories, etc., it was possible to increase the production of field artillery ammunition significantly beyond the maximum planned delivery quantities. As a result, although not immediately, a relief in supply for the field artillery was expected in the near future, but the ammunition situation for the foot artillery remained extraordinarily serious. The number of factories suitable for the production of the difficult-to-manufacture foot artillery ammunition was as low as their production capacity at the time. It was only at the beginning of October 1914 that the preliminary work for the design of simplified foot artillery shells was completed. Before the industrial plants could transition to mass production, even of these easier and faster to produce shells, months had to pass. In any case, the demand for foot artillery ammunition, depending on caliber and type of gun, was many times higher at the beginning of November than the deliverable, actually delivered quantities. To at least supply the main gun of the foot artillery, the heavy field howitzer, with a certain amount of ammunition, the production of ammunition for other heavy calibers had to be more or less restricted. In addition, initial raw material difficulties were already reported; among other things, the shortage of saltpeter became noticeable due to the increased demand for gunpowder.

Overall, the artillery ammunition available at the beginning of November was far from sufficient to cover the ongoing minimum needs of the other combat fronts, in addition to the enormous amounts of ammunition consumed solely by the battles in Flanders. The possibility of accumulating sufficient ammunition reserves for future larger combat operations was not conceivable at the time. Therefore, the serious state of artillery ammunition supply had to gain increasingly decisive importance in the operational considerations of the Supreme Army Command.

In this difficult situation, a bright spot appeared on the military-political horizon: Turkey had sided with the Central Powers.

1) The difficulties of ammunition supply and production are extensively discussed in "War Armament and War Economy", Volume II.  
1 World War. V. Volume.

Page: 562 keyno: 187

A Crisis of the Two-Front War.

positioned. On October 29, the Ottoman fleet encountered a Russian mine-laying ship disguised as a merchant steamer in the Black Sea, near the entrance to the Bosporus. The ship was apparently about to lay mines within Turkish territorial waters. This hostile act prompted Admiral Souchon to seize the Russian mine ship and, in retaliation, to bombard Russian war ports and engage Russian naval forces. On November 2, Russia declared war on the High Porte.

According to agreements between the German and Ottoman military leadership, the main forces of the Turkish army, six army corps, were to assemble at Constantinople to protect the capital against possible landings and to engage Russia on European soil. To tie down strong Russian forces on the Caucasus front, three additional Turkish corps were ready in the Armenian border area. For an advance against Egypt, a corps was assembled in southern Palestine. The overall operations were directed by War Minister Enver Pasha, who staffed many key command and administrative positions with officers from the German military mission.

With Turkey's entry into the war, new prospects opened up for conducting war against England and Russia. The possibility of completely defeating the eastern enemy came closer. With the final closure of the Dardanelles, whose effective blockade for international traffic had already been ordered by the Porte on September 27, Russia not only lost the shortest connection to its allies, but also faced the threat of being cut off from all supplies from the Mediterranean Sea. If it succeeded in bringing Romania and Bulgaria to the side of the Central Powers through superior force deployment and successful operations on the eastern theater of war, the fate of Russia and Serbia could be sealed.

In this decisive hour, General von Falkenhayn received a telegram from Generaloberst von Hindenburg on November 4, urging the regrouping of the main German forces to the east: "It is intended to unite three army corps of the 9th Army in the Posen-Thorn area to launch an offensive from there with forces of the 8th Army." This operation, planned in the most effective direction, promised great success if conducted with strong force. However, the Eastern Army alone was too weak for this; its reinforcement by troops from the west was therefore necessary.

Page: 563 keyno: 188

The German Leadership Faces a Significant Turning Point.

most urgent command; this was done immediately, so the planned operation could effectively prepare the final campaign decision in the East. The management of the two-front war was at a significant turning point.

General v. Falkenhayn became uncertain; according to his own words, he was already aware at this point that in Flanders "against the continuously strengthening enemy, another decisive success... could no longer be achieved." With the arrival of the report from the Commander-in-Chief East about the intended new operation, the final impetus for the decision on whether the attack in the West should be abandoned and the focus of the war effort shifted to the eastern theater of war had indeed come for him. Such a decision was urged not only by the slim prospects for greater successes in the West and the serious ammunition situation but also by the development of the situation in the Southeast, particularly the events on the Serbian theater of war, where the Austro-Hungarian troops had launched a new attack against the Serbs at the end of October and forced them to retreat. These successes, if corresponding ones on the Russian theater of war were added, could become decisive for Bulgaria's stance, "for whose armed intervention," according to a report from the German ambassador in Constantinople at that time, "a German-Austrian success in the East was a prerequisite." Thus, the opportunity arose to gain a new, valuable ally, perhaps even beyond that through the union of Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania to form the Balkan bloc against Russia and Serbia that had been sought from the beginning.

General v. Falkenhayn struggled with the decision; the responsibility weighed heavily on him. Indeed, the cessation of operations in Flanders and the dispatch of the last dispensable soldier to the East before forcing a visible success in the West meant a high degree of self-reflection. The French and their allies were completely exhausted by the months-long, extraordinarily heavy fighting and were hardly capable of a major offensive in the near future; however, this could change in the foreseeable future. General v. Falkenhayn was also not clear that with the continuous fortification of the Western Front, it was necessary to secure all the positions that resulted from the consolidation of the be-

1) v. Falkenhayn, "The Supreme Army Command 1914–1916", p. 29.

Page: 564 keyno: 189

A Crisis of the Two-Front War.

The war of movement arbitrarily arose and was unsuitable for a sustainable defense by weaker forces, to clear, as well as to order extensive straightening of protruding arcs for the conservation of forces, even at the cost of surrendering significant parts of conquered enemy territory. However, he believed he could not take responsibility for such a grave decision, as a wide withdrawal of large parts of the Western Front "would be tantamount to a defeat."

On November 4, the German Chief of General Staff issued new directives: In Flanders, a new effort was to be demanded to get the key point of all battles, Ypres, into German hands.

Thus, the decision was made to continue the desperate struggle for a tactical success in the West, while in the East the tangible prospects for the success of a major strategic strike were greatly diminished, if not entirely abandoned.

Page: V keyno: 190

V. Retrospective.

At the beginning of November 1914, the successful outcome of the two-front war was seriously in question. The full extent of the crisis can only be assessed when the connections of the operations on the various theaters of war in their previous development and in their interrelations are clarified.

The purpose of the German operational plan for the two-front war was to defeat Germany's opponents one after the other. "The entire endeavor of Germany," as stated in the memorandum of Generaloberst v. Moltke on the military-political situation of Germany at the end of November 1911, "must be directed towards ending the war with a few major blows at least on one side as soon as possible." Such a campaign decision could be achieved most quickly and securely against the western opponent; this was also the "stronger and more dangerous, against whom one must first turn in such a situation"). Therefore, the bulk of the German army was to be transferred to the western theater of war; "in the fight against France, according to the view of Generaloberst v. Moltke, "lay the decision of the war"). Only as many forces were to be allocated to the eastern theater of war as were required for the rear protection of the German western army and the task of defending the border area. The force ratio between the two theaters of war was about 1:8. At the beginning of the operations, around 80 German divisions were deployed against 83 French, English, and Belgian in the West, and in East Prussia, 9 German against more than 30 Russian; on the entire Eastern front, 60 divisions of the Central Powers faced 110 Russian and Serbian3). This distribution of forces was most carefully adapted to the special tasks of the two theaters of war. It required a rapid decision in the West and for its implementation also a war-

1) Memorandum of the then General of the Cavalry Count v. Schlieffen from August 1892 on a war on two fronts.  
2) Generaloberst v. Moltke, memorandum from 1913 on the "Behavior of Germany in a Triple Alliance War".  
3) Here, the active and reserve units and on the German side in the West the replacement divisions are taken into account, which were available to the leadership in full number, regardless of whether they had already arrived at the battlefront or not.

Page: 566 keyno: 191

Retrospective.

instrument that was capable not only through numbers, organization, armament, and technical equipment, but above all through its training and intrinsic value, of delivering significant "offensive blows" even against numerically superior opponents. The German operational plan was not executable by just any military instrument. Regarding training and offensive power, the German army of 1914 was at a peak that could not easily be surpassed; however, in all other areas of armament, its further expansion in the last two decades until the outbreak of the First Balkan War had undoubtedly not been promoted to the extent that would have been possible and necessary in view of the impending world war. The feverish efforts of the last two years before the outbreak of war were able to close some gaps in the armament of the German army, but could not fully make up for what had been neglected over many years; above all, it was no longer possible to balance the unfavorable numerical ratio of Germany's own forces to the enemy's as would have been possible with a steady armament policy. Here, the aggressive spirit living in the army, which was nurtured with deliberate one-sidedness in peacetime, had to create the balance. Thus, the operational plan and military instrument stood in a healthy interrelationship with the intrinsic value of the army at the beginning of the war.

Of decisive importance for the success of the German war plan was to keep the operations mobile; a stagnation of the offensive in trench warfare ruled out rapid decisions; according to Generaloberst v. Moltke's view, it was necessary to "take away the momentum and initiative from the army, which we need all the more, the greater the number of enemies we have to reckon with." Generaloberst Moltke believed that the mobility of the overall operations in the West could only be ensured by a wide sweep of the right wing of the army through Belgium, and only in this way could it succeed in defeating the enemy in open field. "At the outbreak of war, this offered the Germans the opportunity to leave their 'front of entrenchment.' When, after the completed deployment at the mutual national borders, the armies took the offensive on all fronts, it actually came to the clash 'in open field' so eagerly sought by Generaloberst v. Moltke, where the Germans on their decision-seeking right wing of the army

\*) For more details, see "War Armament and War Economy," Volume I.  
2) Generaloberst v. Moltke, Memorandum from December 21, 1912.

Page: 567 keyno: 192

Retrospective.

possessed a strong superiority in numbers and offensive power. All prerequisites for the full success of the campaign plan seemed fulfilled. However, the supreme command did not possess the decisive energy to exploit the favorable situation; the hoped-for great and decisive success was denied; only an "ordinary" victory was achieved.

The immediately ensuing pursuit resumed the original campaign plan; by advancing the German right wing towards Paris, the enemy's western flank was to be enveloped. In the ensuing pursuit battles, the allies suffered significant blows at the lower Somme, where the impetuous Oise pressed for attack, but even these were not enough to render them incapable of fighting. Three circumstances were responsible for the lack of success in the pursuit campaign: the stalling of the left wing in Lorraine during the attack ordered by the supreme command against the French fortress front, the pivoting of the right wing southwards in conjunction with the independent turning of the 1st Army against the Oise to pursue the enemy defeated by the 2nd Army at St. Quentin, and finally the weakening of the decisive right wing by prematurely transferring two army corps to the east. This shifted the balance of power between the two theaters of war in favor of the west, without the east gaining a decisive increase in strength. The result of all these events was the difficult operational situation in which the Germans found themselves during the march past Paris, which the enemy skillfully exploited by decisively transitioning from retreat to attack. At the Marne, there was a third major clash, where the advantage of the operational situation no longer lay with the Germans but with the enemy, and during which the enemy command succeeded in seizing the initiative. It almost seemed as if the admirable strength and sharpness of the German military instrument could compensate for the inadequacy of the supreme command. However, this very advantage was destroyed by clumsy interference in the battle decision; the army was forced to retreat at the moment when, after unspeakable efforts and sacrifices, it had just seized victory. The campaign in the west, based on the Schlieffen operational plan, was mishandled! The danger and possibility arose, as at the same time on the eastern theater of war, the setbacks of the Austro-Hungarian army in Galicia had made the situation extremely tense. To whom Generaloberst

Page: 568 keyno: 193

Retrospective.

In May 1914, during his last meeting with General v. Conrad, Moltke had expressed the hope of being finished with France "six weeks after the start of operations," or at least to the extent that he could shift the main forces to the East. It was now clear that this hope could no longer be fulfilled. Essential prerequisites for the successful execution of the two-front war had thus become obsolete.

These disadvantages were compensated by the great success achieved by the small German army in East Prussia. From the beginning, it had faced a difficult situation against an almost twice as strong opponent. Nevertheless, it strove to solve its task of protecting the national borders through offense. In the first encounter with the enemy at Gumbinnen, it was on the verge of securing victory under its banners when it was withdrawn by the leadership before completion. A change in command had become necessary. The new leaders faced a difficult situation. Their first act after taking command was a trip to the front lines to learn about the conditions there firsthand, particularly the state of the sword they were to wield. Thus, the new decisions were built on a sound foundation. Free from any rigidity, adapting with astonishing agility to the constant changes in the situation, the leadership proved itself in the truest sense of the word in a rarely fortunate establishment of secure execution "from case to case." The operational goal, the successive destruction of the two Russian armies, was pursued and achieved with consistency and determination despite all obstacles and frictions. Despite the great numerical inferiority, the German leaders in the East succeeded in surprising the enemy with superior combat power, especially artillery, wherever they sought the decision. No demand was made on the troops that they could not fully meet. The leadership had shown sound judgment for what the troops were capable of achieving in any situation. Operation and military instrument were in constant, most fortunate interaction with each other; from this arose a firm trust between leadership and troops that withstood even the most severe tests. On this basis rested the incomparable military successes at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, which not only freed East Prussia from the enemy in a few weeks but — what was much more significant — provided the opportunity to supply the severely shaken units there with significant forces for support and thus to have a meaningful impact on the setbacks at the Marne and in Galicia.

Page: 569 keyno: 194

Review.

to prevent the overall situation. The German leaders in the East had not only fulfilled the promise given in peacetime to the Austro-Hungarian Chief of General Staff by Generaloberst v. Moltke, they had not only tied down 22 1/2 Russian divisions, but 34 1/2, and partially destroyed them. Thus, it was primarily the great successes of the 8th Army that saved the overall situation; the German supreme army command regained the freedom of operational decision-making; despite the initial failure of the campaign in the West, the basic idea of the original war plan for the two-front war could be maintained. The critical tension between the two theaters of war was initially resolved by mid-September. Time was gained, and the Western army thus had freedom of movement again for a considerable time.

General v. Falkenhayn immediately recognized the relaxation of the overall situation upon taking over the leadership of operations; he was determined to make a second attempt in the West to bring about a decision in the campaign. This decision was perhaps made easier for him because, as a previously one-sided observer of operations on the western theater of war, he had constantly devoted his full attention to it and was therefore inclined from the outset to underestimate the difficulties of the situation in the East.

It was a difficult task that the new leader of the German operations faced in mid-September in the West; from the just completed retreat movement of the German Western army, it was necessary for him to achieve a new decisive offensive operation. The belligerents faced each other at the Aisne in frontal combat at this time, while on the French Maas and Mosel, the battle was in full swing. The bold hopes that the French supreme commander had placed on the subsequent pursuit operation in the first days after the unexpected successes at the Marne had given way to a more sober assessment of the situation. "The Germans have apparently completely preserved the strength to continue the fight," reported the Russian ambassador from Paris to St. Petersburg on September 17. However, the enemy leadership's intention to encircle the German right wing was already apparent.

Apparently, General v. Falkenhayn's confidence in the offensive power of the military instrument remained unshaken, as evidenced by the daily order to the Western army on September 15.

Page: 570 keyno: 195

Retrospective.

tember clearly shows. "The great and brilliant successes of the current campaign," it was said here, "are primarily based on the unrestrained drive forward, which inspires everyone, from the first to the last, and which our opponents were nowhere able to withstand. This unparalleled offensive spirit will continue to enable our army to achieve the highest, to face all the contingencies of war, to impose our will on the enemy."

Doubts as to whether the heavily exhausted army, after the enormous exertions and sacrifices of recent weeks, especially after the setback at the Marne and the provision of fresh strength for a new attack, were apparently not present in it. The only basis for assessing the troops was the brief report from Colonel Tappen upon his return from the front in the early morning of September 15, stating that their fighting strength was still unbroken. That was undoubtedly correct. The troops, unparalleled in heroism and discipline, had survived the severe setback at the Marne without having suffered damage to their internal structure. It was entirely different circumstances that adversely affected the combat value of the Western Army at this time. Above all, it was after the unimaginable exertions during the weeks-long marches and battles without a day of rest and without adequate supplies — as was only natural — physically severely exhausted; this was also clearly expressed in the report of the Army High Command 1 to the Supreme Army Command on the evening of September 15, which, however, only reached General v. Falkenhayn on September 16. "Since the army," it was said here, "has set out from the assembly area, it has continuously advanced in strong marches, fought almost daily, and fought several large, multi-day battles. It has not had a single day of rest until now..." The army's units were "completely mixed and the army exhausted" after the last heavy fighting; it urgently needed "a short rest and strong reinforcements," which until-

To raise the offensive power and combat readiness of the Western Army, it was absolutely necessary to provide replacements, especially of officers, due to the severe weakening of its units — individual units had lost up to 50% of their strength due to combat losses and march attrition; the infantry particularly lacked experienced platoon and company leaders. One of the most proven commanding generals of the time assessed the situation at the front based on his own extensive experience

Page: 571 keyno: 196

Retrospective.

valuable diary entries in a letter to the Reichsarchiv as follows: "... Without sufficient artillery effect and with infantry stretched out like a rubber band, there was no prospect of success. It is no wonder that all attacks fizzled out. The attack orders from above did not take into account the actual conditions. They were probably not known, and as far as I know, nothing was done to learn about them. This type of command from above and the setting of demands that could not be met even with the best will were quite incomprehensible. They damaged trust in the highest leadership and were more suitable for creating discontent and damaging the desire to attack. This must, as painful as it is, be stated if one is to learn from the events of that time; and for this, it is primarily necessary to show how important it is, after setbacks, to maintain close contact with the troops, to orient oneself about their combat strength and capabilities, and to show them a great goal again, for which they are willing to give their best. Energetic leadership is of course also necessary in such times; but if it overextends, and not just once, but repeatedly, its effect fizzles out just like the ordered actions. It must first learn about the sword it wants to wield and sharpen it again. I believe that my experiences will generally align with those on other fronts. ..."

And in valuable addition to this judgment, an experienced chief of staff of an active army corps from that time writes: "... The reasons why the victorious advance up to the Marne was followed by a setback are quite simple and natural. What was previously demanded of the troops was a lot, but it was within their capabilities and was built on sound premises overall. The operation failed, not through the fault of the troops, and at the same time, their forces were exhausted. What the troops needed was rest, restoration of the partly severely shaken order, refreshing of the partly heavily thinned lines, replacement of the torn leadership personnel, ample ammunition, and trust in the higher leadership. Of all this, they received — nothing. But if even a part of these demands could be met, the higher leadership could create new healthy foundations for operations, as quickly as possible, then the old striking power would have blossomed again in surprisingly short time in new freshness. Instead, the troops received new orders in the old direction, which far exceeded their forces and which, to them — not to the leadership — were recognizable as bearing the character of hopelessness. ..."

Page: 572 keyno: 197

Retrospective.

Similarly, other senior general staff officers in their diary entries made available to the Reichsarchiv often complain in quite temperamental words about the detachment of the supreme command from the front, which continuously made demands on the troops that they could not meet even with the best will during those days; as a result, trust in the higher command was severely shaken.

It was very concerning that a severe shortage of ammunition had already become noticeable in the first two days of the bloody battles at the Aisne. Remedying this was the most urgent demand to strengthen the combat power of the troops; the infantry attacks since the Battle of the Marne had mainly failed due to insufficient artillery support as a result of the ammunition shortage. General v. Falkenhayn, when he took over command, had no doubt about the seriousness of the ammunition situation. However, a remedy was initially not possible for the reasons outlined. The ammunition issue became increasingly urgent as the enemy transitioned to pure defense in heavily fortified positions over large parts of his front. Attacks against these required a disproportionately large use of artillery ammunition.

On September 15, General v. Falkenhayn made decisions of far-reaching importance for the continuation of the war far behind in Luremburg, without contact with the fighting front, in the same uncertainty as his predecessor shortly before during the leadership of the Battle of the Marne. While his predecessor, with his pessimistic disposition, fatally underestimated the favorable situation at the fighting front, General v. Falkenhayn acted in the opposite manner. Only close contact with the combat front would have allowed him to gain reliable and secure foundations for his operational decisions. With his clear vision and quick grasp of all essentials, he would have immediately recognized the futility of continuing operations in the previous paths, especially the resumption of a general offensive on the entire army front, and this insight would likely have inevitably led to other operational decisions corresponding to the situation at the front.

Instead, the fundamental new decisions essentially consisted only of continuing the previous operational plan. By resuming the attack from the positions reached after completed withdrawals in the Noyon—Verdun line, fresh forces were to be deployed.

Page: 573 keyno: 198

Retrospective.

on the right wing of the army, the decision previously sought here in vain was to be pursued again with a troop that was severely weakened and not capable of decisive attack without granting a rest period and the addition of fresh combat power. Moreover, the armies were now to attack an enemy who had not only received a strong moral boost from his success at the Marne but also stood in entrenched positions on large parts of his battlefront. Operation and war instrument thus fell into an increasingly sharp imbalance with each other. In the rapid-fire weapon and the machine gun, as well as in the artillery firing from more concealed positions behind protective shields, significant obstacles to the attack had arisen, which hindered the flow of movement in an unprecedented way. In the centuries-old struggle for superiority between attack and defense, the modern weapon effect of the latter seemed to want to give the upper hand. This had already been expressed in the border battles on the Western Front in the ongoing mobile, mostly unjustified complaints of the infantry with enemy and friend about the "failure of their own artillery" and in the frequent "calls for help to the neighbor" whenever the infantry attack stalled and the artillery effect of their own troops could no longer pave the way. If the cause of this phenomenon had perhaps become less clear in the first weeks of leadership, it was partly because at that time the infantry on both sides had advanced to attack, and the defense, except on the southern flank, had not yet been able to prove the full superiority of its weapon effect. Above all, however, the mental momentum of the German infantry in these initial battles had been so decisive that the power of movement overcame all obstacles of enemy fire effect and remained in flow despite terrible blood sacrifices. A significant contribution to this was, of course, also made by the German artillery, especially the numerically and combat-value superior heavy artillery.

This might have changed when the enemy, in the second half of September, also on further stretches of the battlefront, in the center of the army, had switched to defense in entrenched positions and the superior power of his modern weapons fully dominated the battlefield. The physically exhausted and, due to the heavy blood sacrifices, weakened German infantry was now unable to maintain its attack movement in flow, especially since, due to gaps in the ranks of the officers, the experienced leadership and the inspiring example of the youthful leader were missing, and since their own artillery in the

Page: 574 keyno: 199

Retrospective.

was no longer able to support the sword firearm in fulfilling its now considerably more difficult task even approximately adequately due to the great shortage of ammunition. When the German high command, in those days, in view of the great shortage of ammunition and the difficulty of modern combat against a hated enemy, advised the heavily struggling infantry to "abandon long-range artillery fire in their attacks, overrun the French infantry positions, and capture as much enemy artillery as possible," it showed how little the experiences of the preceding battles had penetrated to the high command; apparently, it had no correct idea of the difficulties of the attack against an enemy who understood how to fully exploit the superiority of modern weapon effects in defense. Now, what had already been indicated during the Battle of the Marne on the southern flank in the fight against the French fortress front and meanwhile during the battles at the Aisne on the rest of the front occurred: the offensive movement began to falter against the weapon effects of strong defensive fronts. This was clearly demonstrated by the costly attacks of September 26 and 27. One faced something completely new, the deeper causes of which were initially perhaps recognized by only a few. With the previous means, the offensive movement could no longer be maintained against the insurmountable obstacles of the new temporal weapon effects; new means and forms of attack were needed. It was only natural that the fundamental change in the balance of power between attack and defense became clear to both the leadership and the troops only gradually. The leader of the German operations was also initially surprised by this change, although since his first front experience on September 20/21, he had been constantly striving to incorporate his new insights in close contact with the high command, and for this reason, had also moved the main headquarters far forward.

In contrast, the enemy, well-trained in defense due to his peacetime training, was able to recognize the superiority of the defense on the southern front earlier due to his experiences; he decided to exploit it. The strength of his new enemy artillery enabled him, without any risk, to withdraw significant forces from it to direct them to his decision lines from the north. Here, on the outer flank, he set — just

Page: 575 keyno: 200

Retrospective.

like the Germans — the decision, here he sought the unification

of superior forces. In his own country, he had an undamaged,

extraordinarily favorable railway network, while the Germans

at this time had only extremely inadequate connections with low capacity

available for movements to their right wing under significant operational difficulties.

The entire transport movement of the 6th Army to the right wing

was built on completely insufficient railway services and represented a

daring venture, which succeeded thanks to the dedication and reliability

of the railway personnel and troops, especially since the

enemy did not exploit the advantage offered by his own railway network to the right.

In the mutual struggle for the flank and constantly

with the possibility that the Germans would remain in the rear.

Although the Supreme Army Command primarily through aerial reconnaissance

received timely knowledge of the enemy's intentions

and had a clear understanding of the difficulties of their own railway

situation, no measures were taken to reinforce the decision wing

from the army center by rail, motor vehicles, and marching as strongly

as possible.

In clear recognition of this necessity, Generaloberst

v. Moltke had already ordered the defense of the army center in strongly fortified positions

when re-fronting, and ten days later

his advisors, during their front tour, in accordance with this order

set strong forces from the army center in motion to the decision wing.

This measure was not only partially reversed by his successor, but

by resuming the attack on the Côtes Lorraines for a secondary task,

significant forces were also fixed on the Maas, which were urgently needed

for the decision on the right wing. For this, the Supreme Army Command

only had a strong army reserve in the area of Metz.

There were various possibilities for their deployment; the most immediate being their use on

the right wing. However, this required a time-consuming

and, given the unfavorable transport situation, difficult regrouping;

to ensure a coordinated deployment of all units transported by rail

to Belgium and northern France, it was necessary to adjust the operational

plan to the railway's capacity and accordingly to carry out a coordinated

connection of these troops in a backward direction. This might have allowed a wide

Page: 576 keyno: 201

Retrospective.

The backward swing not only of the right wing of the army but also, under certain circumstances, of the center of the army became necessary. This apparent disadvantage was more than compensated by the possibility of hindering the enemy's pursuit through railway destructions in the evacuated area. The time thus gained opened up the prospect of deploying the newly to be used army far from the rest of the front, around Valenciennes and in the most operationally effective direction against the lower Somme. General v. Falkenhayn had considered similar thoughts; however, he felt compelled to reject them, as "beside the front," in his view, "due to the advantage and the good connections the enemy possessed, it was exposed from the outset to renewed outflanking"; it also seemed "possible to him, if the current enemy front held, to bring the northern French coast and thus control over the English Channel into German hands"¹). However, the decisive factor for him was the concern that continuing the retreat would shake the internal structure of the army. Mainly for this reason, the right wing of the 1st Army was fixed in the area around Noyon. Whether and to what extent General v. Falkenhayn's fears were justified is not to be decided here. If they were indeed justified, there was still another remedy: The deployment of the 6th Army, already assembled in and around Metz, together with the army detachment Strantz being formed in the area south of Verdun for an immediate, surprising attack across the Meuse. Here, as the German army command was aware, only weak and inferior French forces were present at that time. A simultaneous attack west of Verdun with the 5th Army, reinforced by all dispensable forces of the 3rd and 4th Armies, especially artillery, through the Argonne and west of it, offered favorable prospects. This operation required no time-consuming troop movements and was the quickest and most effective, especially since the enemy, due to regrouping to his left wing, weakened his forces elsewhere. A shielding of Verdun and a breakthrough of the enemy front were within the realm of possibility. Whether and to what extent such success would have operational effects remains to be seen here. In any case, it could be assumed with certainty that a breakthrough of the enemy front at this sensitive point thwarted all encirclement attempts by the enemy and the right German wing, which was meanwhile reinforced by the IX Reserve Corps and the I Bavarian Army marching in-

¹) Erich v. Falkenhayn, a. a. D. C. 11 ff.

Page: 577 keyno: 202

Review.

Despite being supported, it was relieved as quickly and effectively as possible. The supreme German leadership was then given the time to prepare a new decisive operation based on the changed situation and a different grouping of forces.

The German leadership's endeavor to hold every foot of conquered ground even under tactically unfavorable conditions had to lead over time to a stagnation of the army front already engaged in battle, without it being possible under the prevailing conditions to keep operations mobile on the outer flank and to regain the initiative. In view of both sides' efforts to make a decision on the outer flank, the German leadership could not succeed, due to the limited capacity of the persistently destroyed and so far only provisionally restored railways, in bringing superior forces to significant deployment at the decision point while rigidly holding the army front from Noyon to Verdun. General v. Falkenhayn had initially calculated that, due to the greatest performance conditions of the railway network remaining in enemy hands, a real deployment of the 6th Army in a decisive operational direction would not occur; from the beginning, he believed that the German leadership might be forced by the course of events to a gradual deployment of this army. The hope that the inner superiority of the German troops would prevail even under unfavorable circumstances could hardly be fulfilled as long as nothing was done to restore their former striking power. The newly flaring battles on the open right army flank, under continued gradual deployment of hastily drawn forces, finally led to the stubborn, sacrificial struggle for the flank and on the other army fronts to trench warfare, which then gradually also spread to the decision flank.

The entire Western Front threatened to stagnate indecisively in trench warfare. The terrible danger this posed for the leadership of the two-front war was by no means lost on General v. Falkenhayn; he was determined to leave no means untried to avert this danger. He saw a last saving way out of the predicament in the accelerated deployment of his last army reserve, the newly formed, still unfinished reserve corps at home on the narrow strip of "free

Page: 578 keyno: 203

Retrospective.

Field" between the sea and the rest of the army front. By achieving a decisive success at this point, he hoped to break the entire remaining German front from its stagnation and also to return to a war of movement here. At the beginning of the battle in Flanders, 96 German divisions fought against 89 1/2 French-British divisions on the Western Front, excluding the remnants of the Belgian army rescued from Antwerp, whose operational capacity at that time was at most equivalent to one or two divisions; on the decisive wing at the front of the 4th Army, the Germans at that time had a superiority of six to seven divisions with very heavy artillery in terms of number and caliber, while in Artois, opposite the 6th Army, the enemy had a superiority of about five divisions. The success of the new operation was only assured if it was possible, by exploiting the initial numerical superiority in Flanders, to quickly break the enemy resistance and strike deep into the enemy's flank. The force of this attack had to be so powerful that the rest of the Allied army front, if possible, was shaken up to the Somme and began to waver. This again required a troop that was not only filled with high morale but also particularly thoroughly trained for the difficult and unique combat tasks that awaited them in sectioned and water-rich terrain against a war-experienced enemy. Such particularly demanding performance would have been just good enough for the battle-tested units of the Western Front after prior rest and preparation. It was therefore obvious to distribute the newly established reserve corps across the entire Western Front instead of deploying their battle-experienced units for the execution of the new operation, utilizing rail transport and land march uniformly, especially since, according to the head of the field railway system, the railways of the occupied territories were at that time fully capable of quickly executing such a large transport movement. A greater loss of time would hardly have occurred with appropriate measures. General v. Falkenhayn, however, determined that the newly established reserve corps would mainly carry out the decisive operation in Flanders. The responsible leader of the operations and simultaneous Minister of War could thus remain unclear about the deficiencies in training, consolidation, and equipment inherent in the young formations. He hoped, however, that surprise of the enemy and unified and powerful deployment of the

1) The German Field Railway System, Volume I, p. 133.

Page: 579 keyno: 204

Review.

new army in an operationally favorable direction, but above all the incomparable

spirit of the young troops would compensate for their other deficiencies.

Instead, they bled themselves dry despite all dedication in futile

attempts against an enemy who, just a few days after the start of the

attack, received ever-increasing reinforcements from his other

fronts and had the experience of months of fighting on his side; he understood

how to use the superior effect of his now greatly increased

artillery and machine guns to excellent effect in the terrain that made the attack so

extraordinarily difficult. Once again, operation and military instrument

were out of proportion to each other. It was psychologically

understandable that General v. Falkenhayn initially closed himself off to this bitter realization.

After all, a failure in the West seriously called into question the

victorious continuation of the two-front war. In addition,

he was heavily burdened by the oppressive feeling of not only the setback

at the Marne due to the stagnation of the entire German army

front in trench warfare into a severe operational failure,

but also of having exhausted the forces, whose deployment a few days after

mobilization had been his own particular achievement, in an insoluble task

and unsuccessfully. A major military success on the western

theater of war seemed all the more necessary to him, as only in this way

could the troops regain their former self-confidence and the feeling of absolute superiority

over the enemy. Despite all the repeated attempts, with

considerable blood sacrifices, to bring movement back into the stagnant front,

the circumstances proved stronger than the will to victory of the German leader. Only when,

after long bloody struggles, the flower of German youth in Flanders

had sunk down and through the floods on the decisive wing as well as the futile deployment of Group Fabel the last

hopes, to which the German leadership clung, were destroyed,

did they recognize their error. The struggle for the campaign

decision on the Western Front remained temporarily

undecided. This result also meant the final

failure of the original operational plan for the two-

front war.

The crisis in the West was exacerbated by the fact that at the same

time the tension on the eastern theater of war also reached its

Page: 580 keyno: 205

Review.

reached the highest degree. Due to the decisive victories in East Prussia, significant forces were freed here by mid-September. Thus, at this time, the German Supreme Army Command could also dispose of a valuable army reserve of eight infantry divisions and one cavalry division on the eastern border. Opinions differed between the German leadership in East Prussia and the allies regarding their deployment. The German Supreme Army Command decided in accordance with the Chief of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army, who, strongly impressed by the defeat in Galicia, wished for the deployment of the new German army in direct conjunction with the allies, — contrary to the original proposal of the German leaders in the East, who aimed to achieve a rapid relief of the heavily shaken allied army by advancing the freed forces from East Prussia over the Narew to Siedlce in an effective operational direction. This resulted in an unfavorable starting position for the allies. Nevertheless, thanks to their operational mobility, the German leadership and troops managed to divert massive enemy forces from the allied army. The Russians turned with far superior force against the German 9th Army and gradually pushed it into defense. The decisive offensive task thus passed to the numerically superior Austro-Hungarian army in Galicia, where the focus of the overall operation now lay. However, the allied army was no longer up to the new task; its offensive power was exhausted, and the hoped-for successes in Galicia were denied.

In view of the overwhelming superiority of the Russians at Ivangorod and Warsaw and the impending encirclement of the German left flank, the entire operation had to be abandoned. The retreat of the 9th Army became necessary. However, for the regaining of the initiative, no sacrifice was too great for the German leaders in the East. Without any hesitation and without regard for the "moods" of the troops, they voluntarily relinquished almost all of Poland and large areas of recaptured territory in East Prussia. The large retreat movement was carried out in a timely manner and with a skill that did great honor to the foresight of the leadership and left the solid structure of the German officer corps unshaken.

The German leadership and the troops in the East had achieved the humanly possible against overwhelming superiority; on their own, they not only tied down overwhelming enemy forces but also relieved the front of the allies beyond expectations, and furthermore, they managed to keep the enemy away from their own national borders.

Page: 581 keyno: 206

Retrospective.

to hold out and thereby provide the Western army with full freedom of movement for three months. Including the Landwehr, there were around 24 German divisions in the East by the end of October against about 50 Russian, with 11 in East Prussia against 20, and 12½ in Poland against 30. On the entire Eastern front, there were around 92 divisions of the Central Powers against about 1201) Russian and Serbian. Considering the low combat strength of the Austro-Hungarian divisions, the ratio was even more unfavorable for the Central Powers.

The overall situation in the East now gave cause for serious concern. The border area in Silesia, Posen, and East Prussia was in danger of being overrun by Russian masses; the previously only threatening specter of the "Russian steamroller" seemed to be becoming a reality around the turn of October/November. The freedom of movement of the Western army was seriously endangered. Count Schlieffen had already stated during a war game in 1905 that the German military leadership could not calmly "watch" if the Russians "marched over the Vistula, Oder, Elbe"; then we could not "continue the war in France"; that was "completely out of the question."

The main focus of the German army was clearly in the West; four-fifths of it were stationed there, only one-fifth in the East. However, the total forces of the Central Powers were almost evenly distributed in terms of division numbers between East and Southeast on one side and West on the other (92 vs. 96 divisions), only the higher combat value of the German divisions gave the West an advantage. If a unified will had stood over a unified army, perhaps a more appropriate distribution of tasks and forces across all theaters of war would have been achieved. However, it was a matter of the power resources of two independent states with different goals standing side by side. As a result, the forces were now insufficient for the tasks set in both the East and the West. "We would," as Count Schlieffen had already outlined the consequences of such division more than 20 years ago, "never be strong enough to defend, but not to achieve a decisive victory." The two-front war threatened to develop into a path leading to indecisive warfare in the East and West.

"By moving German forces back and forth from one theater of war to another, pushing back the enemy here and there, then advancing again..." was, according to Count Schlieffen's view

1) Including the reserves within the interior of the Russian Empire, excluding Landwehr.

Page: 582 keyno: 207

Retrospective.

for the Germans, the multi-front war was not to be won. "Such a war on two fronts cannot be ended by repelling one or the other part, but only by the possible destruction first of one, then of the other opponent." Generaloberst v. Moltke also saw great danger in the indecisive conduct of war on both theaters of war in the aforementioned memorandum of 1913. This would mean Germany would forgo any initiative and offensive and limit itself to a defensive battle on both fronts in a war that had to decide about its survival or downfall.

The failure of operations at the Marne left no doubt that the operation in the West had hopelessly stalled in trench warfare. A crisis—far more serious than that of September—had arisen. The extremely tense situation urged a quick decision. Considerations of the most serious kind stormed upon the leader of the German operations. Even now, there could hardly be any doubt that the two-front war could only be successfully concluded if the basic idea of the war plan, to defeat Germany's enemies one after the other, was adhered to. Now, where in the West for the foreseeable future the impossibility of achieving this goal was proven, it had to be attempted to create complete freedom of action in the East by destroying the Russians. Here the situation had changed significantly compared to the beginning of the war, as the Russians had meanwhile brought their masses from the depths of their empire to their western border and were about to launch their own decisive offensive. Evading a German flanking operation was now much more difficult for them; it was tantamount to a defeat in its effect and was therefore far less likely than at the beginning of the war. The previous operations on the eastern theater of war had taught that the Russian leadership and the Russian army were inferior to the Germans; here, the German leadership was promised the quickest campaign-deciding success, especially since the Russians were currently in a strategically unfavorable grouping. After regaining freedom of action, the more difficult task of subduing the western opponents could be resumed—but then, after eliminating the danger in the East, presumably with sufficient strength.

1) p. 565.

Page: 583 keyno: 208

Retrospective.

The conditions had fundamentally changed compared to the situation at the beginning of the war. On the western front, a solid iron wall had been erected before the German army. In the east, there was still more room to maneuver, things were still in flux, and there were still opportunities to deliver powerful blows with superior forces against weak parts of the enemy's front. Trench warfare had not yet become the all-dominant form of warfare.

Such considerations had to impose themselves on the German Supreme Army Command, especially when, in the last days of October, the Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian army increasingly urged a shift of the focus of warfare to the east, and the development of the situation on the eastern front offered a rare opportunity in the first days of November. The German leaders in the east had unexpectedly regained their operational freedom despite the enemy's great superiority; with a sense of responsibility and determination, they were resolved to immediately seize the initiative again. Based on the repeated and firm assurances of General v. Falkenhayn at the Berlin conference, they firmly believed in an imminent campaign decision on the western front; in conscious selfless renunciation of any reinforcement from the west, they made a decision of untouched audacity. In a combination of operational mobility, the small German 9th Army was to be unexpectedly thrown against the northern flank of the Russian main army. The purpose of the new operation was to halt the threatening Russian offensive. Once again, the leaders in the east wanted to attempt to master the situation with their own strength and to win the necessary time for the western army to achieve a decision. In the east, the missing battalions now had to be replaced in the truest sense of the word by bold leadership, whose boldest example, however, included the heaviest escort losses. The risk was justified because the leadership had managed to maintain the military instrument with hardly diminished striking power despite all the bloody sacrifices.

In the early morning of November 4, the intentions of the commanders in the east came to the attention of the Supreme Army Command. November 4 could become a significant turning point in the conduct of the two-front war. From this day on, there could no longer be any doubt for the leader of the German overall operations that the next campaign decision had to be sought in the east. The flanking operation of the

Page: 584 keyno: 209

Review.

The anticipated time gain for the 9th Army should not be wasted on new, strength-sapping battles in the West; it had to be used for the thorough preparation of the major decisive blow in the East. When, how, and where this should be conducted was not yet foreseeable. Initially, it was important to fundamentally shift the focus of warfare to the East and take all necessary measures to make the strike now planned by the Commander-in-Chief East so powerful through the immediate transfer of some combat-ready corps from the West that the German military leadership would retain the freedom of action for a long time and the meanwhile enriched and time-consuming preparations for the decisive campaign in the East could be made. This required the cessation of all attacks in the West and the transition to defense. The enemy was so weakened by the months of bloody battles that no new major enemy offensive was to be feared for the foreseeable future; according to the available reports, the Allies also lacked troops and war material. Before significant new English reinforcements could be transferred to the field, many months had to pass. This time of weakening of the western opponents had to be used to finally defeat the enemy in the East. All reports from the Western Front also left no doubt that the troops felt superior to the enemy in defense. Even on the Flanders front, the situation was completely secure at this time, as clearly emerges from a letter from an objective, not directly involved observer, Field Marshal Baron von der Goltz, to General von Falkenhayn in those days: "I was often enough," it says in this report, "in the front trenches before the Yser position, to be able to judge how things really are there. It is less bad than is often told and assumed. I found a confident, often downright cheerful mood everywhere during my visits to the troops. Now it also comes that the enemy no longer possesses any significant offensive power. His counterattacks ... can usually only be recognized by somewhat livelier infantry fire, which soon subsides again. The height of the losses is explained less by the duration of the battles than by the length of the front lines, where earlier troop parts usually come evenly to the enemy. Despite these losses and the many other departures, we are still strong enough in the first line to easily hold off the enemy where he intended to advance. In my opinion, even often on many troops of him could stronger parts backwards grant a temporary rest."

Page: 585 keyno: 210

Retrospect.

we will not be overrun, should significant transports to the east also take place ..."

To prepare for the decisive offensive in the east, however, it required deep, incisive, and lengthy measures that had to move in three main directions: increasing the defensive strength of the Western Front, the offensive strength of the Eastern Front, and finally the mobilization of the home front, particularly the German economy. Utilizing the diverse experiences and lessons from previous battles in trench warfare, all means of modern technology had to be employed in the service of defense. It was also an urgent requirement to train the troops in the west for the special and unique tasks of trench warfare according to uniform principles. The defense had to be structured in depth, and the positions made as impregnable as possible. To strengthen the Western Front, one should not shy away from giving up all those positions that had arbitrarily arisen from the halting of the war of movement, were unsuitable for sustainable defense by weaker forces, and hindered the full utilization of weapon effectiveness. Beyond such local position corrections, there was a need to straighten protruding curves on a large scale through front shortenings. However, General v. Falkenhayn rejected this demand on fundamental grounds. In his reply to Field Marshal Freiherr v. der Goltz on November 16, 1914, he said: "Even if many lessons from this campaign may remain unproven, one is beyond any doubt, namely: Hold what you have, and never give up a foot of what you have gained. I will act according to this doctrine and, as said, do not intend to voluntarily give up any foot of land in the west." It was primarily such an attitude that prevented him from stripping the Western Front of personnel forces in favor of a decisive offensive in the east. After strengthening the defensive power of the Western Front, it would have been appropriate to deploy any dispensable industry and artillery in the east to make the front there as powerful as possible. Of decisive importance for any successful continuation of the two-front war was finally the immediate establishment and realization of a new, generous armament program. In a completely different way than before, the creative forces of the homeland also had to be put into the service of defending the fatherland. The goal of the new armament program should not merely be to remedy the ammunition shortage,

Page: 586 keyno: 211

Retrospective.

but also beyond that, the increase of the entire personnel and material combat power of the German army to a maximum, both for attack and defense. The German high command also had to quickly come to fundamental new decisions regarding this problem. However, in the depressing feeling of sacrifices made in vain, despite all passionate and fervent will, General von Falkenhayn no longer found the strength in those gloomy November days to place the conduct of the two-front war on completely new foundations. He persisted in the old paths. Despite the clear realization of the impossibility of an early decision in the West, his gaze was still strongly directed at Ypres; his entire thinking and striving turned to more limited goals, which were extremely difficult to achieve militarily on the one hand, and on the other hand, even if achieved, had no influence on the overall operational situation of the multi-front war. Before the conclusion of the battles in Flanders, a visible success of the German arms was to be achieved through the fall of Ypres. Thus, the two-front war threatened to degenerate into a conduct of war that, according to Schlieffen's view, "could lead to the complete attrition of the German army in the long run." This meant defeat and downfall sooner or later.

To what clear understanding of the conditions for successfully conducting the two-front war had the responsible men come in serious peace training, and what had become of it in the harsh reality, in the aggravating element of war, where will and action weigh more than insights!

The reasons for the indecisive conduct of the war in the West were, besides the errors of leadership, mainly to be found in the ultimately equally surprising superiority of the defense to both enemy and friend, which everywhere, where it was in the hands of a war-experienced defender, understood how to fully bring the effect of modern weapons to bear, had proven to be the stronger form of combat. With the previous means of combat, the attacker was all the less able to subdue them, as "the German army ... had not had a fundamental peace training for positional warfare" (The new means and ways had been found that returned to the attack its previous superiority, above all the momentum and the power of movement, which was only natural, that both opponents sought to primarily use the initially stronger form of combat, the defense. From this

Page: 587 keyno: 212

Retrospective.

A trench warfare had developed along the entire Western Front; it imposed its laws imperiously on the conduct of war on both sides. It was clear that it took considerable time for leadership and troops to become familiar with the laws of this new warfare.

It was tragic that the strong relationship of trust between leadership and troops, which had grown in the East from the consciousness of great shared experiences and achievements, could not develop in the West as circumstances were. Leadership and troops were faced with tasks here that, after the setback at the Marne, could only be solved with an immediate and completely fundamental adjustment to the changed combat conditions if the supreme command demonstrated a similar operational flexibility in mid-September as the leaders in the East. In the tenacious defense of every foot of conquered ground, the troops in the West had to make heavy bloody sacrifices. In fierce struggles, they had performed acts of the highest self-sacrifice. Just as the army in the East, they too experienced their highest ambition in fulfilling every demand of the leadership, enduring even the hardest, on lost posts. The self-evidence with which the German soldier went into battle and death at the command of the leadership revealed the spirit of utmost dedication that filled the entire army of 1914. Nevertheless, the set goal in the West was not achieved.

The further development of the operational situation now depended primarily on the outcome of the struggle for Opera and the impending battles in the East.

keyno: 213

keyno: 214

Military Formations.

Preliminary Note.

The composition of the individual units is derived from the military formations in Volumes I and II; therefore, only the composition of the newly established or reorganized German units since the beginning of the war is given here.

In calculating the number of divisions, two independent brigades are counted as one division; German Landwehr units and equivalent units of other armies are included, but German Landsturm units and corresponding units of other armies are not.

The German Western Army

on September 15, 1914.

1st Army.

(11½ Inf. Div., 2 Cav. Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: Colonel General v. Kluck.

Chief of General Staff: Major General v. Kuhl.

II Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Linsingen; 3rd, 4th Inf. Div.

III Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Lochow; 5th, 6th Inf. Div.

IV Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. Sixt v. Armin; 7th, 8th Inf. Div.

IX Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Quast; 17th, 18th Inf. Div.

IV Reserve Corps: Gen. of Art. v. Gronau; 7th, 22nd Res. Div.

Higher Cavalry Commander 2: Gen. of Cav. v. der Marwitz; 4th, 9th Cav. Div.

10th, 11th, 27th mixed Ldw. Brig.

2nd Army.

(12½ Inf. Div., 2 Cav. Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: Colonel General v. Bülow.

Chief of General Staff: Lieutenant General v. Lauenstein.

Guard Corps: Gen. of Inf. Baron v. Plettenberg; 1st, 2nd G. Inf. Div.

VII Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Claer; 13th, 14th Inf. Div.

X Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Emmich; 19th, 20th Inf. Div.

XII Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. d'Elsa; 23rd, 32nd Inf. Div.

XVIII Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Schenck; 21st, 25th Inf. Div.

X Reserve Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Eben; 2nd G. Res. Div., 19th Res. Div.

Higher Cavalry Commander 1: Lt. Gen. Baron v. Richthofen; 5th, 2nd Cav. Div.

3rd Army.

(4½ Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. of Cav. v. Einem gen. v. Rothmaler.

Chief of General Staff: Major General v. Hepppen.

XIX Army Corps: Gen. of Cav. v. Laffert; 24th, 40th Inf. Div.

XIII Reserve Corps: Gen. of Art. v. Kirchbach; 23rd, 24th Res. Div.

5th Cav. Div.

47th mixed Ldw. Brig.

4th Army.

(8½ Inf. Div., 2 Cav. Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: Colonel General Albrecht Duke of Württemberg.

Chief of General Staff: Lieutenant General v. Lutwitz.

VI Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Pritzelwitz; 11th, 12th Inf. Div.

XIII Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. Tülff v. Tschepe u. Weidenbach; 15th, 16th Inf. Div.

Page: 590 keyno: 215

Military Organization.

VIII Reserve Corps: Gen. of Inf. Baron v. u. zu Egloffstein; 15th, 16th Res. Div.

XVIII Reserve Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Steuben; 21st, 25th Res. Div.

Higher Cavalry Commander 4: Lt. Gen. Baron v. Hollen; 3rd, 6th Cav. Div.

49th Combined Landwehr Brig.

5th Army

(15 Infantry Div., 1 Cavalry Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Crown Prince of the German Empire and of Prussia.

Chief of General Staff: Lt. Gen. Schmidt v. Knobelsdorf.

XIII Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Fabeck; 26th, 27th Inf. Div.

XVI Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Mudra; 33rd, 34th Inf. Div.

V Reserve Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Gündell; 9th, 10th Res. Div.

VI Reserve Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Goßler; 11th, 12th Res. Div.

2nd Landwehr Div.: Lt. Gen. Franke; 33rd, 9th Bavarian Combined Landwehr Brig.

43rd, 45th Combined Landwehr Brig.

Subordinate to 5th Army:

Army Detachment Strantz

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. of Inf. v. Strantz.

Chief of General Staff: Lt. Col. Fischer.

V Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Oven; 9th, 10th Inf. Div.

III Bavarian Army Corps: Gen. of Cav. Baron v. Gebfattel; 5th, 6th Bavarian Inf. Div.

33rd Res. Div. (Main Reserve Metz¹)).

Bavarian Cav. Div.

6th Army

(24 Infantry Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: Colonel General Rupprecht Crown Prince of Bavaria.

Chief of General Staff: Maj. Gen. Krafft v. Dellmensingen.

XIV Army Corps: Lt. Gen. Baron v. Vatter; 28th, 29th Inf. Div.

XXI Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Below (Erik); 31st, 42nd Inf. Div.

I Bavarian Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. Knight v. Xylander; 1st, 2nd Bavarian Inf. Div.

II Bavarian Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. Knight v. Martini; 3rd, 4th Bavarian Inf. Div.

XIV Reserve Corps: Lt. Gen. v. Stein; 26th, 28th Res. Div.

I Bavarian Reserve Corps: Gen. of Inf. Knight v. Faßbender; 1st, 5th Bavarian Res. Div., Bavarian

Landwehr Div.²).

Replacement Corps: Gen. of Inf. Baron v. Falkenhausen; 4th Repl. Div. with attached Brig. Ipfel-

kofer³), 8th, 10th Repl. Div.

Reinforced 6th Repl. Div. (Corps Dwarkowski⁴)).

19th Repl. Div.⁵).

Corps Eberhardt: Gen. of Inf. v. Eberhardt; Danube-Brig., 30th Res. Div., Bavarian

Repl. Div., Detachment Freiburg⁶).

Page: 591 keyno: 216

The German Western Army.

Covering Forces on the Upper Rhine: General of Infantry Gaede; 1st, 2nd Bavarian Combined Landwehr Brigade, 51st Combined Landwehr Brigade (Frech Detachment), 55th Combined Landwehr Brigade (Mathy Detachment), Bodungen Detachment¹).

7th Army.

(6½ Infantry Divisions, 1 Cavalry Division)

Commander-in-Chief: Colonel General v. Heeringen.

Chief of General Staff: Lieutenant General v. Hänisch.

XV Army Corps: General of Infantry v. Deimling; 30th, 39th Infantry Division.

VII Reserve Corps: General of Infantry v. Zwehl; 13th, 14th Reserve Division.

IX Reserve Corps: General of Infantry v. Boehn; 17th, 18th Reserve Division.

7th Cavalry Division.

25th Combined Landwehr Brigade.

General Government Belgium.

(6 Infantry Divisions)

Governor General: Field Marshal Baron v. der Goltz.

Chief of General Staff: Major General Baron v. Lüttwitz.

III Reserve Corps: General of Infantry v. Beseler; 5th, 6th Reserve Division.

Marine Division: Admiral v. Schroeder²).

26th, 37th, 38th, 41st Combined Landwehr Brigade³).

1st and 2nd Reserve Replacement Brigade⁴).

[Continued detailed military unit listings and specifications...]

Page: 592 keyno: 217

Order of Battle.

The German Western Army

on October 10, 1914, evening.

Directly subordinated to the Supreme Army Command:

(3 Inf. Div., 3 Cav. Div.)

III. Reserve Corps¹): Gen. of Inf. v. Beseler; 5th, 6th Res. Div., 4th Ers. Div.; assigned:

1./Res. Foot Art. R. 2 (15 cm-Rt.), ½ II./Res. Foot Art. R. 3 (F. S.), 1st and II./Foot Art. R. 9

(21 cm-Mörs.), 1./Res. Foot Art. R. 18 (10 cm-Ran.), Pi. R. 24, Field Flying Detachment 38.

Higher Cavalry Commander 4: Genlt. Freih. v. der Goltz: 3rd, 6th Bavarian Cav. Div.,

assigned: Bavarian Res. Jäg. Btl. 1, 1./Bavarian Res. Inf. R. 1.

Heaviest Artillery: 1./Foot Art. R. 8 (15 cm-Ran.), 1st and 4th light Coastal Mortar

Battery (30.5 cm-Mörs.), 2nd short Marine Cannon Battery (42 cm-Würf.).

1st Army.

(11½ Inf. Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: Generaloberst v. Kluck.

Chief of Gen. St.: Genmaj. v. Kuhl.

Army Troops: II./Foot Art. R. 4 (21 cm-Mörs.), ½ II./Res. Foot Art. R. 9 (10 cm-Ran.),

Bavarian Pi. R. 18, Field Flying Detachment 12.

I. Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Linsingen; 3rd, 4th Inf. Div.; assigned: reinforced 4th Bavarian

Inf. Brig.

II. Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Lochow; 5th, 6th Inf. Div.; assigned: Gren. R. 2, Jäg.Btl.3.

IX. Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Quast; 17th, 18th Inf. Div.; assigned: II. and III./Ldw.

Inf. R. 53.

IV. Reserve Corps: Gen. of Artl. v. Gronau; 7th, 22nd Res. Div.; assigned: I./Ersatz. R. 2,

1./Res. Foot Art. R. 9 (10 cm-Ran.).

IX. Reserve Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Boehn; 17th, 18th Res. Div.

10th, 27th mixed Ldw. Brig. (without II. and III./Ldw. Inf. R. 53).

2nd Army.

(10 Inf. Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: Generaloberst v. Bülow.

Chief of Gen. St.: Genlt. v. Lauenstein.

Army Troops: III./Foot Art. R. 1 (21 cm-Mörs.), ½ I./Res. Foot Art. R. 18 (10 cm-Ran.),

Bavarian Pi. R. 9, Field Flying Detachment 23.

XVIII. Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Schenck; 21st, 25th Inf. Div.

XXI. Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Below (Fritz); 31st, 42nd Inf. Div.

1st Bavarian Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. Ritter v. Xylander; 1st, 2nd Bavarian Inf. Div. (without

1st Bavarian Inf. Brig.); assigned: Jäg. Btl. 4, 9 and 10, II. and III./Ldw. Inf. R. 35,

1st Bavarian Res. Jäg. Btl. 1.

II. Bavarian Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. Ritter v. Martini; 3rd, 4th Bavarian Inf. Div.

XIV. Reserve Corps: Genlt. v. Stein; 28th, 29th Res. Div.; assigned: Res. Inf. R. 99 (4 Btl.),

Ersatz. Ers. Detachment 76, ½ III./Res. Foot Art. R. 10 (F. S.).

3rd Army.

(8 Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. of Cav. v. Einem gen. v. Rothmaler.

Chief of Gen. St.: Genlt. v. Hoeppner.

Army Troops: III./Foot Art. R. 7 (21 cm-Mörs.), 2 French 12 cm-Cannon Battery from Givet,

Pi. R. 23 and 30, Field Flying Detachment 22.

VI. Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Pritzelwitz; 12th Inf. Div. with ½ III./Foot Art. R. 6

(F. S.).

VIII. Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Heeringen; 15th, 16th Inf. Div.; assigned: Ldw. Inf. R. 116,

24th Inf. Brig. (XIX. A. K.); 48th Inf. Brig. with Jäg. Btl. 12, II./Ldw. R. 18, Field Art. R. 78,

1./Pi. 22.

¹) On October 14, subordinated to the 4th Army.

Page: 593 keyno: 218

The German Army System.

VIII. Reserve Corps: Gen. of Inf. Freb. and u. to Egloffstein; 15th, 16th Res. Div.; assigned: 2nd b/2nd Battery of the XVIII A. R.; 1./9./Res. Foot Art. R. 20 (f. F. S.).

XII. Reserve Corps: Gen. of Artl. v. Kirchbach; 23rd, 24th Res. Div.; assigned: 1/2 II./Res. Foot Art. R. 3 (f. F. S.).

5th Rad. Div.; assigned: 6th Schutz. Bt.

47th mixed Ldw. Brig.

4th Army¹)

(8 Div. Inf.)

Commander-in-Chief: Generaloberst Albrecht Duke of Württemberg.

Chief of Gen. St.: Genmaj. Ilse.

Army Troops²) 2 III./Res. Foot Art. R. 7 (13 cm-Ran.), 5th heavy Coastal Mortar Battery (30.5 cm-Mör.), 3rd short Marine Cannon Battery (42 cm-Mör.), 2 Austrian Motor Transport Columns, 1./Flying Detachment 6.

XXII. Reserve Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Falkenhayn; 43rd, 44th Res. Div.; assigned: 1./Bavarian Res. Foot Art. R. 3 (f. F. S.), 1./2nd Res. Foot Art. R. 7 (2 Batteries 21 cm-Mör.), 1/4 I./Res. Foot Art. R. 3 (10 cm-Ran.), 1./Sp. 25.

XXIII. Reserve Corps: Gen. b. Rad. v. Kleist; 45th, 46th Res. Div.; assigned: 1/2 Ldw. Foot Art. Battery 7 (f. F. S.), 1./Res. Foot Art. R. 9 (2 Batteries 21 cm-Mör.), 1/4 I./Res. Foot Art. R. 3 (10 cm-Ran.), 1./Sp. 25.

XXVI. Reserve Corps: Gen. b. Inf. Frhr. v. Hügel; 51st, 52nd Res. Div.; assigned: 1/2 Ldw. Foot Art. R. 2 (f. F. S.), 1/2 I./Res. Foot Art. R. 7 (2 Batteries 21 cm-Mör.), 1/4 I./Res. Foot Art. R. 3 (10 cm-Ran.), 2./Sp. Test Comp.

XXVII. Reserve Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Carlowitz; 53rd, 54th Res. Div.; assigned: 1/2 Ldw. Foot Art. R. 5 (f. F. S.), 1/2 I./Res. Foot Art. R. 9 (2 Batteries 21 cm-Mör.), 1/4 I./Res. Foot Art. R. 3 (10 cm-Ran.), 2./Ldw. Romp. of the XVIII A. R.

5th Army.

(20 Div. Inf.)

Commander-in-Chief: Genlt. Wilhelm Crown Prince of the German Empire and of Prussia.

Chief of Gen. St.: Genlt. Schmidt b. Knobelsdorf.

Army Troops: I. and II./Foot Art. R. 6 (21 cm-Mör.), II. and III./Foot Art. R. 12 (21 cm-Mör.), 3rd heavy Coastal Mortar Battery (30.5 cm-Mör.), 1st short Marine Cannon Battery (42 cm-Mör.), 1./Res. Foot Art. R. 9, 1./Flying Detachment 25.

XVI. Army Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Mudra; 33rd, 34th Inf. Div.; assigned: 1/2 I./Foot Art. R. 13 (f. F. S.), 33rd Inf. Div. with Jäg. Bt. 46, 34th Inf. Div. without Field Art. R. 70 and I./Field Art. R. 69, 1./3rd Jäg. Bt. 5; assigned: Ldw. Inf. R. 26, 27 and 83, 1 Battery 10 cm-Ran. from Diedenhofen.

V. Reserve Corps: Gen. b. Inf. v. Gündell; 9th, 10th Res. Div.; assigned: Res. Inf. R. 98, 1st and III./Ldw. Inf. R. 102, 8./Res. Foot Art. R. 8 (f. F. S.), II./Res. Foot Art. R. 16 (f. F. S.), 1/2 I./Res. Foot Art. R. 16 (10 cm-Ran.), 1 Battery 15 cm-Ran. from Metz, Field Flying Detachment 44.

VI. Reserve Corps: Gen. b. Inf. v. Gößler; 11th, 12th Res. Div.; 2nd Ldw. Div.; assigned: Ldw. Inf. R. 100, 3./I./Res. Foot Art. R. 3 (f. F. S.), Field Flying Detachment 34.

XVIII. Reserve Corps: Gen. of Inf. v. Schenken; 17th Inf. Div. with Field Art. R. 70, I./Field Art. R. 69, 1/2 III./Foot Art. R. 6 (f. F. S.), 21st Res. Div.; assigned: 1/2 I./Res. Foot Art. R. 20 (f. F. S.), assigned: 49th mixed Ldw. Brig. (without Ldw. Inf. R. 116, 1st Ldw. Est. and 1./5th Battery of the XVIII A. R.).

Subordinate to the 5th Army:

Army Detachment Strantz.

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. b. Inf. v. Strantz.

Chief of Gen. St.: Obstlt. Fischer.

V. Army Corps: Gen. b. Inf. v. Oven; 9th, 10th Inf. Div.; assigned: II./Foot Art. R. 18 (21 cm-Mör.), 1/2 I./Res. Foot Art. R. 16 (10 cm-Ran.), 6./Foot Art. R. 8 (15 cm-Ran.),

1) To be newly formed in Belgium, transport of the corps from the homeland ordered.  
2) Assignment of all heavy and heaviest artillery only on October 12.  
3) Wartime designation of the new reserve corps ¹) Schematic representation.

Page: 594 keyno: 219

Order of Battle.

II./Pi. 27, 2 Reserve Engineer Companies; 33rd Reserve Infantry Division (Main Reserve Metz); assigned: 14th Landwehr Brigade; 1st/Bavarian Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 2 (1 heavy field howitzer), 1/2 I./Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 9 (10 cm gun), 1st and 2nd Engineer 22.

III. Bavarian Army Corps: General of Cavalry Baron von Gebsattel; 5th, 6th Bavarian Infantry Divisions, Bavarian Replacement Division; assigned: II./Bavarian Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 2 (1 heavy field howitzer), II./Bavarian Foot Artillery Regiment 3 (21 cm mortar), III./Foot Artillery Regiment 18 (21 cm mortar), 1/2 I./Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 8 (10 cm gun), 1st/Foot Artillery Regiment 18 (10 cm gun), 2nd and 6th Heavy Coastal Mortar Batteries (30.5 cm mortar), 2 Austrian Motor Mortar Batteries (30.5 cm mortar), II./Engineer 16, 1/2 2nd Landwehr Engineer Company, 1 Reserve Engineer Company.

In Marching Order:

XXIV. Reserve Corps: General of Infantry von Gerok; 47th, 48th Reserve Divisions.

6th Army.

(14 Infantry Divisions, 5 Cavalry Divisions)

Commander-in-Chief: Colonel General Rupprecht Crown Prince of Bavaria.

Chief of General Staff: Major General Krafft von Dellmensingen.

Army Troops: II./Foot Artillery Regiment 7 (21 cm mortar), II./Bavarian Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 1 (10 cm gun), 6th Heavy Coastal Mortar Battery (30.5 cm mortar), Engineer Regiment 19, Field Flying Detachment 5.

Guard Corps: General of Infantry Baron von Plettenberg; 1st, 2nd Guard Infantry Divisions.

IV. Army Corps: General of Infantry Sixt von Armin; 7th, 8th Infantry Divisions.

VII. Army Corps: General of Infantry von Claer; 13th, 14th Infantry Divisions; assigned: Jäger Battalion 11.

XIII. Army Corps: General of Infantry von Fabeck; 26th Infantry Division, 25th Reserve Division; assigned: 1st/Landwehr Foot Artillery Regiment 13 (5 heavy field howitzers), 1st/Landwehr Foot Artillery Regiment 16 (10 cm gun).

XIV. Army Corps: Lieutenant General Baron von Watter; 28th, 29th Infantry Divisions; assigned: 1st/Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 14 (10 cm gun).

XIX. Army Corps: General of Cavalry von Laffert; 40th Infantry Division, 47th Infantry Brigade with II./Regiment 18 (without 5th Squadron) and Field Artillery Regiment 77.

I. Bavarian Reserve Corps: General of Infantry Ritter von Fasbender; 1st, 5th Bavarian Reserve Divisions; assigned: I./Bavarian Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 1 (10 cm gun).

Higher Cavalry Commander 1: Lieutenant General Baron von Richthofen; 5th Cavalry Division with 2nd Jäger Battalion, 9th Rad. Division with 3 Squadrons of Uhlan Regiment 7, 3rd Guard Uhlan Regiment 2, 14 (XV. Army Corps), 2 Squadrons each of Uhlan Regiment 9, Dragoon Regiment 6 (XVIII. Army Corps), Uhlan Regiment 7, Dragoon Regiment 7 (XXI. Army Corps), 1st and 2nd Chevauleger Regiment 3 (Bavarian Army Corps).

Higher Cavalry Commander 2: General of Cavalry von der Marwitz; 2nd Cavalry Division with 3 Squadrons each of 2nd Guard Uhlan Regiment (Special Reserve) and Hussar Regiment 3 (III. Army Corps) and 2 Squadrons of Leib-Guard Hussar Regiment 2 (Special Reserve), 7th Cavalry Division with 3 Squadrons of Uhlan Regiment 16 (VII. Army Corps) and 2 Squadrons of Hussar Regiment 17 (XXI. Army Corps), 9th Cavalry Division with 2 Squadrons of Dragoon Regiment 3 (III. Army Corps) and 3 Squadrons of Dragoon Regiment 16 (III. Army Corps), 6th Jäger Battalion, 3rd Chevauleger Regiment 3, 4, 9 and 10.

11th Mixed Landwehr Brigade (without II. and III./Landwehr Infantry Regiment 35 and 2nd Landsturm Battery of III. Army Corps).

7th Army.

(10 1/2 Infantry Divisions)

Commander-in-Chief: Colonel General von Heeringen.

Chief of General Staff: Lieutenant General von Hänisch.

Army Troops: III./Foot Artillery Regiment 4 (21 cm mortar), 1/2 II./Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 9 (10 cm gun), II./Regiment 31, Field Flying Detachment 26.

X. Army Corps: General of Infantry von Emmich; 19th, 20th Infantry Divisions.

XI. Army Corps: General of Infantry von Elsä; 23rd, 32nd Infantry Divisions; assigned: Reserve Engineer Battalion 21.

XII. Army Corps: General of Infantry von Deimling; 30th, 39th Infantry Divisions; assigned: Reserve Foot Regiment 8 (VII. Army Corps), 2nd/Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 14 (10 cm gun).

1) 14th Landwehr Brigade (1st and II./Landwehr Infantry Regiment 17, I./Landwehr Infantry Regiment 25, Landwehr Infantry Regiment 36, 1st/Landwehr Foot Artillery Regiment 96, 1st/Landwehr Engineer Company).  
2) 1st/Landwehr Foot Artillery Regiment 96, 1st/Landwehr Engineer Company.  
3) Order of Battle for Schematic Representation.

Page: 595 keyno: 220

The German Western Army.

VII Reserve Corps: Gen. d. Inf. v. Zwehl; 13th, 14th Res. Div.; assigned: ½ II./Res. Foot Art. R. 2 (i. F. S.), Field Flying Detachment 39.

X Reserve Corps: Gen. d. Inf. v. Eben; 2nd E. Res. Div., 19th Res. Div.; assigned: ½ II./Res. Foot Art. R. 2 (i. F. S.).

25th Combined Landwehr Brigade.

Army Detachment Falkenhausen.

(9 Div. Inf.)

Commander: Gen. d. Inf. Baron v. Falkenhausen.

Chief of General Staff: Colonel Weidner.

Army Troops: 55th Replacement Brigade (Brig. Replacement Btl. 58, 82, 84).

10th Replacement Div. (without Field Art. Replacement Detachment 22); assigned: 1 Battery 9 cm Cannon from Metz, 1 Landwehr Foot Art. Btl. 9 (i. F. S.), 1st and 6th Replacement/Foot Art. R. 8 (10 cm Cannon), 4th/Res. Foot Art. R. 10 (13 cm Cannon).

8th Replacement Div. (without Field Art. Replacement Detachment 25); assigned: 1st/Landwehr Inf. R. 65, Landwehr Replacement Btl. 68, 1 Battery 9 cm Cannon from Germersheim, 1st/Landwehr Foot Art. Btl. 9 (i. F. S.), 1st/Replacement Foot Art. R. 10 (10 cm Cannon), 1 Battery 12 cm Cannon from Germersheim.

Brigade Spießle (1st Landwehr/Res. Inf. R. 60, 1st Landwehr Inf. R. 82, Landwehr Brigade Replacement Btl. 52, 2nd/Chevaual R. 4, 2nd/Guard R. 7, Field Art. Replacement Detachment 65); assigned: 2 Batteries 9 cm Cannon from Mainz and Germersheim, 1st/Landwehr Foot Art. Btl. 18 (i. F. S.), 1 Battery 12 cm Cannon from Germersheim, 1st/Replacement Pi. Romp. at XV. A. K.

Reinforced Bavarian Landwehr Div.; assigned: 60th Replacement Brigade, Cavalry Replacement Detachment of the 2nd S. Ul. R., Field Art. Replacement Detachment 65, 3 Batteries 9 cm Cannon from Strasbourg and Germersheim, 1st/Res. Foot Art. R. 13 (i. F. S.), 1st/Replacement Foot Art. R. 8 (10 cm Cannon), 2nd/Replacement Pi. Romp. of XV. A. K.

Reinforced 10th Replacement Div. (without 21st Combined Replacement Brigade); assigned: 5th Bavarian Landwehr Brigade, Landwehr Inf. R. 71, 2 Batteries 9 cm Cannon from Strasbourg, II./Res. Foot Art. R. 14 (i. F. S.), 2nd/Res. Foot Art. R. 10 (13 cm Cannon).

Corps Gebhardt (Gen. d. Inf. Gebhardt; Donon-Brig.1), 30th Res. Div.2), Div. v. Redowski3), Detachment Ferling4).

Army Detachment Gaede.

(2 Div. Inf.)

Commander: Gen. d. Inf. Gaede.

Chief of General Staff: Lt. Col. v. Wolff.

Army Troops: Field Art. Replacement Detachment 14, 1st/Foot Art. R. 16 (i. F. S.).

2nd Bavarian Combined Landwehr Brigade; assigned: 1st and 2nd/Landwehr Foot Art. Btl. 20 (i. F. S.).

51st Combined Landwehr Brigade; Landwehr Inf. R. 121 (4 Btl.) and 123, Württemberg Landwehr Battery, 1 Battery 9 cm Cannon from Neubreisach, 4th/Landwehr Foot Art. Btl. 20 (i. F. S.).

55th Combined Landwehr Brigade; Landwehr Inf. R. 40 and 119 (4 Btl.), Replacement Est. Drag. R. 14, Württemberg Landwehr Est. 3, Landwehr Battery 76 (XIV. A. K.), 1st/Foot Art. R. 16 (i. F. S.).

Detachment Böduingen: Landwehr Inf. R. 109 and 110, 2 Landwehr Replacement Est. Drag. R. 22, Württemberg Landwehr Est. 3, Landwehr Battery 76 (XIV. A. K.), 1st/Foot Art. R. 16 (i. F. S.).

Page: 596 keyno: 221

Military Organization.

General Government of Belgium.

(4½ Div. Inf.)

Governor General: Field Marshal Baron von der Goltz.

Chief of General Staff: Major General Baron von Lüttwitz.

Naval Division: Admiral von Schröder.

26th, 37th, 38th, 41st, 1st Bavarian Mixed Landwehr Brigade.

1st and 2nd Reserve Replacement Brigade.

Schematic Representation of a Newly Formed Reserve Corps.

XXII. Reserve Corps1) (26 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, 19 Batteries [76 Guns], 2 Engineer Companies)

44th Reserve Division2) (13 Battalions, 2 Squadrons, 9 Batteries, 1 Engineer Company)

Reserve Infantry Regiment 207

Reserve Infantry Regiment 208

Reserve Infantry Regiment 205

Reserve Infantry Regiment 206

Reserve Jäger Battalion 16

Reserve Cavalry Detachment 44

Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 44

Reserve Medical Company 44

Reserve Division Bridge Train 44

Reserve Engineer Company 44

Reserve Foot Artillery Battery 22

Reserve Searchlight Section 22

2 Infantry, 4 Field Artillery Ammunition Columns, 4 Supply Columns, 4 Field Hospitals, 1 Horse Depot, 2 Field Bath Columns.

1) XXIII. Reserve Corps: Reserve Infantry Regiments 209—216, Reserve Jäger Battalions 17, 18, Reserve Cavalry Detachments 45, 46, Reserve Field Artillery Regiments 45, 46, Reserve Foot Artillery Battery 23.  
XXIV. Reserve Corps: Reserve Infantry Regiments 217—224, Reserve Jäger Battalions 19, 20, Reserve Cavalry Detachments 47, 48, Reserve Field Artillery Regiments 47, 48, Reserve Foot Artillery Battery 24.  
XXV. Reserve Corps: Reserve Infantry Regiments 233—240, Reserve Jäger Battalions 23, 24, Reserve Cavalry Detachments 51, 52, Reserve Field Artillery Regiments 51, 52, Reserve Foot Artillery Battery 25.  
XXVII. Reserve Corps: Reserve Infantry Regiments 241—248, Reserve Jäger Battalions 25, 26, Reserve Cavalry Detachments 53, 54, Reserve Field Artillery Regiments 53, 54, Reserve Foot Artillery Battery 26.  
2) Infantry Brigade Staffs were initially not established, but each division was assigned a general for use as a brigade commander. At the end of October 1914, general brigade staffs were formed, and on December 12, the War Ministry ordered the establishment of brigade staffs and the division into brigades.  
3) 1 Machine Gun Platoon with 2 Machine Guns.  
4) 4 Batteries with 7.7 cm Field Guns, each detachment with 1 light ammunition column.  
5) 3 Batteries with 10 cm Light Field Howitzers, each detachment with 1 light ammunition column.  
6) 2 Batteries with 15 cm Heavy Field Howitzers.

Page: 597 keyno: 222

The French Army.

The French Army¹) on September 15.

Supreme Command:

General Joffre (commandant en chef).

Chief of General Staff: General Belin (major général).

Head of Operations Department: General Berthelot (aide-major général).

1st Army.

(9½ Inf. Div.)

Commander: General Dubail.

Chief of General Staff: Colonel Debeney.

Vosges Group (58th, 66th Res. Div.), XIV Corps (27th, 28th Inf. Div.), Détèville Corps (Div. Barbot, Div. de Maistre), 41st Inf. Div., 71st Res. Div., Fortress Belfort with 57th Res. Div. and 1 active Brig., Fortress Epinal.

2nd Army.

(10½ Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.)

Commander: General de Currières de Castelnau.

Chief of General Staff: General Antinbine.

XVI Corps (31st, 32nd Inf. Div.), XX Corps (11th, 39th Inf. Div.), 2nd Group Res. Div. (59th, 64th, 68th Res. Div.), 70th, 73rd, 74th Res. Div., 2nd Cav. Div., Fortress Toul with 1 active Brig.

3rd Army.

(10½ Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.)

Commander: General Sarrail.

Chief of General Staff: Colonel Lebouc.

V Corps (9th, 10th Inf. Div.), VI Corps (12th, 40th Inf. Div.), XV Corps (29th, 30th Inf. Div.), 3rd Group Res. Div. (65th, 67th, 75th Res. Div.), 7th Cav. Div., Fortress Verdun with 72nd Res. Div. and 1 active Brig.

4th Army.

(8 Inf. Div.)

Commander: General de Langle de Cary.

Chief of General Staff: Colonel Audant.

II Corps (3rd, 4th Inf. Div.), XII Corps (23rd, 24th Inf. Div.), XVII Corps (33rd, 34th Inf. Div.), Colonial Corps (2nd, 3rd Col. Div.)

5th Army.

(12 Inf. Div., 3 Cav. Div.)

Commander: General Franchet d'Espèrey.

Chief of General Staff: General Hély d'Oissel.

III Corps (5th, 6th Inf. Div.), X Corps (19th, 20th Inf. Div.), XVIII Corps (35th, 36th Inf. Div.), 4th Group Res. Div. (53rd, 69th Res. Div.), 38th Inf. Div., 51st Res. Div., Cav. Corps Conneau (4th, 8th, 10th Cav. Div.)

6th Army.

(12½ Inf. Div., 3½ Cav. Div.)

Commander: General Maunoury.

Chief of General Staff: Colonel Guillemin.

IV Corps (7th, 8th Inf. Div.), VII Corps (14th Inf. Div., 63rd Res. Div.), XIII Corps (25th, 26th Inf. Div.), 5th Group Res. Div. (55th, 56th Res. Div.), 6th Group Res. Div. (61st, 62nd Res. Div.), 37th, 45th Inf. Div., 1 Moroccan Brig., Cav. Corps Bridoux (1st, 5th Cav. Div.), 3rd Cav. Div., 1 Spahi Brig.

¹) As deployed at the battlefront.

Page: 598 keyno: 223

Order of Battle.

9th Army.

(10 Inf. Div., 2 Cav. Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: General Foch.

Chief of General Staff: Colonel Weygand.

IX Corps (17th, 18th Inf. Div.), XI Corps (21st, 22nd Inf. Div.), XXI Corps (13th, 43rd Inf. Div.), 42nd Inf. Div., maroff. Div., 52nd, 60th Res. Div., 6th, 9th Cav. Div.

Group of Territorial Divisions.

(4 Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: General d'Amade.

Chief of General Staff: Colonel Morier.

81st, 82nd, 84th, 88th Terr. Div., Cav. Div. Beaudemoulin.

Army Reserve:

(2 Inf. Div.)

VIII Corps (15th, 16th Inf. Div.).

The French Army¹)

on October 10, 1914.

Supreme Command:

as of September 15. Joined since October 4:

General Foch (adjoint au commandant en chef), tasked with leading the group provisoire du nord.

1st Army.

(13 Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.)

Vosges Group (41st Inf. Div., 66th Res. Div.), VIII Corps (15th, 16th Inf. Div.²)), Delsol Corps³) (64th Res. Div., Div. de Taffart), 2nd Group Res. Div. (59th, 68th Res. Div.), 31st Inf. Div., 71st, 73rd Res. Div., 2nd Cav. Div., the fortresses Belfort (with 57th Res. Div.), Epinal and Toul.

2nd Army.

(18 Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.)

IV Corps (7th, 8th Inf. Div.), XI Corps (21st, 22nd Inf. Div.), XIII Corps (25th, 26th Inf. Div.), XIV Corps (27th, 28th Inf. Div.), XX Corps (11th, 39th Inf. Div.), Group of Territorial Div. (81st, 82nd, 84th, 88th Terr. Div.), 53rd, 56th, 58th, 62nd Res. Div., 8th Cav. Div.

3rd Army³).

(11 Inf. Div.)

V Corps (9th, 10th Inf. Div.), VI Corps (12th, 40th Inf. Div.), XV Corps (29th, 30th Inf. Div.), 3rd Group Res. Div. (65th, 67th, 75th Res. Div.), 72nd Res. Div., Fortress Verdun with 1 March Div.

4th Army.

(12 Inf. Div.)

II Corps (3rd, 4th Inf. Div.), IX Corps (17th, 18th Inf. Div.), XII Corps (23rd, 24th Inf. Div.), XVII Corps (33rd, 34th Inf. Div.), Kol. Corps (2nd, 3rd Kol. Div.), 60th Res. Div., 91st Terr. Div.

5th Army⁴).

(11 Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.)

I Corps (1st, 2nd Inf. Div.), III Corps (5th, 6th Inf. Div.), XVIII Corps (35th, 36th Inf. Div.), combined Corps Humbert (42nd Inf. Div., maroff. Div., 52nd Res. Div.), 38th Inf. Div., 51st Res. Div., 9th Cav. Div.

¹) As deployed at the combat front.  
²) Reinforced by five battalions of the active Brig. Belfort.  
³) From September 25, subordinated to the Army High Command of the 1st Army regarding operations south of Verdun.  
⁴) Chief of General Staff: instead of Gen. Hély d'Oissel, Lt. Col. de Lardemelle.

Page: 599 keyno: 224

The British Expeditionary Corps. — The Belgian Army.

6th Army.

(7 Inf. Div.)

VII Corps (14th Inf. Div., 63rd Res. Div.), XVI Corps (32nd Inf. Div.1)), 5th Group Resf. Div.

(55th Ref. Div.2)), 6th Group Resf. Div. (61st Ref. Div.3)), 37th Inf. Div., 69th Res. Div.

9th Army.

(Dissolved on October 7.)

10th Army4).

(9 Inf. Div., 7 Cav. Div.)

Commander: General de Maud'huy.

Chief of Gen. Staff: Colonel des Vallières.

X Corps (19th, 20th Inf. Div.), XXI Corps (13th, 43rd Inf. Div.), Corps d'Urbal (45th Inf. Div.,

70th Ref. Div., 18th Bart. Div.), 87th, 92nd Terr. Div., 1st Cav. Corps (1st, 3rd, 10th Cav. Div.),

2nd Rad. Corps (4th, 5th, 6th Cav. Div.), 7th Rad. Div.

The 2nd and 10th Armies were combined into the

Provisional Northern Army Group.

It consisted of:

Commander: General Foch.

Chief of Gen. Staff: Colonel Weygand.

2nd Army, 10th Army, Dunkirk Fortress with 89th Terr. Div.

The British Expeditionary Corps

on September 15.

(6 1/2 Inf. Div., 2 Cav. Div.)

Commander: Field Marshal Sir John French.

Chief of Gen. Staff: Genlt. Sir Archibald Murray.

1st Gen. Staff Officer: General Wilson.

1st Inf. Brig., 2nd Inf. Brig., 11th Corps (3rd, 5th Inf. Div.), III Corps (4th, 6th Inf. Div.),

19th Inf. Brig., Cav. Brig. (excluding 3rd and 5th Cav. Brig., which were combined under General Gough into a special unit).

on October 10.

(7 1/2 Inf. Div., 2 Cav. Div.)

I Corps (1st, 2nd Inf. Div.), II Corps (3rd, 5th Inf. Div.), III Corps (4th, 6th Inf. Div.)

IV Corps5) (7th Inf. Div., 19th Inf. Brig., Cav. Corps (1st, 2nd Cav. Div.))

Additionally, 2 Jemandry and 2 Territorial Regiments.

Not under the command of the Expeditionary Corps leader:

Marine Div. (3 Brig. in Antwerp) and Indian Corps (Lahore and Meerut Div.6))

The Belgian Army

on September 15 and October 10.

(6 Inf. Div., 1 (2) Cav. Div.)

Commander: King Albert of Belgium.

Chief of Gen. Staff: General Wielemans.

1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th Inf. Div., Rad. Div.7), Antwerp Fortress8).

1) 31st Inf. Div. until November 12 with 1st Army. — 2) 56th Res. Div. with 2nd Army. —  
3) 61st Res. Div. with 2nd Army. — 4) Formed on October 5 from the detachment d'armée de Maud'huy existing since October 1. — 5) Formed on October 10. — 6)  
Arriving in Marseille since September 26. — 7) Formed into 2nd Cav. Div. around October 10. — 8) Capitulated on October 10.

Page: 600 keyno: 225

The German Eastern Army  
on October 1, 1914  
(Later reinforcements in Latin script.)

8th Army

Subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the 9th Army

(9 [later 11] Infantry Divisions, 1 Cavalry Division)

Commander-in-Chief: General of Artillery v. Schubert (from Oct. 4, General of Infantry v. François)

Chief of General Staff: Major General Grünert

I Army Corps: General of Infantry v. François (from Oct. 4, Lieutenant General v. Falk, from Oct. 12, Lieutenant General v. Kosch); 1st, 2nd Infantry Division

I Reserve Corps: General of Infantry Otto v. Below; 1st, 36th Reserve Division

3rd Reserve Division

Landwehr Division Goltz (from Oct. 3, Landwehr Division Einem, from Oct. 14, Landwehr Division Jacobi)

Landwehr Division (Main Reserve) Königsberg

6th, 9th and 70th Landwehr Brigade

Main Reserve Graudenz (a mixed replacement brigade)

[continued military organization details]

1) From Oct. 14, the 34th and 70th Landwehr Brigade were consolidated in the division, 33rd Landwehr Brigade independent. — 2) 2nd Landwehr Brigade, Landwehr Infantry Regiment 9, 2nd Landwehr Replacement Battalion; Cavalry Brigade Charisius (Replacement and Cavalry); 2 Artillery (2 light, 6 heavy batteries, 2 replacement and Landwehr batteries). — 3) The XXV Reserve Corps (26 battalions, 6 squadrons, 19 batteries) had a similar structure to the simultaneously established XXII Reserve Corps (cf. p. 596)...

keyno: 226

The Austro-Hungarian Army.

The Austro-Hungarian Army\*) on October 1, 1914.

Supreme Commander: Gen. of Inf. Archduke Friedrich of Austria. Chief of the General Staff: Gen. of Inf. Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf.

Against Russia: (46½ Inf. Div., 11 Cav. Div.)

1st Army. (13½ Inf. Div., 3 Cav. Div.¹ ²)

Commander: Gen. of Cav. Dankl. Chief of the General Staff: Genmaj. von Rothyanowski. I Corps: Gen. of Cav. Baron von Kirchbach (5th, 12th, 46th Inf. Div.; 35th Rifle Brig. 3rd, 7th), 9th Cav. Div. V Corps: Field Marshal von Puhallo (13th, 14th Inf. Div.; 1st Rifle Brig. 3rd, 7th), 9th Cav. Div. 32nd and 43rd Inf. Div.; 106th Landsturm Div.; 100th, 101st and 110th Landsturm Brig.

¹) Transfers: Oct. 11, 3rd and 7th Cav. Div. to German 9th A. ²) Reinforcements: Oct. 10, 2nd Cav. Div. from 4th A., Oct. 22, 11th Cav. Div.

2nd Army. (10½ Inf. Div., 3 Cav. Div.)

Commander: Gen. of Cav. von Böhm-Ermolli. IV, VII, XII Corps. 1st, 5th, 8th Cav. Div.

3rd Army. (8½ Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.)

Commander: Gen. of Inf. Boroević von Bojna. III, IX, XI Corps. 44th Inf. Div.; 88th Rifle Brig. 4th Cav. Div.

4th Army. (10 Inf. Div., 4 Cav. Div.¹))

Commander: Gen. of Inf. Archduke Josef Ferdinand. 2nd, 6th, 10th, 11th Cav. Div.

¹) Transfers: Oct. 10, 2nd Cav. Div. to 1st A.; Oct. 22, 11th Cav. Div.

Army Group of Gen. of Cav. Baron von Pflanzer-Baltin (being formed from second-order troops).

Fortress Garrisons. (4 Inf. Div.)

Przemysl: Field Marshal Lieutenant von Kusmanek.—23rd Inf. Div.; 93rd, 97th, 108th Landsturm Brig. Krakow: 36th, 95th Landsturm Brig.

Against Serbia: (16 Inf. Div.)

Commander: Field Marshal Potiorek. 5th Army: VIII, XIII Corps. 6th Army: XV, XVI Corps.

Additionally later established: Army Group Syrmien-Banat.

\*) Austro-Hungarian step of German Landwehr.

Page: 602 keyno: 227

Order of Battle.

The Russian Army

(110½ Inf. Div.\*, 39 Cav. Div.)

on October 1, 1914.

Supreme Commander:

Gen. of Cav. Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich of Russia.

Chief of Gen. Staff: Genlt. Januschewitsch.

Gen. Quartermaster and Chief of Oper. Dept.: Genlt. Danilow.

Army Group of the Northwestern Front¹)

(36½² Inf. Div.\*, 10¾ Cav. Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. of Inf. Ruzski.

Chief of Gen. Staff: Genlt. Danowski.

¹) Reinforcements: Oct. 14, 5th Army and Cav. Corps Nowikow from the SW Front.

1st Army.

(14½² Inf. Div., 4½² Cav. Div.¹) ²); reorganized into new 1st Army on October 26³)

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. of Cav. v. Rennenkampf.

II.¹), III., IV.¹), XX., XXVI. (Res.¹)) Corps.

5th Rifle Brig.

25th, 56th, 68th, 73rd Inf. (Res.) Div.

1st and 2nd Guard, 2nd, 3rd Cav. Div., 1st independent Cav. Brig.

¹) Transfers: Oct. 3 and 5, II and IV Corps to 2nd A.; Oct. 18, XXVI (Res.) Corps to 10th A.

²) Reinforcements: Oct. 14, 1st Cav. Div. from 10th A.; from 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Cav. Div. the Cav. Corps Gurko is formed.

³) Reformation of the army on Oct. 26 from parts of the 2nd Army, the Narew Group, and advancing Siberian troops, namely: VI, I Turkestan, V Siberian Corps (50th Inf. Div. and 79th Inf. (Res.) Div.) and VI Siberian (Res.) Corps (13th and 14th Siberian (Res.) Div.), 6th Cav., Guard Cossack and 4th Don Cossack Div.

2nd Army.

(6 Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.¹) ²))

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. of Cav. Scheidemann.

I, XXIII.¹), II Siberian Corps.

6th Cav. Div.¹)

¹) Transfers: Early Oct. 6th Cav. Div. to Narew Gr. (further transfers see under reinforcements).

²) Reinforcements: Early Oct. II and IV Corps from 1st A., I Siberian Corps from Alejen advancing on Oct. 19 to 5th A.), according to. Cav. Div., Guard Cossack Brig. and Attr. Cossack R. (later consolidated as Guard Cossack Div. and on Oct. 26 to new 1st A.) from Narew Gr. and 6th Cav. Div. from 1st A.; 13th and 14th Siberian (Res.) Div. from Alejen. Same divisions transferred on Oct. 26 as parts of V and VI Siberian (Res.) Corps to new 1st A.; 1½ 2nd Inf. Div. as half reinforced by 1st Rifle Brig.

¹) excluding XIII and XV Corps, 54th and 72nd Inf. (Res.) Div., which were temporarily or due to high losses dissolved in East Prussia.

Page: 603 keyno: 228

The Russian Army.

10th Army.

(12½ Inf. Div., 3½ Cav. Div.1)2))

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. of Inf. Flug, from Oct. 6 Gen. of Inf. Siewers.

VI.1), XXII. I. Cauc., I. Turkestan1), III. Siberian Corps.

1st Cauc. Rifle Brigade.

59th, 76th Inf. (Res.) Div.

1), 4th, 15th Cav. Div. 4th Independent Cav. Brigade.

Fortress Osowiec (details unknown).

1) Transfers: Oct. 14 VI. and I. Turkestan Corps to Narew Group, 1st Cav. Div. to 1st Army.

2) Reinforcements: Oct. 18 XXVI. (Res.) Corps from 1st Army; Oct. 26 III. and XX. Corps, 5th Rifle Brigade, 55th, 66th, 73rd Inf. (Res.) Div., 1st and 2nd Guard Cav. Div., Cav. Corps Gurko, 1st Independent Cav. Brigade, all from 1st Army and 84th Inf. (Res.) Div. from 6th Army.

Warsaw Detachment, from Oct. 2 from Narew Group.

(3½ Inf. Div., 1¾ Cav. Div.1)2))

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. of Inf. Ołchowski, from Oct. 2 Gen. of Inf. Bobyr, Commander of the Fortress Nowogeorgiewsk.

XXVII. (Res.) Corps. (63rd and 77th (Res.) Div.)

1/2 2nd Inf. Div., 79th Inf. (Res.) Div.1)

1st Cauc. Cav. Div.1), Guard Cossack Brigade1) and 1st Astrakhan Cossack Regiment1).

Fortress Warsaw: Commander Genlt. Lurbin.

1) Transfers: Inf. Oct. Cauc. Cav. Div., Guard Cossack Brigade and Astra. Cossack Regiment to 2nd Army; Oct. 26 79th Inf. (Res.) Div. to 11th Army (further transfers see under Reinforcements).

2) Reinforcements: Oct. 6 6th Cav. Div. from 2nd Army; Oct. 14 VI. and I. Turk. Corps from 4th Army; 4th Don Cossack Div. from Cav. Corps Nowikow (SW Front); these reinforcements all from 1st Army on Oct. 26.

Southwest Front Army Group1):

(51 Inf. Div., 21 Cav. Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. of Art. Iwanow.

Chief of Gen. Staff: Genlt. Alexejew.

1) Transfers: Oct. 14 5th Army and Cav. Corps Nowikow to NW Front. — These movements within the Southwest Front are only included insofar as they are significant for understanding the battles described in this volume.

3rd Army.

(10 Inf. Div., 5 Cav. Div.)

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. of Inf. Radko-Dmitrijew.

VII., IX., X., XI., XXI. Corps.

7th, 11th and additional Cav. Div., 3rd Don and 3rd Cauc. Cossack Div.

4th Army.

(8 Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.1))

Commander-in-Chief: Gen. of Inf. Ewcrt.

Border, XVI., III. Cauc. Corps.

75th, 81st Inf. (Res.) Div.

Ural Cossack Div.

1) Reinforcements: Oct. 12 XVII. Corps and 61st Inf. (Res.) Div. from 5th Army; Oct. 19 1 Transbaikal Cossack Brigade from Asia.

Page: 604 keyno: 229

Order of Battle.

5th Army.

(10 Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.12); on 14 Oct. to AW Front.)

Commander: Gen. of Cav. Plehwe.

V., XVII.1), XIX., XXV.1) Corps.

61.1), 70. Inf. (Res.) Div.

1st Don Cossack Div.1)

1) Transfers: 2 Oct. XXV Corps to 9th A.; 8 Oct. 1st Don Cossack Div. to 9th A.

12 Oct. XVII Corps and 61st Inf. (Res.) Div. to 4th A.

2) Reinforcements: 8 Oct. 5th Don Cossack Div. and Turkestan Cossack Brig. from Cav. Corps

Nowikow; 19 Oct. 1st Siberian Corps from 2nd A.

8th Army.

(9 Inf. Div., 6 Cav. Div.1))

Commander: Gen. of Cav. Brussilow.

VIII., XII., XXIV. Corps.

3rd, 4th Rifle Brig.

65th, 71st Inf. (Res.) Div.

10th, 12th Rad. Div., 2nd Zusjesl. Cossack Div., 1st and 2nd Kuban, 1st Terek Cossack Div.

1) Reinforcements: 29 Oct. 12th Siberian (Res.) Div. from Asia.

9th Army.

(9 Inf. Div., 1½ Cav. Div.1))

Commander: Gen. of Inf. Letschizki.

Guard, XIV, XVIII Corps.

Guard and 2nd Rifle Brig.

80th, 83rd Inf. (Res.) Div.

13th Rad. Div., independent Guard Cav. Brig.

1) Reinforcements: 2 Oct. XXV Corps from 5th A.; 8 Oct. 1st Don Cossack Div. from 5th A.

Siege Army before Przemysl.

(5 Inf. Div., 1 Cav. Div.1))

Commander: Gen. of Inf. Selivanow.

58th, 60th, 69th, 78th, 82nd Inf. (Res.) Div.1).

9th Cav. Div.

1) 7 Oct. consolidated into XXVIII and XXIX (Res.) Corps.

Cavalry Corps Nowikow.

(5½ Cav. Div.1)); on 14 Oct. to AW Front.)

Leader: Genlt. Nowikow.

5th, 8th, 14th Cav. Div., 4.1), 5th Don Cossack Div.1); Turkestan Cossack Brig.1).

1) Transfers: 8 Oct. 5th Don Cossack Div. and Turkestan Cossack Brig. to 5th A.; 14 Oct.

4th Don Cossack Div. to Narew Gr.

Fortress Iwangorod.

Commander: Genlt. Schwarz; Foot Artillery: 34 15 cm Howitzers and 10 cm Guns, in addition

Guns of the Armored Fort Wannowski.

Page: 605 keyno: 230

The Russian Army.

Additionally available:

(23 Inf. Div., 7¼ Cav. Div.¹))

Remnants of the original 6th Army (Petersburg).

Commander: Gen. of Art. van der Bliet.

50th Inf. Div.¹)

55th, 67th, 74th, 84th Inf. (Res.) Div.¹)

Orenburg Cossack Div.

¹) Transfers: 8th Oct. 50th Inf. Div. to 2nd A.; 26th Oct. 84th Inf. (Res.) Div. to 10th A.

Remnants of the original 7th Army (Odessa).

Commander: Gen. of Art. Akitin.

62nd Inf. (Res.) Div. and 7th Don Cossack R.

Outside Army Corps:

I. Caucasian, II. Turkestan, I.¹), IV., V. Siberian Corps.

66th Inf. (Res.) Div., 12th¹), 13th¹), 14th Siberian (Res.) Div.¹)

6th Turkestan, 3rd 6th Turkestan Rifle Brig.

1st, 2nd, 3rd Kuban Cossack Brig. on foot.

1st, 2nd, 4th Turkestan R. Div., Caucasian Native Cavalry Div.

Transbaikal Cossack Div., 2nd Transbaikal Cossack Brig., Ussuri Cavalry Brig.

Garrison Troops¹): 658 Btl., 114 Squadrons along with artillery and auxiliary weapons; from part of these units, by 18th Oct., 63 mixed brigades were formed, each with 6 Btl., 1 Est., 1 Battery.

¹) Transfers: Early Oct. I. Siberian Corps to 2nd A. (NW Front); 12th Oct. 13th Siberian (Res.) Div. to 2nd A. (NW Front); 19th Oct. 1st Transbaikal Cossack Brig. to 4th A. (SW Front); 26th Oct. 14th Siberian (Res.) Div. to new 1st A. (NW Front); 29th Oct. 12th Siberian (Res.) Div. to 8th A. (SW Front).

²) Also referred to as "Reichswehr" (Opolitschenie).

Page: 606 keyno: 231

Troop Movements on the German Western Front.

Troops.

on the German Western Front from

| Serial No. | Unit | from | to | Type of Troop Movement | Loading Time or Start of Movement | a) Loading Stations b) Departure Locations |

|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| 1. | XV. A. K. | 7th Army (Lorraine) | newly formed 7th Army (Aisne) | Rail transport | 8.—14.9. | a) St. Avricourt, Rixingen, Heming, Rieding; 61. F. B. Breusch Valley Railway |

| 2. | I. Bavarian A. K. | 6th Army (Lorraine) | newly formed 6th Army (Northern France) | a) Rail transport | 14.—17.9. | a) Metz, Saßln, Woippy, Peltre |

| | | | | b) March | Further march I. Bavarian A. K. (without 4th Bavarian F. B.) 18.9. 14.9. | b) Wépion, — Dinant Area south of Béthenville |

| 3. | XII. A. K. | 3rd Army | 2nd Army | March | 18.9. 14.9. | Area south of Béthenville |

| 4. | XVIII. A. K. | 4th Army | | | 14.9. | Semide — Aure south of Dieuze |

| 5. | XIV. A. K. | 6th Army (Lorraine) | Army Detachment Strantz (5th Army) | | 17.9. | Autry |

| 6. | Gen. Command VI. A. K. and 12th I. D. | 4th Army | 3rd Army | | 17.9. | |

| 7. | 2nd R. D. | 2nd Army | to the right wing of the army | | 17.9. | Amifontaine |

| 8. | 9th R. D. | 1st Army | | | 19.9. | southwest of Laon Quierzy |

| 9. | 6th R. D. | | 6th Army | | 23.9. | Berzieux |

| 10. | 5th R. D. | 2nd Army | | | | |

Page: 607 keyno: 232

Troop Movements on the German Western Front.

Appendix 2.

Movements

14 September to 3 November 1914.

a) Railway lines

b) March routes

Unloading locations

Unloading time or end of movement

Notes

a) Trier—Gerolstein—Aachen—Liège—Louvain—Brussels—Mons—Valenciennes

Cambrai, Buigny, St. Quentin, Jam, from 15.9. Lergnier, from 19.9. Laon.

10.—17.9. Rest only on 23.9.

d. L. Diversions of the XV. A. K. via routes Malmédy—Rivage and Namur—Charleroi—Mons.

61. F. B. on route Lergnier—La Fère and Laon

61. F. B. 18.—21.9.

a) Luxembourg—Libramont—Marloie—Direction Namur

Jambes, Anainne, Alffelse, Ciney, Leignon

14.—19.9.

Further travel 4th Bavarian F. B. from 16.9. from Namur via Charleroi—Mons—St. Quentin

4th Bavarian F. B. Lergnier and Noyon

4th Bavarian F. B. 18.—19.9.

the 4th Bavarian F. B. was subordinated to the IX. R. K. (1st Army) on 19.9. and returned to the I. Bavarian A. K. (2nd Army) on 16.10.

b) via Floremnes—Avesnes—Buigny—Roisel

23.9.

Warnerville—Neufchâtel

Evening of 14.9.

the XII. A. K. already transferred to the 7th Army on the evening of 15.9.

Neuflize—Roizy (northeast of Reims) Anferweiler—Corny

Evening of 15.9. 19.9.

Schault—Semide—Moronvilliers

18./19.9.

the VI. A. K. on the march from the 5th Army to the right wing of the army was made available by the D. H. K. of the 4th Army on 14.9.

Bruyères (south of Laon) Coucy le Chât.—Ercheu Coucy le Chât.—Chauny—Noyon—southeast of Roye St. Simon—Roupy—Levergies Vendueil—St. Quentin—Vermand—Péronne

20.9. 19.9. 20.9. 25.9.

H. R. K. 2 m. 2, 7 and 9. R. K. was subordinated to the 6th Army on 25.9.

H. R. K. 1 m. G. and 4. R. D. was subordinated to the 6th Army on 24.9.

Page: 608 keyno: 233

Troop Movements on the German Western Front

Serial No. | Unit | from | to | Type of Troop Movement | Loading Time or Start of Movement | Loading Stations or Departure Locations

11. | 7th R. D. | 1st Army | 6th Army newly formed 6th Army (Northern France) | Marching Rail Transport | 25.9. from 17.9. | French Feterchen, Hargarten, Bolchen, Kurzel

12. | XXI. A. K. | 6th Army (Lorraine) | " | " | " | "

13. | II Bavarian A. K. | 6th Army (Lorraine) | " | a) Rail Transport | 18.–21.9. | Metz, Sablon, Woippy, Peltre

| | | | | b) Marching | 19.9. | south of Namur-Dinant

14. | XIV. A. K. | 6th Army (Lorraine) | " | Rail Transport | 21.–25.9. | on routes Feterchen-Hargarten and Bolchen-Kurzel

15. | 4th E. D. | Army Detachment Falkenhausen | Siege Corps Beseler (Antwerp) | 6th Army | " | 22.–24.9. | Insingen, Leiningen, Bendorf, Möhringen, south of Neufchâtel

16. | XVIII. A. K. (without 50th F. B.) | 2nd Army | " | Marching | 22.9. | "

17. | 50th F. B. (XVIII. A. K.) | 7th Army | " | Rail Transport | 27.9. | Laon

18. | I Bavarian R. R. | Army Detachment Falkenhausen | " | " | 27.–29.9. | Metz, Sablon, Woippy, Peltre

19. | IV. A. K. | 1st Army | " | Marching | 28.9. | southwest of Tuvcy le Chat.

20. | 6th R. | 2nd Army | " | a) Rail Transport (Infantry) | 28.9.–2.10. | a) Guignicourt

| | | | | b) Marching (mounted weapons) | 27.9.–1.10. | b) Guignicourt

21. | Bavarian R. D. | Army Detachment Strantz (5th Army) | to the right wing of the army (in the area of Lille) | Rail Transport | 30.9.–1.10. | Metz, Woippy, Peltre

22. | 6th R. D. | 4th Army | " | " | " | "

23. | 3rd R. D. | 4th Army | " | " | 1.–2.10. | Arlon, Autel, Althus, Arlon, Autel, Althus

Page: 609 keyno: 234

Troop Movements on the German Western Front.

a) Railway Lines

b) March Routes

Unloading Locations

Unloading Time or Completion of Movement

Remarks

Nesle—Cartigny

Trier—Gerolstein—Aachen

Liège—Namur

Charleroi—Mons—Valenciennes—Cambrai, from 24.9. via Namur—Charleroi—Maubeuge—Busigny

Aurlu

Luxembourg—Libramont—Marlorie—Direction Namur

St. Quentin, Busigny, from 23.9. St. Quentin, Ham

25.9.

20.—28.9.

see Remark to 7.

Jambes, Naninne, Alffesse, Ciney, Leignon

19.—23.9.

b) Philippeville—Bohain

Aurlu

Trier—Gerolstein—Aachen

Liège—Namur

Charleroi—Mons—Valenciennes

Busigny, Cambrai, Lourches, Denain

25.9.

24.—29.9.

Luxembourg—Libramont—Marlorie—Liège

Brussels

24.—27.9.

Laon—La Fère—Guiscard—south of Nesle

25.9.

The 50th F. B. temporarily transferred to the 7th Army.

La Fère—Tergnier

Ham

27.—28.9.

Luxembourg—Libramont—Marlorie—Liège—Namur—Charleroi—Mons

Guiscard—Ham—Péronne—south of Bapaume

on the route Valenciennes—Cambrai

29.9.—2.10.

30.9.

Laon—Tergnier

St. Quentin, parts of Cambrai

29.9.—3.10.

Grandlup—St. Quentin

30.9.—3.10.

Trier—Gerolstein—Aachen—Liège—Leuven—Brussels—Mons

Valenciennes, Denain, Lourches

2.—3.10.

Libramont—Marlorie—Namur—Charleroi

Libramont—Marlorie—Namur—Charleroi

Mons, Manage

1.—2.10.

Mons, Manage, later St. Ghislain

3.—4.10.

† World War. Vol. V.  
H. K. R. 4 (3rd, 6th and Bavarian R. D.) initially remained under the O. H. L.

Page: 610 keyno: 235

Troop Movements on the German Western Front.

Section No. | Unit | from | to | Type of Troop Movement | Loading Time or Start of Movement | a) Loading Stations b) Departure Locations

24. | 28th Infantry Division (XIV Army Corps) | Army Detachment Strantz (5th Army) | 6th Army | Rail Transport | 3rd–5th Oct. | a) Sablon, b) Wippy

25. | 29th Infantry Division (XIV Army Corps) | " | " | " | " | a) Vantour, b) Bigy, Pieblingen, Guignicourt

26. | VII Army Corps | 2nd Army | " | " | 4th–8th Oct. |

27. | XIX Army Corps (without 48th Infantry Brigade) | 3rd Army | " | March | 4th Oct. | Ste. Marie à Py and Somme Py on Breusch Valley Railway as well as Schlettstadt, Dambach and Martirch

28. | Bavarian Ersatz Division | Army Detachment Falkenhausen | Army Detachment Strantz (5th Army) | Rail Transport | 3rd–5th Oct. |

29. | 26th Infantry Division (Corps Flag) | 5th Army | 6th Army | " | 7th–9th Oct. | Challarange, Autry

30. | 25th Reserve Division (Corps Flag) | " | " | " | 8th–10th Oct. |

31. | XXII Reserve Corps (43rd Reserve Division and 44th Reserve Division) | Home | newly formed 4th Army | " | 11th Oct. | Training Ground Döberitz and Hofsen

32. | XXIII Reserve Corps (45th Reserve Division and 46th Reserve Division) | " | " | " | " | Training Ground Jüterbog and Loßstedt

33. | XXIV Reserve Corps (47th Reserve Division and 48th Reserve Division) | " | Army Detachment Strantz (5th Army) | " | " | Training Ground Heuberg and Darmstadt

34. | XXVI Reserve Corps (51st Reserve Division and 52nd Reserve Division) | " | newly formed 4th Army | " | " | Training Ground Ohrdruf and Senne Camp

35. | XXVII Reserve Corps (53rd Reserve Division and 54th Reserve Division) | " | " | " | " | Dresden and Training Ground Münsingen

keyno: 236

Troop Movements on the German We

a) Rail Lines

b) March Routes

Unloading Locations

Unloading Time or End of Movement

Luxembourg—Libramont—Marloie—Namur—Charleroi

Trier—Gerolstein—Aachen—Liège—Leuven—Brussels—Mons

Laon—Tergnier—St. Quentin

Château Porcien—Rozoy—Orchies—Ruppi. Lille

Bensdorf—Metz and Saargemünd—Hargarten—Diedenhofen

Mons, St. Ghislain, from 6.10. Douai

Valenciennes, Denain, Lourches, from 6.10. Douai

Cambrai

—

Ars, Noréant, Chambley, Mars la Tour, Batilly and Conflans

4.—8.10.

5.—8.10.

until 10.10.

Evening of 11.10.

4.—7.10.

Amagne Lucquy—Charleville—Hirson; Foot march; Further travel from Sains and Avesnes via Aulnoye—Maubeuge—Valenciennes, from 9.10. via direct route Aulnoye—Valenciennes

Hanover—Hamm—Mönchengladbach—Aachen—Liège—Brussels

Berlin—Wittenberge—Hamburg—Münster—Düsseldorf—Cologne—Aachen—Liège—Brussels

Immendingen—Hausach—Strasbourg—Obermodern—Saargemünd—Metz with approach: Darmstadt—Friedrichsfeld—Karlsruhe—Rüschwoog—Obermodern

Bebra—Kassel—Bestwig—Elberfeld—Cologne—Hünnerath—Lommersweiler—Gouvy—Libramont—Namur—Charleroi

Hof—Bamberg—Würzburg—Frankfurt a.M.—Niederlahnstein—Trier—Luxembourg—Libramont

Valenciennes, St. Amand

Termonde, Ghent

Denderleeuw, Scheldewindeke, Burst

Metz

Grammont, Gottegem

Lessines—Leuze

8.—10.10.

13.—18.10.

"

12.—14.10.

13.—18.10.

"

Page: 612 keyno: 237

Troop Movements on the German Western Front.

No. | Unit | from | to | Type of Troop Movement | Loading Time or Start of Movement | a) Loading Stations b) Departure Locations

36. | Reinforced III. R. C. (5th R. D., 6th R. D. and 4th E. D.) | Antwerp | 4th Army | March | 11. 10. | Antwerp

37. | 22nd I. B. (VI. A. R.) | 5th Army | 3rd Army | " | 17. 10. | Condé-Autry

38. | 48th I. B. (XIX. A. R.) | 3rd Army | 6th Army | Rail Transport | 20.—21. 10. | Pont Faverger, Somme Py

39. | Marine Division (previously Garrison of Antwerp) | Antwerp | 4th Army | " | 21.—22. 10. | Antwerp

40. | XV. A. C. | 7th Army | 6th Army | March | 20. 10. | north of Craonne

41. | 6th Bavarian R. D. | Home | " | Rail Transport | 21.—22. 10. | in the line areas Munich and Nuremberg

42. | Gen. Command XXIV. R. C. (and 48th R. D.) | Army Detachment Strantz (5th Army) | 2nd Army | " | 22.—24. 10. | Metz

43. | II. Bavarian A. C. | " | " | March | 24. 10. | northeast of Chaulnes

44. | 3rd I. D. (II. A. C.) | 1st Army | " | Rail Transport | 29.—31. 10. | Tergnier, Noyon, Laon

Page: 613 keyno: 238

Troop Movements on the German Western Front.

a) Railway lines

b) March routes

Unloading locations

Unloading time or end of movement

Notes

Namur—Charleroi with approach: Ulm—Bietigheim—Bruchsal—Heidelberg—Mannheim—Bischofsheim

K. A. Ulst—Paulacstem—Gintte—Roulers—Ypern—Reyen and Aloft—Gavere—Thielt—Thourout—Leke

K. A. Nermonde—Deynze—Ruddervoorde—Schoyre and Zeevele—Ostcamp—Ettelghem—Mannteensvere

E. N. Loterien—Gent—Aeltre—Bruges—Ostend—Middelkerke and Hulst—Ursel—Bruges—Blantenberghe—Ghesault—St. Souplet—Pont Faverger—Auvroy

Amagne Lucquy—Charleville—Liart—Laon—Tergnier—Cambrai—Valenciennes

Brussels

—

—

Lille

Bruges, Ostend

18. 10.

21.—23. 10.

21.—22. 10.

The III. A. K. was subordinated to the 4th Army on 14. 10.

The 11th I. D.—21st and 22nd I. B.—was subordinated to the 5th Army on 26. 9.

The M. D. initially remained under the General Government of Belgium; it came under the command of the 4th Army on 28. 10.

Laon—La Fère—Cambrai—Roubaix—northwest. Tourcoing

Heidelberg—Mainz—Cologne—Aachen—Liège

Brussels

Luxembourg—Namur—Charleroi

Gouzeaucourt—Douai—Pont à Marcq—north of Lille

Cambrai—Valenciennes

—

Tournai, Lille

Lille, Templeuve Orchies

—

29. 10.

23.—25. 10.

23.—25. 10.

28. 10.

29. 10.—1. 11.

The 6th Bavarian R. D. temporarily transferred to the 4th Army.

The II. Bavarian A. K. joined the 2nd Army on 10. 10. due to the reorganization of the Western Army.

Page: 614 keyno: 239

Troop Movements of the Enemy on the Western Front.

Troops

of the enemy on the Western Front from

(Information according to the official French\*) and English sources

Section No. | Unit | from | to | Type of Troop Movement | Loading Time or Start of Movement | Loading Stations or Departure Locations

1. | XIII Corps | 1st Army | 6th Army | Rail Transport | from 11.9. | Epinal

2. | VIII | " | 2. | from 19.9.: 3rd Army new 2nd Army | " | from 14.9. | Area Charmes- Bayon

3. | XIV | " | " | " | from 18.9. | Area Bayon

4. | Cavalry Corps Conneau | 5. | " | " | Marching | 18.9. | Area west of Reims Carlepont

5. | IV Corps | 6. | " | " | Rail Transport with Motor Vehicles | Night 18./19.9 19.9. | Toul

6. | A.D.R. 2 | 6. | " | " | " | 19.9. | Toul

7. | XX Corps | 2nd Army | new 2nd Army | Rail Transport | from 19.9. | Toul, Nancy

8. | VIII | 3. | " | " | from 19.9. or 20.9. | St. Mihiel and south of Reims Compiegne

9. | XI | " | 6th Army from 25.9.: 2nd Army 3rd Army | Marching Rail Transport | 21.9. 25.9. | Area Ste. Menehould

10. | VIII | Reserve behind 4th Army | " | Rail Transport and Marching | 25.9. (Line probably earlier) | Area Ste. Menehould

11. | X | 5th Army | Reserve | Marching | 25.9. | Area west of Reims Verdier- Compiegne

12. | Div. Barbot | 1. | " | Rail Transport | from 28.9. | Charmes, Chatel, Chalon Nancy

13. | 70th Res. D. (Fayolle) | 1st Army | 2nd Army (A. Abt. de Maud'huy) | Rail Transport | from 28.9. | Charmes, Chatel, Chalon Nancy

\* ) BB. X.

Page: 615 keyno: 240

Troop Movements of the Enemy on the Western Front.

movements

14 September to 3 November 1914.

(as well as according to Hantaur. Completeness and accuracy not guaranteed.)

Rail lines or March routes | Unloading locations | Unloading time or end of movement | Remarks

Paire—Gray—Villes les Pots—Dijon—Villeneuve—Triac—Noisy—Pantin—St. Denis | Area of Creil | 14—16.9. | then march on foot via Compiègne

Area of St. Mihiel | from 14.9.

Darnieulles—Jussey—Paire—Gray—Villers les Pots—Villeneuve—Noisy—Pantin—Saint Denis—Creil—Villers Cotterêts—Compiègne—Roye | Clermont, St. Just, Beauvais | approximately 20—23.9. | 1) according to another source on 19.9.

Conchy les Pots—Wacquemoulin—Lataule—Tricot | 20.9.

Creil, Poix, Abancourt | 20.9. and following days

Domgermain—Barisey—Brion—Troyes—Flamboin—Montereau—Melun—Corbeil—Juvisy—Versailles—Plaisir—Grignon—Mantes—Goutteville les Rouen—Darnetal—Serqueux as A.D.R. 2 | Area of Contry—Grandvillers 2) Area of Ste. Ménehould Area of Compiègne Longueau | 20—25.9. | 2) according to Hantaur near Poix-Abancourt

Creil—Longueau | partly Lérouville—Sampigny, partly Brabant | 25.9. and following days | 3) Sources conflicting!

Area of Berberie | 28.9.

Area of Amiens 4) | from 30.9.

as XIV Corps to Creil, then Arras | Area of Arras | 30.9.—1.10.

as XX Corps to Serqueux, then Amiens— | Area of Lens | 1.10.

Page: 616 keyno: 241

Troop Movements of the Enemy on the Western Front.

No. | Unit | from | to | Type of Troop Movement | Loading Time or Start of Movement | Loading Stations or Departure Locations

---|---|---|---|---|---|---

14. | 8th Cav. Div. | 6th | 2nd Army | March | 30.9. | Crépy en Valois

15. | 4th „ | 5th | „ | Rail Transport | from 30.9. | Epernay

16. | 92nd Terr. Div. | Paris | „ | March, with Motor Vehicles | 1.10. 9.10. | Paris Amiens

17. | 56th Res. Div. | 6th Army | 2nd | March, Rail Transport | 1.10. | Area Soissons Compiègne

18. | XXI Corps | 9th | „ | Rail Transport | from 2.10. | Châlons s.M.

19. | 62nd Res. Div. | 7th R.D. | 2nd Army | Rail Transport | from 2.10. | Compiègne

20. | 7th R.D. | „ | 2nd Army (A. Abt. de Maud'huy) | Rail Transport | from 2.10. | Soevy—Void

21. | 2nd Brit. K.D. | Aisne Front | to 1st Army Wing | March | 2.10. | Area Fère en Tardenois

22. | 1st Brit. K.D. | „ | „ | Rail Transport | 2.10. 3.10. | „ Sommepuis, Fère Champenoise

23. | 6th R.D. | 9th Army | 2nd Army (A. Abt. de Maud'huy) | Rail Transport | from 3.10. | ?

24. | 45th F.D. | 6th | „ | with Motor Vehicles, Rail Transport | from 3.10. 4.10. | Jonchery s. V.

25. | 53rd R.D. | 5th | „ | Rail Transport and March | 5.10. | Compiègne

26. | Army Group High Command Foch | — | 2nd Army | with Motor Vehicles and Rail Transport | 4.10. | Châlons s.M.

27. | 69th R.D. | 5th Army | 6th Army | with Motor Vehicles | 4. or 5.10. | ?

28. | II Brit. Corps | Aisne Front | to 1st Army Wing | Rail Transport | from 5.10. | Longueil, Pont Ste. Maxence

| | | | | March and with Motor Vehicles | 9.10. | Abbeville

Page: 617 keyno: 242

Troop Movements of the Enemy on the Western Front.

Railway Lines

or

March Routes

Unloading Locations

Unloading Time

or

Completion

of Movement

Notes

Fère Champenoise—Esternay—Athisy—Creil—Amiens—Arras

via Davenescourt

Area west of Roye

Lens

1. 10.

2. 10.

Area Amiens

Area Nœux les Mines

Compiègne

?

12. 10.

2. 10.

Montdidier

2. 10.

Creil—Abbeville—Calais

partly Armentières—

Merville, partly St. Pol

Labobiffière

(Area Armentières⁵)

4.—6. 10.

5. 10.

4. 10.

Gondrecourt—Brienne—

Troyes—Flamboin—

Montereau—Corbeil—

Juvisy—Versailles—

Plaisir—Grignon—

Mantes—Sotteville—

Serqueux

via Doullens

Area Hazebrouck

11. 10.

via Doullens

Troyes—Flamboin,

Montereau—Corbeil—

Juvisy—Versailles—

Sotteville—Sarnetal—

Abbeville—Staples—

St. Pol

Area Merville

(Area Hazebrouck⁶)

11. 10.

5. 10.

Area Arras

Compiègne

4. 10.

5. 10.

The 53rd Reserve Division was

deployed on 13. 10. southwest

of Bray s. S.

Area Montdidier

6. 10.

Doullens

5. 10.

The 69th Reserve Division relieved

British troops at Condé

s. A. on 12. 10.

Breteuil—Aubigny

Verzy le Sec

5. 10.

Abbeville

8.—9. 10.

Béthune

11. 10.

⁵) to Hanotaur near  
Lens.  
⁶) to Hanotaur near  
Lille, Armentières.

Page: 618 keyno: 243

Troop Movements of the Enemy on the Western Front.

Section No. | Unit | from | to | Type of Troop Movement | Loading Time or Start of Movement | Loading Stations or Departure Locations

29. | 87th Territorial Division | Le Havre | to Dunkirk 2nd Army, later 10th Army | Ship Transport Rail Transport | from 5. 10. | Le Havre Area Arches

30. | 58th Reserve Division | 1st Army | " | March and Motor Transport | 9. 10. | Montivillier

31. | 7th British Infantry Division | Home | Detachment Rawlinson | Ship Transport | ? | ?

32. | 3rd British Reserve Division | 1st Army | 6th Army, later Special Detachment "Belgium" | Rail Transport March | from 7. 10. | Toul Area Soissons Pierrefonds

33. | XVI Corps | " | " | Rail Transport with Motor Vehicles and Rail Transport | from 28. 10. | Fère en Tardenois

34. | British High Command | Aisne Front | to the Left Wing of the Army | Rail Transport | from 8. 10. | Paris

35. | 89th Territorial Division | Paris | to Dunkirk | Rail Transport Ship Transport | 9. 10. | Cherbourg

36. | III British Corps | Aisne Front | to the Left Wing of the Army | Rail Transport | from 9. 10. | Area Compiègne-Pont Ste. Maxence Clermont, Beauvais Les Aubrais

37. | 91st Territorial Division | Paris | 4th Army | " | from 15. 10. | Epernay

38. | British Lahorde Division | Marseille | to the Expeditionary Corps 10th Army later Special Detachment "Belgium" | " | from 17. 10. | Mourmelon le Grand

39. | 42nd Infantry Division | 5th Army | " | " | from 18. 10. | Les Aubrais

40. | IX Corps | 4th | " | " | from 20. 10. | Fismes

41. | British Meerut Division | Marseille | to the Expeditionary Corps Special Detachment "Belgium" | " | from 26. 10. | Les Aubrais

42. | XXXII Corps | 5th Army | " | Rail Transport | from 27. 10. | Fismes

43. | 3rd Infantry Division | 5th | " | " | from 27. 10. | Fismes

Page: 61 keyno: 244

Troop Movements of the Enemy on the Western Front.

Railway Lines

or

March Routes

Unloading Locations

Unloading Time

or

Completion

of

Movement

Remarks

Épinal—Chalendrey—

Chaumont—Joinville—

Blesme—Sommesous—

Châlons—Noizy—Pantin

Dunkirk

Montdidier

Nœux les Mines

Zeebrugge

Ostend

Area Soissons

and Compiègne

Pierrefonds

Hazebrouck

Abbeville

St. Omer

Cherbourg

Dunkirk

St. Omer

Mourmelon le Grand

Area St. Omer—

Hazebrouck

Furnes

Area Cassel

Area Berguette

Area Dunkirk

Area Calais

7. 10.

8. 10.

14. 10.

7. 10.

8. 10.

14. 10.

?

30. 10.

8. 10.

12. 10.

9. 10.

10. 10.

11. 10.

17. 10.

20. 10.

21. 10.

23. 10.

between

20. and 29. 10.

29. 10.

29. 10.

from there by motor vehicle

to Furnes.

Noizy—Pantin—La Plaine

—Épluches—Creil—

Amiens—Calais

as 42nd Inf. Div. to

Amiens, then Staples—

St. Pol

Oulchy—Mareuil—Ormoy

—La Plaine—Creil—

Amiens—Abbeville—

Staples—Calais

as XXXII Corps

Page: 620 keyno: 245

Appendix 3. Source Reference.

The presentation is based on the files in the Reichsarchiv as well as the information provided by the leading personalities involved and their staff. The existing literature is so extensive that it cannot be listed here in detail. Only the most important sources are named below. In the presentation, they are indicated by the keyword highlighted in bold in this directory.

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Page: 621 keyno: 246

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Page: 622 keyno: 247

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keyno: 248

Index of Persons.

Albert, King of Belgium 221. 229. 230. 234. 235. 236. 239. 240. 248. 358. 362. 363. 371. 374. 378. 381. 384. 387.

Albrecht, Duke of Württemberg, Colonel General, Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Army 48. 52. 54. 64. 67. 78. 95. 276. 279. 296. 297. 298. 297. 298. 303. 319. 321. 322. 332.

Albrecht, Major General, Commander of the 1st Guard Reserve Division 482.

Allenby, British General, Leader of the 1st Cavalry Division, later of the Cavalry Corps 267.

d'Almade, French General, Leader of a Group of Territorial Divisions 130.

Sirt v. Arnim, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the IV Army Corps 72. 167. 169. 170. 191. 205. 286.

v. Bahrfeldt, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 19th Reserve Division 43.

v. Below (Fritz), General of Infantry, Commanding General of the XXI Army Corps 171. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197.

v. Below (Otto), General of Infantry, Commanding General of the I Reserve Corps 516. 519. 528. 536. 537. 545. 547. 548.

v. Below, Major General, Commander of the 5th Guard Infantry Brigade 482.

v. Beizler, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the III Reserve Corps 221. 222. 223. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 242. 249. 254. 255. 283. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 303. 315. 321. 323. 333. 334. 338. 341.

v. Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor 11. 12. 15.

Bibron, French General, Commander of Dunkirk, Leader of a Group 361.

v. Böhnmann, Major General, Commander of the 75th Infantry Brigade 482. 483.

v. Bredow, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the IX Reserve Corps 33. 41. 44. 171. 177. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197.

v. Böhm-Ermolli, Austro-Hungarian General of Cavalry, Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army 418. 491.

Baron v. Bolfras, Austro-Hungarian General of Infantry, Chief of the Military Cabinet (Military Cabinet) 463. 472. 552.

v. Bönig, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 3rd Guard Infantry Division 441.

Bordenghen, Lieutenant General, Leader of the Siege Artillery before Antwerp 226.

Boroëvić v. Bojna, Austro-Hungarian General of Infantry, Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army 418.

Brecht, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division 539.

Bridour, French General, Leader of a Cavalry Corps 130.

v. Briesen, General of Infantry, Commander of the 49th Reserve Division 533.

Baron de Broqueville, Belgian Prime Minister and Minister of War 234. 236. 289. 301.

Bronzart v. Schellendorf, Colonel, Turkish General, Chief of the Ottoman General Staff 557.

Knight v. Brudermann, Austro-Hungarian Field Marshal, Commander of the 3rd Cavalry Division 480.

Brugère, French General, Leader of a Group of Territorial Divisions 87. 115. 130. 134. 137. 146. 251. 252. 253.

Buisson, French General, Leader of a Cavalry Corps 130. 142.

v. Bülow, Colonel General, Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army 19. 20. 21. 22. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 32. 34. 35. 36. 38. 39. 43. 45. 46. 51. 56. 58. 59. 60. 72. 78. 83. 84. 85. 91. 116. 143. 151. 160. 184. 290. 349. 351. 352.

v. Carlowitz, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the XXVII Reserve Corps 301. 321. 323.

Winston Churchill, British First Lord of the Admiralty 236. 239.

Page: 624 keyno: 249

Index of Persons.

v. Claer, Gen. of Inf., Comm. Gen. of VII. A. K. 27. 314. 325. 326.

Claudius, Genlt., Cmdr. of the 9th Ldw. Brig. 537.

Conneau, French General, Leader of a Cav. Corps and at times a Cav. Group 260. 359. 365. 385.

Fhr. Conrad v. Hötzendorf, Austro-Hungarian Gen. of Inf., Chief of the General Staff 405. 406. 407. 412. 413. 415. 416. 417. 418. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 481. 498. 499. 500. 552. 555. 556. 557. 558. 568. 580. 582. 585.

de Curieres de Castelnau, French Gen., Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army 90. 131. 137. 138. 139. 251. 256. 257. 264.

Danilow, Russian Genlt., General Quartermaster and Chief of the Operations Department of the O. S. N. 434. 551.

Dankl, Austro-Hungarian Gen. of Cav., Commander-in-Chief of the 1st Army 418. 475. 476. 477. 478. 480. 481. 482. 483.

v. Deimling, Gen. of Inf., Comm. Gen. of the XV. A. K. 27. 330. 339.

Delcassé, French Foreign Minister 125.

Deubner, Professor 422.

v. Dommes, Colonel, Head of Department in the D. O. H. L. 66. 83. 84. 85. 104. 107. 172. 174. 175. 209. 281.

v. Dorrer, General, Cmdr. of the 44th Res. Div. 321.

Dubail, French General, Commander-in-Chief of the 1st Army 123. 127. 128. 136. 140. 141. 142. 249. 257.

Dubois, French General, Leader of the IX. Corps 389. 391.

v. Eben, Gen. of Inf., Comm. Gen. of the X. Res. K. 39. 43.

v. Eberhardt, Gen. of Inf., Comm. Gen. of a combined Corps 24.

Fhr. v. u. zu Egloffstein, Gen. of Inf., Comm. Gen. of the VIII. Res. K. 48.

v. Einem, known as v. Rothmaler, Gen. of Cav., Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army 51. 53. 54. 64. 67. 92. 109. 117.

d'Elsa, Gen. of Inf., Comm. Gen. of the XII. A. K. 27. 40.

v. Emmich, Gen. of Inf., Comm. Gen. of the X. A. K. 36.

Enver Pasha, Ottoman General, Minister of War, later Chief of General Staff 14. 554. 562.

Ewert, Russian Gen. of Inf., Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Army 460. 493.

v. Fabec, Gen. of Inf., Comm. Gen. of the XIII. A. K. 52. 95. 155. 329. 330. 335. 336. 337. 340. 341.

v. Fabec, Lt. Colonel, Head of Central Dept. of the O. H. L. 560.

v. Fall, Genlt., Cmdr. of the 2nd Inf. Div. 518. 529.

Fhr. v. Falkenhausen, Gen. of Inf., Commander-in-Chief of an Army Detachment 19. 24. 82. 103. 104. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 153.

v. Falkenhayn, Genlt., Minister of War and General Quartermaster, Leader of German Operations 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 14. 16. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 57. 58. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 72. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 81. 83. 84. 95. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 112. 118. 143. 144. 146. 147. 144. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 157. 158. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 186. 187. 189. 195. 197. 198. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 270. 271. 272. 273. 275. 276. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 295. 296. 298. 299. 307. 308. 310. 311. 312. 316. 317. 318. 322. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 340. 341. 343. 347. 348. 349. 417. 418. 447. 488. 489. 490. 518. 551. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 569. 570. 571. 576. 577. 578. 579. 585. 586. 587.

Ritter v. Fassbender, Gen. of Inf., Comm. Gen. of the I. Bavarian Res. K. 186. 190. 216.

Page: 625 keyno: 250

Index of Persons.

Ferdinand, King of Romania 554.

Fischer, Lt. Col., Chief of the General Staff of the Army

Division Strantz 25.

Fleischmann v. Theißruck, Austro-Hungarian

Captain in the General Staff, Liaison

Officer at the Eastern A. O. R. 8, later 9

405. 406. 408. 415. 416. 436. 455. 465.

Flug, Russian General of Infantry, Commander-in-Chief

of the 10th Army 522. 524. 525. 544.

Foch, French General, Commander-in-Chief of the

French General Supreme Army

Group 104. 124. 256. 257. 258. 259.

260. 266. 266. 266. 267. 269. 269. 359.

361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 367. 368. 369.

370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 376. 377. 379.

381. 382. 383. 384. 386. 387. 388. 389.

391. 392. 393. 394. 396. 397. 398. 399.

Franchet d’Esperey, French General,

Commander-in-Chief of the 5th Army 124. 139.

v. François, General of Infantry, Commanding General

of the I. A. K., later Commander-in-Chief

of the 8th Army 463. 464. 490. 505. 506.

509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 518.

519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526.

531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 537. 538. 539.

540. 541. 542. 547. 548. 551. 552.

Franke, Lt. Gen., Senior Ldw. Commander z 50.93.

Franz Josef I., Emperor of Austria,

King of Hungary 406. 467. 468. 558.

559, 560.

French, Sir John, British Field Marshal,

Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary

Corps 124. 126. 154. 102. 246. 247. 248.

254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261.

265. 267. 268. 269. 358. 360. 363. 364.

365. 367. 368. 370. 372. 374. 375. 376.

391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398.

Baron v. Freytag-Loringhoven, Lt. Gen.,

Representative of the O. H. L. at the Austro-Hungarian

A. O. R. 3 403. 407. 409. 418. 468. 469.

549. 550. 560.

v. Friedeburg, Major General, Commander of the 6th Guard

Infantry Brigade 482.

Friedrich, Archduke of Austria, Austro-

Hungarian General of Infantry, Commander-in-Chief

over Army and Fleet 3, 403. 406. 407. 409.

419. 468.

Friemel, Major General, General of Engineers at the

Siege Corps before Antwerp 226.

Frohröfer, Lt. Col., Chief of the General Staff

of the XIX. A. K. 55.

Gaede, General of Infantry, Deputy Commanding General

of the XIV. A. K., later Commander-in-Chief

of an Army Division 19. 23. 24. 84. 120.

122. 151.

Gallieni, French General, Military Governor

of Paris 175.

v. Gallwitz, General of Artillery, Commanding General

of the Garbe Reserve A. K. 440. 441. 452. 453.

454. 455. 456. 466. 469. 474. 477. 478.

479. 480. 482. 484. 491.

v. Garnier, Lt. Gen., Commander of the 4th Cavalry Division

37. 40.

Baron v. Gebsattel, General of Cavalry, Commanding

General of the III. Bavarian A. K. 96. 100.

v. Gersdorff, Major General, Commander of the 63rd Infantry

Brigade 44. 92.

Baron v. der Goltz, Field Marshal,

Governor General of Belgium 23. 57.

62. 222. 224. 226. 227. 228. 229. 232.

242. 244. 296. 297. 319. 322. 584. 585.

Baron der Goltz, Lt. Gen., Commander of a Ldw.

Division 502. 508. 509.

v. Götz, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the

VI. Reserve Corps 118.

Gough, British General, Leader of the 2nd Cavalry

Division 248.

Grapow, Colonel and Commander of the Ldw. Regiments 53

161.

Groener, Colonel, Chief of the Field Railway

Service 20. 21. 59. 275. 286.

v. Gronau, General of Artillery, Commanding General of the

IV. Reserve Corps 71.

Großfeist, French General, Leader of the

42nd Infantry Division 384.

Grünert, Major General, Chief of the General Staff of the

8th Army 410. 501. 504. 528.

de Guise, Belgian General, Governor of

Antwerp 241.

v. Gündell, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the

V. Reserve Corps 118.

Haddon, Sir Charles, British General Ordnance

Master 140.

Page: 626 keyno: 251

Index of Persons.

v. Hahn, Major General, Commander of the 87th Infantry Brigade 470. 486.

Haig, Sir Douglas, British General, Leader of the I Corps 372. 379. 381. 391. 392. 396. 397.

v. Hänisch, Lieutenant General, Chief of the General Staff of the 7th Army 112.

Hasse, Captain in the General Staff 469.

v. Harthausen, Colonel, Chief of the General Staff of the XXI Army Corps 196. 256.

v. Heeringen, Colonel General, Commander-in-Chief of the 7th Army 34. 35. 40. 70. 71. 72. 78. 92. 109. 111. 112. 116. 150. 160. 174. 176. 184. 354.

v. Heineccius, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 36th Infantry Division 470.

Heinrich, Prince of Prussia, Grand Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Sea Forces 521.

v. Held, Colonel, Leader of a Detachment of the 10th Reserve Division 153.

Hell, Colonel, Chief of the General Staff of the XX Army Corps 483.

Hentsch, Lieutenant Colonel, Head of Department in the O. H. Z. 3. 55. 81. 151. 172. 175. 176.

v. Heydebreck, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 7th Cavalry Division 34.

v. Heymann, Major General 66.

v. Hindenburg, v. Beneckendorff and —, Colonel General, Commander-in-Chief of the 8th, later the 9th Army, then Commander-in-Chief East, 3. 402. 404. 405. 409. 410. 411. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 420. 424. 426. 434. 435. 437. 439. 440. 446. 447. 451. 455. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 472. 473. 476. 482. 485. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 558. 559. 562. 563. 566. 568. 580. 583.

v. Hoeppner, Major General, Chief of the General Staff of the 3rd Army 117.

Hoffmann, Lieutenant Colonel, First General Staff Officer at the A. O. K. 9 448. 467. 483. 500.

Prince Gottfried von Hohenlohe, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin 556.

Ritter v. Höhn, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 6th Bavarian Infantry Division 96. 99.

Baron v. Höningen known as v. Huene, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the XIV Army Corps 274.

Baron v. Hollen, Lieutenant General, Senior Cavalry Commander 4 47. 152. 175. 185. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 307. 313.

Baron v. Hügel, General, Commanding General XXVI Reserve Corps 335.

Hugnet, Colonel 265.

v. Hülsen, Major General, Commander of the 43rd Infantry Brigade 454.

Humbert, French General, Leader of the XXXII Corps (temporarily Leader of the 9th Army) 256. 388. 390.

Hurt, Lieutenant General 186. 190.

Ilse, Major General, Deputy Quartermaster General of the 2nd Army, later Chief of the General Staff of the 4th Army 276. 280. 297. 299. 301.

Iswolfski, Russian Ambassador in France 129.

Juwannow, Russian General of Artillery, Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front 430. 431. 432. 433. 458. 459. 461. 491. 495. 497.

Izzet, Pasha 14.

v. Jacoby, General of Infantry, Leader of a Landwehr Division 334. 539.

v. Jagow, State Secretary of the Foreign Office 11. 12.

Januschewitsch, Russian Lieutenant General, Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army 129. 525. 526.

Jermolow, Russian Lieutenant General, Military Attaché in London 375.

Joffre, French General, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army 123. 124. 125. 127. 128. 130. 132. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 399. 569.

Josef Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, Austro-Hungarian General of Infantry, Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Army 418.

Jung, Major General, Commander of the 1st Reserve Infantry Brigade 242.

Page: 627 keyno: 252

Index of Persons.

Kaempffer, Lt. Gen., Gen. of Engineers at A. O. K. 5 157.

Kahlich, Colonel, Chief of the Gen. Staff of the III. Res. K. 226. 280.

Karl I., King of Romania 554.

Baron von Kirchbach, Austro-Hungarian Gen. of Cav., Commanding General of the I. Corps 477. 478. 479.

von Kirchbach, Gen. of Artillery, Commanding Gen. of the XII. Res. K. 51.

Kitchener, Lord, Secretary of State for War 325. 248. 254. 255. 261. 265. 366. 376. 378. 386. 396. 397. 398. 399.

von Kluck, Colonel General, Commander-in-Chief of the 1st Army 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 35. 39. 56. 70. 105. 149. 171. 195. 332. 348. 351.

Baron von König, Lt. Gen., Cmdr. of the 3rd Cav. Div. 441.

Eder von Korda, Austro-Hungarian Field Marshal, Cmdr. of the 7th Cav. Div. 443. 471.

Kosch, Lt. Gen., Commanding Gen. of the I. A. K. 355. 358. 541.

Krafft von Dellmensingen, Major Gen., Chief of the Gen. Staff of the 6th Army 62. 63. 76. 84. 85. 167. 171. 172. 181. 184. 194. 198. 222. 223. 224. 225. 283. 287. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 302. 326. 329. 342. 343.

Baron Kress von Kressenstein, Lt. Gen., Cmdr. of the 5th Bavarian Res. Div. 186.

Krause, Lt. Gen., Cmdr. of the 36th Res. Div. 514.

von Kuhl, Major Gen., Chief of the Gen. Staff of the 1st Army 31. 80. 194. 196. 290.

Kundmann, Austro-Hungarian Major, Aide-de-Camp to the Chief of the General Staff 556. 557.

von Kusmanek, Austro-Hungarian Field Marshal, Cmdr. of the Fortress Przemyśl 438.

von Laffert, Gen. of Cav., Commanding Gen. of the XIX. A. K. 51.

de Langle de Cary, French General, Commander-in-Chief of the French 4th Army 124.

von Lauenstein, Lt. Gen., Chief of the Gen. Staff of the 2nd Army 91. 110. 331.

von Lesse, Major Gen., Cmdr. of the 52nd Res. Div. 458.

von Sanders, Turkish Marshal, Head of the German Military Mission 14. 554.

von Linsingen, Gen. of Inf., Commanding Gen. of the II. A. K. 71.

Lismann, Lt. Gen., Cmdr. of the 3rd Garbe-Inf. Div. 480.

von Lochow, Gen. of Inf., Commanding Gen. of the III. A. K. 353.

von Lodenfeld, Gen. of Inf., Deputy Commanding Gen. of the Guard Corps 274.

von Lobberg, Lt. Col., Chief of the Gen. Staff of the XIII. A. K. 66.

von Ludwager, Major Gen., Cmdr. of the 33rd Inf. Brig. 161.

Ludendorff, Major Gen., Chief of the Gen. Staff of the 8th, later the 9th Army 403. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 434. 448. 466. 467. 469. 498. 556. 557. 558. 568. 580. 583.

Baron von Lüttwitz (Arthur), Major Gen., Chief of the General Government of Belgium 280.

Baron von Lüttwitz (Walter), Lt. Gen., Chief of the Gen. Staff of the 4th Army 78. 276.

Baron von Lyncker, Gen. of Inf., Chief of the Military Cabinet 1. 10.

von Mackensen, Gen. of Cav., Commanding Gen. of the XVII. A. K. 38. 42. 45. 44. 444. 450. 456. 457. 465. 467. 471. 486. 491.

Maria, Queen of Romania 555.

Ritter von Marterer, Austro-Hungarian Field Marshal, Military Chancellery 406.

Ritter von Martini, Gen. of Inf., Commanding Gen. of the II. Bavarian A. K. 90. 167. 330.

von der Marwitz, Gen. of Cav., Senior Cav. Cmdr. 2 42. 86. 88. 89. 113. 164. 167. 168. 178. 179. 180. 183. 184. 185. 203. 204. 206. 214. 260. 261. 328. 336.

Matty, Lt. Col., First Gen. Staff Officer at A. O. K. 2. 79. 80.

de Maud'huy, French General, Leader of an Army Detachment, later of the 10th Army 246. 253. 256. 258ff. 262. 269. 368. 385.

Maunoury, French General, Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army 124. 140. 142.

Meister, Colonel, Chief of the Gen. Staff of the III. Res. K. 226.

Ritter von Mertens, Quirnheim, Lt. Col., First Gen. Staff Officer at A. O. K. 8. 80. 162. 188. 282. 284. 291.

Page: 628 keyno: 253

Index of Persons.

v. Meyer, Lt. Gen., Cmdr. of the 37th Bavarian Brigade 227. 238. 322.

Millerand, French Minister of War 143.

de Mitry, French General, Leader of the 2nd Cavalry Corps 263.

v. Moltke, Colonel General, Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army 1. 3. 5. 6. 9. 11. 17. 18. 22. 57. 60. 61. 62. 177. 408. 415. 417. 418. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 572. 575. 581. 582.

v. Morgen, Lt. Gen., Cmdr. of the 3rd Reserve Division 509. 512. 514. 516. 517. 518. 519. 525. 528. 529. 530. 532. 541. 547. 548.

v. Mudra, Gen. of Inf., Commanding Gen. of the XVI Army Corps 155. 157. 158. 355.

v. Nahmer, Major on the Staff of the Chief of the Field Railway Service 275.

Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia 125. 429.

Nicholas Nikolayevich, Grand Duke, Russian General of Cavalry, Supreme Commander of all Land and Sea Forces 129. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 457. 491. 494. 495. 496. 498. 522. 546.

Nowikow, Russian Lt. Gen., Leader of a Cavalry Division 423. 424. 425.

v. Oven, Gen. of Inf., Governor of the Fortress Metz, Leader of the V Army Corps 50. 96. 98. 99.

Paléologue, French Ambassador at the Russian Court 125.

Paris, British General, Leader of the Marine Brigades 242.

Pau, French General 265. 268. 270. 358. 360.

Petersen, Major 41.

v. Peszel, Lt. Gen., Cmdr. of the 50th Reserve Division 533.

v. Plessen, Colonel General, Adjutant General to the Emperor 148.

v. Plüskow, Gen. of Inf., Commanding Gen. of the XI Army Corps 427. 486. 489.

v. Pöhlmann, Major Gen., Cmdr. of the 68th Infantry Brigade 157.

v. Pohl, Admiral, Chief of the Admiralty Staff 10. 11.

Poincaré, President of the French Republic 257. 265. 399.

v. Pritzelwitz, Gen. of Inf., Commanding Gen. of the VI Army Corps 47. 48. 49.

Puhallo v. Brlog, Austro-Hungarian Field Marshal, Commanding Gen. of the V Corps 481.

v. Quast, Gen. of Inf., Commanding Gen. of the IX Army Corps 33. 37. 41. 42.

Rathenau, Head of the A. E. G. 7.

Rauch, Russian Lt. Gen., Cmdr. of the 2nd Guard Cavalry Division 522.

Rawlinson, British General, Leader of the IV Corps 254. 261. 265. 267. 268. 358. 386.

v. Reichenau, Major Gen., Cmdr. of the 15th Infantry Brigade 186.

v. Rennenkampf, Russian Gen. of Cavalry, Commander-in-Chief of the 1st Army 402. 405. 522. 543. 546.

v. Reuter, Colonel, 161.

Baron v. Richthofen, Lt. Gen., Leader of Cavalry Cmdr. 1 88. 89. 113. 163. 164. 165. 178. 179. 190. 307. 336. 337. 340. 343.

Ronarc'h, French Admiral, Leader of the Marine Fusilier Brigade 382. 384.

v. Runel, Major Gen., Cmdr. of the 43rd Reserve Division 323.

Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria, Colonel General, Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army 18. 62. 76. 80. 84. 85. 87. 91. 106. 107. 115. 163. 166. 167. 171. 172. 176. 181. 183. 184. 187. 188. 189. 199. 206. 216. 220. 278. 284f. 287. 288. 289. 293. 314. 315. 316. 342.

Ruzski, Russian Gen. of Inf., Commander-in-Chief of the Northwest Front 431. 433. 491. 494. 495. 522. 523. 524. 525. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547.

Said Halim Pasha, Ottoman Grand Vizier 554.

Sarrail, French General, Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army 123. 128. 132. 249.

Sazonov, Russian Foreign Minister 125. 129.

v. Saucken, Colonel, Quartermaster General of the 9th Army 415. 456. 460.

Page: 629 keyno: 254

Index of Persons.

Schabel, Major General 226.

Schar, Major General, Commander of the 72nd Infantry Brigade 442. 449. 452.

Baron von Scheffer-Boyadel, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the XXV Reserve Corps 464. 531. 533. 534. 541.

Scheremann, Russian General of Cavalry, Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army 460. 461. 492. 495. 522.

von Schenck, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the XVIII Army Corps 43. 90. 193.

von Schlichtius and Neidorff, Commander of the 6th Reserve Division 222. 301.

Count Schlieffen, Field Marshal, Chief of the General Staff of the Army 8. 565. 567. 581.

Count von Schmettow, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 6th Cavalry Division 307.

Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, Lieutenant General, Chief of the General Staff of the 5th Army 25. 65. 66. 74. 93. 105. 118. 328.

von Scholtz, General of Artillery, Commanding General of the XX Army Corps 450. 456.

von Schröder, Admiral, Leader of the Marine Division 222.

von Schubert, General of Artillery, Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Army, later Commanding General of the XXVII Reserve Corps 323. 408. 409. 410. 501. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 525. 526. 527. 528. 536. 547. 548.

von der Schulenburg, Colonel, Commander of the 11th Landwehr Brigade 209. 325.

Sieger, Lieutenant General, Chief of the Field Ammunition Service 102. 147.

Siewers, Russian General of Infantry, Commander-in-Chief of the 10th Army 544. 545. 546. 547.

Slameczka, Austro-Hungarian Colonel in the General Staff 436.

Smith Dorrien, British General, Leader of the II Corps 363.

Sontag, Major General, Commander of the 41st Infantry Division 444.

Suchon, Vice Admiral, Leader of the Mediterranean Division 554. 562.

von Stein, Lieutenant General, Commanding General at the XIV Reserve Corps, former Quartermaster General 20. 22. 28. 143. 165. 169.

Steinmetz, Lieutenant General, General of Foot Artillery at the A. O. R. 2 32.

von Stetten, Major General, Commander of the Bavarian Cavalry Division 307. 313. 336.

von Steuben, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the XVIII Reserve Corps 48. 49. 155.

von Strantz, General of Infantry, Commander-in-Chief of an Army Detachment 24. 25. 50. 54. 55. 64. 65. 68. 69. 76. 95. 96. 97. 98. 101. 102. 104. 153. 177.

Suchomlinow, Russian War Minister 125. 525. 526.

Tappen, Colonel, Chief of the Operations Department of the O. H. L. 4. 20. 21. 22. 28. 58. 62. 67. 77. 143. 148. 177. 220. 279. 288. 342. 557. 570.

Taverna, French General, Leader of the XVI Corps 397.

Tchynsen, Major in the General Staff 423.

Tieschowitz von Tieschowa, Major in the General Staff 51. 56. 80.

von Tieschowitz, Lieutenant Colonel, First General Staff Officer at the III Reserve Corps 226.

Tülff von Tschepe and Weidenbach, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the VIII Army Corps 54. 73. 109.

Tyrwhitt, British Admiral, Leader of a Squadron 369.

von Udermann, Major, Leader of a Security Detachment of the Siege Corps before Antwerp 228.

Duke von Urach, Count of Württemberg, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 26th Infantry Division 345.

d'Urbal, French General, Leader of the XXXIII Corps, later of the Army Detachment "Belgium" 372. 375. 376. 378. 380. 381. 382. 387. 388. 389. 391. 392. 393. 394. 396f. 398.

Vett, Major General, Commander of the 70th Reserve Infantry Brigade 537.

Villiers, Sir Francis, English Envoy to the Belgian Court 234. 235.

Voigt, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 5th Reserve Division 222.

Wagner, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 38th Infantry Division 486.

Page: 630 keyno: 255

Index of Persons.

Wahnschaffe, Major General, Commander of the 41st Landwehr Brigade 209. 231.

von Wandel, Lieutenant General, Deputy Minister of War 5. 273.

Waldorf, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 52nd Reserve Division 321. 322.

Baron von Wangenheim, German Ambassador in Constantinople 14. 563.

Baron von Watter, Lieutenant General, Commanding General of the XIV Army Corps 97. 100.

Weddigen, Captain 11.

von Wegerer, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 4th Landwehr Division 441.

Weide, Colonel 32. 36. 37. 40.

Knight von Wenninger, Lieutenant General, Bavarian Military Plenipotentiary at the Great Headquarters 76. 84. 284. 286.

von Werder, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 5th Army Replacement Division 228. 239. 242.

Wielemans, Belgian General, Chief of the General Staff 384. 387.

Wilhelm II, German Emperor, King of Prussia 1. 10. 79. 105. 148. 184. 185. 187. 218. 274. 276. 288. 340. 341. 394. 395. 406. 407. 409. 410. 467. 468. 527. 528.558. 559. 560.

Wilhelm, Crown Prince of the German Empire and of Prussia, Lieutenant General, Commander-in-Chief of the 5th Army 17. 49. 94. 348. 355. 356.

Wilson, British General 393.

von Windler, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 2nd Guards Infantry Division 202.

von Woyrsch, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the Landwehr Corps 411.

von Wrisberg, Chief of the Army Department in the Ministry of War 273.

von Wrochem, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 21st Landwehr Brigade 451. 457.

Knight von Xylander, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the I Bavarian Army Corps 87. 89.

Zieten, Major General 226.

Zimmermann, Undersecretary in the Foreign Office 12. 559.

von Zweyl, General of Infantry, Commanding General of the VII Reserve Corps 71.

keyno: 256

Troop Directory.

Germany.

Minister of War 1. 5f. 10. 273. 540. 560.

Army Command 6f. 10f. 14. 18. 29ff. 31. 35.

38f. 42f. 46ff. 65ff. 70. 72. 75ff.

89f. 92. 94f. 97. 99. 102. 105ff.

112. 115. 117ff. 135f. 146f. 159ff.

166. 168. 171f. 185ff. 197. 199.

208ff. 214f. 218ff. 222. 226ff. 238. 243.

247f. 254f. 258ff. 271. 293. 295f.

297f. 300. 304. 307ff. 316f. 319f.

321. 325ff. 336. 338. 341f. 345. 347ff. 353. 355f.

359f. 401. 403ff. 407ff. 411f. 414. 416ff.

420. 424. 435. 463. 467. 488ff. 501. 505.

517ff. 526f. 530. 540. 548. 550ff. 555ff.

567ff. 572ff. 580ff.

General Staff 6ff. 222ff. 245. 502.

Commander-in-Chief East 541f. 555. 558. 560.

562f. 583.

1st Army 3f. 17ff. 23. 26. 28ff. 37ff. 44ff.

56. 58f. 61f. 64f. 69ff. 75f. 79f. 82ff.

91f. 104ff. 112ff. 116. 144. 147. 149f.

160ff. 168. 171f. 179. 189. 192. 194ff.

203f. 277f. 290f. 322. 327. 329f. 331.

348f. 351ff. 400. 567. 576. 331.

2nd Army 3. 17. 19ff. 26ff. 34ff. 39. 43.

51f. 56. 58f. 61. 64f. 67ff. 78ff.

82f. 91f. 106f. 109ff. 116f. 145f. 149f.

158f. 171f. 184. 208. 215. 219. 277f.

290f. 317. 322. 327. 331. 334f. 351f.

354f. 576.

3rd Army 17. 19. 22. 25. 27. 46ff. 58. 64f.

71f. 73f. 78f. 82. 91f. 94. 106ff. 117f.

146. 157ff. 176. 184. 219. 277f. 290f.

354f. 576.

4th Army 17. 19. 22. 25. 27. 46ff. 58. 64f.

71f. 73f. 78f. 82. 91f. 94. 106ff. 117f.

146. 157ff. 176. 184. 219. 277f. 290f.

354f. 576.

5th Army 17. 19. 24f. 46. 49f. 52. 54. 58.

64ff. 73f. 77ff. 82. 92ff. 102. 105ff

118. 150f. 155ff. 184. 219. 276ff. 328.

332. 336f. 355f. 400. 576. 578.

6th Army 4. 18ff. 22ff. 58. 60ff. 69f. 75ff.

79f. 84ff. 102ff. 112ff. 120. 143f. 146f.

149ff. 158. 160ff. 198ff. 206ff. 212

291f. 300. 320. 260. 270ff. 297f. 300.

297f. 300. 304. 307ff. 316ff. 324ff.

335ff. 340ff. 345ff. 351f. 401. 553.

575ff.

7th Army 3f. 17ff. 26ff. 34f. 37. 39. 43ff.

56. 59. 61f. 64f. 69ff. 78f. 82. 84. 91f.

106f. 109ff. 116f. 145f. 149f. 158f.

222. 277f. 290f. 328. 349. 351. 355f. 501.

8th Army 3. 275. 402ff.

New 8th Army 410f. 414. 416f. 438. 447.

463ff. 488. 490. 501ff. 524ff. 530ff.

536ff. 544. 546f. 551ff. 555. 557f. 562.

568f.

9th Army 3. 402. 408ff. 413ff. 434ff. 445ff.

462ff. 472ff. 481. 483ff. 496ff. 504.

506f. 530f. 540. 545. 549. 551ff. 555ff.

562. 580. 583.

Army Detachment Falkenhausen 64. 82. 103f.

118ff. 150f. 154. 277. 357.

Army Detachment Gaede 82. 118. 120. 122f.

151. 277. 357.

Army Detachment Strantz 24f. 50. 54. 64. 68f.

76. 95. 98. 101f. 104. 121f. 147f. 150f.

153f. 176. 275ff. 332. 356. 450f. 576.

Army Group Below 194. 203.

Army Group Boehn 193f. 196.

Army Group Bülow 143.

Army Group Claer 314. 357. 354f.

Army Group Fabeck 324. 327. 329f. 354f.

347ff. 550f. 555f. 579.

Army Group Mackensen 444. 448.

460f. 470f. 473. 479f. 489. 494f.

Page: 632 keyno: 257

Troop Directory.

Cav. Group Marwitz 313. 324f. 329. 331. 336.

Gen. Gov. in Belgium 18. 75. 209. 222. 226ff. 231. 238. 242ff. 280. 297. 309. 315.

Guard Corps 27. 79. 83. 92. 117. 151. 159. 171. 174. 176. 182. 186ff. 191f. 198ff. 206. 215f. 227. 293. 327.

I. A. R. 410. 464. 501ff. 504ff. 509ff. 523f. 525ff. 531ff. 535ff. 541f. 544. 546. 550. 551. 541. 150. 193ff. 277. 352.

II. A. R. 26. 35. 37. 72. 146. 150. 152. 161. 163. 166ff. 174. 176. 178ff. 186ff. 191f. 192f. 202f. 205f. 215f. 277. 293. 316. 327.

V. A. R. 24. 50. 55. 95ff. 101. 153. 356.

VI. A. R. 20. 22. 27. 32. 47ff. 51. 277. 348. 354.

VII. A. R. 27. 32. 34. 36. 38f. 83. 111. 117. 159f. 183. 185. 216. 277. 293f. 308. 314. 330.

VIII. A. R. 47. 54. 66f. 73. 108f. 117. 157. 159. 277. 354.

IX. A. R. 26. 30. 33. 35. 37ff. 44f. 71. 161. 277. 352.

X. A. R. 27. 34ff. 38f. 83. 92. 110f. 117. 151. 159f. 277. 354.

XI. A. R. 410. 416f. 420. 426f. 446. 451f. 455. 473. 475. 485. 489. 494.

XII. A. R. 20. 22. 27. 32. 35. 37. 40. 44. 71. 82. 111f. 116. 160. 277. 354. 364. 369.

XIII. A. R. 49. 52. 66. 93ff. 106. 108. 154f. 157f. 215f. 219. 277ff. 281. 286f. 289f. 292. 307. 310. 313. 326f. 329f. 337. 346. 369.

XIV. A. R. 23f. 50. 55. 76. 96ff. 103. 119. 121f. 135. 151ff. 175f. 183. 187f. 198ff. 204. 222. 210. 214ff. 219f. 249. 250. 252. 270. 272. 277. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300.

XV. A. R. 17. 27. 32. 34f. 36. 37ff. 44f. 71. 111f. 116. 139. 150. 160. 277. 291. 317. 319. 327. 335f. 341f. 351f. 354.

XVI. A. R. 410. 420. 426f. 446. 451f. 455. 473. 475. 485. 489. 494.

XVII. A. R. 410. 420. 428. 438. 442ff. 450. 456. 470. 485. 489.

XVIII. A. R. 20. 27. 32. 34. 36. 38f. 43. 72. 79. 82ff. 90. 92. 107. 112f. 115f. 150ff. 162ff. 171ff. 176ff. 192ff. 208. 277. 351f.

XIX. A. R. 46. 51. 53ff. 67. 108f. 117. 159f. 175f. 182. 185f. 192. 215f. 217. 219. 277f. 281. 286f. 289f. 292f. 310. 313. 326. 336. 346. 356. 364. 369.

XX. A. R. 410. 414. 420. 426. 428. 438f. 442ff. 450. 456. 469f. 476. 478. 485f. 489. 494. 496.

XXI. A. R. 22. 62ff. 75ff. 82. 84ff. 87. 107. 113. 115. 139. 171. 173. 178. 193ff. 277. 351f.

I. Bavarian A. R. 23. 42. 56f. 65f. 76. 82. 84f. 107. 112f. 115. 164. 166f. 175. 178. 182. 194. 197. 226. 277f. 351f. 354.

II. Bavarian A. R. 23. 63f. 76f. 87. 107. 112f. 146. 166f. 167f. 176f. 182. 189. 199. 203. 207. 277. 327. 336. 356. 369.

III. Bavarian A. R. 24. 50. 95ff. 153. 153. 355.

Guard Reserve Corps 404. 408. 410. 414. 420. 423. 426f. 437. 442. 449. 451f. 454f. 461f. 469. 473ff. 489. 494ff.

I. Reserve Corps 410. 501f. 506. 511f. 514. 520. 529f. 535f.

II. Reserve Corps 18. 56. 60. 221ff. 226ff. 243. 276f. 280ff. 289f. 295ff. 305f. 309. 311ff. 319. 321ff. 333ff. 335f. 344. 347. 369. 393. 396.

IV. Reserve Corps 26. 35. 37. 71f. 105. 150. 161. 277. 353.

V. Reserve Corps 50. 94. 118. 277. 355.

VI. Reserve Corps 49. 52. 66. 93. 118. 155. 277. 355.

VII. Reserve Corps 17. 27. 29f. 35ff. 36. 40. 43f. 70f. 78. 92. 111f. 277. 355.

VIII. Reserve Corps 47ff. 54. 73. 108. 159. 277. 354.

IX. Reserve Corps 18. 20. 26. 28ff. 35ff. 37ff. 44f. 64. 75f. 82. 171. 175. 177f. 191f. 197. 227. 291. 351f. 354.

X. Reserve Corps 27. 34ff. 38f. 83. 92. 110. 151. 159f. 277. 354.

XI. Reserve Corps 410. 420. 426f. 446. 451f. 455. 473. 475. 485. 489. 494.

XII. Reserve Corps 46. 51. 53. 58. 67. 108. 117. 277. 354.

Page: 635 keyno: 258

Troop Directory.

XIV. Reserve Corps 23. 60. 64. 76. 82. 86ff. 90. 104. 115f. 120. 141. 146. 163ff. 174. 178. 180. 182. 187. 188. 192. 199. 203. 226ff. 243. 277. 351. 501.

XVIII. Reserve Corps 47ff. 54. 74. 73. 94f. 108. 115. 154f. 157ff. 219. 277. 282. 297.

XXII. Reserve Corps 5. 272ff. 282. 297. 300ff. 305f. 309. 312f. 315f. 319f. 334f. 338ff. 345. 373. 393. 553.

XXIII. Reserve Corps 5. 272ff. 282. 297. 300ff. 305f. 310. 312. 315f. 319f. 334f. 338ff. 345. 373. 553.

XXIV. Reserve Corps 5. 154. 272ff. 312. 317. 327. 329. 553.

XXV. Reserve Corps 5. 272ff. 463f. 530ff. 541. 544f. 551. 553.

XXVI. Reserve Corps 5. 272ff. 282. 297. 300ff. 305ff. 310. 312. 315. 317. 325. 328. 335. 338ff. 344f. 373. 553.

XXVII. Reserve Corps 5. 272ff. 282. 297. 300ff. 305ff. 310. 312. 315. 317. 325. 328. 335. 338ff. 342. 345. 373. 553.

I. Bavarian Reserve Corps 24. 103f. 115. 119. 121. 150. 152. 163f. 166ff. 174. 178ff. 186ff. 199f. 202ff. 207. 216f. 220. 277. 294f. 308ff. 313. 316.

Landwehr Corps 3. 410ff. 416. 420. 426f. 439f. 451f. 454f. 466. 473. 483ff. 489. 494f.

Replacement Corps 119.

Corps Below 516f. 519. 529. 531. 536ff. 543. 545. 547.

Corps Beseler (Siege Corps of Antwerp) 1. 120. 177. 219. 225. 227ff. 240. 283f.

Corps Eberhardt 24. 119f.

Corps Fabeck 2 277f.

Corps Frommel 420. 425. 428. 437f. 442ff. 450. 456. 485. 489.

Corps Morgen 517ff. 524. 529ff. 538. 541. 544.

Corps Steuben 277.

Corps Svardwowski 119. 121.

1) see also III. Reserve Corps.

2) see also XIII. A. K.

Deputy General Command of I. A. K. 411. 558.

Deputy General Command of II. A. K. 410. 420. 457. 489. 558.

Deputy General Command of V. A. K. 410. 420. 438. 489. 558.

Deputy General Command of VI. A. K. 410. 487. 558.

Deputy General Command of XIV. A. K. 224. 411. 558.

Deputy General Command of XVII. A. K. 411. 558.

Deputy General Command of XX. A. K. 411. 528. 558.

Higher Cavalry Commander 1 19. 27. 88. 90. 104. 107. 112f. 115f. 151. 163ff. 167ff. 174. 179ff. 183ff. 188ff. 192. 199. 202ff. 208. 214ff. 277. 281. 292ff. 307. 331.

Higher Cavalry Commander 2 19. 27. 30. 42. 56. 86. 88f. 104. 107. 112. 115f. 151. 163f. 167ff. 174. 178ff. 183ff. 188. 192. 199f. 200. 202ff. 208. 213ff. 260. 280. 282. 285. 290. 292ff. 310. 313. 331.

Higher Cavalry Commander 3 410.

Higher Cavalry Commander 4 47. 112f. 115f. 151. 163ff. 167ff. 174. 179ff. 183ff. 188ff. 192. 199. 202ff. 208. 214ff. 277. 281. 292ff. 307. 331. 364.

1st Guard Infantry Division 27. 36. 39. 92. 110. 151f. 159. 163. 168f. 172. 178. 180. 182. 202. 215.

2nd Guard Infantry Division 27. 34f. 51. 92. 110. 117. 151f. 159. 172. 178. 180. 182. 202.

3rd Guard Infantry Division 440f. 449. 452ff. 459. 469. 474. 477f. 480.

1st Infantry Division 506. 511f. 515. 518ff. 528. 535.

2nd Infantry Division 506. 509. 511f. 515. 518ff. 526. 535.

3rd Infantry Division 161. 176. 193. 195. 332. 336. 342f. 345. 349. 353.

4th Infantry Division 71f. 82. 86. 88. 90. 112. 150. 164. 173. 195f. 348. 353f.

5th Infantry Division 203. 205ff. 326. 336. 342f. 345. 349. 353.

6th Infantry Division 202. 207. 215.

7th Infantry Division 96ff. 153.

8th Infantry Division 96ff. 153.

9th Infantry Division 96ff. 153.

10th Infantry Division 96ff. 153.

Page: 634 keyno: 259

Troop Directory.

11th Inf. Div. 47ff. 73. 94f. 108. 155f. 158f. 277. 354f.

12th Inf. Div. 48f. 51f. 109.

13th Inf. Div. 36. 111. 160. 183f. 198. 200f. 203ff. 207f. 214ff. 220. 294. 346.

14th Inf. Div. 36. 111. 160. 208. 216. 219. 282. 289f. 292f. 308. 310. 313. 316. 326.

15th Inf. Div. 37.

16th Inf. Div. 27.

17th Inf. Div. 26. 36. 113. 172. 192ff.

22nd Inf. Div. 446. 452. 475f. 486. 489.

23rd Inf. Div. 160.

24th Inf. Div. 159. 277. 307. 326.

25th Inf. Div. 36. 113. 173. 192ff.

26th Inf. Div. 52. 108. 154. 158. 316. 326f. 329f. 336ff. 340ff. 345.

27th Inf. Div. 108. 155ff. 277. 348. 355.

28th Inf. Div. 99. 201ff. 206. 216.

29th Inf. Div. 99f. 200ff. 207. 216. 292. 316. 326.

30th Inf. Div. 338f. 343.

31st Inf. Div. 88. 193f. 197. 208.

32nd Inf. Div. 160.

33rd Inf. Div. 156ff. 355.

34th Inf. Div. 156ff. 355.

35th Inf. Div. 443f. 450. 456. 486.

36th Inf. Div. 444. 450. 470. 492.

37th Inf. Div. 426. 428. 444. 450. 456. 470.

38th Inf. Div. 486.

39th Inf. Div. 337. 339.

40th Inf. Div. 67. 307.

41st Inf. Div. 426. 444. 450. 479. 482.

42nd Inf. Div. 86. 88f.

1st Bavarian Inf. Div. 88f.

2nd Bavarian Inf. Div. 87. 89.

3rd Bavarian Inf. Div. 113. 116. 164.

4th Bavarian Inf. Div. 113. 116.

5th Bavarian Inf. Div. 96f. 99f. 122. 151. 153. 357.

6th Bavarian Inf. Div. 96f. 99f.

Marine Div. 56. 221. 222ff. 233. 238f. 243. 295. 309. 315. 322. 324. 345.

1st Guard Res. Div. 441f. 452. 474. 477f. 480. 482. 484.

2nd Guard Res. Div. 36f. 39. 92. 109f.

1st Res. Div. 511. 516. 528. 536.

3rd Res. Div. 410. 501f. 504ff. 510ff. 517ff. 526. 528f. 532.

5th Res. Div. 200. 222. 228. 230. 232. 237f. 241. 296f. 299. 302. 305. 309. 312. 315. 318. 321. 333. 344.

6th Res. Div. 222. 228. 231f. 237f. 296f. 299f. 301f. 305. 309. 312. 315. 318. 323. 341. 344.

9th Res. Div. 94.

10th Res. Div. 94. 153.

11th Res. Div. 94. 153.

17th Res. Div. 34. 37f. 40f. 44. 71. 161. 171. 196f.

18th Res. Div. 33f. 37. 40f. 44. 71. 161. 171. 173. 192f. 196. 352.

19th Res. Div. 43. 92. 110.

21st Res. Div. 154. 158.

25th Res. Div. 48. 108. 155. 158. 216. 277. 326.

28th Res. Div. 114. 116. 164.

29th Res. Div. 114. 116. 164.

30th Res. Div. 119.

33rd Res. Div. (Main Reserve Metz) 24. 50. 55. 94f. 153.

35th Res. Div. (Main Reserve Thorn) 410f. 414. 416ff. 420. 450. 488. 502. 504.

36th Res. Div. 512ff. 520. 526. 528. 535ff.

43rd Res. Div. 273. 305. 318. 320. 323. 332. 334. 340. 342. 345.

44th Res. Div. 305. 318. 320ff. 353. 340f. 344.

45th Res. Div. 306. 342. 344.

46th Res. Div. 306. 312. 315. 344.

48th Res. Div. 327.

49th Res. Div. 531ff.

50th Res. Div. 532ff. 545.

51st Res. Div. 306. 315. 319. 344.

52nd Res. Div. 306. 321f. 342.

53rd Res. Div. 306. 319. 321f.

54th Res. Div. 306. 316. 319. 323.

1st Bavarian Res. Div. 169. 179ff. 186. 191. 200. 205. 326.

5th Bavarian Res. Div. 169. 179ff. 186. 190. 200.

6th Bavarian Res. Div. 5. 312. 322f. 330. 336. 340ff. 345. 349.

Guard Res. Div. 24. 119. 122. 153. 249. 357.

keyno: 260

Troop Directory.

4. Erf. Div. 24. 56. 60. 64. 119f. 228. 230ff. 238f. 241. 245f. 276f. 280. 284. 295ff. 302. 305. 309. 312. 315. 321ff. 335f. 359. 348.

8. Erf. Div. 24. 119. 122. 153. 357.

10. Erf. Div. 24. 119. 122. 153. 357.

19. Erf. Div. 24. 119. 121.

Bavarian Erf. Div. 119. 122. 154. 357.

Landw. Div. 439ff. 449. 459.

Landw. Div. 411. 449. 460.

Landw. Div. 119. 121.

Landw. Div. (Franke) 50. 93. 118. 277.

Landw. Div. Einem 532.

Landw. Div. Goltz 410. 502. 505. 508f. 516. 519f. 523. 528f.

Landw. Div. Jacobi 538f.

Landw. Div. Königsberg (Main Reserve) 410. 502f. 516. 520. 528. 536f.

Landw. Div. Bredow (Main Reserve Posen) 410f. 414. 420. 444. 450. 488.

Group Kaempffer 157f.

Guard Div. Huiter 192. 200f. 207.

Guard Div. Winkler 189f. 191f. 198ff. 206f.

Div. Ludwald 161f. 196f. 353.

Guard Cav. Div. 27. 83. 89f. 90. 113ff. 164f. 179. 185. 190. 204. 214. 216. 277. 307. 313. 340. 345.

1. Cav. Div. 24. 26. 36. 50f. 506. 510ff. 515. 524. 528f. 534. 538f. 547.

2. Cav. Div. 27. 43. 56. 86. 113f. 164. 167ff. 178f. 182. 186. 191. 199. 201ff. 206. 215. 277. 293. 344f.

3. Cav. Div. 47. 151f. 209ff. 277. 294. 307. 313. 336.

4. Cav. Div. 26. 33. 37. 40. 45. 82. 86f. 89f. 113ff. 163ff. 179. 185. 190. 199f.

5. Cav. Div. 24. 27. 307. 313. 336f. 340.

6. Cav. Div. 24. 277. 355. 489.

7. Cav. Div. 47. 151f. 209ff. 277. 294. 307. 313.

8. Cav. Div. 26. 34. 37. 39ff. 44. 82. 86. 113f. 139. 164f. 179ff. 185. 189. 204. 215. 277. 313. 336.

9. Cav. Div. 410. 420. 428. 432. 442. 444. 451. 456. 470f.

10. Cav. Div. 27. 43. 56. 86. 164f. 179f. 185. 189f. 199. 204. 277. 294. 307. 313.

Bavarian Cav. Div. 24. 50. 64. 97. 99. 113f. 209ff. 268. 277. 294. 307. 313. 336.

1. Guard Inf. Brig. 191.

2. Guard Inf. Brig. 192.

3. Guard Inf. Brig. 192.

4. Guard Inf. Brig. 191.

5. Guard Inf. Brig. 177f. 482.

6. Guard Inf. Brig. 477. 480. 482.

11. Inf. Brig. 353.

12. Inf. Brig. 353.

15. Inf. Brig. 186.

16. Inf. Brig. 26.

17. Inf. Brig. 26.

18. Inf. Brig. 48.

22. Inf. Brig. 48. 354.

28. Inf. Brig. 27.

33. Inf. Brig. 161.

34. Inf. Brig. 26. 161.

43. Inf. Brig. 446. 452ff.

46. Inf. Brig. 48.

48. Inf. Brig. 159. 219. 277.

50. Inf. Brig. 79. 84. 92. 112. 151.

52. Inf. Brig. 340.

56. Inf. Brig. 40. 44. 92.

63. Inf. Brig. 93.

68. Inf. Brig. 355.

69. Inf. Brig. 439. 442. 449. 452. 455.

70. Inf. Brig. 450. 456. 470. 474.

73. Inf. Brig. 444. 450.

74. Inf. Brig. 444. 450.

78. Inf. Brig. 48.

87. Inf. Brig. 444. 470. 486. 493.

4. Bavarian Inf. Brig. 42. 44. 64. 71. 194f. 197. 352.

Marine Inf. Brig. 222.

1. Guard Res. Inf. Brig. 460.

11. Res. Inf. Brig. 334.

12. Res. Inf. Brig. 334.

15. Res. Inf. Brig. 441. 452f.

43. Res. Inf. Brig. 26. 161.

49. Res. Inf. Brig. 48.

50. Res. Inf. Brig. 48.

69. Res. Inf. Brig. 537.

70. Res. Inf. Brig. 537. 539.

6. Landw. Brig. 410. 503. 511ff. 528f. 538.

9. Landw. Brig. 503. 520. 528. 536f.

10. Landw. Brig. 26. 33. 37. 40. 45. 82. 86.

Page: 636 keyno: 261

Troop Directory.

11. Landw. Brig. 33. 87. 209. 277f. 324f. 336. 343. 345f.

14. Landw. Brig. 153.

25. Landw. Brig. 27. 92. 278.

26. Landw. Brig. 56. 228. 231. 233. 237. 240. 243. 295.

27. Landw. Brig. 26. 278.

29. Landw. Brig. 278.

33. Landw. Brig. 528f. 532.

37. Landw. Brig. 56. 227. 231f. 234. 238f. 241ff. 295ff. 315. 319. 321. 324. 345.

38. Landw. Brig. 56. 233. 319. 322. 324. 345.

41. Landw. Brig. 56. 209. 277.

46. Landw. Brig. 46. 278.

47. Landw. Brig. 47. 278.

55. Landw. Brig. 122.

60. Landw. Brig. 119.

70. Landw. Brig. 410. 502. 507f. 516. 519. 528f.

1. Bavarian Landw. Brig. 120. 238f. 241f. 244. 295ff. 309.

2. Bavarian Landw. Brig. 120.

5. Bavarian Landw. Brig. 119.

9. Replacement Brig. 228. 231f. 241f. 295. 318.

13. Replacement Brig. 228. 295. 323.

33. Replacement Brig. 228. 295. 323. 333.

1. Reserve Replacement Brig. 56. 238f. 242. 244. 295.

2. Reserve Replacement Brig. 56. 319. 321. 335. 342.

Main Reserve Graudenz 410f.

Landst. Brig. Hoffmann 456f. 470. 492.

Landst. Brig. Rintelen 457.

Landst. Brig. Westernhagen (Fortress Thorn) 457.

1. Cavalry Brig. 502. 505. 506.

25. Cavalry Brig. 325.

41. Cavalry Brig. 534.

Gen. of Foot Artillery 3. 277.

Foot Artillery Brig. Command 1. 277.

Gen. of Engineers 4. 277.

Inf. R. 72 26.

Inf. R. 84 26.

Gren. R. 89 26.

Inf. R. 98 156.

Inf. R. 147 450. 455.

Inf. R. 153 26.

Inf. R. 155 153.

Inf. R. 165 26.

Reserve Inf. R. 26 237.

Reserve Inf. R. 35 237.

Bavarian Reserve Inf. R. 1 277.

Landw. Inf. R. 35 278.

Landw. Inf. R. 53 161.

Landw. Inf. R. 75 278.

Sailor Regiment 222.

Detachment Douai 209f. 277.

Detachment Udermann 231. 240.

Sailor Artillery Brig. 222.

Brig. Ipselkofer 119.

Donon Detachment 119.

Detachment Bodungen (Troops of the Command of the Upper Rhine Fortifications) 120. 122.

Detachment Ferling (Fortress Garrison Strasbourg) 119.

Detachment Frech (51st Combined Landw. Brig.) 120.

Detachment Wahnschaffe 209f. 214. 231. 277f. 307. 346.

Detachment Mathy (55th Landw. Brig.) 120.

Detachment Grapow 161f. 196f.

Detachment Steinmetz, later Weick 32. 36f. 40.

Main Reserve Breslau (21st Landw. Brig.) 420. 438. 444. 451. 456f. 470. 486. 488. 492.

Detachment Udermann 231. 240.

Guard Jäger Battalion 214.

Jäger Battalion 3 41.

Jäger Battalion 4 41. 336.

Jäger Battalion 5 41. 336.

Jäger Battalion 10 41. 336.

Jäger Battalion 12 277.

Bavarian Reserve Jäger Battalion 1 277.

Jäger Detachment Petersen 41.

Machine Gun Detachment 7 43.

Ul. R. 18 277.

Reserve Ul. R. 6 153.

Field Artillery R. 4 26.

Field Artillery R. 45 26.

Field Artillery R. 60 26.

Page: 637 keyno: 262

Troop Directory

Field Artillery Regiment 78 277.

Detachment Field Artillery Regiment 10 43.

Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 10 153.

Staff Foot Artillery Regiment 3 277.

I./Foot Artillery Regiment 1 278.

II./Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 4 278.

III./Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 9 278.

I./Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 9 278.

2./Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 10 278.

3./Reserve Foot Artillery Regiment 14 278.

Captured Battery (French 12 cm-Ran.) 278.

Heavy Coastal Mortar Battery Book (30.5 cm) 285.

Pioneer Regiment 18 278.

Pioneer Regiment 19 278. 314.

Pioneer Regiment 23 278.

Pioneer Regiment 30 278.

Pioneer Regiment 31 278.

Bavarian Pioneer Regiment 278.

Pioneer Battalion 22. 277.

1st Landwehr Pioneer Company VII. A. K. 278.

2nd Landwehr Pioneer Company VII. A. K. 278.

1st Landwehr Pioneer Company VIII. A. K. 278.

2nd Landwehr Pioneer Company VIII. A. K. 278.

Army Telegraph Detachment 2 277.

Army Telegraph Detachment 4 277.

Radio Command 2 277.

Radio Command 4 277.

Heavy Radio Station 6 277.

Heavy Radio Station 9 277.

Heavy Radio Station 14 277.

Heavy Radio Station 23 277.

Flying Detachment 6 277.

Flying Detachment 23 277.

Field Airship Detachment 2 277.

Field Airship Detachment 3 277.

Mobile Weather Station 1 277.

Mobile Weather Station 2 277.

Airship Z IV 508.

Airship Z IX 147.

Schütte-Lanz Airship "Liegniß" 423.

Fortresses:

Breslau (see also 21st Landwehr Brigade) 432. 458. 487ff.

Diedenhofen 123. 127.

Graudenz (see also Main Reserve) 411. 489. 502. 528. 530. 532. 534f.

Königsberg (see also Landwehr Division Königsberg) 404. 503. 505. 530.

Lötzen 503. 517. 528. 531.

Metz 17. 24. 50. 65. 102. 123. 127. 131f. 134.

Posen (see also Landwehr Division Bredow) 403. 411. 458. 488f.

Strasbourg 24f.

Thorn (see also 35th Reserve Division) 411. 416. 420. 457f. 485. 488ff. 492. 502. 507. 528.

Admiralty Staff 520.

Navy 309.

Fleet 10f. 414. 503. 505. 520f.

Mediterranean Division 554.

Large Cruiser "Goeben" 554.

Small Cruiser "Breslau" 554.

U 9 11.

Austria-Hungary.

Army Command (Army High Command)

3. 402ff. 406. 408f. 411ff. 419. 421f. 422. 424. 436. 439. 443. 446. 455. 463. 465ff. 472. 476. 484. 549ff. 555ff.

Army 2. 3. 126. 402ff. 411ff. 418ff. 422ff. 428. 433ff. 438. 454. 464. 466. 471. 474. 471f. 484. 487f. 498. 549ff. 555ff. 580.

1st Army 412. 416. 418. 424ff. 428f. 436. 438. 446f. 451. 455. 462f. 465ff. 471ff. 485ff. 491. 494ff. 498.

2nd Army 412f. 418f. 422. 435. 438. 446. 472. 491.

3rd Army 412. 416. 418. 424. 435. 438. 446. 462f. 472.

4th Army 412. 416. 418. 424. 435. 438. 462f. 472.

Page: 638 keyno: 263

Troop Directory.

I Corps 465. 475ff. 482f.

V Corps 463. 475ff. 481. 483.

X Corps 463. 472f. 475. 481.

Rad. Corps Korda 443. 465. 471. 485f.

489. 494.

5th Inf. Div. 455. 463. 475.

12th Inf. Div. 465. 475. 477ff.

14th Inf. Div. 475.

23rd Inf. Div. 475.

37th Inf. Div. 475. 481.

43rd Inf. Div. 475. 480. 483.

46th Inf. Div. 465. 475.

106th Lfst. Div. 475.

3rd Rad. Div. 443. 470. 476. 478ff. 482. 484.

7th Rad. Div. 443. 471.

11th Rad. Div. 481.

35th Lfst. Brig. 475.

Polish Legion 421.

Fortresses:

Przemysl 403. 407. 412f. 418f. 422ff.

428. 430. 433. 436. 438. 446. 468. 472.

481.

Krakow 412. 419. 431f.

France.

Minister of War 129. 139. 367.

Army Command 25. 56. 104. 125ff. 145.

245ff. 255ff. 261f. 268. 271ff. 317.

357ff. 364. 366ff. 369. 381. 398ff. 569.

Provisional Army Group North (Foch)

256ff. 264ff. 369. 371ff. 376ff. 384.

391.

1st Army 123f. 127. 131ff. 139ff. 246ff.

257. 262. 360. 366.

2nd Army 90. 123. 125. 127f. 131ff. 137.

139ff. 146. 175. 246f. 249ff. 256f. 259.

262f. 266. 359. 363f. 367. 368. 394.

3rd Army 123. 125ff. 131ff. 135f. 139. 142.

247ff. 262. 385.

4th Army 124. 133. 263. 371.

5th Army 124. 126. 134. 136f. 139f.

246f. 252. 263. 359f. 365f. 385. 388.

6th Army 124f. 127f. 131f. 134. 136f. 140.

142. 247. 249. 251f. 263. 385. 386.

9th Army 123. 131. 140. 143. 250. 256.

10th Army (Army Detachment de Castelnau)

245ff. 250ff. 256. 258ff. 262f. 265ff.

269. 358ff. 363. 368. 371. 377. 385.

Army Detachment "Belgium" 369. 372f. 376ff.

381. 387f. 390f. 395ff.

Rad. Group Conneau (1st and 2nd Cav. Corps)

259f. 359. 361. 363. 365f. 368.

I Corps 252.

II Corps 146.

III Corps 146.

IV Corps 41. 56. 90f. 131f. 134. 137f. 141.

146. 249. 251. 259. 262. 264. 266.

VI Corps 135.

VIII Corps 131ff. 135f.

IX Corps 56. 67. 91. 258. 367. 371ff. 375.

379ff. 387. 389. 391ff. 397.

X Corps 140. 146. 182. 188. 246. 250ff.

258ff. 266.

XI Corps 67. 81. 131. 140f. 146. 250. 258.

XII Corps 81.

XIII Corps 41. 90. 124. 127f. 131ff. 137.

142. 146. 249. 251.

XIV Corps 90. 131. 137f. 141. 146. 262.

XV Corps 52. 249.

XVI Corps 128. 135. 146. 249. 257. 366f.

393. 397.

XVII Corps 146.

XVIII Corps 134. 255.

XIX Corps 146.

XX Corps 90. 131. 137f. 141. 146. 249.

252. 258. 260. 262. 266. 394.

XXI Corps 188. 199. 202. 210. 246. 250ff.

253f. 258f. 262f. 314. 393.

1) Also referred to as "armée de poursuite".

Page: 639 keyno: 264

Troop Directory.

Provisional Corps Délèville (later XXXI Corps) 140. 360.

Combined Corps Humbert (later XXXII Corps) 360. 388. 390. 393f.

Provisional Corps d'Urbal (later XXXIII Corps) 188. 246. 252. 258f. 360. 372.

3rd Group Res. Div. (Paul Durand) 131.

4th Group Res. Div. (Valabrègue) 252.

Group d'Amade (Territorial Div.) 124f.

Group Brugère (Territorial Div.) 87. 131f. 137. 139. 141. 146. 182. 251ff. 258. 260. 262. 266.

Group Bidon 361. 363. 366. 368. 370ff. 379.

Cav. Corps Conneau (1.) 131f. 137. 141. 188. 246. 250ff. 256. 258ff. 262f. 267. 358. 361. 368. 383. 385f. 394f.

Cav. Corps de Mitry (2.) 246. 252. 254. 256. 259f. 262f. 267f. 358. 361. 368. 371. 376ff. 381ff. 387f. 393ff.

Cav. Corps Bridoux (later Buisson) 124f. 127. 130f. 134. 137f. 142.

8th Inf. Div. 262.

9th Inf. Div. 254. 259f. 262ff.

10th Inf. Div. 135f.

11th Inf. Div. 381. 383.

12th Inf. Div. 387.

13th Inf. Div. 257. 366. 389. 393ff.

37th Inf. Div. 41. 124.

38th Inf. Div. 388f. 395. 397.

39th Inf. Div. 262. 394f.

42nd Inf. Div. 318. 320. 365. 367. 372. 376ff. 395ff.

43rd Inf. Div. 253. 258ff. 263. 393. 397.

45th Inf. Div. 251. 253. 258.

53rd Res. Div. 252. 266.

54th Res. Div. 249. 251.

55th Res. Div. 257.

56th Res. Div. 252. 266.

57th Res. Div. 56.

69th Res. Div. 135.

70th Res. Div. 252. 255.

70th Res. Div. (Div. Fayolle) 140. 179. 246. 250ff. 258.

73rd Res. Div. 135.

75th Res. Div. 135. 142.

81st Territorial Div. 114. 141. 253.

82nd Territorial Div. 114. 141. 255.

84th Territorial Div. 114. 141. 253.

87th Territorial Div. 256. 263. 265. 361. 363. 366. 376. 383.

88th Territorial Div. 114. 141.

91st Territorial Div. 114. 141. 253. 256. 361. 363. 366. 373. 376. 388. 395ff.

92nd Territorial Div. 249. 267.

Div. Barbot 140. 246. 250ff. 259.

1st Cav. Div. 42. 137. 252.

2nd Cav. Div. 96. 131.

3rd Cav. Div. 42. 137. 252.

4th Cav. Div. 132. 137. 246. 252. 260.

5th Cav. Div. 42. 137. 141. 212. 252. 383. 396.

6th Cav. Div. 211f. 252. 260.

7th Cav. Div. 136. 212. 220. 246. 260.

8th Cav. Div. 267. 368.

9th Cav. Div. 137. 249. 253. 262. 266.

10th Cav. Div. 393.

Marine Brig. (Monarc'h) 240. 265. 267. 359. 361f. 364f. 367. 373. 377. 379. 381ff. 388.

Senegal Brig. 387.

Fortresses and Forts:

Belfort 16. 103.

Calais 279.

Dunkirk 138. 256. 279. 293. 297. 361. 364f. 369. 373.

Epinal 356.

Lille 175. 178. 184f. 206. 209ff. 213ff. 231. 255. 262. 264f. 268ff. 298. 359. 361.

Maubeuge 222. 245.

Nancy 24. 96. 104. 121. 128. 133. 357.

Reims 27. 110f.

Fort de la Pompelle 27. 51. 92. 110.

Fort de St. Thierry 111.

Page: 640 keyno: 265

Troop Directory.

Intermediate Position de Chenay 111.

Soul 16. 24. 50. 96. 100f. 104. 121. 131. 153. 356f.

Verdun 16. 19. 24f. 50. 65. 68. 82. 93f. 96. 101. 127. 153. 276. 328. 349. 355f. 400. 576.

Fort Douaumont 68.

Grand Couronné 133.

Fortifications on the Middle Meuse 24f. 121. 143f. 150.

Camp de Romains 19. 24f. 50. 64f. 68f. 95. 97f. 100f. 136. 139.

Gironville 95.

Lionville 95. 101.

Les Paroches 19. 24f. 50. 64f. 68f. 95. 97f. 100.

Troyon 19. 24f. 50. 64f. 68f. 95. 97f. 101.

Commander of the 1st Region 138.

Navy Minister 367.

Fleet 367. 371.

Belgium.

Army Command 177. 221. 229. 234. 265. 268. 270. 358ff. 364ff. 370. 373. 377f. 380ff. 384. 387. 393.

Army 18. 139. 210. 219. 221f. 225. 229f. 232ff. 238ff. 242ff. 246. 261. 263. 265. 267. 270. 280ff. 283. 289. 291. 295f. 297ff. 303. 306. 311. 313. 357ff. 371ff. 387ff. 393. 396. 400. 578.

1st Inf. Div. 267. 362. 387.

2nd Inf. Div. 239f. 242. 263. 268. 303. 364.

3rd Inf. Div. 267. 364. 373.

4th Inf. Div. 267. 364. 366. 373.

5th Inf. Div. 267. 364. 366. 373. 380.

6th Inf. Div. 267. 364. 366. 373.

Cavalry 267. 363. 368. 370. 372. 375.

3rd Inf. Brig. 387.

Volunteer Formations 265.

Fortresses:

Antwerp 56f. 60. 64. 68. 120. 139. 177. 184f. 219f. 221ff. 254f. 257. 261. 265ff. 267f. 270f. 276f. 280f. 291. 295. 299. 306. 309. 314. 355.

Fort Breendonk 242.

Fort Broechem 237. 240.

Fort Kessel 218. 237.

Fort Koningshoyckt 185. 233.

Fort Lierre 185. 233. 237.

Fort St. Marie 231.

Fort Waelhem 185. 230. 232f. 237f. 257.

Fort Wavre Ste. Catherine 230. 232f.

Intermediate Position Boschbeek 232.

Intermediate Position Dorpvelde 232.

Intermediate Position Letterheide 242.

Intermediate Position Massenhoven 240.

Intermediate Position Tallaert 233.

Liège 245. 322.

Namur 221. 245.

England.

War Ministry 267. 395.

High Command 126. 132. 140. 245ff. 254ff. 261. 264. 267ff. 317. 358. 374. 376f. 379. 383. 385. 389. 397f. 400.

Expeditionary Corps 11. 124. 130. 134. 136. 140. 147. 198. 246ff. 254f. 257. 260ff. 264ff. 269. 280. 287ff. 357. 357f. 359f. 362f. 365ff. 371ff. 385. 385f. 389ff. 399.

I Corps 255. 264. 269. 288f. 360. 366f. 372. 374f. 377ff. 381. 383. 385f. 389ff.

II Corps 248. 255. 261. 264. 266ff. 288f. 357f. 360f. 363. 365. 367. 370. 376f. 381. 383. 385. 394.

III Corps 255. 264. 269.

IV Corps (Rawlinson) 267. 269. 362. 365f. 367. 370. 372. 374f. 377. 383. 385f. 389ff. 399.

Page: 641 keyno: 266

Troop Directory.

1st Cav. Corps Allenby 267f. 361. 363. 365. 368. 370f. 374. 376f. 385f. 390. 394f.

1st Inf. Div. 381. 383.

2nd Inf. Div. 381. 383. 390.

3rd Inf. Div. 287. 292.

4th Inf. Div. 289.

5th Inf. Div. 287. 292.

6th Inf. Div. 236. 240. 246. 248. 254f. 261. 264f. 267. 289. 390f. 394f.

7th Inf. Div. 246. 248. 287. 298. 386. 396f.

8th Inf. Div. 289.

1st Cav. Div. 255. 289.

2nd Cav. Div. 248. 255. 261. 264. 289.

3rd Cav. Div. 235f. 240. 246. 254. 264f. 267. 289. 360f. 363. 368. 371f. 374. 386.

19th Inf. Brig. 248. 374.

Marine Brig. 235f. 239f. 242. 244. 263. 359.

Yeomanry Troops 396.

Territorial Troops 386. 396f.

Indian Corps 246ff. 374. 386.

Indian Labor Div. 367. 374. 376f. 381. 383.

Admiralty 369.

Fleet 290. 302. 305. 309. 312. 315. 318. 322f. 333. 364f. 367. 369. 371. 373. 375. 378. 384. 388. 521.

Armored Cruiser Aboukir, Hogue, Cressy 11.

Russia.

Army Command 129. 375f. 429. 431ff. 444. 457f. 461. 491. 494ff. 499f. 521ff. 525f. 542. 544ff. 582.

Army 125. 129. 412. 416. 429. 457. 498f. 549. 551. 553. 580ff.

Army Group of the Northwest Front 431ff. 457. 491. 495ff. 521ff. 525. 542ff.

Army Group of the Southwest Front 430ff. 434. 457ff. 461. 495ff. 542.

Old 1st Army 1) 402f. 433. 458. 503. 517. 522f. 540. 542f. 545f.

New 1st Army 482f. 496f.

2nd Army 402. 431f. 437. 443. 444f. 445f. 458ff. 491ff. 497. 521ff. 525. 542.

3rd Army 412. 430. 446.

4th Army 412. 425. 432. 435. 445f. 458ff. 492ff. 497.

5th Army 412. 425. 430. 445f. 458f. 461. 491. 493ff. 497.

7th Army 412.

8th Army 412. 430. 446.

9th Army 412. 416. 425. 425f. 430. 433ff. 445f. 458. 492ff. 497.

10th Army 431. 433. 458. 492. 496. 503. 517. 522ff. 542ff. 551.

Siege Army 446.

Warsaw Division (Narew Group) 431. 458. 491. 494. 523. 542. 545.

Guard Corps 423. 425f. 435. 446. 484. 496.

Grenadier Corps 432. 435. 445f. 449. 459f. 482. 495f.

I Corps 434f. 446. 456. 460. 486f. 493f. 522.

II Corps 444. 446. 459ff. 487. 494. 503. 522. 530f. 542.

III Corps 503. 522. 530. 536. 543. 546f.

IV Corps 446. 487. 503. 522. 530f. 542.

V Corps 495f.

VI Corps 487. 492. 522f. 528. 535. 542f.

IX Corps 475.

X Corps 475.

XI Corps 475.

1) Also referred to as "Army Rennentampf".  
World War. Vol. V.

Page: 642 keyno: 267

Troop Directory.

XIII Corps 431. 503.

XIV Corps 423. 425. 453f. 446. 484. 496.

XV Corps 431. 503.

XVI Corps 432. 435. 446. 459f. 495f.

XVII Corps 446. 452. 461. 465. 469. 478.

493. 495f.

XVIII Corps 423. 435. 446. 517.

XIX Corps 496.

XX Corps 423. 530.

XXI Corps 475.

XXII Corps 503. 522ff. 530. 533. 544. 546.

XXIII Corps 445f. 446. 459ff. 487. 492.

494. 522.

XXV Corps 484. 496.

XXVI (Reserve) Corps 522. 524. 530.

543f. 546.

XXVII (Reserve) Corps 446. 460. 494.

523.

I Caucasian Corps 431. 503. 522ff. 529f.

544ff.

II Caucasian Corps 432. 439f. 442. 445f.

452. 459ff. 469. 479. 493. 495f. 503.

I Turkestan Corps 492. 522f. 530. 532. 535.

543ff.

I Siberian Corps 444. 446. 456. 460. 493f.

II Siberian Corps 432. 444. 446. 456. 459f.

487. 492. 494. 522. 542.

III Siberian Corps 503. 519. 522ff. 529f.

532. 544ff.

IV Siberian Corps 446.

V Siberian Corps 487.

Cavalry Corps Gurko 546f.

Cavalry Corps Nowikow 423. 425f. 430. 433.

491f.

64th Infantry Division 431.

7th Infantry Division 496.

21st Infantry Division 460.

26th Infantry Division 486.

39th Infantry Division 538.

38th Infantry Division 426.

50th Infantry Division 487. 492. 494.

53rd Infantry (Res.) Division 503. 543. 546.

54th Infantry (Res.) Division 431. 503.

56th Infantry (Res.) Division 503. 536ff. 543.

57th Infantry (Res.) Division 503.

60th Infantry (Res.) Division 503.

61st Infantry (Res.) Division 493. 496.

64th Infantry (Res.) Division 431.

68th Infantry (Res.) Division 503. 543.

70th Infantry (Res.) Division 481.

72nd Infantry (Res.) Division 431. 503.

73rd Infantry (Res.) Division 503.

75th Infantry (Res.) Division (Main Ref. Compulsory)

428. 430. 434. 446. 460f. 469. 479.

493.

76th Infantry (Res.) Division 503.

79th Infantry (Res.) Division (Main Ref. Compulsory Assigned) 487. 492. 494.

80th Infantry (Res.) Division 426. 428. 434.

81st Infantry (Res.) Division 503.

82nd Infantry (Res.) Division 446.

1st Siberian Rifle Division 444.

4th Siberian Rifle Division 444.

5th Siberian Rifle Division 450.

6th Siberian Rifle Division 487.

11th Siberian Rifle Division 431. 532. 543.

13th Siberian (Res.) Rifle Division 492ff.

1st Guards Cavalry Division 503. 543.

2nd Guards Cavalry Division 503. 543.

1st Cavalry Division 503. 523f.

2nd Cavalry Division 503. 522. 543.

3rd Cavalry Division 503. 522. 543.

4th Cavalry Division 519. 523. 525. 535. 544.

5th Cavalry Division 424. 427. 433. 492.

6th Cavalry Division 528.

7th Cavalry Division 424. 433. 492.

8th Cavalry Division 424. 433.

13th Cavalry Division 496.

14th Cavalry Division 424. 433. 492.

15th Cavalry Division 528.

Caucasian Cavalry Division 424. 428. 432. 434.

1st Don Cossack Division 496.

4th Don Cossack Division 424. 433.

5th Don Cossack Division 424. 433.

Ural Cossack Division 432. 434. 459ff. 495f.

Guards Rifle Brigade 425ff. 434. 496.

1st Rifle Brigade 492.

2nd Rifle Brigade 425ff. 434. 496.

5th Rifle Brigade 503. 536f. 543.

2nd Turkestan Rifle Brigade 431.

Independent Guards Cavalry Brigade 427. 434.

1st Independent Cavalry Brigade 543. 547.

4th Independent Cavalry Brigade 431f.

Page: 643 keyno: 268

Troop Directory.

Transbaikal Cossack Brigade 495f.

Ussuri Cossack Brigade 424. 433.

Siberian Rifle Regiment 444.

Fortresses:

Grodno 501. 504ff. 522.

Ivangorod 422. 431ff. 435f. 438ff.

445f. 448f. 453ff. 458ff. 462. 465ff.

475ff. 484ff. 492ff. 497ff.

Fort Wannowski 447.

Novogeorgievsk 431. 438. 445ff. 458.

492. 522f.

Osowiec 404. 501f. 503ff. 508. 522f. 532.

Warsaw 413f. 421. 424. 431f. 437ff.

442ff. 448. 450f. 456. 458. 460ff.

472. 477. 482. 484ff. 491ff. 498ff.

504ff. 523. 549.

Fleet 562.

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